the nature of critical thinking an outline of critical thinking dispositions and abilities

The Nature of Critical Thinking : An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilitiesi Robert H. Ennis ( [email protected] ) Emeritus Professor, University of Illinois Last Revised, May, 2011 Critical thinking is reasonable and reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do. This definition I believe captures the core of the way the term is used in the critical thinking movement. In deciding what to believe or do, one is helped by the employment of a set of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that I shall outline. These can serve as a set of comprehensive goals for a critical thinking curriculum and its assessment. Usefulness in curriculum decisions, teaching, and assessment, not elegance or mutual exclusiveness, is the purpose of this outline. For the sake of brevity, clarification in the form of examples, qualifications, and more detail, including more criteria, are omitted, but can be found in sources listed below, but most fully in my Critical Thinking (1996a). This outline is the encapsulation of many years of work in the elaboration of the simple definition of critical thinking given above, and it distinguishes between critical thinking dispositions and abilities. It is only a critical thinking content outline. It does not specify grade level, curriculum sequence, emphasis, teaching approach, or type of subject-matter content involved (standard subject-matter content, general knowledge content, streetwise-knowledge content, special knowledge content, etc.). For assessment purposes it can only provide a basis for developing a table of specifications and the preparation of assessment rubrics.

Critical Thinking Dispositions

Ideal critical thinkers are disposed to

1. Care that their beliefs be trueii, and that their decisions be justified; that is, care to "get it right" to the extent possible; including to a. Seek alternative hypotheses, explanations , conclusions, plans, sources, etc.; and be open to them b. Consider seriously other points of view than their own c. Try to be well informed d. Endorse a position to the extent that, but only to the extent that, it is justified by the information that is available e. Use their critical thinking abilities

2. Care to understand and present a position honestly and clearly, theirs as well as others'; including to a. Discover and listen to others' view and reasons b. Be clear about the intended meaning of what is said, written, or otherwise communicated, seeking as much precision as the situation requires c. Determine, and maintain focus on, the conclusion or question d. Seek and offer reasons e. Take into account the total situation f. Be reflectively aware of their own basic beliefs

1 3. Care about every person. (This one is an auxiliary, not constitutive, disposition. Although this concern for people is not constitutive, critical thinking can be dangerous without it.) Caring critical thinkers a. Avoid intimidating or confusing others with their critical thinking prowess, taking into account others' feelings and level of understanding b. Are concerned about others' welfare

Critical Thinking Abilities

The following abilities numbered 1 to 3 involve basic clarification; 4 and 5, the bases for a decision; 6 to 8, inference ; 9 and 10, advanced clarification; and 11 and 12, supposition and integration. Abilities13 to 15 are auxiliary abilities, not constitutive of critical thinking, but very helpful.

Ideal critical thinkers have the ability to: i. Is this what you are (Basic Clarification, 1 to 3) saying:______? 1. Focus on a question: j. Would you say more about that? a. Identify or formulate a question b. Identify or formulate criteria for (Two Bases for a Decision: 4 and 5) judging possible answers 4. Judge the credibility of a source. c. Keep the question and situation Major criteria (but not necessary in mind conditions): a. Expertise 2. Analyze arguments : b. Lack of conflict of interest a. Identify conclusions c. Agreement with other sources b. Identify reasons or premises d. Reputation c. Ascribe or identify simple e. Use of established procedures assumptions (see also ability 10) f. Known risk to reputation (the c. Identify and handle irrelevance source’s knowing of a risk to d. See the structure of an argument reputation, if wrong) e. Summarize g. Ability to give reasons h. Careful habits 3. Ask and answer clarification and/or challenge questions, such 5. Observe, and judge observation as: reports. Major criteria (but not a. Why? necessary conditions, except for the b. What is your main point? first): c. What do you mean by·? a. Minimal inferring involved d. What would be an example? b. Short time interval between e. What would not be an example observation and report (though close to being one)? c. Report by the observer, rather f. How does that apply to this case than someone else (that is, the (describe a case, which appears report is not hearsay) to be a counterexample)? d. Provision of records g. What difference does it make? e. Corroboration h. What are the facts ? f. Possibility of corroboration g. Good access

2 h. Competent employment of (d) Historical claims that certain technology, if technology applies things happened (including i. Satisfaction by observer (and criminal accusations) reporter, if a different person) of (e) Reported definitions the credibility criteria in Ability (f) Claims that some proposition # 4 above is an unstated, but used, reason (Note: A third basis is your own established (2) Characteristic investigative conclusions.) activities (a) Designing experiments, (Inference, 6 to 8) including planning to control 6. Deduce, and judge deduction: variables a. Class logic (b) Seeking evidence and b. Conditional logic counterevidence, including c. Interpretation of logical statistical significance terminology, including (c) Seeking other possible (1) Negation and double negation explanations (2) Necessary and sufficient (3) Criteria, the first four being condition language essential, the fifth being desirable (3) Such words as "only", "if and (a) The proposed conclusion only if", "or", "some", "unless", would explain or help explain the and "not both" evidence d. Qualified deductive reasoning (b) The proposed conclusion is (a loosening for practical consistent with all known facts purposes) (c) Competitive alternative

explanations are inconsistent 7. Make material inferences with facts (roughly “induction”): (d) A competent sincere effort a. To generalizations. Broad has been made to find supporting considerations: and opposing data, and (1) Typicality of data, including alternative hypotheses valid sampling where appropriate (e) The proposed conclusion (2) Volume of instances seems plausible and simple, (3) Conformity of instances to fitting into the broader picture generalization

(4) Having a principled way of 8. Make and judge value judgments dealing with outliers Important factors: b. To explanatory hypotheses a. Background facts (IBE: “inference-to-best- b. Consequences of accepting or explanation ”): rejecting the judgment (1) Major types of explanatory c. Prima facie application of conclusions and hypotheses: acceptable principles (a) Specific and general causal d. Alternatives claims e. Balancing, weighing, deciding (b) Claims about the beliefs and

attitudes of people (Advanced Clarification, 9 and 10) (c) Interpretation of authors’ 9. Define terms and judge definitions, intended meanings using appropriate criteria

3 Three basic dimensions are form, (called “assumptions of the argument” function (act), and content. A fourth, by Hitchcock (1985)) more advanced dimension is (3) Used assumptions (judged by handling equivocation. hypothesis -testing criteria, Ennis 1982), a. Definition form. For criteria for 1 called “assumptions of the arguer” by through 4 and 6, see Ennis (1996, Ch 12 Hitchcock (1985) & 13). For #5 see Ennis (1964, 1969c). (1) Synonym (Supposition and Integration, 11 and 12) (2) Classification 11. Consider and reason from premises, (3) Range reasons, assumptions, positions, (4) Equivalent-expression and other propositions with (5) Operational which they disagree or about (6) Example and non-example which they are in doubt, without b. Definitional functions (acts) letting the disagreement or doubt (1) Report a meaning (criteria: the interfere with their thinking five for an explanatory hypothesis) ("suppositional thinking") (2) Stipulate a meaning (criteria: convenience, consistency, avoidance of 12. Integrate the dispositions and other impact equivocation) abilities in making and defending a (3) Express a position on an issue decision (positional definitions, including "programmatic" and (Auxiliary abilities, 13 to 15) "persuasive" definitions) 13. Proceed in an orderly manner Criteria: those for a position appropriate to the situation: (Ennis 2001) a. Follow problem solving steps c. Content of the definition b. Monitor their own thinking (that is, d. Identifying and handling engage in metacognition ) equivocation (Ennis 1996) c. Employ a reasonable critical thinking checklist 10. Attribute unstated assumptions (an ability that belongs under both basic 14. Be sensitive to the feelings, level of clarification (2b) and inference (7b1f) knowledge, and degree of a. Pejorative flavor (dubiousness or sophistication of others falsity): commonly but not always associated to some degree with the 15. Employ appropriate rhetorical different types. Criteria: See #8 above. strategies in discussion and b. Types: presentation (oral and written), (1) Presuppositions (required for a including employing and reacting proposition to make sense) to " fallacy " labels in an (2) Needed assumptions (needed by appropriate manner. Examples of the reasoning to be at its strongest, but fallacy labels are "circularity," not logically necessary (Ennis 1982)), "bandwagon," "post hoc," "equivocation," "non sequitur," and "straw person”

4 Summary and Comments

In brief, the ideal critical thinker is disposed to try to "get it right," to present a position honestly and clearly, and to care about others (this last being auxiliary, not constitutive); furthermore the ideal critical thinker has the ability to clarify, to seek and judge well the basis for a view, to infer wisely from the basis, to imaginatively suppose and integrate, and to do these things with dispatch, sensitivity, and rhetorical skill.

In presenting this outline of critical thinking dispositions and abilities, I have only attempted to depict, rather than defend, them. The defense would require much more space than is available, but would follow two general paths: 1) examining the traditions of good thinking in existing successful disciplines of inquiry , and 2) seeing how we go wrong when we attempt to decide what to believe or do.

In any teaching situation for which critical thinking is a goal, whether it be a separate critical thinking course or module, or one in which the critical thinking content is infused in (making critical thinking principles explicit) or immersed in (not making critical thinking principles explicit) standard subject-matter content, or some mixture of these; all of the dispositions, as well as the suppositional and integrational abilities (# 11 and #12) and auxiliary abilities (#13 through #15) are applicable all the time and should permeate the instruction to the extent that time and student ability permit.

I have only attempted to outline a usable and defensible set of critical thinking goals, including criteria for making judgments. Space limitations have precluded exemplifying their application to curriculum, teaching, and assessment, though I have done so elsewhere.iii However, goals are the place to start. I hope that this outline provides a useful basis on which to build curriculum, teaching, and assessment procedures.

Sources of exemplification, elaboration, and more criteria.

The meaning, significance, and application of some of the above aspects might not be apparent to some, who might find the following items, most of which contain helpful examples, to be of help. Furthermore criteria for definition are not provided in the above outline of the nature of critical thinking because they are too complex for a brief listing. Elaboration of these criteria and this conception by me are listed in “ References ” (below): in process, 2011, 2007, 2006, 2004, 2002, 2001, 1998, 1996a, 1996b, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1987a, 1987b, 1982b, 1982a, 1981a, 1981b, 1981c, 1980, 1979, 1974a, 1974b, 1973, 1969a, 1969b, 1969c, 1968, 1964a, 1964b, 1962, 1961, and 1958. Of these, 1996a, 1991c, 1987a are the best choices for a combination of currency (though there have been minor changes since then), comprehensiveness, and exemplification.

References.

Ennis, Robert H. (in process). Making and defending singular causal claims.

Ennis, Robert H. (2011). Critical Thinking: Reflection And Perspective—Part I. Inquiry, Vol. 26, 1.

5 Ennis, Robert H. (2007). 'Probable' and its equivalents. In Hans V. Hansen & Robert C. Pinto (Eds.), Reason reclaimed: Essays in honor of J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson. Newport News, VA: Vale Press. Pp. 243-256.

Ennis, Robert H. (2006). 'Probably'. In David Hitchcock & Bart Verheij (Eds.), Arguing on the Toulmin model. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer. Pp. 145-164.

Ennis, Robert H. (2004). Applying soundness standards to qualified reasoning. Informal Logic , 24, 1, 23-39.

Ennis, Robert H. (2002). Goals for a critical thinking curriculum and its assessment. In Arthur L. Costa (Ed.), Developing minds (3rd Edition). Alexandria, VA: ASCD. Pp. 44-46.

Ennis, Robert H. (2001). Argument appraisal strategy: A comprehensive approach. Informal Logic, 21.2 (2), 97-140.

Ennis, Robert H. (1998). Is critical thinking culturally biased? Teaching Philosophy , 21, 1 (March), 15-33.

Ennis, Robert H. (1996a) Critical thinking. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Ennis, Robert H. (1996b). Critical thinking dispositions: Their nature and assessability. Informal Logic, 18, 2 & 3, 165-182 .

Ennis, Robert H. (1991a). The State of Illinois goals and sample learning objectives for scientific thinking and methods: Strengths, weaknesses and suggestions. Spectrum, 17 (1), 10-16.

Ennis, Robert H. (1991b). An elaboration of a cardinal goal of science instruction: Scientific thinking. Educational Philosophy and Theory , 23 (1), 31-45.

Ennis, Robert H. (1991c). Critical thinking: A streamlined conception. Teaching Philosophy, 14 (1), 5-25.

Ennis, Robert H. (1987a). A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In J. Baron & R. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching thinking skills: Theory and practice. New York: W.H. Freeman. Pp. 9-26.

Ennis, Robert H. (1987b). A conception of critical thinking – with some curriculum suggestions. APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy, Summer. Pp.1-5.

Ennis, Robert H. (1982a). Mackie's singular causality and linked overdetermination. In Asquith, Peter D. & Nickles, Thomas (Eds.), PSA 1982. East Lansing MI: Philosophy of Science Association. Pp. 55-64.

Ennis, Robert H. (1982b). Identifying implicit assumptions. Synthese , 51, 61-86.

6 Ennis, Robert H. (1981a). A conception of deductive logic competence. Teaching Philosophy, 4, 337-385.

Ennis, Robert H. (1981b) Rational thinking and educational practice. In J. Soltis, (Ed.), Philosophy of Education , 1981 (Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I). Chicago, IL: The National Society for the Study of Education. Pp. 143-183.

Ennis, Robert H. (1981c). Eight fallacies in Bloom's taxonomy. In C.J.B. Macmillan (Ed.), Philosophy of education 1980. Bloomington, IL: Philosophy of Education Society. Pp. 269-273.

Ennis, Robert H. (1980). Presidential address: A conception of rational thinking. In Jerrold Coombs (Ed.), Philosophy of education 1979. Bloomington, IL: Philosophy of Education Society. Pp. 1- 30. Ennis, Robert H. (1979). Research in philosophy of science and science education . In P. Asquith & H. Kyburg (Eds.), Current research in philosophy of science. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association. Pp. 138-170.

Ennis, Robert H. (1974a). The believability of people. Educational Forum, 38, 347-354.

Ennis, Robert H. (1974b). Definition in science teaching. Instructional Science, 3, 285-298.

Ennis, Robert H. (1973). On causality. Educational Researcher, 2 (6), 4-11.

Ennis, Robert H. (1969a). Logic in teaching. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Ennis, Robert H. (1969b). Ordinary logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Ennis, Robert H. (1969c). Operationism can and should be divorced from covering law assumptions (a reprint of “Operational Definitions (1964a). In L.I. Krimerman (Ed.), (1969), The nature and scope of social science: A critical anthology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, pp. 431-444. Pp. 431-444.

Ennis, Robert H. (1968). Enumerative induction and best explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 65, 523-530.

Ennis, Robert H. (1964a). Operational definitions. American Educational Research Journal, 1, 183- 201.

Ennis, Robert H. (1964b). A definition of critical thinking. The Reading Teacher, 17 (8), 599-612.

Ennis, Robert H. (1962). A concept of critical thinking. Harvard Educational Review, 32, 81-111. Reprinted in B. Paul Komisar and C.J.B. Macmillan (Eds.), (1967), Psychological concepts in education. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, pp. 114-148.

Ennis, Robert H. (1961). Assumption-finding. In B.O. Smith & R.H. Ennis (Eds.), Language and concepts in education. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company . Pp. 161-178. Reprinted as (1971)

7 La identificacion de supestos, in B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis (Eds.), Lenguaje y conceptos en la educacion, Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, pp. 177-194.

Ennis, Robert H. (1959). The development of a critical thinking test. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois. University Microfilms #59-00505.

i This is a several-times-revised version of a presentation at the Sixth International Conference on Thinking at MIT, Cambridge, MA, July, 1994. Last revised May, 2011. ii With respect to epistemological constructivism (the view that truth is constructed): In expressing a concern about true belief , this conception of critical thinking accepts the view that our concepts and vocabulary are constructed by us, but also that (to oversimplify somewhat) the relationships among the referents of our concepts and terms are not constructed by us. We can have true or false beliefs about these. With respect to pedagogical constructivism (the view that students learn best when they construct their own answers to problems and questions): For some (but not all) goals and types of learning, this view has empirical support, but it should not be confused with epistemological constructivism. In particular, the validity of pedagogical constructivism (to the extent that it is valid) does not imply the validity of epistemological constructivism. They are totally different ideas. iii My complete list of publications is to be found in the publications sections of my academic web site, http://faculty.ed.uiuc.edu/rhennis

Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability

Robert H. Ennis

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The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities i

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Associated data.

This research did not involve collection of original data, and hence there are no new data to make available.

A review of the research shows that critical thinking is a more inclusive construct than intelligence, going beyond what general cognitive ability can account for. For instance, critical thinking can more completely account for many everyday outcomes, such as how thinkers reject false conspiracy theories, paranormal and pseudoscientific claims, psychological misconceptions, and other unsubstantiated claims. Deficiencies in the components of critical thinking (in specific reasoning skills, dispositions, and relevant knowledge) contribute to unsubstantiated belief endorsement in ways that go beyond what standardized intelligence tests test. Specifically, people who endorse unsubstantiated claims less tend to show better critical thinking skills, possess more relevant knowledge, and are more disposed to think critically. They tend to be more scientifically skeptical and possess a more rational–analytic cognitive style, while those who accept unsubstantiated claims more tend to be more cynical and adopt a more intuitive–experiential cognitive style. These findings suggest that for a fuller understanding of unsubstantiated beliefs, researchers and instructors should also assess specific reasoning skills, relevant knowledge, and dispositions which go beyond what intelligence tests test.

1. Introduction

Why do some people believe implausible claims, such as the QAnon conspiracy theory, that a cabal of liberals is kidnapping and trafficking many thousands of children each year, despite the lack of any credible supporting evidence? Are believers less intelligent than non-believers? Do they lack knowledge of such matters? Are they more gullible or less skeptical than non-believers? Or, more generally, are they failing to think critically?

Understanding the factors contributing to acceptance of unsubstantiated claims is important, not only to the development of theories of intelligence and critical thinking but also because many unsubstantiated beliefs are false, and some are even dangerous. Endorsing them can have a negative impact on an individual and society at large. For example, false beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic, such as believing that 5G cell towers induced the spread of the COVID-19 virus, led some British citizens to set fire to 5G towers ( Jolley and Paterson 2020 ). Other believers in COVID-19 conspiracy theories endangered their own and their children’s lives when they refused to socially distance and be vaccinated with highly effective vaccines, despite the admonitions of scientific experts ( Bierwiaczonek et al. 2020 ). Further endangering the population at large, those who believe the false conspiracy theory that human-caused global warming is a hoax likely fail to respond adaptively to this serious global threat ( van der Linden 2015 ). Parents, who uncritically accept pseudoscientific claims, such as the false belief that facilitated communication is an effective treatment for childhood autism, may forego more effective treatments ( Lilienfeld 2007 ). Moreover, people in various parts of the world still persecute other people whom they believe are witches possessing supernatural powers. Likewise, many people still believe in demonic possession, which has been associated with mental disorders ( Nie and Olson 2016 ). Compounding the problems created by these various unsubstantiated beliefs, numerous studies now show that when someone accepts one of these types of unfounded claims, they tend to accept others as well; see Bensley et al. ( 2022 ) for a review.

Studying the factors that contribute to unfounded beliefs is important not only because of their real-world consequences but also because this can facilitate a better understanding of unfounded beliefs and how they are related to critical thinking and intelligence. This article focuses on important ways in which critical thinking and intelligence differ, especially in terms of how a comprehensive model of CT differs from the view of intelligence as general cognitive ability. I argue that this model of CT more fully accounts for how people can accurately decide if a claim is unsubstantiated than can views of intelligence, emphasizing general cognitive ability. In addition to general cognitive ability, thinking critically about unsubstantiated claims involves deployment of specific reasoning skills, dispositions related to CT, and specific knowledge, which go beyond the contribution of general cognitive ability.

Accordingly, this article begins with an examination of the constructs of critical thinking and intelligence. Then, it discusses theories proposing that to understand thinking in the real world requires going beyond general cognitive ability. Specifically, the focus is on factors related to critical thinking, such as specific reasoning skills, dispositions, metacognition, and relevant knowledge. I review research showing that that this alternative multidimensional view of CT can better account for individual differences in the tendency to endorse multiple types of unsubstantiated claims than can general cognitive ability alone.

2. Defining Critical Thinking and Intelligence

Critical thinking is an almost universally valued educational objective in the US and in many other countries which seek to improve it. In contrast, intelligence, although much valued, has often been viewed as a more stable characteristic and less amenable to improvement through specific short-term interventions, such as traditional instruction or more recently through practice on computer-implemented training programs. According to Wechsler’s influential definition, intelligence is a person’s “aggregate or global capacity to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment” ( Wechsler 1944, p. 3 ).

Consistent with this definition, intelligence has long been associated with general cognitive or intellectual ability and the potential to learn and reason well. Intelligence (IQ) tests measure general cognitive abilities, such as knowledge of words, memory skills, analogical reasoning, speed of processing, and the ability to solve verbal and spatial problems. General intelligence or “g” is a composite of these abilities statistically derived from various cognitive subtests on IQ tests which are positively intercorrelated. There is considerable overlap between g and the concept of fluid intelligence (Gf) in the prominent Cattell–Horn–Carroll model ( McGrew 2009 ), which refers to “the ability to solve novel problems, the solution of which does not depend on previously acquired skills and knowledge,” and crystalized intelligence (Gc), which refers to experience, existing skills, and general knowledge ( Conway and Kovacs 2018, pp. 50–51 ). Although g or general intelligence is based on a higher order factor, inclusive of fluid and crystallized intelligence, it is technically not the same as general cognitive ability, a commonly used, related term. However, in this article, I use “general cognitive ability” and “cognitive ability” because they are the imprecise terms frequently used in the research reviewed.

Although IQ scores have been found to predict performance in basic real-world domains, such as academic performance and job success ( Gottfredson 2004 ), an enduring question for intelligence researchers has been whether g and intelligence tests predict the ability to adapt well in other real-world situations, which concerns the second part of Wechsler’s definition. So, in addition to the search for the underlying structure of intelligence, researchers have been perennially concerned with how general abilities associated with intelligence can be applied to help a person adapt to real-world situations. The issue is largely a question of how cognitive ability and intelligence can help people solve real-world problems and cope adaptively and succeed in dealing with various environmental demands ( Sternberg 2019 ).

Based on broad conceptual definitions of intelligence and critical thinking, both intelligence and CT should aid adaptive functioning in the real world, presumably because they both involve rational approaches. Their common association with rationality gives each term a positive connotation. However, complicating the definition of each of these is the fact that rationality also continues to have a variety of meanings. In this article, in agreement with Stanovich et al. ( 2018 ), rationality is defined in the normative sense, used in cognitive science, as the distance between a person’s response and some normative standard of optimal behavior. As such, degree of rationality falls on a continuous scale, not a categorical one.

Despite disagreements surrounding the conceptual definitions of intelligence, critical thinking, and rationality, a commonality in these terms is they are value-laden and normative. In the case of intelligence, people are judged based on norms from standardized intelligence tests, especially in academic settings. Although scores on CT tests seldom are, nor could be, used to judge individuals in this way, the normative and value-laden basis of CT is apparent in people’s informal judgements. They often judge others who have made poor decisions to be irrational or to have failed to think critically.

This value-laden aspect of CT is also apparent in formal definitions of CT. Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) defined critical thinking as “the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that increase the probability of a desirable outcome. It is used to describe thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal-directed.” The positive conception of CT as helping a person adapt well to one’s environment is clearly implied in “desirable outcome”.

Robert Ennis ( 1987 ) has offered a simpler, yet useful definition of critical thinking that also has normative implications. According to Ennis, “critical thinking is reasonable, reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” ( Ennis 1987, p. 102 ). This definition implies that CT helps people know what to believe (a goal of epistemic rationality) and how to act (a goal of instrumental rationality). This is conveyed by associating “critical thinking” with the positive terms, “reasonable” and “reflective”. Dictionaries commonly define “reasonable” as “rational”, “logical”, “intelligent”, and “good”, all terms with positive connotations.

For critical thinkers, being reasonable involves using logical rules, standards of evidence, and other criteria that must be met for a product of thinking to be considered good. Critical thinkers use these to evaluate how strongly reasons or evidence supports one claim versus another, drawing conclusions which are supported by the highest quality evidence ( Bensley 2018 ). If no high-quality evidence is available for consideration, it would be unreasonable to draw a strong conclusion. Unfortunately, people’s beliefs are too often based on acceptance of unsubstantiated claims. This is a failure of CT, but is it also a failure of intelligence?

3. Does Critical Thinking “Go Beyond” What Is Meant by Intelligence?

Despite the conceptual overlap in intelligence and CT at a general level, one way that CT can be distinguished from the common view of intelligence as general cognitive ability is in terms of what each can account for. Although intelligence tests, especially measures of general cognitive ability, have reliably predicted academic and job performance, they may not be sufficient to predict other everyday outcomes for which CT measures have made successful predictions and have added to the variance accounted for in performance. For instance, replicating a study by Butler ( 2012 ), Butler et al. ( 2017 ) obtained a negative correlation ( r = −0.33) between scores on the Halpern Critical Thinking Appraisal (HCTA) and a measure of 134 negative, real-world outcomes, not expected to befall critical thinkers, such as engaging in unprotected sex or posting a message on social media which the person regretted. They found that higher HCTA scores not only predicted better life decisions, but also predicted better performance beyond a measure of general cognitive ability. These results suggest that CT can account for real-world outcomes and goes beyond general cognitive ability to account for additional variance.

Some theorists maintain that standardized intelligence tests do not capture the variety of abilities that people need to adapt well in the real world. For example, Gardner ( 1999 ), has proposed that additional forms of intelligence are needed, such as spatial, musical, and interpersonal intelligences in addition to linguistic and logical–mathematical intelligences, more typically associated with general cognitive ability and academic success. In other theorizing, Sternberg ( 1988 ) has proposed three additional types of intelligence: analytical, practical, and creative intelligence, to more fully capture the variety of intelligent abilities on which people differ. Critical thinking is considered part of analytical skills which involve evaluating the quality and applicability of ideas, products, and options ( Sternberg 2022 ). Regarding adaptive intelligence, Sternberg ( 2019 ) has emphasized how adaptive aspects of intelligence are needed to solve real-world problems both at the individual and species levels. According to Sternberg, core components of intelligence have evolved in humans, but intelligence takes different forms in different cultures, with each culture valuing its own skills for adaptation. Thus, the construct of intelligence must go beyond core cognitive ability to encompass the specific abilities needed for adaptive behavior in specific cultures and settings.

Two other theories propose that other components be added to intelligent and rational thinking. Ackerman ( 2022 ) has emphasized the importance of acquiring domain-specific knowledge for engaging in intelligent functioning in the wide variety of tasks found in everyday life. Ackerman has argued that declarative, procedural, and tacit knowledge, as well as non-ability variables, are needed to better predict job performance and performance of other everyday activities. Taking another approach, Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) have proposed that critical thinking is essentially the adaptive application of intelligence for solving real-world problems. Elsewhere, Butler and Halpern ( 2019 ) have argued that dispositions such as open-mindedness are another aspect of CT and that domain-specific knowledge and specific CT skills are needed to solve real-world problems.

Examples are readily available for how CT goes beyond what IQ tests test to include specific rules for reasoning and relevant knowledge needed to execute real-world tasks. Take the example of scientific reasoning, which can be viewed as a specialized form of CT. Drawing a well-reasoned inductive conclusion about a theory or analyzing the quality of a research study both require that a thinker possess relevant specialized knowledge related to the question and specific reasoning skills for reasoning about scientific methodology. In contrast, IQ tests are deliberately designed to be nonspecialized in assessing Gc, broadly sampling vocabulary and general knowledge in order to be fair and unbiased ( Stanovich 2009 ). Specialized knowledge and reasoning skills are also needed in non-academic domains. Jurors must possess specialized knowledge to understand expert, forensic testimony and specific reasoning skills to interpret the law and make well-reasoned judgments about a defendant’s guilt or innocence.

Besides lacking specific reasoning skills and domain-relevant knowledge, people may fail to think critically because they are not disposed to use their reasoning skills to examine such claims and want to preserve their favored beliefs. Critical thinking dispositions are attitudes or traits that make it more likely that a person will think critically. Theorists have proposed numerous CT dispositions (e.g., Bensley 2018 ; Butler and Halpern 2019 ; Dwyer 2017 ; Ennis 1987 ). Some commonly identified CT dispositions especially relevant to this discussion are open-mindedness, skepticism, intellectual engagement, and the tendency to take a reflective, rational–analytic approach. Critical thinking dispositions are clearly value-laden and prescriptive. A good thinker should be open-minded, skeptical, reflective, intellectually engaged, and value a rational–analytic approach to inquiry. Conversely, corresponding negative dispositions, such as “close-mindedness” and “gullibility”, could obstruct CT.

Without the appropriate disposition, individuals will not use their reasoning skills to think critically about questions. For example, the brilliant mystery writer, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who was trained as a physician and created the hyper-reasonable detective Sherlock Holmes, was not disposed to think critically about some unsubstantiated claims. Conan Doyle was no doubt highly intelligent in cognitive ability terms, but he was not sufficiently skeptical (disposed to think critically) about spiritualism. He believed that he was talking to his dearly departed son though a medium, despite the warnings of his magician friend, Harry Houdini, who told him that mediums used trickery in their seances. Perhaps influenced by his Irish father’s belief in the “wee folk”, Conan Doyle also believed that fairies inhabited the English countryside, based on children’s photos, despite the advice of experts who said the photos could be faked. Nevertheless, he was skeptical of a new theory of tuberculosis proposed by Koch when he reported on it, despite his wife suffering from the disease. So, in professional capacities, Conan Doyle used his CT skills, but in certain other domains for which he was motivated to accept unsubstantiated claims, he failed to think critically, insufficiently disposed to skeptically challenge certain implausible claims.

This example makes two important points. Conan Doyle’s superior intelligence was not enough for him to reject implausible claims about the world. In general, motivated reasoning can lead people, even those considered highly intelligent, to accept claims with no good evidentiary support. The second important point is that we would not be able to adequately explain cases like this one, considering only the person’s intelligence or even their reasoning skills, without also considering the person’s disposition. General cognitive ability alone is not sufficient, and CT dispositions should also be considered.

Supporting this conclusion, Stanovich and West ( 1997 ) examined the influence of dispositions beyond the contribution of cognitive ability on a CT task. They gave college students an argument evaluation test in which participants first rated their agreement with several claims about real social and political issues made by a fictitious person. Then, they gave them evidence against each claim and finally asked them to rate the quality of a counterargument made by the same fictitious person. Participants’ ratings of the counterarguments were compared to the median ratings of expert judges on the quality of the rebuttals. Stanovich and West also administered a new measure of rational disposition called the Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) scale and the SAT as a proxy for cognitive ability. The AOT was a composite of items from several other scales that would be expected to measure CT disposition. They found that both SAT and AOT scores were significant predictors of higher argument analysis scores. Even after partialing out cognitive ability, actively open-minded thinking was significant. These results suggest that general cognitive ability alone was not sufficient to account for thinking critically about real-world issues and that CT disposition was needed to go beyond it.

Further examining the roles of CT dispositions and cognitive ability on reasoning, Stanovich and West ( 2008 ) studied myside bias, a bias in reasoning closely related to one-sided thinking and confirmation bias. A critical thinker would be expected to not show myside bias and instead fairly evaluate evidence on all sides of a question. Stanovich and West ( 2007 ) found that college students often showed myside bias when asked their opinions about real-world policy issues, such as those concerning the health risks of smoking and drinking alcohol. For example, compared to non-smokers, smokers judged the health risks of smoking to be lower. When they divided participants into higher versus lower cognitive ability groups based on SAT scores, the two groups showed little difference on myside bias. Moreover, on the hazards of drinking issue, participants who drank less had higher scores on the CT disposition measure.

Other research supports the need for both reasoning ability and CT disposition in predicting outcomes in the real world. Ren et al. ( 2020 ) found that CT disposition, as measured by a Chinese critical thinking disposition inventory, and a CT skill measure together contributed a significant amount of the variance in predicting academic performance beyond the contribution of cognitive ability alone, as measured by a test of fluid intelligence. Further supporting the claim that CT requires both cognitive ability and CT disposition, Ku and Ho ( 2010 ) found that a CT disposition measure significantly predicted scores on a CT test beyond the significant contribution of verbal intelligence in high school and college students from Hong Kong.

The contribution of dispositions to thinking is related to another way that CT goes beyond the application of general cognitive ability, i.e., by way of the motivation for reasoning. Assuming that all reasoning is motivated ( Kunda 1990 ), then CT is motivated, too, which is implicit within the Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) and Ennis ( 1987 ) definitions. Critical thinking is motivated in the sense of being purposeful and directed towards the goal of arriving at an accurate conclusion. For instance, corresponding to pursuit of the goal of accurate reasoning, the CT disposition of “truth-seeking” guides a person towards reaching the CT goal of arriving at an accurate conclusion.

Also, according to Kunda ( 1990 ), a second type of motivated reasoning can lead to faulty conclusions, often by directing a person towards the goal of maintaining favored beliefs and preconceptions, as in illusory correlation, belief perseverance, and confirmation bias. Corresponding to this second type, negative dispositions, such as close-mindedness and self-serving motives, can incline thinkers towards faulty conclusions. This is especially relevant in the present discussion because poorer reasoning, thinking errors, and the inappropriate use of heuristics are related to the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, all of which are CT failures. The term “thinking errors” is a generic term referring to logical fallacies, informal reasoning fallacies, argumentation errors, and inappropriate uses of cognitive heuristics ( Bensley 2018 ). Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts, commonly used to simplify judgment tasks and reduce mental effort. Yet, when used inappropriately, heuristics often result in biased judgments.

Stanovich ( 2009 ) has argued that IQ tests do not test people’s use of heuristics, but heuristics have been found to be negatively correlated with CT performance ( West et al. 2008 ). In this same study, they found that college students’ cognitive ability, as measured by performance on the SAT, was not correlated with thinking biases associated with use of heuristics. Although Stanovich and West ( 2008 ) found that susceptibility to biases, such as the conjunction fallacy, framing effect, base-rate neglect, affect bias, and myside bias were all uncorrelated with cognitive ability (using SAT as a proxy), other types of thinking errors were correlated with SAT.

Likewise, two types of knowledge are related to the two forms of motivated reasoning. For instance, inaccurate knowledge, such as misconceptions, can derail reasoning from moving towards a correct conclusion, as in when a person reasons from false premises. In contrast, reasoning from accurate knowledge is more likely to produce an accurate conclusion. Taking into account inaccurate knowledge and thinking errors is important to understanding the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims because these are also related to negative dispositions, such as close-mindedness and cynicism, none of which are measured by intelligence tests.

Critical thinking questions are often situated in real-world examples or in simulations of them which are designed to detect thinking errors and bias. As described in Halpern and Butler ( 2018 ), an item like one on the “Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment” (HCTA) provides respondents with a mock newspaper story about research showing that first-graders who attended preschool were better able to learn how to read. Then the question asks if preschool should be made mandatory. A correct response to this item requires recognizing that correlation does not imply causation, that is, avoiding a common reasoning error people make in thinking about research implications in everyday life. Another CT skills test, “Analyzing Psychological Statements” (APS) assesses the ability to recognize thinking errors and apply argumentation skills and psychology to evaluate psychology-related examples and simulations of real-life situations ( Bensley 2021 ). For instance, besides identifying thinking errors in brief samples of thinking, questions ask respondents to distinguish arguments from non-arguments, find assumptions in arguments, evaluate kinds of evidence, and draw a conclusion from a brief psychological argument. An important implication of the studies just reviewed is that efforts to understand CT can be further informed by assessing thinking errors and biases, which, as the next discussion shows, are related to individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive style.

4. Dual-Process Theory Measures and Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Dual-process theory (DPT) and measures associated with it have been widely used in the study of the endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs, especially as they relate to cognitive style. According to a cognitive style version of DPT, people have two modes of processing, a fast intuitive–experiential (I-E) style of processing and a slower, reflective, rational–analytic (R-A) style of processing. The intuitive cognitive style is associated with reliance on hunches, feelings, personal experience, and cognitive heuristics which simplify processing, while the R-A cognitive style is a reflective, rational–analytic style associated with more elaborate and effortful processing ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Epstein 2008 ). As such, the rational–analytic cognitive style is consistent with CT dispositions, such as those promoting the effortful analysis of evidence, objective truth, and logical consistency. In fact, CT is sometimes referred to as “critical-analytic” thinking ( Byrnes and Dunbar 2014 ) and has been associated with analytical intelligence Sternberg ( 1988 ) and with rational thinking, as discussed before.

People use both modes of processing, but they show individual differences in which mode they tend to rely upon, although the intuitive–experiential mode is the default ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Morgan 2016 ; Pacini and Epstein 1999 ), and they accept unsubstantiated claims differentially based on their predominate cognitive style ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Epstein 2008 ). Specifically, individuals who rely more on an I-E cognitive style tend to endorse unsubstantiated claims more strongly, while individuals who rely more on a R-A cognitive style tend to endorse those claims less. Note, however, that other theorists view the two processes and cognitive styles somewhat differently, (e.g., Kahneman 2011 ; Stanovich et al. 2018 ).

Researchers have often assessed the contribution of these two cognitive styles to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, using variants of three measures: the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) of Frederick ( 2005 ), the Rational–Experiential Inventory of Epstein and his colleagues ( Pacini and Epstein 1999 ), and the related Need for Cognition scale of Cacioppo and Petty ( 1982 ). The CRT is a performance-based test which asks participants to solve problems that appear to require simple mathematical calculations, but which actually require more reflection. People typically do poorly on the CRT, which is thought to indicate reliance on an intuitive cognitive style, while better performance is thought to indicate reliance on the slower, more deliberate, and reflective cognitive style. The positive correlation of the CRT with numeracy scores suggests it also has a cognitive skill component ( Patel et al. 2019 ). The Rational–Experiential Inventory (REI) of Pacini and Epstein ( 1999 ) contains one scale designed to measure an intuitive–experiential cognitive style and a second scale intended to measure a rational–analytic (R-A) style. The R-A scale was adapted from the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale of Cacioppo and Petty ( 1982 ), another scale associated with rational–analytic thinking and expected to be negatively correlated with unsubstantiated beliefs. The NFC was found to be related to open-mindedness and intellectual engagement, two CT dispositions ( Cacioppo et al. 1996 ).

The cognitive styles associated with DPT also relate to CT dispositions. Thinking critically requires that individuals be disposed to use their reasoning skills to reject unsubstantiated claims ( Bensley 2018 ) and that they be inclined to take a rational–analytic approach rather than relying on their intuitions and feelings. For instance, Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) found that students who endorsed more psychological misconceptions adopted a more intuitive cognitive style, were less disposed to take a rational–scientific approach to psychology, and scored lower on a psychological critical thinking skills test. Further supporting this connection, West et al. ( 2008 ) found that participants who tended to use cognitive heuristics more, thought to be related to intuitive processing and bias, scored lower on a critical thinking measure. As the Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) results suggest, in addition to assessing reasoning skills and dispositions, comprehensive CT assessment research should assess knowledge and unsubstantiated beliefs because these are related to failures of critical thinking.

5. Assessing Critical Thinking and Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Assessing endorsement of unsubstantiated claims provides another way to assess CT outcomes related to everyday thinking, which goes beyond what intelligence tests test ( Bensley and Lilienfeld 2020 ). From the perspective of the multi-dimensional model of CT, endorsement of unsubstantiated claims could result from deficiencies in a person’s CT reasoning skills, a lack of relevant knowledge, and in the engagement of inappropriate dispositions. Suppose an individual endorses an unsubstantiated claim, such as believing the conspiracy theory that human-caused global warming is a hoax. The person may lack the specific reasoning skills needed to critically evaluate the conspiracy. Lantian et al. ( 2020 ) found that scores on a CT skills test were negatively correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs. The person also must possess relevant scientific knowledge, such as knowing the facts that each year humans pump about 40 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas which traps heat in the atmosphere. Or, the person may not be scientifically skeptical or too cynical or mistrustful of scientists or governmental officials.

Although endorsing unsubstantiated beliefs is clearly a failure of CT, problems arise in deciding which ones are unsubstantiated, especially when considering conspiracy theories. Typically, the claims which critical thinkers should reject as unsubstantiated are those which are not supported by objective evidence. But of the many conspiracies proposed, few are vigorously examined. Moreover, some conspiracy theories which authorities might initially deny turn out to be real, such as the MK-Ultra theory that the CIA was secretly conducting mind-control research on American citizens.

A way out of this quagmire is to define unsubstantiated beliefs on a continuum which depends on the quality of evidence. This has led to the definition of unsubstantiated claims as assertions which have not been supported by high-quality evidence ( Bensley 2023 ). Those which are supported have the kind of evidentiary support that critical thinkers are expected to value in drawing reasonable conclusions. Instead of insisting that a claim must be demonstrably false to be rejected, we adopt a more tentative acceptance or rejection of claims, based on how much good evidence supports them. Many claims are unsubstantiated because they have not yet been carefully examined and so totally lack support or they may be supported only by low quality evidence such as personal experience, anecdotes, or non-scientific authority. Other claims are more clearly unsubstantiated because they contradict the findings of high-quality research. A critical thinker should be highly skeptical of these.

Psychological misconceptions are one type of claim that can be more clearly unsubstantiated. Psychological misconceptions are commonsense psychological claims (folk theories) about the mind, brain, and behavior that are contradicted by the bulk of high-quality scientific research. Author developed the Test of Psychological Knowledge and Misconceptions (TOPKAM), a 40-item, forced-choice measure with each item posing a statement of a psychological misconception and the other response option stating the evidence-based alternative ( Bensley et al. 2014 ). They found that higher scores on the APS, the argument analysis test applying psychological concepts to analyze real-world examples, were associated with more correct answers on the TOPKAM. Other studies have found positive correlations between CT skills tests and other measures of psychological misconceptions ( McCutcheon et al. 1992 ; Kowalski and Taylor 2004 ). Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) also found that higher correct TOPKAM scores were positively correlated with scores on the Inventory of Thinking Dispositions in Psychology (ITDP) of Bensley ( 2021 ), a measure of the disposition to take a rational and scientific approach to psychology but were negatively correlated with an intuitive cognitive style.

Bensley et al. ( 2021 ) conducted a multidimensional study, assessing beginner psychology students starting a CT course on their endorsement of psychological misconceptions, recognition of thinking errors, CT dispositions, and metacognition, before and after CT instruction. Two classes received explicit instruction involving considerable practice in argument analysis and scientific reasoning skills, with one class receiving CT instruction focused more on recognizing psychological misconceptions and a second class focused more on recognizing various thinking errors. Bensley et al. assessed both classes before and after instruction on the TOPKAM and on the Test of Thinking Errors, a test of the ability to recognize in real-world examples 17 different types of thinking errors, such as confirmation bias, inappropriate use of the availability and representativeness heuristics, reasoning from ignorance/possibility, gambler’s fallacy, and hasty generalization ( Bensley et al. 2021 ). Correct TOPKAM and TOTE scores were positively correlated, and after CT instruction both were positively correlated with the APS, the CT test of argument analysis skills.

Bensley et al. found that after explicit instruction of CT skills, students improved significantly on both the TOPKAM and TOTE, but those focusing on recognizing misconceptions improved the most. Also, those students who improved the most on the TOTE scored higher on the REI rational–analytic scale and on the ITDP, while those improving the most on the TOTE scored higher on the ITDP. The students receiving explicit CT skill instruction in recognizing misconceptions also significantly improved the accuracy of their metacognitive monitoring in estimating their TOPKAM scores after instruction.

Given that before instruction neither class differed in GPA nor on the SAT, a proxy for general cognitive ability, CT instruction provided a good accounting for the improvement in recognition of thinking errors and misconceptions without recourse to intelligence. However, SAT scores were positively correlated with both TOTE scores and APS scores, suggesting that cognitive ability contributed to CT skill performance. These results replicated the earlier findings of Bensley and Spero ( 2014 ) showing that explicit CT instruction improved performance on both CT skills tests and metacognitive monitoring accuracy while controlling for SAT, which was positively correlated with the CT skills test performance.

Taken together, these findings suggest that cognitive ability contributes to performance on CT tasks but that CT instruction goes beyond it to further improve performance. As the results of Bensley et al. ( 2021 ) show, and as discussed next, thinking errors and bias from heuristics are CT failures that should also be assessed because they are related to endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs and cognitive style.

6. Dual-Processing Theory and Research on Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Consistent with DPT, numerous other studies have obtained significant positive correlations between intuitive cognitive style and paranormal belief, often using the REI intuitive–experiential scale and the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) of Tobacyk ( 2004 ) (e.g., Genovese 2005 ; Irwin and Young 2002 ; Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Pennycook et al. 2015 ; Rogers et al. 2018 ; Saher and Lindeman 2005 ). Studies have also found positive correlations between superstitious belief and intuitive cognitive style (e.g., Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Maqsood et al. 2018 ). REI intuitive–experiential thinking style was also positively correlated with belief in complementary and alternative medicine ( Lindeman 2011 ), conspiracy theory belief ( Alper et al. 2020 ), and with endorsement of psychological misconceptions ( Bensley et al. 2014 ; Bensley et al. 2022 ).

Additional evidence for DPT has been found when REI R-A and NFC scores were negatively correlated with scores on measures of unsubstantiated beliefs, but studies correlating them with measures of paranormal belief and conspiracy theory belief have shown mixed results. Supporting a relationship, REI rational–analytic and NFC scores significantly and negatively predicted paranormal belief ( Lobato et al. 2014 ; Pennycook et al. 2012 ). Other studies have also obtained a negative correlation between NFC and paranormal belief ( Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Rogers et al. 2018 ; Stahl and van Prooijen 2018 ), but both Genovese ( 2005 ) and Pennycook et al. ( 2015 ) found that NFC was not significantly correlated with paranormal belief. Swami et al. ( 2014 ) found that although REI R-A scores were negatively correlated with conspiracy theory belief, NFC scores were not.

Researchers often refer to people who are doubtful of paranormal and other unfounded claims as “skeptics” and so have tested whether measures related to skepticism are associated with less endorsement of unsubstantiated claims. They typically view skepticism as a stance towards unsubstantiated claims taken by rational people who reject them, (e.g., Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Stahl and van Prooijen 2018 ), rather than as a disposition inclining a person to think critically about unsubstantiated beliefs ( Bensley 2018 ).

Fasce and Pico ( 2019 ) conducted one of the few studies using a measure related to skeptical disposition, the Critical Thinking Disposition Scale (CTDS) of Sosu ( 2013 ), in relation to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims. They found that scores on the CTDS were negatively correlated with scores on the RPBS but not significantly correlated with either a measure of pseudoscience or of conspiracy theory belief. However, the CRT was negatively correlated with both RPBS and the pseudoscience measure. Because Fasce and Pico ( 2019 ) did not examine correlations with the Reflective Skepticism subscale of the CTDS, its contribution apart from full-scale CTDS was not found.

To more directly test skepticism as a disposition, we recently assessed college students on how well three new measures predicted endorsement of psychological misconceptions, paranormal claims, and conspiracy theories ( Bensley et al. 2022 ). The dispositional measures included a measure of general skeptical attitude; a second measure, the Scientific Skepticism Scale (SSS), which focused more on waiting to accept claims until high-quality scientific evidence supported them; and a third measure, the Cynicism Scale (CS), which focused on doubting the sincerity of the motives of scientists and people in general. We found that although the general skepticism scale did not predict any of the unsubstantiated belief measures, SSS scores were a significant negative predictor of both paranormal belief and conspiracy theory belief. REI R-A scores were a less consistent negative predictor, while REI I-E scores were more consistent positive predictors, and surprisingly CS scores were the most consistent positive predictors of the unsubstantiated beliefs.

Researchers commonly assume that people who accept implausible, unsubstantiated claims are gullible or not sufficiently skeptical. For instance, van Prooijen ( 2019 ) has argued that conspiracy theory believers are more gullible (less skeptical) than non-believers and tend to accept unsubstantiated claims more than less gullible people. van Prooijen ( 2019 ) reviewed several studies supporting the claim that people who are more gullible tend to endorse conspiracy theories more. However, he did not report any studies in which a gullible disposition was directly measured.

Recently, we directly tested the gullibility hypothesis in relation to scientific skepticism ( Bensley et al. 2023 ) using the Gullibility Scale of Teunisse et al. ( 2019 ) on which people skeptical of the paranormal had been shown to have lower scores. We found that Gullibility Scale and the Cynicism Scale scores were positively correlated, and both were significant positive predictors of unsubstantiated beliefs, in general, consistent with an intuitive–experiential cognitive style. In contrast, we found that scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, the Scientific Skepticism Scale, and the REI rational–analytic scale were all positively intercorrelated and significant negative predictors of unsubstantiated beliefs, in general, consistent with a rational–analytic/reflective cognitive style. Scientific skepticism scores negatively predicted general endorsement of unsubstantiated claims beyond the REI R-A scale, but neither the CTDS nor the CTDS Reflective Skepticism subscale were significant. These results replicated findings from the Bensley et al. ( 2023 ) study and supported an elaborated dual-process model of unsubstantiated belief. The SSS was not only a substantial negative predictor, it was also negatively correlated with the Gullibility Scale, as expected.

These results suggest that both CT-related dispositions and CT skills are related to endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs. However, a measure of general cognitive ability or intelligence must be examined along with measures of CT and unsubstantiated beliefs to determine if CT goes beyond intelligence to predict unsubstantiated beliefs. In one of the few studies that also included a measure of cognitive ability, Stahl and van Prooijen ( 2018 ) found that dispositional characteristics helped account for acceptance of conspiracies and paranormal belief beyond cognitive ability. Using the Importance of Rationality Scale (IRS), a rational–analytic scale designed to measure skepticism towards unsubstantiated beliefs, Stahl and van Prooijen ( 2018 ) found that the IRS was negatively correlated with paranormal belief and belief in conspiracy theories. In separate hierarchical regressions, cognitive ability was the strongest negative predictor of both paranormal belief and of conspiracy belief, but IRS scores in combination with cognitive ability negatively predicted endorsement of paranormal belief but did not significantly predict conspiracy theory belief. These results provided partial support that that a measure of rational–analytic cognitive style related to skeptical disposition added to the variance accounted for beyond cognitive ability in negatively predicting unsubstantiated belief.

In another study that included a measure of cognitive ability, Cavojova et al. ( 2019 ) examined how CT-related dispositions and the Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS) were related to a measure of paranormal, pseudoscientific, and conspiracy theory beliefs. The SRS of Drummond and Fischhoff ( 2017 ) likely measures CT skill in that it measures the ability to evaluate scientific research and evidence. As expected, the unsubstantiated belief measure was negatively correlated with the SRS and a cognitive ability measure, similar to Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Unsubstantiated beliefs were positively correlated with dogmatism (the opposite of open-mindedness) but not with REI rational–analytic cognitive style. The SRS was a significant negative predictor of both unsubstantiated belief and susceptibility to bias beyond the contribution of cognitive ability, but neither dogmatism nor analytic thinking were significant predictors. Nevertheless, this study provides some support that a measure related to CT reasoning skill accounts for variance in unsubstantiated belief beyond cognitive ability.

The failure of this study to show a correlation between rational–analytic cognitive style and unsubstantiated beliefs, when some other studies have found significant correlations with it and related measures, has implications for the multidimensional assessment of unsubstantiated beliefs. One implication is that the REI rational–analytic scale may not be a strong predictor of unsubstantiated beliefs. In fact, we have recently found that the Scientific Skepticism Scale was a stronger negative predictor ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Bensley et al. 2023 ), which also suggests that other measures related to rational–analytic thinking styles should be examined. This could help triangulate the contribution of self-report cognitive style measures to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, recognizing that the use of self-report measures has a checkered history in psychological research. A second implication is that once again, measures of critical thinking skill and cognitive ability were negative predictors of unsubstantiated belief and so they, too, should be included in future assessments of unsubstantiated beliefs.

7. Discussion

This review provided different lines of evidence supporting the claim that CT goes beyond cognitive ability in accounting for certain real-world outcomes. Participants who think critically reported fewer problems in everyday functioning, not expected to befall critical thinkers. People who endorsed unsubstantiated claims less showed better CT skills, more accurate domain-specific knowledge, less susceptibility to thinking errors and bias, and were more disposed to think critically. More specifically, they tended to be more scientifically skeptical and adopt a more rational–analytic cognitive style. In contrast, those who endorsed them more tended to be more cynical and adopt an intuitive–experiential cognitive style. These characteristics go beyond what standardized intelligence tests test. In some studies, the CT measures accounted for additional variance beyond the variance contributed by general cognitive ability.

That is not to say that measures of general cognitive ability are not useful. As noted by Gottfredson ( 2004 ), “g” is a highly successful predictor of academic and job performance. More is known about g and Gf than about many other psychological constructs. On average, g is closely related to Gf, which is highly correlated with working memory ( r = 0.70) and can be as high as r = 0.77 ( r 2 = 0.60) based on a correlated two-factor model ( Gignac 2014 ). Because modern working memory theory is, itself, a powerful theory ( Chai et al. 2018 ), this lends construct validity to the fluid intelligence construct. Although cognitive scientists have clearly made progress in understanding the executive processes underlying intelligence, they have not yet identified the specific cognitive components of intelligence ( Sternberg 2022 ). Moreover, theorists have acknowledged that intelligence must also include components beyond g, including domain-specific knowledge ( Ackerman 2022 ; Conway and Kovacs 2018 ) which are not yet clearly understood,

This review also pointed to limitations in the research that should be addressed. So far, not only have few studies of unsubstantiated beliefs included measures of intelligence, but they have also often used proxies for intelligence test scores, such as SAT scores. Future studies, besides using more and better measures of intelligence, could benefit from inclusion of more specifically focused measures, such as measures of Gf and Gc. Also, more research should be carried out to develop additional high-quality measures of CT, including ones that assess specific reasoning skills and knowledge relevant to thinking about a subject, which could help resolve perennial questions about the domain-general versus domain-specific nature of intelligence and CT. Overall, the results of this review encourage taking a multidimensional approach to investigating the complex constructs of intelligence, CT, and unsubstantiated belief. Supporting these recommendations were results of studies in which the improvement accrued from explicit CT skill instruction could be more fully understood when CT skills, relevant knowledge, CT dispositions, metacognitive monitoring accuracy, and a proxy for intelligence were used.

8. Conclusions

Critical thinking, broadly conceived, offers ways to understand real-world outcomes of thinking beyond what general cognitive ability can provide and intelligence tests test. A multi-dimensional view of CT which includes specific reasoning and metacognitive skills, CT dispositions, and relevant knowledge can add to our understanding of why some people endorse unsubstantiated claims more than others do, going beyond what intelligence tests test. Although general cognitive ability and domain-general knowledge often contribute to performance on CT tasks, thinking critically about real-world questions also involves applying rules, criteria, and knowledge which are specific to the question under consideration, as well as the appropriate dispositions and cognitive styles for deploying these.

Despite the advantages of taking this multidimensional approach to CT in helping us to more fully understand everyday thinking and irrationality, it presents challenges for researchers and instructors. It implies the need to assess and instruct multidimensionally, including not only measures of reasoning skills but also addressing thinking errors and biases, dispositions, the knowledge relevant to a task, and the accuracy of metacognitive judgments. As noted by Dwyer ( 2023 ), adopting a more complex conceptualization of CT beyond just skills is needed, but it presents challenges for those seeking to improve students’ CT. Nevertheless, the research reviewed suggests that taking this multidimensional approach to CT can enhance our understanding of the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims beyond what standardized intelligence tests contribute. More research is needed to resolve remaining controversies and to develop evidence-based applications of the findings.

Funding Statement

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

This research involved no new testing of participants and hence did not require Institutional Review Board approval.

Informed Consent Statement

This research involved no new testing of participants and hence did not require an Informed Consent Statement.

Data Availability Statement

Conflicts of interest.

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Intelligence

What are the key dispositions of good critical thinkers, a collective intelligence analysis of critical thinking dispositions..

Posted January 18, 2016

As human beings, we make thousands of decisions every day. Every time we go to the shop to buy bread we must decide whether we would prefer white bread, brown bread, small or large loaf, barrel or sliced, etc. The same goes for the ‘simple’ task of ordering a coffee. For example, if you enter Starbucks, it’s been estimated that there are over 19,000 possible beverages available to you (Vohs et al., 2014). Indeed, we are immersed in increasingly complex and differentiated environments -- decisions are ever-present and surround us as we make our way in the world.

Of course, some decisions are more important than others. Perhaps ordering coffee at Starbucks and selecting bread at the shop are not seen as incredibly important by many people and, naturally, we often depend on prior choices or habitual responses to guide our choices in these situations. But what about decisions we care about, decisions that we recognise as important and that require some deliberation? Repeating habitual responses or ‘going with our gut’ in those situations will not suffice – we must pause for reflection and think critically – we must think about our decisions in these situations. Although it is not always clear what is needed to support good critical thinking, scholars have suggested that there may be a number of core personal dispositions that support good critical thinking. But what are these critical thinking dispositions?

Critical thinking (CT) is commonly defined as a metacognitive process, consisting of a number of cognitive skills (e.g. analysis, evaluation and inference) and a variety of personal dispositions (e.g. open-mindedness, inquisitiveness and scepticism), that, when used appropriately, increases the chances of producing a logical solution to a problem or a valid conclusion to an argument (Dwyer, 2011; Dwyer, Hogan & Stewart, 2012; 2014). However, most definitions of critical thinking (CT), and most interventions designed to increase CT, are grounded in academic or expert definitions of CT skills; and there has been very little emphasis on CT dispositions in the research conducted to date. Furthermore, students and educators are rarely, if ever, asked to describe their perspectives on what constitutes CT or key CT dispositions. As such, critical thinking dispositions have not yet been clearly conceptualised in research literature; and what little is agreed upon when it comes to such disposition is generally derived from the opinions of academics.

So what do students and educators describe as the key dispositions of good critical thinkers? We recently conducted research to address this question, as part of our ongoing efforts to develop and validate a new Critical Thinking Dispositions Scale . Using a collective intelligence methodology, Interactive Management , we examined the way students and educators conceptualise CT dispositions.

Interactive Management (IM) is a computer-assisted process that allows a group to build a structural model describing relations among elements in a system. In the current study, these elements were CT dispositions, and the relations of interest were the ways in which these dispositions support one another in a positive system of influence. Interactive Management is a five-step systems thinking methodology that is used to aid groups in developing outcomes that integrate contributions from individuals with diverse views, backgrounds and perspectives, via: (1) generating and clarifying ideas; (2) voting, ranking and selecting elements for structuring; (3) structuring elements by answering a series of questions in the form: “Does CT disposition A facilitate CT disposition B?’’; (4) evaluating a graphical representation of group logic; and (5) interpreting and evaluating discourse and reasoning to further understand the nature of the collective intelligence. In our study on critical thinking dispositions, three groups comprising a total of thirty-one students and ten educators took part in the collective intelligence workshops. Across these three workshops, a total of 32 CT dispositions were identified and organised into 13 categories (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Key Dispositions of Good Critical Thinkers

An analysis of the systems thinking of participants revealed that key CT dispositions including inquisitiveness , open-mindedness and self-efficacy had the strongest positive, supporting influence on other CT dispositions in the set; whereas, reflection and resourcefulness were seen as highly dependent on other dispositions (i.e., supported positively by other dispositions in the set). Drawing upon the logic of these systems structures, and ordering the full set of critical thinking dispositions by reference to their relative influence in the system, revealed the following ordered set:

Inquisitiveness : An inclination to be curious; desire to fully understand something, discover the answer to a problem and accept that the full answer may not yet be known; a desire to understand a task and its associated requirements, available options and limits.
Open-Mindedness : An inclination to be cognitively flexible, open to divergent or conflicting views; detaching from one’s own beliefs to consider diverse points of view without bias or self-interest; to be open to feedback, accepting positive feedback, criticism or constructive feedback with thoughtful consideration; an openness to amending existing knowledge in light of new ideas and experiences; and a willingness to explore new, alternative or ‘unusual’ ideas.
Self-efficacy : The tendency to be confident and trust in one’s own reasoned judgments; acknowledging one’s sense of self while considering problems and arguments (i.e. situating reasoned judgements within one’s own life experiences, knowledge, biases, culture and environment); to believe in one’s ability to receive and internalize feedback positively and constructively; to be self-efficacious in leading others in the rational resolution of problems; and belief that good reasoning is the key to living a rational life and to a creating a more just world.
Attentiveness : Willingness to focus and concentrate; to be aware of surroundings, context, consequences and potential obstacles; to have the ‘full picture’.
Intrinsic Goal Orientation : Inclined to be enthusiastic towards a goal, task, topic of focus and, if not the topic itself, enthusiasm for the process of learning new things; to search for answers as a result of internal motivation , rather than an external, extrinsic reward system.
Perseverance : To be resilient and to be motivated to persist at working through complex tasks and the associated frustration and difficulty inherent in such tasks, without giving up; motivation to get the job done correctly; a desire to progress.
Organization : An inclination to be orderly, systematic and diligent with information, resources and time when determining and maintaining focus on a task, problem or question, whilst simultaneously considering the total situation and being able to present the resulting information in a holistic, organized fashion, for purposes of achieving specified goals.
Truth-Seeking : A desire for knowledge and truth; to seek and offer both reasons and objections in an effort to inform and to be well-informed; a willingness to challenge popular beliefs and social norms by asking questions (of oneself and others); to be honest and objective about pursuing the truth even if the findings do not support one’s self-interest or pre-conceived beliefs or opinions; and willingness to change one’s mind about an idea as a result of the desire for truth.
Creativity : A tendency to visualize and generate ideas; and to ‘think outside the box’ (i.e. think differently than usual)
Skepticism: An inclination to challenge ideas and question conclusions in light of the evidence presented; to withhold judgment prior to engaging with the evidence; to take a position and be able to change position when the evidence and reasons are sufficient; and to look at findings from various perspectives.
Reflection : An inclination to reflect on one’s behavior, attitudes, opinions, and motivations; to distinguish what is known and what is not; to approach decision-making with an awareness of limited knowledge or uncertainty, recognition that some problems are ill-structured, some situations permit more than one plausible conclusion or solution, and judgments must often be made based on analysis, evaluation, standards, contexts and evidence that preclude certainty.
Resourcefulness : The willingness to utilize existing resources to resolve problems; search for additional resources in order to resolve problems; to switch between solution processes and knowledge to seek new ways/information to solve a problem; to make the best of the resources available; to adapt and/or improve if something goes wrong; and to think about how and why something went wrong.

Another way to understand this logic of supporting influence, or the relation between critical thinking dispositions, is by reference to the total influence map in figure 2, where dispositions to the left are collectively seen to influence disposition to the right. This figure represents a meta-analysis of the systems thinking across the three workshops, and highlights dispositions that influence or support other dispositions in the system.

Figure 2. Influence Map Describing Supporting Relations between CT Dispositions

Interestingly, one CT disposition, clarity , although highlighted as important during the idea generation stage (i.e., Step 1 above), did not receive a sufficient number of votes when it came to selecting ideas for structuring (i.e., Step 3 above). However, we believe it is important to highlight the significance of clarity , which was defined by our participants as the inclination to seek intelligibility, transparency, lucidity and precision, from oneself and others, and to be clear with respect to the intended meaning of what is communicated .

We appreciate that more work needs to be done to further understand the dynamics of critical thinking dispositions in action. We are currently working to develop critical thinking educational programmes that support the cultivation of key CT skills and dispositions. The understanding obtained through our collective intelligence research has also informed the development or a new Critical Thinking Dispositions Scale , which we are currently working to validate. We believe a new Critical Thinking Dispositions Scale is needed to empower students and educators who wish to reflect upon their critical thinking dispositions and negotiate new learning experiences that promote the development of CT skill and dispositions in academic settings. If you would like to contribute to our scale development work, we would be delighted if you could take our survey.

Link to Sona version of survey for NUI, Galway Students :

A direct link to survey is available upon request to [email protected]

Chris Dwyer ( LinkedIn , ResearchGate ), Michael Hogan ( Web ), Owen Harney ( ResearchGate ), Caroline Kavanagh, Sarah Quinn.

Dwyer, C.P., Hogan, M.J., Harney, O. & Kavanagh, C. (2016). Facilitating a student-educator conceptual model of dispositions towards critical thinking through interactive management. Educational Technology & Research (Submitted).

Dwyer, C.P. & Hogan, M.J. (2014). An integrated critical thinking framework for the 21st century. Thinking Skills & Creativity, 12, 43-52.

Dwyer, C.P., Hogan, M.J., & Stewart, I. (2012). An evaluation of argument mapping as a method of enhancing critical thinking performance in e-learning environments. Metacognition and Learning, 7, 219-244.

Dwyer, C.P., Hogan, M.J., & Stewart, I. (2011). The promotion of critical thinking skills through argument mapping. In C.P. Horvart & J.M. Forte (Eds.), Critical Thinking, 97-122. Nova Science Publishers, New York.

Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., Schmeichel, B. J., Twenge, J. M., Nelson, N. M., & Tice, D. M. (2014). Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: a limited-resource account of decision making, self-regulation , and active initiative.

Michael Hogan, Ph.D. , is a lecturer in psychology at the National University of Ireland, Galway.

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Cites background from "Critical Thinking Dispositions: The..."

... What might be described as an over-emphasis on skills has been countered recently by a rebirth of interest in the dispositional side of thinking (Siegel, 1988; Paul, 1990; Esterle, 1993; Facione & Facione, 1992; Tishman and Andrade 1996, Ennis, 1996). ...

... …endorse the importance of the critical spirit or the overall disposition toward CT, few take an empirical approach to measuring that disposition or exploring the elements of that overall disposition to value and utilize CT (Ennis, 1994; Facione, 1994; Salomon, 1994; Tishman, 1994, Ennis, 1996). ...

... Ennis takes the physical science approach as paradigmatic (Ennis, 1996). ...

... While Perkins and Tishman did suggest such an approach, Ennis argued common sense grounds that it is both implausible and impractical (Perkins and Tishman, 1993; Ennis, 1996). ...

... …incompatible conceptualizations, as well as listings of CT dispositions, exist in the literature (cf. Baron, 1987; Lipman, 1987; Facione and Facione, 1992; Perkins, 1993; Ennis 1996), to clarify these questions let us first consider some commonplace examples of human dispositions, other than CT. 2. ...

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... The prevalence of courses is matched by an abundance of critical-thinking texts (e.g., Barry & Rudinow, 1994; Ennis, 1996a). ...

... It also is expressed in claims that critical thinkers exhibit certain mental dispositions (Ennis, 1996b) or “perfections of thought” (Paul, 1989)—for instance, thinking that is clear, precise, relevant, deep, fair, and complete. ...

... They also can be taught how to evaluate the credibility of information sources (Ennis, 1996a) and how to assess the expected value of information so that scarce organizational resources are not wasted on research activities of dubious merit. ...

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"Critical Thinking Dispositions: The..." refers background in this paper

... Recent feminist critiques of the critical thinking movement (Noddings, 1992; Thayer-Bacon, 1993; and Martin, 1988) have urged the inclusion of one or more of these dispositions in the conception of critical thinking. ...

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... Baron, 1985; Dewey, 1930; Ennis, 1987, 1991; Facione & Facione, ...

... A number of people interested in critical thinking have urged that critical thinking ability is not enough, that critical thinking dispositions are needed as well (see, for example,1. Baron, 1985; Dewey, 1930; Ennis, 1987, 1991; Facione & Facione, 1992; Martin, 1992; McPeck, 1991; Norris, 1992; Norris & Ennis, 1989; Passmore, 1967; Paul, 1990; Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1993; Resnick, 1987; Siegel, 1988; and Taube, 1993). ...

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... Subject-Specificity a/Critical Thinking Many commentators have held that critical thinking is subject-specific (for example, Glaser, 1984; McPeck, 1990). ...

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Thinking critically about critical thinking dispositions in technology education

Published: 05 February 2020
Volume 31 , pages 465–488, ( 2021 )

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Willem Rauscher ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-5741-160X 1 &
Hendri Badenhorst 1

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While much research has been done on Critical Thinking (CT) skills, the disposition toward CT has not been adequately investigated. The paucity of literature regarding technology teachers’ disposition toward CT is particularly problematic as these teachers have to assist learners with the designing and making of solutions (artefacts) to problems that are often ill structured. Solving these problems is complicated and involves critical thinking. Helping learners to find solutions to these problems, therefore, requires teachers to be willing to think critically and encourage critical thinking in the classroom. Profiling these teachers’ dispositions could reveal their inclination to employ critical thinking, and give an indication of the likelihood that they may foster CT skills and the disposition toward CT in the classroom. In addition, such profiling could provide a descriptive baseline for further investigation into the relationship that seems to exist between CT dispositions and professions. This study, therefore, aimed to investigate technology teachers’ disposition to think critically in terms of their habits of mind. Quantitative research, using an online survey, was employed in this study. A Likert Scale instrument comprising 42 statements, derived from Facione’s (Informal Log 20(1): 61–84, 2000 ) seven habits of mind, was administered to South African technology teachers. The participants had to rate their level of agreement with each statement on a six-point scale. The research findings revealed that this sample had a positive disposition toward CT. The habits of mind that ranked the strongest were CT Self-confidence and Inquisitiveness, while Mature Judgment ranked the weakest (although still in a positive direction). Further research is needed to establish which dispositions should be emphasised in order to address the dispositional needs in technology education.

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the nature of critical thinking an outline of critical thinking dispositions and abilities

Strategies for fostering critical thinking dispositions in the technology classroom

Joalise Janse van Rensburg & Willem Rauscher

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Rauscher, W., Badenhorst, H. Thinking critically about critical thinking dispositions in technology education. Int J Technol Des Educ 31 , 465–488 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10798-020-09564-3

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The profile of critical thinking skills students on science learning

Y Hidayati 1 and P Sinaga 1

Published under licence by IOP Publishing Ltd Journal of Physics: Conference Series , Volume 1402 , Issue 4 Citation Y Hidayati and P Sinaga 2019 J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 1402 044075 DOI 10.1088/1742-6596/1402/4/044075

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Critical thinking skills are an important and necessary skill to confront the challenges in the 21st century. Critical thinking define as basic skills that should be owned by someone to be able to develop thinking skills at a more complex level. This research is aimed to determine junior high school students' critical thinking skills in science learning. This research is descriptive qualitative research using instruments developed based on aspects of critical thinking skills according Ennis which include elementary clarification, basic support, inference, advanced clarification and strategies and tactics. The subjects in this research were 30 students in grade eight of a junior high school in Bandung which was chosen using purposive sampling technique. The results of the study show that the average percentage of the five aspects of critical skills received by students is 45 and falls into a very low category. The conclusion from this skill of the students still was in a low category, so that needed a way to enhance on indicators of students' critical thinking skills.

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment. Political and business leaders endorse its importance.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o'clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68-69; 1933: 91-92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot's position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Morevoer, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69-70; 1933: 92-93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond line from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on the subsequent emotive response (Siegel 1988).

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in frequency in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the frequency of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Critical thinking dispositions can usefully be divided into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started) (Facione 1990a: 25). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking.
Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), and Black (2012).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work.

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? Abrami et al. (2015) found that in the experimental and quasi-experimental studies that they analyzed dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), and Bailin et al. (1999b).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities , by Robert H. Ennis

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PDF The Nature of Critical Thinking 51711
The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilitiesi Robert H. Ennis ([email protected]) Emeritus Professor, University of Illinois Last Revised, May, 2011 Critical thinking is reasonable and reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do. This definition I believe captures the core of ...
PDF The Nature of Critical Thinking
An earlier version of the present statement, " The Nature of Critical Thinking: Outlines of General Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities" is in Ennis, 2011a. For interactive teaching suggestions that would make such a syllabus more engaging, see "Twenty-One Strategies and Tactics for Teaching Critical Thinking" on this web site,
The Natureof Critical Thinking 51711 000
View PDF. The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilitiesi Robert H. Ennis ([email protected]) Emeritus Professor, University of Illinois Last Revised, May, 2011 Critical thinking is reasonable and reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do.
An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilitiesi Robert H
This outline is the encapsulation of many years of work in the elaboration of the simple definition of critical thinking given above, and it distinguishes between critical thinking dispositions and abilities. It is only a critical thinking content outline. It does not specify grade level, curriculum sequence, emphasis, teaching approach, or ...
Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking. Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms ...
A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities.
A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. Citation. Ennis, R. H. (1987). A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In J. B. Baron & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching thinking skills: Theory and practice (pp. 9-26). W H Freeman/Times Books/ Henry Holt & Co.
THE DISPOSITIONS OF CRITICAL THINKERS
Abstract. Most theorists agree that the ability to think critically is distinct from the disposition to do so. Many of us may have the ability to be critical thinkers, but unless we are consistently and internally motivated to think and reason this way, these abilities are effectively redundant. Such dispositions are both intellectual character ...
The Nature and Nurture of Critical Thinking.
This chapter introduces the concept of critical thinking. Examples are given of critical thinking, the concept is defined, the question of whether critical thinking can be learned is discussed, and a pedagogy for critical thinking is offered. The chapters in this book all demonstrate how critical thinking skills are developed in psychology classes, using a broad range of topics and formats ...
Critical Thinking Ability and Disposition As Factors of Performance on
Dressel and Mayhew (1954) outlined five critical thinking abilities, but also defined critical thinking as "a point of view to ward problems and their solutions and a way of thinking about ... critical thinking dispositions and 16 critical thinking abilities. The abilities are closely allied to those outlined by Browne et al. (1978),
Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability
Abstract. Assuming that critical thinking dispositions are at least as important as critical thinking abilities, Ennis examines the concept of critical thinking disposition and suggests some criteria for judging sets of them. He considers a leading approach to their analysis and offers as an alternative a simpler set, including the disposition ...
THE NATURE AND VALUE OF CRITICAL THINKING
This chapter explores the nature and value of critical thinking. It asks what critical thinking is and how it differs from other kinds of thinking. It then explores what it means to think critically; what makes that kind of thinking critical. As part of this, the chapter considers whether critical thinking varies from one discipline to the next ...
Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability
Abstract. Read online. Assuming that critical thinking dispositions are at least as important as critical thinking abilities, Ennis examines the concept of critical thinking disposition and suggests some criteria for judging sets of them.
Critical Thinking
Abstract. Science education has long accepted that critical thinking should be a focus in instruction. The National Science Education Standards (see also) advocate the use of inquiry (see also) which demands critical thinking if it is be applied effectively.
Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability
Assuming that critical thinking dispositions are at least as important as critical thinking abilities, Ennis examines the concept of critical thinking disposition and suggests some criteria for judging sets of them. He considers a leading approach to their analysis and offers as an alternative a simpler set, including the disposition to seek alternatives and be open to them. After examining ...
The Nature of Critical Thinking
DOI link for The Nature of Critical Thinking. The Nature of Critical Thinking. By Robert H. Gass, John S. Seiter. Book Arguing, Reasoning, and Thinking Well. Click here to navigate to parent product. Edition 1st Edition. First Published 2019. Imprint Routledge. Pages 20. eBook ISBN 9781351242493.
The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking
1. Care that their beliefs be true ii , and that their decisions be justified; that is, care to "get it right" to the extent possible; including to a. Seek alternative hypotheses, explanations, conclusions, plans, sources, etc.; and be open to them b. Consider seriously other points of view than their own c. Try to be well informed d.
PDF Critical thinking: A literature review
critical thinking recognized that the ability to think critically is distinct from the disposition to do so (Ennis, 1985). Empirical evidence appears to confirm the notion that critical thinking abilities and dispositions are, in fact, separate entities (Facione, 2000). These dispositions have variously been cast as attitudes or habits of mind ...
Critical Thinking, Intelligence, and Unsubstantiated Beliefs: An
Critical thinking dispositions are attitudes or traits that make it more likely that a person will think critically. ... The nature and development of critical-analytic thinking. Educational Research Review. 2014; 26:477-93. doi: 10.1007/s10648-014-9284-. ... A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In: Baron Joan ...
What are the Key Dispositions of Good Critical Thinkers?
Critical thinking (CT) is commonly defined as a metacognitive process, consisting of a number of cognitive skills (e.g. analysis, evaluation and inference) and a variety of personal dispositions ...
Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability
(DOI: 10.22329/IL.V18I2.2378) Assuming that critical thinking dispositions are at least as important as critical thinking abilities, Ennis examines the concept of critical thinking disposition and suggests some criteria for judging sets of them. He considers a leading approach to their analysis and offers as an alternative a simpler set, including the disposition to seek alternatives and be ...
Thinking critically about critical thinking dispositions in technology
Critical thinking involves both skills/ability and dispositions (Siegel 1999; Facione 2015) and thus both skills/ability and dispositions should be incorporated in instruction and assessment (Ennis 1996).. Disposition toward critical thinking. A disposition is an inclination to do something under certain circumstances (Ennis 1996).Thinking dispositions are genuine tendencies or inclinations ...
The profile of critical thinking skills students on science learning
Abstract. Critical thinking skills are an important and necessary skill to confront the challenges in the 21st century. Critical thinking define as basic skills that should be owned by someone to be able to develop thinking skills at a more complex level. This research is aimed to determine junior high school students' critical thinking ...
Critical Thinking
Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking ...

Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability

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