of truth essay questions

Of Truth | Francis Bacon | Summary | Questions Answers

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Of Truth By Francis Bacon | Summary

Introduction : Of Truth is an aphoristic essay written by Francis Bacon. He begins this essay with a quotation from Pilate, who asks “What is truth?” According to Bacon, truth is a belief that binds the mind and restricts free choice in thinking and acting. The Greek philosophers who questioned the limits of human knowledge are no longer alive, yet some still do. Men go through numerous challenges in order to understand the truth, but once they do, it limits their thinking and they want to go back to lying. Love, according to Bacon, is a corrupt yet inherent human tendency. Bacon, like the Greek philosopher Lucian, wonders what causes a man to love lying because it does not provide delight as poetry does or provide profit as business does.

Summary of “Of Truth”

Francis Bacon’s essay Of Truth is one of his more famous essays. The essay begins by making a genial observation: it mocks those who refuse to admit that there is objective truth that needs to be acknowledged by all. Bacon almost laughs as he says that people oft have a natural love of lying even when lying yields no notable advantage. ‘Truth’ resembles light, but Bacon opines that many people prefer to flirt with darkness because they take some pleasure in lies and take to lying almost without need. Bacon who might have had faced a debacle with allegations labeled against him at the ripe age of 60; however, asserts that truth is the greatest good that a man can possess. Where does Truth come from and why it is so important? Bacon has the answer – he asserts that Truth comes from God and consequently it brings us close to God, and naturally truth provides us with greatest pleasure.

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This essay of Bacon is structured in an interesting manner. It begins with the mentioning Pilate, a symbolic Christ-killer and enemy of God, but it ends by elaborately celebrating God’s goodness and creativity. Pontius Pilate it is said had interrogated Jesus before his crucifixion, Jesus proclaimed that “Everyone on the side of truth listens to me.” (John 18:37). To this, Pilate had mockingly replied: “What is truth?” and thereafter left Jesus to address the Jewish clergy who were hell bent on getting Christ crucified even over a Barabbas (v. 38). True there is no official record of Jesus’ reply to Pilate but Christians largely believe that Pilate had looked down upon Truth. Jesus does say this to his disciple Thomas, “I am the way, and the truth, and the life” (John 14:6). Pilate was dismissive of truth; God, on the other hand, created truth and personifies truth. The the essay though framed by references especially relevant to Christians, Bacon leads to the conclusion that truth is God. Does it not remind us of the Indian thought: Satyam Sivam Sundaram (Truth is God). Bacon does cite various classical authorities and discusses various classical opinions to augment his belief. Not all classical philosophers believed in the existence of truth but there would be some who like the Christians agreed that truth should be highly valued. Bacon is wit personified. He says lying is found oft attractive and truth pain boring, so people would tell lie even when there is no benefit from it. Bacon takes the essay back to the debate initiated by Plato: Poets told lies. Bacon like most of his contemporaries suggested that the lies told by the poets were not harmful in nature. Almost Aristotelian in argument, he says poetic untruth is shadow lie. Finally he ends the essay by aligning himself to the Christian doctrine of truth. Unlike the two essays of our discussion, this essay sees a number of allusions which are used to drive the basic idea of the essay home. Bacon raises serious questions and pushes the readers to think. Apart from allusion , imagery of light and darkness is used effectively: Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond, or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights.

What strikes again is the persuasive nature of Bacon and he does it with such smoothness, that he does not sound like a preacher. The essay is not ornamental like contemporary Elizabethan essays but is straight and simple. There is also a moderate use of Latinism in the essay. Of Truth is indicative of the greatness of Bacon’s mind and art. That he wasa philosopher and gifted with practical reasoning sense is also revealed. Bacon talks of subjective truth that is functional in social life. After reading the essay, we are likely to conclude that Bacon is also a moralist. What are the other aspects of Bacon that we will notice is revealed through the essay? He is a keen observer of human mind and behavior. He candidly says that like in the time of Pilate there would be people who do not care about truth. Bacon reasons as to why people do tell lies! First, truth is acquired through hard work and man is not enthusiastic about hard work. Secondly, truth curtails man’s freedom. Thirdly Bacon says “a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself.” Further he says: “A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure.” In the bright light of truth, man fears exposure. Bacon states that if deprived of false pride and vanities, the human mind would be deflated and would look poor and sad. He uses the idea of truth to create a utopia suggesting that truth can make the earth a paradise: “Certainly, it is heaven upon earth, to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in Providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.” Also Bacon presents the need of truth in civic life: “….. that clear and round dealing is the honour of man’s nature; and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work better, but it embaseth it.” The liar virtually has no salvation. Bacon uses the imagery of a snake to present the state of a liar. Bacon takes to the French essayist Montaigne who is of the view that “a lie faces God and shrinks from man” to reiterate his point. It is with this that Bacon concludes that untruth is equal to wickedness. He uses the imagery of the alloy to pin his point. At no point in the essay does it digress, it is single in tone in trying to prove that truth could only salvage man.

Questions and Answers

Q. What is the main theme of the essay of truth?

Answer: In Francis Bacon’s essay “Of Truth,” the author extols the value of truth and critically explains that there are many people who do not place much value on truth, as they find lies more interesting. Bacon asserts that truth comes straight from God, so our relationship with truth brings humans closer to God.

Q. What is truth according to Francis Bacon?

Answer: Bacon says that truth is a belief that binds the mind and hinders free will in thinking and acting. The Greek philosophers who questioned the possibilities of human knowledge are no longer there, but there are still some people who question the same.

Answer : His writing style is aphoristic which means a compact, condensed and epigrammatic style of writing. He was expert in expressing truth in a few possible words with beauty. His essays are an example of this aphoristic style. His essay “Of Truth” has many examples of the aphoristic style.

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Read our detailed notes on the Francis Bacon’s famous essay, “Of Truth”. Our notes cover Of Truth summary and analysis.

Of Truth by Francis Bacon Summary & Analysis

In this essay, Bacon has presented the objective truth in various manifestations.Similarly, Bacon shares with us the subjective truth, operative in social life. “OF TRUTH” is Bacon’s masterpiece that shows his keen observation of human beings with special regard to truth. In the beginning of the essay, Bacon rightly observes that generally people do not care for truth as Pilate, the governor of the Roman Empire, while conducting the trial of Jesus Christ, cares little for truth:

“What is truth? Said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer.”

Advancing his essay, Bacon explores the reasons why the people do not like truth. First, truth is acquired through hard work and man is ever reluctant to work hard. Secondly, truth curtails man’s freedom. More than that the real reason of man’s disliking to truth is that man is attached to lies which Bacon says “a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself.” Man loves falsehood because, Bacon says that truth is as if the bright light of the day and would show what men, in actual, are. They look attractive and colourful in the dim light of lies.He futher adds,

“A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure.”

It is a fact that man prefers to cherish illusions, which make his life more interesting. With a profound observation of man’s psychology, Bacon states that if deprived of false pride and vanities, the human mind would contract like a deflated balloon and these human beings would become poor, sad and ill. However, poetic untruth is not gone unnoticed by Bacon’s piercing intellect. He says though poetic untruth is a wine of the Devil in priest’s eyes, yet it is not as harmful as the other lies are. Bacon being a literary artist illustrates this concept with an apt imagery that the poetic untruth is but the shadow of a lie. The enquiry of truth, knowledge of truth and belief of truth are compared with the enjoyment of love. Such a comparison lends the literary charm to this essay.Bacon further says in that the last act of creation was to create rational faculty, which helps in finding truth, is the finished product of God’s blessing as he says:

“… The last was the light of reason…is the illumination of his spirit.”

Bacon’s moral idealism is obvious when he advancing his argument in favour of truth asserts that the earth can be made paradise only with the help of truth. Man should ever stick to truth in every matter, do the act of charity and have faith in every matter, do the act of charity and have faith in God. Bacon’s strong belief in truth and Divinity is stated thus:

“Certainly, it is heaven upon earth, to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in Providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.”

From the objective truth, Bacon passes judgment, to the subjective truth, which he calls “the truth of civil business”. It is the compelling quality of truth, Bacon observes, that the persons who do not practice truth, acknowledge it. Bacon’s idealistic moral attitude is obvious in these lines when he says: “….. that clear and round dealing is the honour of man’s nature; and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work better, but it embaseth it.”

Bacon further asserts that the liars are like a snake that goes basely upon the belly and not upon the feet. Imagery comprising comparison is apt and convincing. Moreover, Bacon refers to Montaigne who is of the view that “a lie faces God and shrinks from man”. Bacon adds that falsehood is the height of wickedness and as such will invite the Judgment of God upon all human beings on Doom’s day. Therefore, Bacon concludes his essay with didacticism with a tinge of Christian morality.

In the essay, “OF TRUTH”, there is no digression. All the arguments in the essay pertain to the single main idea, truth. Bacon’s wide learning is clearly observed when he refers to Pilate (history), Lucian (Greek literature), Creation, Montaigne (a French essayist). “OF TRUTH” is enriched with striking similes and analogies, such as he equates liars as a snake moving basely on its belly, mixture of falsehood is like an alloy of gold and silver.Similarly, truth is ‘open day light’ whereas lie is ‘candle light i.e fake dim light. Truth is ‘a pearl’ i.e worthy and precious whereas ,lie is ‘a diamond’ that reflects light illusions when placed in daylight.

The essay “OF TRUTH” is not ornamental as was the practice of the Elizabethan prose writers. Bacon is simple, natural and straightforward in his essay though Elizabethan colour is also found in “OF TRUTH” because there is a moderate use of Latinism in the essay. Economy of words is found in the essay not alone, but syntactic brevity is also obvious in this essay. We find conversational ease in this essay, which is the outstanding feature of Bacon’s style. There is a peculiar feature of Bacon i.e. aphorism. We find many short, crispy, memorable and witty sayings in this essay.

Therefore, Bacon’s essay “OF TRUTH” is rich in matter and manner. This is really a council ‘civil and moral’.

Of Truth, by Francis Bacon

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An Introduction to Punctuation
Ph.D., Rhetoric and English, University of Georgia
M.A., Modern English and American Literature, University of Leicester
B.A., English, State University of New York

"Of Truth" is the opening essay in the final edition of the philosopher, statesman and jurist Francis Bacon 's "Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral" (1625). In this essay, as associate professor of philosophy Svetozar Minkov points out, Bacon addresses the question of "whether it is worse to lie to others or to oneself--to possess truth (and lie, when necessary, to others) or to think one possesses the truth but be mistaken and hence unintentionally convey falsehoods to both oneself and to others" ("Francis Bacon's 'Inquiry Touching Human Nature,'" 2010). In "Of Truth," Bacon argues that people have a natural inclination to lie to others: "a natural though corrupt love, of the lie itself."

"What is truth?" said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly, there be that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief, affecting free-will in thinking as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing wits which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labor which men take in finding out of truth, nor again that when it is found it imposeth upon men's thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor, but a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie's sake. But I cannot tell: this same truth is a naked and open daylight that doth not show the masques and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so stately and daintily as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves? One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum daemonum [the wine of devils] because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it that doth the hurt, such as we spake of before. But howsoever these things are thus in men's depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God in the works of the days was the light of the sense; the last was the light of reason; and his Sabbath work ever since is the illumination of his spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the matter, or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen. The poet that beautified the sect that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well, "It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below; but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and wanderings and mists and tempests in the vale below"*; so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological and philosophical truth to the truth of civil business: it will be acknowledged, even by those that practice it not, that clear and round dealing is the honor of man's nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent, which goeth basely upon the belly and not upon the feet. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false and perfidious; and therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace and such an odious charge. Saith he, "If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much as to say that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards man." For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men: it being foretold that when Christ cometh, "He shall not find faith upon the earth."

*Bacon's paraphrase of the opening lines of Book II of "On the Nature of Things" by Roman poet Titus Lucretius Carus.

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Of Truth – Francis Bacon – Complete Explanation

by Francis Bacon

Complete explanation of the essay alongside the original text

WHAT is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.

Explanation

Here Francis Bacon refers to Pontius Pilate, who occupied a position of influence in Emperor Tiberius’s court. For his involvement in the persecution of Jesus Christ, Pilate was not looked upon favourably by Christians. He enjoyed a somewhat sullied reputation. Here Bacon takes Pilate’s name to express how humans, in general, avoid Truth. They find Truth inconvenient and difficult to imbibe.

Certainly there be that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting.

People do not seek Truth, and enjoy resorting to falsehood and lies. People like ambiguity , and inaccuracy, so that they can couch the harshness of Truth in convenient language.

And though the sects of philosophers, of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing wits which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients.

Bacon goes back to the ancient Greek philosophers, who often lost their way while looking to ascertain what really ‘truth’ was. He laments the fact that some of these independent-minded, free-thinking philosophers proposed that there was nothing real as ‘truth’. But, while trying to prove the contrary, they soon wavered, and came out with conflicting decisions. These types of thinkers have all but ceased to exist. The present day ones lack the rigor and verve of the ancient great minds. They are paler versions of their illustrious predecessors. Nevertheless, they, too, doubt the existence of truth, and tend to drift towards falsehood.

But it is not only the difficulty and labor which men take in finding out of truth, nor again that when it is found it imposeth upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor; but a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself.

Undoubtedly, people do make very sincere and strenuous attempts to discover ‘truth’. They succeed, but regrettably, they find the burden and demands of ‘truth’ to be unbearable. Expediently, they abandon the pursuit of ‘truth’, and drift towards ‘lies’ knowingly very well that resorting to ‘lies’ is degrading. The world of ‘lies’ is dark, but people, somehow’ develop a fascination for lies at the expense of truth.

One of the later school of the Grecians examineth the matter and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies, where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie’s sake.

Some Greek philosophers of later periods delved in to this matter. They tried to know why and what attracts people towards ‘lies’. In poetry, some distortion of truth adds to a poem’s literary beauty. So allowance needs to be made to accommodate fantasy and fiction as they enhance the readers’ literary pleasure. Merchants and traders resort to a certain amount of falsehood to entice the customers to buy their merchandize. But, why do common folks resort to lies despite knowing its unsavoury consequences.

But I cannot tell; this same truth is a naked and open day-light, that doth not show the masks and mummeries and triumphs of the world, half so stately and daintily as candle-lights.

‘Truth’ depicts everything very honestly, faithfully and transparently. There is no place for extravagant praise or derision, superficial description or sycophantic eulogy in ‘truth’. Emperors, heroes, military commanders and other men and women of prominence are described with the minimum laudatory language. Truth builds no artificial aura of greatness around them. So, bereft of their unrealistic praise, they appear vastly diminished in stature.

Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights.

A pearl shines in the day. A diamond or a carbuncle glow at night giving an unreal feeling of light in the midst of total darkness. ‘Truth’ is like a pearl. It shows what is visible to the naked eye. It can’t show anything by lighting up something unrealistically. Only ‘falsehood’ has that capacity to make something apparent in total darkness.

A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men’s minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?

A cocktail of lies and truth has the potency to please humans more than only lies or only truth. Bacon, paradoxically, suggests the utility of such combination of lies and truth. If everything is portrayed in their true colours with no addition of superficial praise, flaterring comments and allusions, the society will appear drab and indolent. Vanity and aggrandizement induce creativity, energy and intellectual activity. For example, if a poet is not felicitated or a player is not rewarded, how will they be motivated to reach higher levels of accomplishments? While showering praise, use of a certain amount of unreal description of one’s feat is needed. Otherwise, the praise will be bland and ineffective.

One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum dæmonum [devils’-wine], because it filleth the imagination; and yet it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it, that doth the hurt; such as we spake of before.

Some very revered men of great wisdom denigrated poetry saying it contained lies. They felt, the poet adds fiction, exaggerations, allusions etc. to his poem to impart it some charm and attraction for the reader. Bacon says, most of these lies actually may not stay permanently in the mind of the reader. However, a part of such falsehood does get embedded in the reader’s mind impairing the sense of the readers. This could indeed be a sad consequence of reading poetry.

But howsoever these things are thus in men’s depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it, the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature.

So, lies, undoubtedly, deprave the mind. Truth, on the other hand, remains unblemished always. It is absolute and does not lend itself to differing interpretations. Inquiry of truth is a romantic pursuit that demands indulgence of the pursuer. Knowledge of truth means owning this unique gift. When one reposes absolute faith in truth, the feeling becomes very enjoyable . It symbolizes the ultimate good of human nature.

The first creature of God, in the works of the days, was the light of the sense; the last was the light of reason; and his sabbath work ever since is the illumination of his Spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the matter or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen.

When God created the world, He gave the light of sense to the mankind. Using this, human beings could see and feel the world around them. Then God gave the power of reason. Using this, human beings could reason what was good or bad in the things happening pr being said around them. As a result, human beings got the power of enlightenment. After this, God radiated light that illuminated the world which was so disorderly then. Then His light fell on human beings to make them superior in knowledge and wisdom to other species. After this, He focused his kindly light on the face of those human beings whom He loved most.

The poet that beautified the sect that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well: It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and wanderings and mists and tempests in the vale below; so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly, it is heaven upon earth, to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

When one stands in the sea beach and gets to see ships being rocked violently by the winds, it becomes a breath-taking experience. In the same way, one can stand by the window of a high castle and watch the fight raging below. This also is a unique experience. In the same way, when a human being can realize truth, he can feel as if he stands atop a high mountain enjoying its beauty and bliss. But attaining such an exalted status must not make the man to feel proud. Instead, he should be humble, and benign towards others. He should engage in charity.

To pass from theological and philosophical truth to the truth of civil business; it will be acknowledged even by those that practise it not, that clear and round dealing is the honor of man’s nature; and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent; which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false and perfidious. And therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace and such an odious charge.

Theosophical and philosophical truth belong to a certain domain. While dealing with our day-to-day mundane matters, one finds it difficult to stick to the truth always. To make his business and dealings smoother, he mixes some lies to his dealings. This, at times, appears to be a practical necessity. Although, he might succeed and emerge a winner, such conduct is vile and degrading. It is like an alloy where a foreign element is added in small quantities to a metal like gold and silver to give it more strength and toughness. However, such alloying robs the silver or gold of its luster. It is like a snake that moves on its belly always, and can never stand up erect and upright. This is why, eminent men like Montaigne declared that falsehood was universally degrading and loathsome.

Saith he, If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much to say, as that he is brave towards God and a coward towards men. For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed, as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men; it being foretold that when Christ cometh, he shall not find faith upon the earth.

When analyzed deeply, he said, it means that a person who lies is afraid of ordinary mortals and has the temerity to face God. He is a lowly soul bereft of any wisdom or intellectual heft. When the Day of the Judgment arrives, a person who has lied all his life, can not face God, and will be punished for his guilt. It has been said that gradual erosion of moral values in the world will slowly drag the earth to a state where ‘Faith’ ceases to exist.

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Thank you for commenting! Do read the explanations for other Francis Bacon Essays on our blog. https://www.englishcharity.com/category/literature/francis-bacon-literature/

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Of Truth – Summary and Analysis

Published by sirafzal72 on january 20, 2022 january 20, 2022, of truth by francis bacon.

In this famous essay, Bacon demonstrates his profound observation of human beings with a particular emphasis on truth. Bacon asserts in this article that truth is the highest value for humans. He refers to the pursuit of truth as wooing it, knowledge of truth as being present with it, and belief in truth as enjoying it. He has conveyed objective truth in a variety of ways here. Bacon correctly observes at the outset of the essay that the general public is unconcerned with truth, just as Pilate, the Roman empire’s governor, was unconcerned with truth during the trial of Jesus Christ, ‘What is truth?’ Said a mocking Pilate, refusing to stay for an answer’. Bacon is referring to Pontius Pilate, who had a position of authority in the court of Emperor Tiberius. Pilate was not regarded favourably by Christians due to his role in the persecution of Jesus Christ. He earned a slightly tarnished reputation. Bacon uses Pilate’s name to illustrate how humans, on the whole, avoid truth. They consider truth to be inconvenient and difficult to swallow.

The essay has a didactic tone. The writer’s objective is to establish a love of truth in the brains and hearts of his readers. Bacon, a moralist with moral idealism, says that the planet can only be transformed into paradise via the use of truth. Man should always adhere to the truth in all circumstances, perform acts of kindness, and have trust in all circumstances, including confidence in God. His firm trust in truth and divinity is expressed as follows: ‘Certainly, it is heaven on earth to have a man’s mentality more inclined toward charity, resting in Providence, and turning toward the poles of truth’. The essay concludes with some didactism infused with Christian morality. Bacon makes reference to the Bible in order to express his thoughts. He closes the essay with a Bible verse and an allusion to the ultimate judgement in which God will assess all human beings’ acts.

Of Truth Critical Analysis by Sir Francis Bacon along with Summary

Of Truth Critical Analysis by Sir Francis Bacon + Summary

The world knows Sir Francis Bacon for his worldly wisdom. He had made an analysis of the world and in “Of Truth”, he guided his readers on how to get success even in critical situations. Alexander Pope called Bacon the meanest kind of person because of his worldly philosophy. Bacon always focuses on worldly benefits and rarely talks about the fruits of eternal life. In “Of Truth”, he speaks in favor of the truth; he also differentiates it from lie and forces us to speak the truth in every situation. He supports his arguments through solid quotations.

Bacon also answers some of the old skeptical people, who were against the truth. He does not exaggerate truth but put reality in front of his readers. A person can only become honest if he speaks the truth. A lie may delight a person but it does not honor him. Let’s see what else he says.

“Of Truth” Summary and Critical Analysis:

Sir Francis Bacon starts his essay while referring the Ancient Roman Governor Pilate, who made the situation critical without doing an analysis of truth. Pilate asked for truth but did not wait for it. If he would have known the truth, he may have not passed the judgment to crucify the Christ. He then talks about skeptical minds, who are not easily convincible. He doubts that Pilate was also skeptical. Definitely, there are people who do not have strong beliefs. Numerous people are there in the world, who change their minds frequently. They consider that fixed beliefs are a sign of mental slavery. Whenever they think or take decisions, they use their free will; they stubbornly ignore every belief. In Greeks, there was a school of philosophers having skeptics. They may have died now but skeptical people are there even today in this world.

Why Do Not People Speak the Truth?

There are many reasons behind not speaking the truth. One of them is that discovery of truth requires efforts and time. Let us do a critical analysis of this truth from real life example. There are many courts in every country; each court has thousands of cases; in every case, either the defendant or the plaintiff is right. Every case has been heard for many years in order to find out who is speaking the truth. Secondly, both the parties (plaintiff and defendant) struggle to prove themselves right. Indeed Sir Francis Bacon is right. Effort and time are required to discover the truth. The second reason, which Bacon provides for not speaking the truth, is that it is hard to digest. When it is discovered people hardly believe it.

Then he talks about lies. He is of the view that lies attract people but no one adopts truth. He is confused that why people tell a lie for the sake of a lie. Nevertheless, he understands that poets sell lie because it gives pleasure to human beings. Traders tell lies because they want to sell their goods but lie for the sake of lie is not understandable.

How Is The Truth Different from Lie?

Bacon gives a real-life example. He says that if the audience sees a spectacle on the stage in daylight it will look as it is. On the other hand, if the same show is presented with candlelight then it will attract more people; it would definitely give pleasure to the audience. Lie, in the same way, has a beautiful and shiny cover, due to which people like lie instead of truth. However, if the truth were mixed with a lie then it would also give pleasure. Moreover, people have created their own false beliefs, judgments, and opinions. If these things were snatched from them, their condition would become miserable as these things give them hope and strange kind of pleasure.

Critical Analysis of “Of Truth” Shows that Poetry is Harmful?

Is poetry a lie? If so, is it harmful? No, Bacon does not think so. Early writers of the church called poetry a devil’s wine. It is because it exaggerates things and is full of fancies. It also takes a person in the world of imagination; therefore, they called poetry a lie and harmful to human beings. Bacon agrees that the poetry is a lie but he denies the second allegation. He says that it is not harmful at all. He divides lies into two categories; short-term and long-term. Poetry tells lie but people soon forget it; therefore, it causes no harm to them. Only those lies are harmful that sink in the mind and are difficult to forget.

Truth Ends Pride:

The light was the first thing, which the God had created. Then He bestowed men, rational faculty. Since then, He is illuminating the human minds. Bacon advises that whenever a person takes a decision, he should rely on his rationality. It would be based upon truth. He quotes Lucretius, who says that realization of truth is the greatest pleasure in the world. When someone realizes the truth, he becomes aware of its importance. He also recognizes his false beliefs and silly hopes. Truth also nips the pride in the bud due to which a person becomes pitiful.

Importance of Truth:

If we deeply do critical analysis “Of Truth” then we realize that Bacon truth has its own significance. Falsehood brings disgrace and truth brings honor. Even those persons, who do not speak truth, know its worth. Furthermore, the truth is required not only in the field of theology and philosophy but also in every field of life. Bacon refers Montaigne, who says that a liar is always brave towards God but coward towards humans. By telling a lie, a liar directly challenges God. He knows that he has to face God on doomsday yet he promotes falsehood. Thus, he is brave enough to get punishment in enteral life.

At the end of the essay, we find some morality. Bacon tries his best to convince his readers and compels them to speak the truth. The last argument, which he advances, is the “fear of doomsday”. A liar would be punished on the Day of Judgment, says Sir Francis Bacon.

Conclusion of “Of Truth Critical Analysis”:

To conclude, Bacon in this essay persuades people to speak the truth at any cost. He appreciates those people who stick with the truth. Thus, his tone in this essay is didactic; style is lucid and examples are rich. Solid references from Greeks, Romans, other subjects and various philosophers demonstrate experience and knowledge of the writer in every field of life. It seems that he has made critical analysis of his experiences and then written “Of Truth”. In short, the whole essay is worth reading for the person, who wants success in both the worlds.

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Of Truth, Sir Francis Bacon, Analysis & Summary

Sir Francis Bacon, renowned for his profound worldly wisdom, offers a compelling analysis of the human condition in his essay "Of Truth." Although criticized by some, such as Alexander Pope, for his emphasis on worldly pursuits, Bacon's guidance in navigating critical situations remains invaluable. In this essay, he espouses the virtues of truth and provides practical advice on how to attain success even in the face of adversity.

While Bacon's philosophy often focuses on earthly benefits, it is important to note that he does not neglect the spiritual realm or the fruits of eternal life. In "Of Truth," he places great importance on the pursuit of truth itself, distinguishing it from falsehood and advocating for its consistent presence in all aspects of our lives. Drawing upon solid quotations, he presents a compelling case for the inherent value and necessity of truth.

Furthermore, Bacon directly addresses the skepticism of those who question the nature of truth. Rather than embellishing truth with excessive claims, he presents reality as it is, urging his readers to embrace honesty as the foundation of personal integrity. He emphasizes that only through a commitment to truth can one truly embody honesty, highlighting the inherent honor that comes from speaking the truth.

As we delve further into Bacon's essay, we will uncover the intricacies of his thoughts and the significance of his teachings on truth, which serve as a guiding light for navigating the complexities of life.

Unveiling the Essence of Truth: A Summary and Critical Analysis of "Of Truth" by Sir Francis Bacon

In his thought-provoking essay, "Of Truth," Sir Francis Bacon initiates the discourse by alluding to the historical figure of Pilate, the Ancient Roman Governor. Pilate's failure to fully comprehend and analyze the truth led him to make a critical decision without patiently awaiting its revelation. Bacon suggests that had Pilate possessed a deeper understanding of the truth, he might have refrained from passing judgment on the crucifixion of Christ.

Turning his attention to skeptical minds, Bacon contemplates whether Pilate himself exhibited such skepticism. He acknowledges the existence of individuals who possess wavering beliefs, constantly shifting their perspectives. These individuals perceive steadfast beliefs as a form of mental enslavement and pride themselves on their free-thinking nature. These echoes of skepticism can still be found in the world today, despite the passage of time and the decline of ancient schools of skeptical philosophy.

Bacon's insights shed light on the intricate dynamics of truth and belief, challenging readers to reflect on the nature of certainty and the influence of skepticism in shaping human thought. By delving into the depths of skepticism and its impact on our perception of truth, Bacon encourages us to critically examine our own beliefs and biases.

As we delve further into Bacon's essay, we will explore his nuanced perspectives on truth and its implications for human understanding, ultimately unraveling the multifaceted nature of truth itself.

The Veil of Untruth: Reasons for Withholding the Truth

The reluctance to speak the truth can be attributed to various underlying factors. Sir Francis Bacon delves into this complex phenomenon, offering a critical analysis of the reasons behind people's aversion to truth. One prominent explanation lies in the arduous and time-consuming nature of truth discovery. Bacon's astute observation finds resonance in real-life examples, such as the extensive legal processes that courts undertake to uncover the truth in countless cases. Years of diligent examination and scrutiny are necessary to discern who is truly speaking the truth.

Intriguingly, both the plaintiff and defendant passionately strive to prove their respective claims, underscoring the substantial effort and time required in the pursuit of truth. Bacon's assertion gains credibility as he highlights the challenging nature of unearthing the truth and the inherent complexities surrounding it.

A second reason, as postulated by Bacon, revolves around the inherent difficulty in accepting the truth once it is revealed. People often find it hard to digest and assimilate the truth into their worldview. This hesitance to embrace the truth can be attributed to various psychological and cognitive factors, underscoring the depth of human complexity and the innate resistance to transformative truths.

Bacon also ponders the paradoxical allure of lies and their appeal to human beings. He acknowledges that lies possess a certain magnetic pull, capturing the attention and interest of individuals. Yet, he expresses perplexity over why people would fabricate falsehoods merely for the sake of deceit. While understanding the motives behind poets and traders who employ lies for pleasure or profit, the concept of lying for its own sake remains an enigma to Bacon, challenging the very essence of human behavior.

In this profound exploration of truth and deception, Bacon presents a compelling analysis of the intricate web of motives and complexities that underlie the reluctance to embrace and speak the truth.

The Dichotomy of Truth and Lie: A Delicate Balance

Sir Francis Bacon explores the contrasting nature of truth and lies, shedding light on the allure and appeal of deception. Drawing upon a vivid real-life analogy, Bacon evokes the imagery of a spectacle presented under different lighting conditions. He posits that while the same show in broad daylight appears as it is, the introduction of candlelight transforms it into a captivating experience that entices a larger audience and provides pleasure. Similarly, lies possess an attractive facade, adorned with beauty and charm, captivating the minds of individuals.

Furthermore, Bacon delves into the intricate relationship between truth and lies. He muses that if the truth were blended with a lie, it would still possess the power to delight. This observation highlights the complex interplay between the two, suggesting that the allure of falsehoods can permeate even when intertwined with elements of truth.

Intriguingly, Bacon delves into the human propensity for constructing false beliefs, judgments, and opinions. These self-created constructs provide individuals with hope and a peculiar form of pleasure. Were these illusions to be stripped away, Bacon suggests that individuals would find themselves in a state of misery, deprived of the comforting illusions that afford them solace and gratification.

In this contemplation of truth and lies, Bacon offers a nuanced understanding of their intertwined existence, illuminating the seductive nature of deception and the delicate balance between truth and falsehood that shapes human perceptions and experiences.

The Paradox of Poetry: A Delicate Deception

Sir Francis Bacon delves into the controversial realm of poetry, acknowledging the accusations leveled against it by early writers of the church who deemed it as a dangerous elixir, aptly labeled as the "devil's wine." These writers argued that poetry, with its embellishments and flights of fancy, was inherently deceitful and led individuals astray into a realm of imagination. While Bacon acknowledges the inherent deceptive nature of poetry, he refutes the notion that it is inherently harmful.

Bacon acknowledges that poetry indeed presents a form of artistic falsehood, weaving tales that deviate from reality. However, he argues that the harm lies not in the art form itself, but rather in the lasting impact of lies on the human psyche. He categorizes lies into two distinct types: those that are short-lived and those that linger in the mind, difficult to forget. In Bacon's view, poetry falls into the former category. The lies presented within poetic verses may captivate and entrance momentarily, but they are transient in their influence. As a result, they do not inflict lasting harm upon individuals.

By distinguishing between the transient nature of poetic falsehoods and the enduring impact of lies that embed themselves within the human mind, Bacon challenges the notion that poetry is inherently harmful. He recognizes the allure of poetic deception, yet contends that its fleeting nature ultimately prevents it from causing lasting damage.

In this analysis, Bacon engages with the paradoxical nature of poetry, acknowledging its deceptive qualities while disputing the assertion that it is fundamentally detrimental to the human experience.

The Power of Truth: Humbling Pride

Sir Francis Bacon highlights the profound significance of truth, emphasizing its role in guiding human decision-making and illuminating the depths of our understanding. Drawing upon the notion of light as the initial creation of God, Bacon emphasizes the inherent connection between truth and enlightenment.

Bacon urges individuals to rely upon their rational faculties when making decisions, emphasizing the importance of basing one's actions on truth. He cites the words of Lucretius, who proclaims that the realization of truth is the pinnacle of human pleasure. Through this realization, one becomes acutely aware of the falsehoods that have clouded their beliefs and the frivolous hopes that once gripped them. Truth, in its essence, has the power to dismantle the veils of ignorance and arrogance.

By recognizing and embracing the truth, individuals are humbled and liberated from the shackles of pride. The revelation of truth reveals the fallibility of one's own judgments and dispels illusions of grandeur, fostering a sense of humility and compassion.

In this perspective, Bacon underscores the transformative potential of truth, highlighting its capacity to humble pride and open the path to self-awareness and empathy.

The Significance of Truth: Honoring the Virtuous

Sir Francis Bacon's profound exploration of truth in "Of Truth" highlights its immense significance in various aspects of life. Through a critical analysis of his ideas, we come to recognize the inherent worth of truth and the detrimental consequences of falsehood.

Bacon asserts that falsehood brings disgrace, while truth bestows honor. Even those who are inclined to lie are aware of the value and importance of truth. The recognition of truth extends beyond the realms of theology and philosophy; it permeates every facet of human existence.

Bacon references Montaigne, who remarks that a liar may exhibit bravery in the face of God but cowardice in their interactions with fellow humans. By engaging in falsehood, a liar directly challenges the divine. Despite their awareness of the impending judgment they will face on the Day of Judgment, they persist in promoting deception. This audacity to willingly endure eternal punishment displays a twisted form of courage.

In the concluding part of the essay, Bacon introduces a moral dimension, seeking to persuade and compel his readers to embrace truthfulness. He presents the "fear of doomsday" as a powerful motivator. According to Bacon, liars will ultimately face punishment on the Day of Judgment.

Thus, Bacon underscores the significance of truth, not only as a moral imperative but also as a means to honor and virtuous living, reminding individuals of the consequences they will face for their actions in the eternal realm.

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Francis Bacon

What is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly there be, that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing wits, which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them, as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labor, which men take in finding out of truth, nor again, that when it is found, it imposeth upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor; but a natural though corrupt love, of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians, examineth the matter, and is at a stand, to think what should be in it, that men should love lies; where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie’s sake. But I cannot tell; this same truth, is a naked, and open day-light, that doth not show the masks, and mummeries, and triumphs, of the world, half so stately and daintily as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond, or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men’s minds, vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds, of a number of men, poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?

One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum doemonum , [the devils wine] because it filleth the imagination; and yet, it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in, and settleth in it, that doth the hurt; such as we spake of before. But, howsoever these things are thus in men’s depraved judgments, and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making, or wooing of it, the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God, in the works of the days, was the light of the sense; the last, was the light of reason; and his sabbath work ever since, is the illumination of his Spirit. First he breathed light, upon the face of the matter or chaos; then he breathed light, into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light, into the face of his chosen. The poet, that beautified the sect, that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well: It is a pleasure, to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure, to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale below; so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling, or pride. Certainly, it is heaven upon earth, to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological, and philosophical truth, to the truth of civil business; it will be acknowledged, even by those that practise it not, that clear, and round dealing, is the honor of man’s nature; and that mixture of falsehoods, is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding, and crooked courses, are the goings of the serpent; which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet. There is no vice, that doth so cover a man with shame, as to be found false and perfidious. And therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason, why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace, and such an odious charge? Saith he, If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much to say, as that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards men. For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. Surely the wickedness of falsehood, and breach of faith, cannot possibly be so highly expressed, as in that it shall be the last peal, to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men; it being foretold, that when Christ cometh, he shall not find faith upon the earth.

MLA Citation

Bacon, Francis. “Of truth.” 1601. Quotidiana. Ed. Patrick Madden. 22 Jan 2007. 28 Apr 2024 <http://essays.quotidiana.org/bacon/truth/>.

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Of Truth by Francis Bacon | Summary, Analysis, Explanations

Of Truth by Francis Bacon

Table of Contents

Of Truth Summary

Man bears always a great curiosity to know what is truth? Bacon here, has given us a conception about truth in his essay which he begins with the reference of Pilate. Pilate, the ancient Roman Governor of Judaca, was however, indifferent in knowing the definition of truth, for he was skeptic. Certainly there are some people who delight in frequent changing their believe and they consider that to remain fixed in a belief is a type of mental captivity which hampers man’s free-will in thoughts as well as in actions. There were some skeptic philosophers in Greece, who supported fickleness in belief. According to their view, whatever a man took to believe was true. Till now, some persons prefer alternation of belief.

It is very difficult and toilsome job to discover truth. But it is discovered that truth imposes upon man’s thought. When a truth is discovered, man cannot change his opinion anymore, because he is bound by truth then. Man has a corrupt, but natural love for lie from the ancient time. The poets tell lies in order to make interesting their compositions and to give pleasure to his readers. The businessmen told lies to gain more commercial profit. But the case of man is much different Men tell lies for the lie’s sake.

Truth is like broad day-light in which the things are seen in their original form and shape. But falsehood is like candle-light where the things lose their original glory and genuinely. Under this faint light, the artificial things show up very magnificent which they are not actually Truth gives greater pleasure when a lie has been added to it. That is why man cannot live without falsehood. If the malpractices like vain opinions, false hopes, wrong Valuations, are taken out of man’s mind, his mind will be full of melancholy and illness. Man has a great love for lie that keeps him happy

An early writer of Church described poetry as the wine of the devils because it gives rise to fancies in the mind and encourages lies Poetry tells lies which are received by the mind and then forgotten and so, it does not hurt us for they do not settle down in the mind. But such harm is done by those lies which sink into the mind and settle down there.

The man who understand truth, realize also the value of it. Truth alone is capable of judging its nature or defining itself. The inquiry of truth is the love-making of it, the knowledge of truth is the presence of it, and the belief of truth is the enjoying of it. These three ideas are taught by truth itself. Truth is the supreme good of human nature.

God has created in his six working days all the creatures. – inanimate as well as animate. The first thing God created was the light and the final thing. He created was the rational faculty which he bestowed upon man. In leisure, God began to illuminate the minds of men by grace of divine truths. First God infused light upon the face of matter or chaos. Then he infused light into the face of man. Even now and always he inspires light into the face of that person whom He gives special favour.

The poet Lucretius’ observation was excellent the greatest pleasure for a man was the realization of truth and not any pleasure of the world is comparable to it. Standing upon the vantage-ground of truth, a man can best see the errors, wanderings, lies, follies and foibles prevailing in the world. The outlook of this man should be replete with pity, not with pride or arrogance. All the reasonings of human beings should be based upon truth

Not only theological and philosophical truth, the truth of everyday social life is much important. When we go to deal with men, we should follow clear and direct way of dealing, because clear-cut and straightforward manner of conduct is the supreme honour of men’s nature. Men generally admix falsehood with truth to gain advantages easily. But the mixture of falsehood debases his humanity and lowers his degree. Falsehood brings man disgrace and odium. Montaigne said rightly that, in telling a lie, man is brave towards God and a coward towards men. It is because man has no courage to tell a lie to his brethren.

The wickedness of falsehood and loss of faith will come under the penalty on the Doomsday when God will appeal to call all human beings for the final judgement. In far-off future, when Christ will come on the second Dooms –day, he shall not find men’s belief in God.

Of Truth Explanations

“What is truth’? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.”

It is an eternal query what truth is. Men are pursuit to know truth from the ancient time, but hitherto they cannot find out the definition of truth. They went on investigating from various corner, searched many books, many doctrines, logic, but yet failed to discover truth. At last they cling to an idea that truth cannot be discovered it is unattainable. Actually, men have undergone simply a cursory quest for truth. It is not easy to discover truth, moreover it is a toilsome and mammoth task to discover it. Men do not possess the mind to strive for truth. Not only that men do not care properly to know it. Men love lies more than truth and love to change their very opinions. If truth is discovered, it will act as a kind of restraint upon the minds of men. Then men cannot do according to his own whim. That is why each and every man remains indifferent to know what truth is. To give this idea Bacon cited the example of Pilate, the ancient Roman Governor of Judaea, who is not an exception to common human nature and who acts here as a representative of mankind. He also asked the definition of truth, but in a light-hearted manner. Bacon explains that people generally get much pleasure in frequent changing of their opinions. They think truth a captivity which affects free will in thinking as well as in acting. They aim at complete and unrestricted freedom of thought, opinion and action. So, when they search for truth, they only show a mere cursory quest for it, just like Pilate.

Bacon attempts to test, refine and bring to the perfection, first, man’s conceptions and then, human nature itself. Here, too, Bacon first cited an example of individual and then used it to all human beings. “What is truth?”- is an excerpt from the Bible: John 18.38 . It is very difficult to decide why Pilate was perhaps justified in not waiting for the answer to his question. This effort of the human spirit to fight the fears and limitations of the human condition may perhaps rank as the noblest expression of Bacon’s philosophic mind. There is a slight touch of obscurity here for the uninitiated reader.

“But I cannot tell : this same truth is a naked and open day light, that doth not show the masques and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so stately and daintily as candle-lights.”

Human beings are somehow or other attracted by lies. They have a natural, though corrupt, love for lies. Poets make use of lies in their compositions in order to cater pleasure to readers. Businessmen tell lies for gaining more commercial profits. But why common people tell lies for the lie’s sake is not clear. It is the common habit of people to hide their real face and figure and character under false hood. Lie hides the original matter of the things and shows what is artificial. Men know well the greatness of truth, yet they follow lies and use masques, mummeries and triumphs, Masque is an entertainment consisting of dancing and other diversions of performers whose faces are disguised in masks. Mummery is also a popular, primitive entertainment in which the performers make sports and gestures without speaking, Triumphs are magnificent because pompous shows are provided to people for amusement. All these are the various types of false hood which hides the genuine shape. It is the difference between truth and lie. Truth is like open daylight while lie is like the faint and dim light of the candle. The faint light of candle shows up the cheap and artificial things very magnificent and attractive. But in daylight the original shape is seen and it shows things what they are. Sun is sublime, Sun-shine is sublime and so is truth. There is nothing superior to truth, nothing brighter than truth.

The passage gives expression to ideas which are noble and worthy of the highest appreciation. Bacon relates truth as stable, pure and serene. He gives here, vivid simile and metaphor in order to elucidate his ideas. The comparison between truth and daylight and between die and candle-light is excellent and remarkable. Bacon is right that truth is not so alluring as a lie or falsehood. The sentences are written in compact and terse style of which Bacon is a master.

“Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day, but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights.”

Bacon points out that truth, in comparison with lie and falsehood, is more stable, pure and serene. Truth is like clear, open daylight which does not show the masques, mummeries and triumphs of the world as so magnificent and attractive as candle lights show them. Yet, people follow the path of falsehood. It is because falsehood hides the original form and shows what is artificial, just like candlelight shows up the simple things the most attractive and magnificent. But truth is like open daylight always showing things in their original form. Nothing is comparable to truth in its sublimity, purity and sanctity. Truth is like pearl which is seen to the best advantage in day-light. Falsehood is like diamond or carbuncle which is seen best in varied lights. Truth is one and always the same. It always appears with its original form and never hides itself in masks. Though the price of pearl is lower than that of diamond or carbuncle, but pearl is more sublime, pure and holy than these precious stones which like falsehood assumes various forms in varied lights. Diamond or carbuncle becomes more attractive at night and thus distracts the belief of the people. That is why, truth is always compared to a pearl, the lustre of which can best be appreciated in daylight and it never be compared to a diamond or a carbuncle which can be best admired in the artificial light of candles and lamps. Truth lacks the charm of verity which falsehood has. So truth is indispensible for glorification and purification of human life.

The passage gives expression to ideas which are noble and worthy of the highest appreciation. There is a didactic tone submerged here. The object of the writer is to instill into the mind of his readers a love of truth Bacon gives us very vivid similes and metaphors in order to illustrate his ideas. The comparison between truth and pearl and between falsehood and carbuncle is excellent and notable. The sentences are written in condensed and aphoristic style of which Bacon is the master. Above all, the passage epitomizes the theme: it does not matter, whether the price is high or low; but it is the genuineness that matters.

“A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure.”

Bacon points out that there is a giddiness in man’s nature. Men get more delight in changing their opinions now and then. They do not want to remain fixed on any truth Human mind has a corrupt love for lies. It seems that human beings are somehow or other attracted by lies. Lies told by poets in their composition add delight and taste. The traders tell lies to gain more. But why people take the shelter of lies for lie’s sake is not clear. They feel a certain proneness to lies. Even Bacon is unable to explain it. It is perhaps the main fact that truth gives more pleasure when a lie is added to it. People enjoy much delight and pleasure in admixing falsehood with truth. Human mind is fond of gain opinions, false hopes. In other words, human beings retain falsehood for whole time. If the vain opinions, flattering hopes, wrong judgments were to be taken out of human mind, his mind would be full of melancholy and illness. All these different types of falsehood give people a strange kind of pleasure and keep them happy. Bacon warns us at last. Though falsehood gives our mind pleasure, it is harmful some time. Lies which are received by the mind and then forgotten cannot harm us. But lies which sink into the mind and settle down there forever, hurt us.

The sentence reveals Bacon’s wisdom and gives expression to ideas which are noble and worthy of the appreciation. Nobody will disgrace with Bacon when he says falsehood has a pleasing effect upon a human being. This sentence shows Bacon’s gift of compression. It is epigrammatic and can be used as a quotation in need.

“For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man”.

Truth, in comparison with falsehood, is more stable, pure and serene. It shows us the path of victory to follow. It is so clear as open daylight is, it is so graceful and dignified as a pearl is. Nothing is comparable to truth in its sublimity, purity and sanctity. Yet people constantly tell lies and follow the path of falsehood. Human beings have a natural and corrupt love for lies. With the passing of time, they became too much desperate and reckless in telling lies. They even ignore the honour and dignity of God. They tell hundreds of lies in their everyday life but take oath in the name of God and thus they defy God. But human beings never tell lies to his fellowmen. They cannot trust his brethren. They always get afraid of being unlocked of their secrecy and that is why they cannot tell the truth to their fellow men so desperately and courageously as they tell the lies facing God. In this connection Bacon cited Montaigne who said very logically and aptly that, in telling a lie, man is brave towards God and a coward towards men. A liar does not have the courage to tell the truth to his fellow human beings, but he has the courage to tell a lie defying God. To tell a lie men come face to face of God, but remain far away from man. Here lies the paradox. Bacon feels that the whole world has been submerged under the wickedness of falsehood. In far-off future, when Christ will come on this earth on the second Doomsday, he will certainly not find man’s faith on God.

The sentence is the fruit of high meditation. If gives expression to ides which are noble and worthy of the highest appreciation. Bacon is right that while a man tells a lie, his cowardliness is revealed. It is an illustration of Bacon’s gift of compression. It also implies Bacon’s love of quotations. The quotation from Montaixne is very effective for the purpose for which it has been introduced: “For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man”

“Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a men’s mind move in charity rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth”.

Bacon is here enunciating a noble principle. He uplifts the ideas of charity and truth and teaches us to submit whole-heartedly to the will of god. He relates truth as stable, pure, and sacred. The man who can be able to realize truth, he can feel the heavenly bliss. The greatest pleasure for a man is the realization of truth. Nothing is comparable to the pleasure that comes out of truth. It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore and to see ships tossed upon the sea, it is also a pleasure to stand in front of window of a castle and to see a battle and the adventures thereof. But no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth and to survey the errors, false hoods, mistakes and injustices prevailing in the world. While dealing with truth man’s outlook should be full of pity. All the reasonings of human being should be based upon truth. Human beings will be capable of enjoying the bliss of paradise in spite of staying on earth of their mind become replete with kindness, humanity faith on God and, above all, truth.

“Bacon here says that a man’s mind should move in charity’ as the universe is moved by the ‘primum mobile’: rest in providence as the universe rests in infinite space and revolve around truth as the spheres, revolve around the celestial poles.” It expresses the ideas which are noble and worthy of the highest appreciation. The passage also illustrates Bacon’s gift of compression. A great sublime ideal is laid within these few words.

“and that mixture of falsehood is like allay in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it”.

People have a common proneness and inclination to falsehood. It is a corrupt love for lies. The fact is not clear why men give more preference to lies than truth, although they know it very well that truth will show the right path to victory. Truth gives more pleasure when a lie is added to it. If the notion of false hopes, vain opinions and wrong judgments is cut-off from man’s mind, he will feel himself miserable. Falsehood gives people a strange kind of pleasure. But it can never be ignored that, and even people who themselves do not practice truth will admit that direct and straightforward conduct shows honorable and noble quality of human nature. Yet men go to mix lies with truth to gain more conveniences in practical life. But false hood undoubtedly lowers and degrades a man. The mixture of falsehood is like alloy which is mixed into gold or silver. The admixture of an alloy, though makes the metal more flexible and easier to work, but it debases the substance. To strengthen the fact, Bacon compares false hood and dishonest practices with the crooked and twisting movements of the snakes. As the serpent follows the winding way, not straight, it is the lowest creature that moves upon its belly. So if a man tells lies and follows the cooked ways of society, he will remain in the lowest condition than others.

This passage gives expression to ideas which are noble and worthy of the highest appreciation. The object of the writer is to instill into the mind of the readers a kind of love for truth and a kind of contempt for falsehood. Here lies Bacon’s compact and condensed style. Bacon’s comparison here, is excellent. The alloy makes the metal work better, but it lessens the value of the metal. Similarly, falsehood may be useful from the practical and business point of view, but it lowers the dignity of the individual who tells a lie

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Bacon's Essays/Of Truth

To passe from Theologicall, and Philosophicall Truth, to the Truth of civil Businesse [24] ; It will be acknowledged, even by those that practize it not, that cleare and Round [25] dealing, is the Honour of Man's Nature; And that Mixture of Falshood, is like Allay in Coyne of Gold and Silver, which may make the Metall worke the better, but it embaseth [26] it. For these winding, and crooked courses, are the Goings of the Serpent; which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the Feet. There is no Vice [27] that doth so cover Man with Shame as to be found false and perfidious. And therefore Mountaigny saith prettily, when he inquired the reason why the word of the Lie should be such a Disgrace, and such an Odious Charge, Saith he, If it be well weighed, To say that a man lieth, is as much to say as that he is brave towards God and a Coward towards Men. For a Lie faces God, and shrinkes from Man. Surely the Wickednesse of Falshood and Breach of Faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed, as in that it shall be the last Peale [28] to call the Iudgements of God upon the Generations of Men; It being foretold that, when Christ cometh, He shall not finde Faith upon the Earth.

↑ said Pilate in derision
↑ fickleness
↑ aiming at
↑ discursive minds
↑ whose disposition is the same as that of the ancients, though their abilities are less
↑ i.e. imposes restraint
↑ at a loss
↑ why it is
↑ But somehow or other
↑ does not make the world's dramatic spectacles and farcical shows and public pageants appear
↑ at pleasure
↑ the wine of devils
↑ i.e. such a lie as
↑ whatever the true cause may be why
↑ created thing
↑ i.e. of men's minds by the Holy Spirit
↑ not to be overlooked, or, perhaps , inaccessible to others
↑ provided that
↑ the habit of truthfulness in social intercourse
↑ plain and straightforward
↑ i.e. no other vice

This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.

Public domain Public domain false false

Francis Bacon: Essays and Major Works

By francis bacon, francis bacon: essays and major works essay questions.

How does Francis Bacon address the concept of truth and human perception?

Bacon spends time examining the idea of human perception as well as truth, two ideas that are often disparate. Bacon observes that even though humans are aware of their limited perceptibility, they lack knowledge and insights regarding how these limitations play a role in shaping their consciousness. As such, most humans (according to Bacon) are likely lacking knowledge they could otherwise acquire if they were to understand the limitations that exist for them. Additionally, Bacon argues that cultural ideologies as well as the human mind impede one's ability to gain pure knowledge.

Culture and community pose a challenge to Bacon's concept of the philosopher. How does Bacon showcase this tension?

Bacon argues that to become a philosopher in its full meaning, a pursuer of truth in its definite form, one must expect opposition and at times shame from one's own community. Since the community may not be in support of the same pursuits – indeed, they may be actively trying to suppress deeper knowledge due to the conflicts that may arise from it – their support transforms from being beneficial to being a restrictive obstacle. This obstacle has to be cleared for one to think clearly and with no predispositions.

How does Bacon differentiate between his civil essays and his moral essays?

Bacon's essays cover a wide array of subject matter, including "civil" topics like friendship and seditious speech – things that affect societies and their growth – as well as "moral" topics like envy and love – or things that affect the individual. While the original title of Bacon's essay collection was Essays or Counsels, both Civil and Moral , Bacon makes no clear distinction between the two, instead alternating freely between moral and civil concerns. As such, Bacon suggests that these two realms of philosophy are actually intertwined and are oftentimes dependent on one another.

What is Bacon's opinion on poetry?

In The Advancement of Learning , Bacon establishes that there are three fundamental forms of human knowledge: history, poetry, and philosophy. By far, Bacon places the most importance on philosophy, as this is where he sees humans being able to advance the most in terms of knowledge acquisition. While Bacon acknowledges the utility of poetry for its ability to enhance man's imagination, he cautions against placing too much emphasis on poetry as a means of knowledge acquisition. Bacon argues that poetry too often leads to fancy and a detachment from reality, as it focuses on rhetoric and images rather than concrete experience.

What makes Bensalem a utopia in The New Atlantis ?

While The New Atlantis is collectively referred to as Bacon's incomplete utopian novel, the word "utopia" never appears in the text itself ("utopia" had entered the English vernacular from Latin when Thomas More wrote his Utopia in 1516). What Bacon describes is nevertheless an ideal society, specifically one that places scientific inquiry at the heart of its prosperity. In Bensalem, conflicts like poverty, competition for resources, and war do not exist, as everything is shared among the people. Similarly, the island's dedication to learning above all else has helped make it the most technologically and philosophically advanced society in the world, even despite its remote location and relatively unknown existence.

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Francis Bacon: Essays and Major Works Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for Francis Bacon: Essays and Major Works is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

why baccon used OF before starting his essays

becose it is used to mention the things particular

What is Sir Francis Bacon’s main purpose in the text?

In this essay Bacon states his ideology about education and learning. He argues that, "studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability." Bacon felt that people should delight in knowledge for its own sake rather than a means to an end...

Part A: which statement best summarizes the text

A. Learning is personal and focuses on improving weaknesses and enhancing strengths.

Study Guide for Francis Bacon: Essays and Major Works

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Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.

It would be impossible to survey all there is to say about truth in any coherent way. Instead, this essay will concentrate on the main themes in the study of truth in the contemporary philosophical literature. It will attempt to survey the key problems and theories of current interest, and show how they relate to one-another. A number of other entries investigate many of these topics in greater depth. Generally, discussion of the principal arguments is left to them. The goal of this essay is only to provide an overview of the current Theories. Many of the papers mentioned in this essay can be found in the anthologies edited by Blackburn and Simmons (1999) and Lynch (2001b). There are a number of book-length surveys of the topics discussed here, including Burgess and Burgess (2011), Kirkham (1992), and Künne (2003). Also, a number of the topics discussed here, and many further ones, are surveyed at more length in papers in Glanzberg (2018).

The problem of truth is in a way easy to state: what truths are, and what (if anything) makes them true. But this simple statement masks a great deal of controversy. Whether there is a metaphysical problem of truth at all, and if there is, what kind of theory might address it, are all standing issues in the theory of truth. We will see a number of distinct ways of answering these questions.

1.1 The correspondence theory

1.1.1 the origins of the correspondence theory, 1.1.2 the neo-classical correspondence theory, 1.2 the coherence theory, 1.3 pragmatist theories, 2.1 sentences as truth-bearers, 2.2 convention t, 2.3 recursive definition of truth, 2.4 reference and satisfaction, 3.1 correspondence without facts, 3.2 representation and correspondence, 3.3 facts again, 3.4 truthmakers, 4.1 realism and truth, 4.2 anti-realism and truth, 4.3 anti-realism and pragmatism, 4.4 truth pluralism, 5.1 the redundancy theory, 5.2 minimalist theories, 5.3 other aspects of deflationism, 6.1 truth-bearers, 6.2 truth and truth conditions, 6.3 truth conditions and deflationism, 6.4 truth and the theory of meaning, 6.5 the coherence theory and meaning, 6.6 truth and assertion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the neo-classical theories of truth.

Much of the contemporary literature on truth takes as its starting point some ideas which were prominent in the early part of the 20th century. There were a number of views of truth under discussion at that time, the most significant for the contemporary literature being the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist theories of truth.

These theories all attempt to directly answer the nature question : what is the nature of truth? They take this question at face value: there are truths, and the question to be answered concerns their nature. In answering this question, each theory makes the notion of truth part of a more thoroughgoing metaphysics or epistemology. Explaining the nature of truth becomes an application of some metaphysical system, and truth inherits significant metaphysical presuppositions along the way.

The goal of this section is to characterize the ideas of the correspondence, coherence and pragmatist theories which animate the contemporary debate. In some cases, the received forms of these theories depart from the views that were actually defended in the early 20th century. We thus dub them the ‘neo-classical theories’. Where appropriate, we pause to indicate how the neo-classical theories emerge from their ‘classical’ roots in the early 20th century.

Perhaps the most important of the neo-classical theories for the contemporary literature is the correspondence theory. Ideas that sound strikingly like a correspondence theory are no doubt very old. They might well be found in Aristotle or Aquinas. When we turn to the late 19th and early 20th centuries where we pick up the story of the neo-classical theories of truth, it is clear that ideas about correspondence were central to the discussions of the time. In spite of their importance, however, it is strikingly difficult to find an accurate citation in the early 20th century for the received neo-classical view. Furthermore, the way the correspondence theory actually emerged will provide some valuable reference points for the contemporary debate. For these reasons, we dwell on the origins of the correspondence theory in the late 19th and early 20th centuries at greater length than those of the other neo-classical views, before turning to its contemporary neo-classical form. For an overview of the correspondence theory, see David (2018).

The basic idea of the correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it corresponds to the way things actually are – to the facts. This idea can be seen in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. Its modern history starts with the beginnings of analytic philosophy at the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.

Let us pick up the thread of this story in the years between 1898 and about 1910. These years are marked by Moore and Russell’s rejection of idealism. Yet at this point, they do not hold a correspondence theory of truth. Indeed Moore (1899) sees the correspondence theory as a source of idealism, and rejects it. Russell follows Moore in this regard. (For discussion of Moore’s early critique of idealism, where he rejects the correspondence theory of truth, see Baldwin (1991). Hylton (1990) provides an extensive discussion of Russell in the context of British idealism. An overview of these issues is given by Baldwin (2018).)

In this period, Moore and Russell hold a version of the identity theory of truth . They say comparatively little about it, but it is stated briefly in Moore (1899; 1902) and Russell (1904). According to the identity theory, a true proposition is identical to a fact. Specifically, in Moore and Russell’s hands, the theory begins with propositions, understood as the objects of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. Propositions are what are believed, and give the contents of beliefs. They are also, according to this theory, the primary bearers of truth. When a proposition is true, it is identical to a fact, and a belief in that proposition is correct. (Related ideas about the identity theory and idealism are discussed by McDowell (1994) and further developed by Hornsby (2001).)

The identity theory Moore and Russell espoused takes truth to be a property of propositions. Furthermore, taking up an idea familiar to readers of Moore, the property of truth is a simple unanalyzable property. Facts are understood as simply those propositions which are true. There are true propositions and false ones, and facts just are true propositions. There is thus no “difference between truth and the reality to which it is supposed to correspond” (Moore, 1902, p. 21). (For further discussion of the identity theory of truth, see Baldwin (1991), Candlish (1999), Candlish and Damnjanovic (2018), Cartwright (1987), Dodd (2000), and the entry on the identity theory of truth .)

Moore and Russell came to reject the identity theory of truth in favor of a correspondence theory, sometime around 1910 (as we see in Moore, 1953, which reports lectures he gave in 1910–1911, and Russell, 1910b). They do so because they came to reject the existence of propositions. Why? Among reasons, they came to doubt that there could be any such things as false propositions, and then concluded that there are no such things as propositions at all.

Why did Moore and Russell find false propositions problematic? A full answer to this question is a point of scholarship that would take us too far afield. (Moore himself lamented that he could not “put the objection in a clear and convincing way” (1953, p. 263), but see Cartwright (1987) and David (2001) for careful and clear exploration of the arguments.) But very roughly, the identification of facts with true propositions left them unable to see what a false proposition could be other than something which is just like a fact, though false. If such things existed, we would have fact-like things in the world, which Moore and Russell now see as enough to make false propositions count as true. Hence, they cannot exist, and so there are no false propositions. As Russell (1956, p. 223) later says, propositions seem to be at best “curious shadowy things” in addition to facts.

As Cartwright (1987) reminds us, it is useful to think of this argument in the context of Russell’s slightly earlier views about propositions. As we see clearly in Russell (1903), for instance, he takes propositions to have constituents. But they are not mere collections of constituents, but a ‘unity’ which brings the constituents together. (We thus confront the ‘problem of the unity of the proposition’.) But what, we might ask, would be the ‘unity’ of a proposition that Samuel Ramey sings – with constituents Ramey and singing – except Ramey bearing the property of singing? If that is what the unity consists in, then we seem to have nothing other than the fact that Ramey sings. But then we could not have genuine false propositions without having false facts.

As Cartwright also reminds us, there is some reason to doubt the cogency of this sort of argument. But let us put the assessment of the arguments aside, and continue the story. From the rejection of propositions a correspondence theory emerges. The primary bearers of truth are no longer propositions, but beliefs themselves. In a slogan:

A belief is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact .

Views like this are held by Moore (1953) and Russell (1910b; 1912). Of course, to understand such a theory, we need to understand the crucial relation of correspondence, as well as the notion of a fact to which a belief corresponds. We now turn to these questions. In doing so, we will leave the history, and present a somewhat more modern reconstruction of a correspondence theory. (For more on facts and proposition in this period, see Sullivan and Johnston (2018).)

The correspondence theory of truth is at its core an ontological thesis: a belief is true if there exists an appropriate entity – a fact – to which it corresponds. If there is no such entity, the belief is false.

Facts, for the neo-classical correspondence theory, are entities in their own right. Facts are generally taken to be composed of particulars and properties and relations or universals, at least. The neo-classical correspondence theory thus only makes sense within the setting of a metaphysics that includes such facts. Hence, it is no accident that as Moore and Russell turn away from the identity theory of truth, the metaphysics of facts takes on a much more significant role in their views. This perhaps becomes most vivid in the later Russell (1956, p. 182), where the existence of facts is the “first truism.” (The influence of Wittgenstein’s ideas to appear in the Tractatus (1922) on Russell in this period was strong, and indeed, the Tractatus remains one of the important sources for the neo-classical correspondence theory. For more recent extensive discussions of facts, see Armstrong (1997) and Neale (2001).)

Consider, for example, the belief that Ramey sings. Let us grant that this belief is true. In what does its truth consist, according to the correspondence theory? It consists in there being a fact in the world, built from the individual Ramey, and the property of singing. Let us denote this $\langle$ Ramey , Singing $\rangle$. This fact exists. In contrast, the world (we presume) contains no fact $\langle$ Ramey , Dancing $\rangle$. The belief that Ramey sings stands in the relation of correspondence to the fact $\langle$ Ramey , Singing $\rangle$, and so the belief is true.

What is the relation of correspondence? One of the standing objections to the classical correspondence theory is that a fully adequate explanation of correspondence proves elusive. But for a simple belief, like that Ramey sings, we can observe that the structure of the fact $\langle$ Ramey , Singing $\rangle$ matches the subject-predicate form of the that -clause which reports the belief, and may well match the structure of the belief itself.

So far, we have very much the kind of view that Moore and Russell would have found congenial. But the modern form of the correspondence theory seeks to round out the explanation of correspondence by appeal to propositions . Indeed, it is common to base a correspondence theory of truth upon the notion of a structured proposition . Propositions are again cast as the contents of beliefs and assertions, and propositions have structure which at least roughly corresponds to the structure of sentences. At least, for simple beliefs like that Ramey sings, the proposition has the same subject predicate structure as the sentence. (Proponents of structured propositions, such as Kaplan (1989), often look to Russell (1903) for inspiration, and find unconvincing Russell’s reasons for rejecting them.)

With facts and structured propositions in hand, an attempt may be made to explain the relation of correspondence. Correspondence holds between a proposition and a fact when the proposition and fact have the same structure, and the same constituents at each structural position. When they correspond, the proposition and fact thus mirror each-other. In our simple example, we might have:

Propositions, though structured like facts, can be true or false. In a false case, like the proposition that Ramey dances, we would find no fact at the bottom of the corresponding diagram. Beliefs are true or false depending on whether the propositions which are believed are.

We have sketched this view for simple propositions like the proposition that Ramey sings. How to extend it to more complex cases, like general propositions or negative propositions, is an issue we will not delve into here. It requires deciding whether there are complex facts, such as general facts or negative facts, or whether there is a more complex relation of correspondence between complex propositions and simple facts. (The issue of whether there are such complex facts marks a break between Russell (1956) and Wittgenstein (1922) and the earlier views which Moore (1953) and Russell (1912) sketch.)

According to the correspondence theory as sketched here, what is key to truth is a relation between propositions and the world, which obtains when the world contains a fact that is structurally similar to the proposition. Though this is not the theory Moore and Russell held, it weaves together ideas of theirs with a more modern take on (structured) propositions. We will thus dub it the neo-classical correspondence theory. This theory offers us a paradigm example of a correspondence theory of truth.

The leading idea of the correspondence theory is familiar. It is a form of the older idea that true beliefs show the right kind of resemblance to what is believed. In contrast to earlier empiricist theories, the thesis is not that one’s ideas per se resemble what they are about. Rather, the propositions which give the contents of one’s true beliefs mirror reality, in virtue of entering into correspondence relations to the right pieces of it.

In this theory, it is the way the world provides us with appropriately structured entities that explains truth. Our metaphysics thus explains the nature of truth, by providing the entities needed to enter into correspondence relations.

For more on the correspondence theory, see David (1994, 2018) and the entry on the correspondance theory of truth .

Though initially the correspondence theory was seen by its developers as a competitor to the identity theory of truth, it was also understood as opposed to the coherence theory of truth.

We will be much briefer with the historical origins of the coherence theory than we were with the correspondence theory. Like the correspondence theory, versions of the coherence theory can be seen throughout the history of philosophy. (See, for instance, Walker (1989) for a discussion of its early modern lineage.) Like the correspondence theory, it was important in the early 20th century British origins of analytic philosophy. Particularly, the coherence theory of truth is associated with the British idealists to whom Moore and Russell were reacting.

Many idealists at that time did indeed hold coherence theories. Let us take as an example Joachim (1906). (This is the theory that Russell (1910a) attacks.) Joachim says that:

Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole (p. 76).

We will not attempt a full exposition of Joachim’s view, which would take us well beyond the discussion of truth into the details of British idealism. But a few remarks about his theory will help to give substance to the quoted passage.

Perhaps most importantly, Joachim talks of ‘truth’ in the singular. This is not merely a turn of phrase, but a reflection of his monistic idealism. Joachim insists that what is true is the “whole complete truth” (p. 90). Individual judgments or beliefs are certainly not the whole complete truth. Such judgments are, according to Joachim, only true to a degree. One aspect of this doctrine is a kind of holism about content, which holds that any individual belief or judgment gets its content only in virtue of being part of a system of judgments. But even these systems are only true to a degree, measuring the extent to which they express the content of the single ‘whole complete truth’. Any real judgment we might make will only be partially true.

To flesh out Joachim’s theory, we would have to explain what a significant whole is. We will not attempt that, as it leads us to some of the more formidable aspects of his view, e.g., that it is a “process of self-fulfillment” (p. 77). But it is clear that Joachim takes ‘systematic coherence’ to be stronger than consistency. In keeping with his holism about content, he rejects the idea that coherence is a relation between independently identified contents, and so finds it necessary to appeal to ‘significant wholes’.

As with the correspondence theory, it will be useful to recast the coherence theory in a more modern form, which will abstract away from some of the difficult features of British idealism. As with the correspondence theory, it can be put in a slogan:

A belief is true if and only if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs.

To further the contrast with the neo-classical correspondence theory, we may add that a proposition is true if it is the content of a belief in the system, or entailed by a belief in the system. We may assume, with Joachim, that the condition of coherence will be stronger than consistency. With the idealists generally, we might suppose that features of the believing subject will come into play.

This theory is offered as an analysis of the nature of truth, and not simply a test or criterion for truth. Put as such, it is clearly not Joachim’s theory (it lacks his monism, and he rejects propositions), but it is a standard take on coherence in the contemporary literature. (It is the way the coherence theory is given in Walker (1989), for instance. See also Young (2001) for a recent defense of a coherence theory.) Let us take this as our neo-classical version of the coherence theory. The contrast with the correspondence theory of truth is clear. Far from being a matter of whether the world provides a suitable object to mirror a proposition, truth is a matter of how beliefs are related to each-other.

The coherence theory of truth enjoys two sorts of motivations. One is primarily epistemological. Most coherence theorists also hold a coherence theory of knowledge; more specifically, a coherence theory of justification. According to this theory, to be justified is to be part of a coherent system of beliefs. An argument for this is often based on the claim that only another belief could stand in a justification relation to a belief, allowing nothing but properties of systems of belief, including coherence, to be conditions for justification. Combining this with the thesis that a fully justified belief is true forms an argument for the coherence theory of truth. (An argument along these lines is found in Blanshard (1939), who holds a form of the coherence theory closely related to Joachim’s.)

The steps in this argument may be questioned by a number of contemporary epistemological views. But the coherence theory also goes hand-in-hand with its own metaphysics as well. The coherence theory is typically associated with idealism. As we have already discussed, forms of it were held by British idealists such as Joachim, and later by Blanshard (in America). An idealist should see the last step in the justification argument as quite natural. More generally, an idealist will see little (if any) room between a system of beliefs and the world it is about, leaving the coherence theory of truth as an extremely natural option.

It is possible to be an idealist without adopting a coherence theory. (For instance, many scholars read Bradley as holding a version of the identity theory of truth. See Baldwin (1991) for some discussion.) However, it is hard to see much of a way to hold the coherence theory of truth without maintaining some form of idealism. If there is nothing to truth beyond what is to be found in an appropriate system of beliefs, then it would seem one’s beliefs constitute the world in a way that amounts to idealism. (Walker (1989) argues that every coherence theorist must be an idealist, but not vice-versa.)

The neo-classical correspondence theory seeks to capture the intuition that truth is a content-to-world relation. It captures this in the most straightforward way, by asking for an object in the world to pair up with a true proposition. The neo-classical coherence theory, in contrast, insists that truth is not a content-to-world relation at all; rather, it is a content-to-content, or belief-to-belief, relation. The coherence theory requires some metaphysics which can make the world somehow reflect this, and idealism appears to be it. (A distant descendant of the neo-classical coherence theory that does not require idealism will be discussed in section 6.5 below.)

For more on the coherence theory, see Walker (2018) and the entry on the coherence theory of truth .

A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans. For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:

Truth is the end of inquiry.

(See, for instance Hartshorne et al., 1931–58, §3.432.) Both Peirce and James are associated with the slogan that:

Truth is satisfactory to believe.

James (e.g., 1907) understands this principle as telling us what practical value truth has. True beliefs are guaranteed not to conflict with subsequent experience. Likewise, Peirce’s slogan tells us that true beliefs will remain settled at the end of prolonged inquiry. Peirce’s slogan is perhaps most typically associated with pragmatist views of truth, so we might take it to be our canonical neo-classical theory. However, the contemporary literature does not seem to have firmly settled upon a received ‘neo-classical’ pragmatist theory.

In her reconstruction (upon which we have relied heavily), Haack (1976) notes that the pragmatists’ views on truth also make room for the idea that truth involves a kind of correspondence, insofar as the scientific method of inquiry is answerable to some independent world. Peirce, for instance, does not reject a correspondence theory outright; rather, he complains that it provides merely a ‘nominal’ or ‘transcendental’ definition of truth (e.g Hartshorne et al., 1931–58, §5.553, §5.572), which is cut off from practical matters of experience, belief, and doubt (§5.416). (See Misak (2004) for an extended discussion.)

This marks an important difference between the pragmatist theories and the coherence theory we just considered. Even so, pragmatist theories also have an affinity with coherence theories, insofar as we expect the end of inquiry to be a coherent system of beliefs. As Haack also notes, James maintains an important verificationist idea: truth is what is verifiable. We will see this idea re-appear in section 4.

For more on pragmatist theories of truth, see Misak (2018). James’ views are discussed further in the entry on William James . Peirce’s views are discussed further in the entry on Charles Sanders Peirce .

2. Tarski’s theory of truth

Modern forms of the classical theories survive. Many of these modern theories, notably correspondence theories, draw on ideas developed by Tarski.

In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that his seminal work on truth (1935) is very much of a piece with other works in mathematical logic, such as his (1931), and as much as anything this work lays the ground-work for the modern subject of model theory – a branch of mathematical logic, not the metaphysics of truth. In this respect, Tarski’s work provides a set of highly useful tools that may be employed in a wide range of philosophical projects. (See Patterson (2012) for more on Tarski’s work in its historical context.)

Tarski’s work has a number of components, which we will consider in turn.

In the classical debate on truth at the beginning of the 20th century we considered in section 1, the issue of truth-bearers was of great significance. For instance, Moore and Russell’s turn to the correspondence theory was driven by their views on whether there are propositions to be the bearers of truth. Many theories we reviewed took beliefs to be the bearers of truth.

In contrast, Tarski and much of the subsequent work on truth takes sentences to be the primary bearers of truth. This is not an entirely novel development: Russell (1956) also takes truth to apply to sentence (which he calls ‘propositions’ in that text). But whereas much of the classical debate takes the issue of the primary bearers of truth to be a substantial and important metaphysical one, Tarski is quite casual about it. His primary reason for taking sentences as truth-bearers is convenience, and he explicitly distances himself from any commitment about the philosophically contentious issues surrounding other candidate truth-bearers (e.g., Tarski, 1944). (Russell (1956) makes a similar suggestion that sentences are the appropriate truth-bearers “for the purposes of logic” (p. 184), though he still takes the classical metaphysical issues to be important.)

We will return to the issue of the primary bearers of truth in section 6.1. For the moment, it will be useful to simply follow Tarski’s lead. But it should be stressed that for this discussion, sentences are fully interpreted sentences, having meanings. We will also assume that the sentences in question do not change their content across occasions of use, i.e., that they display no context-dependence. We are taking sentences to be what Quine (1960) calls ‘eternal sentences’.

In some places (e.g., Tarski, 1944), Tarski refers to his view as the ‘semantic conception of truth’. It is not entirely clear just what Tarski had in mind by this, but it is clear enough that Tarski’s theory defines truth for sentences in terms of concepts like reference and satisfaction, which are intimately related to the basic semantic functions of names and predicates (according to many approaches to semantics). For more discussion, see Woleński (2001).

Let us suppose we have a fixed language $\mathbf{L}$ whose sentences are fully interpreted. The basic question Tarski poses is what an adequate theory of truth for $\mathbf{L}$ would be. Tarski’s answer is embodied in what he calls Convention T :

An adequate theory of truth for $\mathbf{L}$ must imply, for each sentence $\phi$ of $\mathbf{L}$

$\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ is true if and only if $\phi$.

(We have simplified Tarski’s presentation somewhat.) This is an adequacy condition for theories, not a theory itself. Given the assumption that $\mathbf{L}$ is fully interpreted, we may assume that each sentence $\phi$ in fact has a truth value. In light of this, Convention T guarantees that the truth predicate given by the theory will be extensionally correct , i.e., have as its extension all and only the true sentences of $\mathbf{L}$.

Convention T draws our attention to the biconditionals of the form

$\ulcorner \ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ is true if and only if $\phi \urcorner$,

which are usually called the Tarski biconditionals for a language $\mathbf{L}$.

Tarski does not merely propose a condition of adequacy for theories of truth, he also shows how to meet it. One of his insights is that if the language $\mathbf{L}$ displays the right structure, then truth for $\mathbf{L}$ can be defined recursively. For instance, let us suppose that $\mathbf{L}$ is a simple formal language, containing two atomic sentences ‘snow is white’ and ‘grass is green’, and the sentential connectives $\vee$ and $\neg$.

In spite of its simplicity, $\mathbf{L}$ contains infinitely many distinct sentences. But truth can be defined for all of them by recursion.

‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
‘Grass is green’ is true if and only if grass is green.
$\ulcorner \phi \vee \psi \urcorner$ is true if and only if $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ is true or $\ulcorner \psi \urcorner$ is true.
$\ulcorner \neg \phi \urcorner$ is true if and only if it is not the case that $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ is true.

This theory satisfies Convention T.

This may look trivial, but in defining an extensionally correct truth predicate for an infinite language with four clauses, we have made a modest application of a very powerful technique.

Tarski’s techniques go further, however. They do not stop with atomic sentences. Tarski notes that truth for each atomic sentence can be defined in terms of two closely related notions: reference and satisfaction . Let us consider a language $\mathbf{L}'$, just like $\mathbf{L}$ except that instead of simply having two atomic sentences, $\mathbf{L}'$ breaks atomic sentences into terms and predicates. $\mathbf{L}'$ contains terms ‘snow’ and ‘grass’ (let us engage in the idealization that these are simply singular terms), and predicates ‘is white’ and ‘is green’. So $\mathbf{L}'$ is like $\mathbf{L}$, but also contains the sentences ‘Snow is green’ and ‘Grass is white’.)

We can define truth for atomic sentences of $\mathbf{L}'$ in the following way.

‘Snow’ refers to snow.
‘Grass’ refers to grass.
$a$ satisfies ‘is white’ if and only if $a$ is white.
$a$ satisfies ‘is green’ if and only if $a$ is green.
For any atomic sentence $\ulcorner t$ is $P \urcorner$: $\ulcorner t$ is $P \urcorner$ is true if and only if the referent of $\ulcorner t \urcorner$ satisfies $\ulcorner P\urcorner$.

One of Tarski’s key insights is that the apparatus of satisfaction allows for a recursive definition of truth for sentences with quantifiers , though we will not examine that here. We could repeat the recursion clauses for $\mathbf{L}$ to produce a full theory of truth for $\mathbf{L}'$.

Let us say that a Tarskian theory of truth is a recursive theory, built up in ways similar to the theory of truth for $\mathbf{L}'$. Tarski goes on to demonstrate some key applications of such a theory of truth. A Tarskian theory of truth for a language $\mathbf{L}$ can be used to show that theories in $\mathbf{L}$ are consistent. This was especially important to Tarski, who was concerned the Liar paradox would make theories in languages containing a truth predicate inconsistent.

For more, see Ray (2018) and the entries on axiomatic theories of truth , the Liar paradox , and Tarski’s truth definitions .

3. Correspondence revisited

The correspondence theory of truth expresses the very natural idea that truth is a content-to-world or word-to-world relation: what we say or think is true or false in virtue of the way the world turns out to be. We suggested that, against a background like the metaphysics of facts, it does so in a straightforward way. But the idea of correspondence is certainly not specific to this framework. Indeed, it is controversial whether a correspondence theory should rely on any particular metaphysics at all. The basic idea of correspondence, as Tarski (1944) and others have suggested, is captured in the slogan from Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ 7.27, “to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true” (Ross, 1928). ‘What is’, it is natural enough to say, is a fact, but this natural turn of phrase may well not require a full-blown metaphysics of facts. (For a discussion of Aristotle’s views in a historical context, see Szaif (2018).)

Yet without the metaphysics of facts, the notion of correspondence as discussed in section 1.1 loses substance. This has led to two distinct strands in contemporary thinking about the correspondence theory. One strand seeks to recast the correspondence theory in a way that does not rely on any particular ontology. Another seeks to find an appropriate ontology for correspondence, either in terms of facts or other entities. We will consider each in turn.

Tarski himself sometimes suggested that his theory was a kind of correspondence theory of truth. Whether his own theory is a correspondence theory, and even whether it provides any substantial philosophical account of truth at all, is a matter of controversy. (One rather drastic negative assessment from Putnam (1985–86, p. 333) is that “As a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.”) But a number of philosophers (e.g., Davidson, 1969; Field, 1972) have seen Tarski’s theory as providing at least the core of a correspondence theory of truth which dispenses with the metaphysics of facts.

Tarski’s theory shows how truth for a sentence is determined by certain properties of its constituents; in particular, by properties of reference and satisfaction (as well as by the logical constants). As it is normally understood, reference is the preeminent word-to-world relation. Satisfaction is naturally understood as a word-to-world relation as well, which relates a predicate to the things in the world that bear it. The Tarskian recursive definition shows how truth is determined by reference and satisfaction, and so is in effect determined by the things in the world we refer to and the properties they bear. This, one might propose, is all the correspondence we need. It is not correspondence of sentences or propositions to facts; rather, it is correspondence of our expressions to objects and the properties they bear, and then ways of working out the truth of claims in terms of this.

This is certainly not the neo-classical idea of correspondence. In not positing facts, it does not posit any single object to which a true proposition or sentence might correspond. Rather, it shows how truth might be worked out from basic word-to-world relations. However, a number of authors have noted that Tarski’s theory cannot by itself provide us with such an account of truth. As we will discuss more fully in section 4.2, Tarski’s apparatus is in fact compatible with theories of truth that are certainly not correspondence theories.

Field (1972), in an influential discussion and diagnosis of what is lacking in Tarski’s account, in effect points out that whether we really have something worthy of the name ‘correspondence’ depends on our having notions of reference and satisfaction which genuinely establish word-to-world relations. (Field does not use the term ‘correspondence’, but does talk about e.g., the “connection between words and things” (p. 373).) By itself, Field notes, Tarski’s theory does not offer an account of reference and satisfaction at all. Rather, it offers a number of disquotation clauses , such as:

These clauses have an air of triviality (though whether they are to be understood as trivial principles or statements of non-trivial semantic facts has been a matter of some debate). With Field, we might propose to supplement clauses like these with an account of reference and satisfaction. Such a theory should tell us what makes it the case that the word ‘snow’ refer to snow. (In 1972, Field was envisaging a physicalist account, along the lines of the causal theory of reference.) This should inter alia guarantee that truth is really determined by word-to-world relations, so in conjunction with the Tarskian recursive definition, it could provide a correspondence theory of truth.

Such a theory clearly does not rely on a metaphysics of facts. Indeed, it is in many ways metaphysically neutral, as it does not take a stand on the nature of particulars, or of the properties or universals that underwrite facts about satisfaction. However, it may not be entirely devoid of metaphysical implications, as we will discuss further in section 4.1.

Much of the subsequent discussion of Field-style approaches to correspondence has focused on the role of representation in these views. Field’s own (1972) discussion relies on a causal relation between terms and their referents, and a similar relation for satisfaction. These are instances of representation relations. According to representational views, meaningful items, like perhaps thoughts or sentences or their constituents, have their contents in virtue of standing in the right relation to the things they represent. On many views, including Field’s, a name stands in such a relation to its bearer, and the relation is a causal one.

The project of developing a naturalist account of the representation relation has been an important one in the philosophy of mind and language. (See the entry on mental representation .) But, it has implications for the theory of truth. Representational views of content lead naturally to correspondence theories of truth. To make this vivid, suppose you hold that sentences or beliefs stand in a representation relation to some objects. It is natural to suppose that for true beliefs or sentences, those objects would be facts. We then have a correspondence theory, with the correspondence relation explicated as a representation relation: a truth bearer is true if it represents a fact.

As we have discussed, many contemporary views reject facts, but one can hold a representational view of content without them. One interpretation of Field’s theory is just that. The relations of reference and satisfaction are representation relations, and truth for sentences is determined compositionally in terms of those representation relations, and the nature of the objects they represent. If we have such relations, we have the building blocks for a correspondence theory without facts. Field (1972) anticipated a naturalist reduction of the representation via a causal theory, but any view that accepts representation relations for truth bearers or their constituents can provide a similar theory of truth. (See Jackson (2006) and Lynch (2009) for further discussion.)

Representational views of content provide a natural way to approach the correspondence theory of truth, and likewise, anti-representational views provide a natural way to avoid the correspondence theory of truth. This is most clear in the work of Davidson, as we will discuss more in section 6.5.

There have been a number of correspondence theories that do make use of facts. Some are notably different from the neo-classical theory sketched in section 1.1. For instance, Austin (1950) proposes a view in which each statement (understood roughly as an utterance event) corresponds to both a fact or situation, and a type of situation. It is true if the former is of the latter type. This theory, which has been developed by situation theory (e.g., Barwise and Perry, 1986), rejects the idea that correspondence is a kind of mirroring between a fact and a proposition. Rather, correspondence relations to Austin are entirely conventional. (See Vision (2004) for an extended defense of an Austinian correspondence theory.) As an ordinary language philosopher, Austin grounds his notion of fact more in linguistic usage than in an articulated metaphysics, but he defends his use of fact-talk in Austin (1961b).

In a somewhat more Tarskian spirit, formal theories of facts or states of affairs have also been developed. For instance, Taylor (1976) provides a recursive definition of a collection of ‘states of affairs’ for a given language. Taylor’s states of affairs seem to reflect the notion of fact at work in the neo-classical theory, though as an exercise in logic, they are officially $n$-tuples of objects and intensions .

There are more metaphysically robust notions of fact in the current literature. For instance, Armstrong (1997) defends a metaphysics in which facts (under the name ‘states of affairs’) are metaphysically fundamental. The view has much in common with the neo-classical one. Like the neo-classical view, Armstrong endorses a version of the correspondence theory. States of affairs are truthmakers for propositions, though Armstrong argues that there may be many such truthmakers for a given proposition, and vice versa. (Armstrong also envisages a naturalistic account of propositions as classes of equivalent belief-tokens.)

Armstrong’s primary argument is what he calls the ‘truthmaker argument’. It begins by advancing a truthmaker principle , which holds that for any given truth, there must be a truthmaker – a “something in the world which makes it the case, that serves as an ontological ground, for this truth” (p. 115). It is then argued that facts are the appropriate truthmakers.

In contrast to the approach to correspondence discussed in section 3.1, which offered correspondence with minimal ontological implications, this view returns to the ontological basis of correspondence that was characteristic of the neo-classical theory.

For more on facts, see the entry on facts .

The truthmaker principle is often put as the schema:

If $\phi$, then there is an $x$ such that necessarily, if $x$ exists, then $\phi$.

(Fox (1987) proposed putting the principle this way, rather than explicitly in terms of truth.)

The truthmaker principle expresses the ontological aspect of the neo-classical correspondence theory. Not merely must truth obtain in virtue of word-to-world relations, but there must be a thing that makes each truth true. (For one view on this, see Merricks (2007).)

The neo-classical correspondence theory, and Armstrong, cast facts as the appropriate truthmakers. However, it is a non-trivial step from the truthmaker principle to the existence of facts. There are a number of proposals in the literature for how other sorts of objects could be truthmakers; for instance, tropes (called ‘moments’, in Mulligan et al., 1984). Parsons (1999) argues that the truthmaker principle (presented in a somewhat different form) is compatible with there being only concrete particulars.

As we saw in discussing the neo-classical correspondence theory, truthmaker theories, and fact theories in particular, raise a number of issues. One which has been discussed at length, for instance, is whether there are negative facts . Negative facts would be the truthmakers for negated sentences. Russell (1956) notoriously expresses ambivalence about whether there are negative facts. Armstrong (1997) rejects them, while Beall (2000) defends them. (For more discussion of truthmakers, see Cameron (2018) and the papers in Beebee and Dodd (2005).)

4. Realism and anti-realism

The neo-classical theories we surveyed in section 1 made the theory of truth an application of their background metaphysics (and in some cases epistemology). In section 2 and especially in section 3, we returned to the issue of what sorts of ontological commitments might go with the theory of truth. There we saw a range of options, from relatively ontologically non-committal theories, to theories requiring highly specific ontologies.

There is another way in which truth relates to metaphysics. Many ideas about realism and anti-realism are closely related to ideas about truth. Indeed, many approaches to questions about realism and anti-realism simply make them questions about truth.

In discussing the approach to correspondence of section 3.1, we noted that it has few ontological requirements. It relies on there being objects of reference, and something about the world which makes for determinate satisfaction relations; but beyond that, it is ontologically neutral. But as we mentioned there, this is not to say that it has no metaphysical implications. A correspondence theory of truth, of any kind, is often taken to embody a form of realism .

The key features of realism, as we will take it, are that:

The world exists objectively, independently of the ways we think about it or describe it.
Our thoughts and claims are about that world.

(Wright (1992) offers a nice statement of this way of thinking about realism.) These theses imply that our claims are objectively true or false, depending on how the world they are about is. The world that we represent in our thoughts or language is an objective world. (Realism may be restricted to some subject-matter, or range of discourse, but for simplicity, we will talk about only its global form.)

It is often argued that these theses require some form of the correspondence theory of truth. (Putnam (1978, p. 18) notes, “Whatever else realists say, they typically say that they believe in a ‘correspondence theory of truth’.”) At least, they are supported by the kind of correspondence theory without facts discussed in section 3.1, such as Field’s proposal. Such a theory will provide an account of objective relations of reference and satisfaction, and show how these determine the truth or falsehood of what we say about the world. Field’s own approach (1972) to this problem seeks a physicalist explanation of reference. But realism is a more general idea than physicalism. Any theory that provides objective relations of reference and satisfaction, and builds up a theory of truth from them, would give a form of realism. (Making the objectivity of reference the key to realism is characteristic of work of Putnam, e.g., 1978.)

Another important mark of realism expressed in terms of truth is the property of bivalence . As Dummett has stressed (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1983; 1991), a realist should see there being a fact of the matter one way or the other about whether any given claim is correct. Hence, one important mark of realism is that it goes together with the principle of bivalence : every truth-bearer (sentence or proposition) is true or false. In much of his work, Dummett has made this the characteristic mark of realism, and often identifies realism about some subject-matter with accepting bivalence for discourse about that subject-matter. At the very least, it captures a great deal of what is more loosely put in the statement of realism above.

Both the approaches to realism, through reference and through bivalence, make truth the primary vehicle for an account of realism. A theory of truth which substantiates bivalence, or builds truth from a determinate reference relation, does most of the work of giving a realistic metaphysics. It might even simply be a realistic metaphysics.

We have thus turned on its head the relation of truth to metaphysics we saw in our discussion of the neo-classical correspondence theory in section 1.1. There, a correspondence theory of truth was built upon a substantial metaphysics. Here, we have seen how articulating a theory that captures the idea of correspondence can be crucial to providing a realist metaphysics. (For another perspective on realism and truth, see Alston (1996). Devitt (1984) offers an opposing view to the kind we have sketched here, which rejects any characterization of realism in terms of truth or other semantic concepts.)

In light of our discussion in section 1.1.1, we should pause to note that the connection between realism and the correspondence theory of truth is not absolute. When Moore and Russell held the identity theory of truth, they were most certainly realists. The right kind of metaphysics of propositions can support a realist view, as can a metaphysics of facts. The modern form of realism we have been discussing here seeks to avoid basing itself on such particular ontological commitments, and so prefers to rely on the kind of correspondence-without-facts approach discussed in section 3.1. This is not to say that realism will be devoid of ontological commitments, but the commitments will flow from whichever specific claims about some subject-matter are taken to be true.

For more on realism and truth, see Fumerton (2002) and the entry on realism .

It should come as no surprise that the relation between truth and metaphysics seen by modern realists can also be exploited by anti-realists. Many modern anti-realists see the theory of truth as the key to formulating and defending their views. With Dummett (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1991), we might expect the characteristic mark of anti-realism to be the rejection of bivalence.

Indeed, many contemporary forms of anti-realism may be formulated as theories of truth, and they do typically deny bivalence. Anti-realism comes in many forms, but let us take as an example a (somewhat crude) form of verificationism. Such a theory holds that a claim is correct just insofar as it is in principle verifiable , i.e., there is a verification procedure we could in principle carry out which would yield the answer that the claim in question was verified.

So understood, verificationism is a theory of truth. The claim is not that verification is the most important epistemic notion, but that truth just is verifiability. As with the kind of realism we considered in section 4.1, this view expresses its metaphysical commitments in its explanation of the nature of truth. Truth is not, to this view, a fully objective matter, independent of us or our thoughts. Instead, truth is constrained by our abilities to verify, and is thus constrained by our epistemic situation. Truth is to a significant degree an epistemic matter, which is typical of many anti-realist positions.

As Dummett says, the verificationist notion of truth does not appear to support bivalence. Any statement that reaches beyond what we can in principle verify or refute (verify its negation) will be a counter-example to bivalence. Take, for instance, the claim that there is some substance, say uranium, present in some region of the universe too distant to be inspected by us within the expected lifespan of the universe. Insofar as this really would be in principle unverifiable, we have no reason to maintain it is true or false according to the verificationist theory of truth.

Verificationism of this sort is one of a family of anti-realist views. Another example is the view that identifies truth with warranted assertibility. Assertibility, as well as verifiability, has been important in Dummett’s work. (See also works of McDowell, e.g., 1976 and Wright, e.g., 1976; 1982; 1992.)

Anti-realism of the Dummettian sort is not a descendant of the coherence theory of truth per se . But in some ways, as Dummett himself has noted, it might be construed as a descendant – perhaps very distant – of idealism. If idealism is the most drastic form of rejection of the independence of mind and world, Dummettian anti-realism is a more modest form, which sees epistemology imprinted in the world, rather than the wholesale embedding of world into mind. At the same time, the idea of truth as warranted assertibility or verifiability reiterates a theme from the pragmatist views of truth we surveyed in section 1.3.

Anti-realist theories of truth, like the realist ones we discussed in section 4.1, can generally make use of the Tarskian apparatus. Convention T, in particular, does not discriminate between realist and anti-realist notions of truth. Likewise, the base clauses of a Tarskian recursive theory are given as disquotation principles, which are neutral between realist and anti-realist understandings of notions like reference. As we saw with the correspondence theory, giving a full account of the nature of truth will generally require more than the Tarskian apparatus itself. How an anti-realist is to explain the basic concepts that go into a Tarskian theory is a delicate matter. As Dummett and Wright have investigated in great detail, it appears that the background logic in which the theory is developed will have to be non-classical.

For more on anti-realism and truth, see Shieh (2018) and the papers in Greenough and Lynch (2006) and the entry on realism .

Many commentators see a close connection between Dummett’s anti-realism and the pragmatists’ views of truth, in that both put great weight on ideas of verifiability or assertibility. Dummett himself stressed parallels between anti-realism and intuitionism in the philosophy of mathematics.

Another view on truth which returns to pragmatist themes is the ‘internal realism’ of Putnam (1981). There Putnam glosses truth as what would be justified under ideal epistemic conditions. With the pragmatists, Putnam sees the ideal conditions as something which can be approximated, echoing the idea of truth as the end of inquiry.

Putnam is cautious about calling his view anti-realism, preferring the label ‘internal realism’. But he is clear that he sees his view as opposed to realism (‘metaphysical realism’, as he calls it).

Davidson’s views on truth have also been associated with pragmatism, notably by Rorty (1986). Davidson has distanced himself from this interpretation (e.g., 1990), but he does highlight connections between truth and belief and meaning. Insofar as these are human attitudes or relate to human actions, Davidson grants there is some affinity between his views and those of some pragmatists (especially, he says, Dewey).

Another view that has grown out of the literature on realism and anti-realism, and has become increasingly important in the current literature, is that of pluralism about truth. This view, developed in work of Lynch (e.g. 2001b; 2009) and Wright (e.g. 1992; 1999), proposes that there are multiple ways for truth bearers to be true. Wright, in particular, suggests that in certain domains of discourse what we say is true in virtue of a correspondence-like relation, while in others it is its true in virtue of a kind of assertibility relation that is closer in spirit to the anti-realist views we have just discussed.

Such a proposal might suggest there are multiple concepts of truth, or that the term ‘true’ is itself ambiguous. However, whether or not a pluralist view is committed to such claims has been disputed. In particular, Lynch (2001b; 2009) develops a version of pluralism which takes truth to be a functional role concept. The functional role of truth is characterized by a range of principles that articulate such features of truth as its objectivity, its role in inquiry, and related ideas we have encountered in considering various theories of truth. (A related point about platitudes governing the concept of truth is made by Wright (1992).) But according to Lynch, these display the functional role of truth. Furthermore, Lynch claims that on analogy with analytic functionalism, these principles can be seen as deriving from our pre-theoretic or ‘folk’ ideas about truth.

Like all functional role concepts, truth must be realized, and according to Lynch it may be realized in different ways in different settings. Such multiple realizability has been one of the hallmarks of functional role concepts discussed in the philosophy of mind. For instance, Lynch suggests that for ordinary claims about material objects, truth might be realized by a correspondence property (which he links to representational views), while for moral claims truth might be manifest by an assertibility property along more anti-realist lines.

For more on pluralism about truth, see Pedersen and Lynch (2018) and the entry on pluralist theories of truth .

5. Deflationism

We began in section 1 with the neo-classical theories, which explained the nature of truth within wider metaphysical systems. We then considered some alternatives in sections 2 and 3, some of which had more modest ontological implications. But we still saw in section 4 that substantial theories of truth tend to imply metaphysical theses, or even embody metaphysical positions.

One long-standing trend in the discussion of truth is to insist that truth really does not carry metaphysical significance at all. It does not, as it has no significance on its own. A number of different ideas have been advanced along these lines, under the general heading of deflationism .

Deflationist ideas appear quite early on, including a well-known argument against correspondence in Frege (1918–19). However, many deflationists take their cue from an idea of Ramsey (1927), often called the equivalence thesis :

$\ulcorner \ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ is true $\urcorner$ has the same meaning as $\phi$.

(Ramsey himself takes truth-bearers to be propositions rather than sentences. Glanzberg (2003b) questions whether Ramsey’s account of propositions really makes him a deflationist.)

This can be taken as the core of a theory of truth, often called the redundancy theory . The redundancy theory holds that there is no property of truth at all, and appearances of the expression ‘true’ in our sentences are redundant, having no effect on what we express.

The equivalence thesis can also be understood in terms of speech acts rather than meaning:

To assert that $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ is true is just to assert that $\phi$.

This view was advanced by Strawson (1949; 1950), though Strawson also argues that there are other important aspects of speech acts involving ‘true’ beyond what is asserted. For instance, they may be acts of confirming or granting what someone else said. (Strawson would also object to my making sentences the bearers of truth.)

In either its speech act or meaning form, the redundancy theory argues there is no property of truth. It is commonly noted that the equivalence thesis itself is not enough to sustain the redundancy theory. It merely holds that when truth occurs in the outermost position in a sentence, and the full sentence to which truth is predicated is quoted, then truth is eliminable. What happens in other environments is left to be seen. Modern developments of the redundancy theory include Grover et al. (1975).

The equivalence principle looks familiar: it has something like the form of the Tarski biconditionals discussed in section 2.2. However, it is a stronger principle, which identifies the two sides of the biconditional – either their meanings or the speech acts performed with them. The Tarski biconditionals themselves are simply material biconditionals.

A number of deflationary theories look to the Tarski biconditionals rather than the full equivalence principle. Their key idea is that even if we do not insist on redundancy, we may still hold the following theses:

For a given language $\mathbf{L}$ and every $\phi$ in $\mathbf{L}$, the biconditionals $\ulcorner \ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ is true if and only if $\phi \urcorner$ hold by definition (or analytically, or trivially, or by stipulation …).
This is all there is to say about the concept of truth.

We will refer to views which adopt these as minimalist . Officially, this is the name of the view of Horwich (1990), but we will apply it somewhat more widely. (Horwich’s view differs in some specific respects from what is presented here, such as predicating truth of propositions, but we believe it is close enough to what is sketched here to justify the name.)

The second thesis, that the Tarski biconditionals are all there is to say about truth, captures something similar to the redundancy theory’s view. It comes near to saying that truth is not a property at all; to the extent that truth is a property, there is no more to it than the disquotational pattern of the Tarski biconditionals. As Horwich puts it, there is no substantial underlying metaphysics to truth. And as Soames (1984) stresses, certainly nothing that could ground as far-reaching a view as realism or anti-realism.

If there is no property of truth, or no substantial property of truth, what role does our term ‘true’ play? Deflationists typically note that the truth predicate provides us with a convenient device of disquotation . Such a device allows us to make some useful claims which we could not formulate otherwise, such as the blind ascription ‘The next thing that Bill says will be true’. (For more on blind ascriptions and their relation to deflationism, see Azzouni, 2001.) A predicate obeying the Tarski biconditionals can also be used to express what would otherwise be (potentially) infinite conjunctions or disjunctions, such as the notorious statement of Papal infallibility put ‘Everything the Pope says is true’. (Suggestions like this are found in Leeds, 1978 and Quine, 1970.)

Recognizing these uses for a truth predicate, we might simply think of it as introduced into a language by stipulation . The Tarski biconditionals themselves might be stipulated, as the minimalists envisage. One could also construe the clauses of a recursive Tarskian theory as stipulated. (There are some significant logical differences between these two options. See Halbach (1999) and Ketland (1999) for discussion.) Other deflationists, such as Beall (2005) or Field (1994), might prefer to focus here on rules of inference or rules of use, rather than the Tarski biconditionals themselves.

There are also important connections between deflationist ideas about truth and certain ideas about meaning. These are fundamental to the deflationism of Field (1986; 1994), which will be discussed in section 6.3. For an insightful critique of deflationism, see Gupta (1993).

For more on deflationism, see Azzouni (2018) and the entry on the deflationary theory of truth .

6. Truth and language

One of the important themes in the literature on truth is its connection to meaning, or more generally, to language. This has proved an important application of ideas about truth, and an important issue in the study of truth itself. This section will consider a number of issues relating truth and language.

There have been many debates in the literature over what the primary bearers of truth are. Candidates typically include beliefs, propositions, sentences, and utterances. We have already seen in section 1 that the classical debates on truth took this issue very seriously, and what sort of theory of truth was viable was often seen to depend on what the bearers of truth are.

In spite of the number of options under discussion, and the significance that has sometimes been placed on the choice, there is an important similarity between candidate truth-bearers. Consider the role of truth-bearers in the correspondence theory, for instance. We have seen versions of it which take beliefs, propositions, or interpreted sentences to be the primary bearers of truth. But all of them rely upon the idea that their truth-bearers are meaningful , and are thereby able to say something about what the world is like. (We might say that they are able to represent the world, but that is to use ‘represent’ in a wider sense than we saw in section 3.2. No assumptions about just what stands in relations to what objects are required to see truth-bearers as meaningful.) It is in virtue of being meaningful that truth-bearers are able to enter into correspondence relations. Truth-bearers are things which meaningfully make claims about what the world is like, and are true or false depending on whether the facts in the world are as described.

Exactly the same point can be made for the anti-realist theories of truth we saw in section 4.2, though with different accounts of how truth-bearers are meaningful, and what the world contributes. Though it is somewhat more delicate, something similar can be said for coherence theories, which usually take beliefs, or whole systems of beliefs, as the primary truth-bearers. Though a coherence theory will hardly talk of beliefs representing the facts, it is crucial to the coherence theory that beliefs are contentful beliefs of agents, and that they can enter into coherence relations. Noting the complications in interpreting the genuine classical coherence theories, it appears fair to note that this requires truth-bearers to be meaningful, however the background metaphysics (presumably idealism) understands meaning.

Though Tarski works with sentences, the same can be said of his theory. The sentences to which Tarski’s theory applies are fully interpreted, and so also are meaningful. They characterize the world as being some way or another, and this in turn determines whether they are true or false. Indeed, Tarski needs there to be a fact of the matter about whether each sentence is true or false (abstracting away from context dependence), to ensure that the Tarski biconditionals do their job of fixing the extension of ‘is true’. (But note that just what this fact of the matter consists in is left open by the Tarskian apparatus.)

We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing something meaningful. This makes them reasonable bearers of truth. For this reason, it seems, contemporary debates on truth have been much less concerned with the issue of truth-bearers than were the classical ones. Some issues remain, of course. Different metaphysical assumptions may place primary weight on some particular node in the circle, and some metaphysical views still challenge the existence of some of the nodes. Perhaps more importantly, different views on the nature of meaning itself might cast doubt on the coherence of some of the nodes. Notoriously for instance, Quineans (e.g., Quine, 1960) deny the existence of intensional entities, including propositions. Even so, it increasingly appears doubtful that attention to truth per se will bias us towards one particular primary bearer of truth.

For more on these issues, see King (2018).

There is a related, but somewhat different point, which is important to understanding the theories we have canvassed.

The neo-classical theories of truth start with truth-bearers which are already understood to be meaningful, and explain how they get their truth values. But along the way, they often do something more. Take the neo-classical correspondence theory, for instance. This theory, in effect, starts with a view of how propositions are meaningful. They are so in virtue of having constituents in the world, which are brought together in the right way. There are many complications about the nature of meaning, but at a minimum, this tells us what the truth conditions associated with a proposition are. The theory then explains how such truth conditions can lead to the truth value true , by the right fact existing .

Many theories of truth are like the neo-classical correspondence theory in being as much theories of how truth-bearers are meaningful as of how their truth values are fixed. Again, abstracting from some complications about meaning, this makes them theories both of truth conditions and truth values . The Tarskian theory of truth can be construed this way too. This can be seen both in the way the Tarski biconditionals are understood, and how a recursive theory of truth is understood. As we explained Convention T in section 2.2, the primary role of a Tarski biconditional of the form $\ulcorner \ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ is true if and only if $\phi \urcorner$ is to fix whether $\phi$ is in the extension of ‘is true’ or not. But it can also be seen as stating the truth conditions of $\phi$. Both rely on the fact that the unquoted occurrence of $\phi$ is an occurrence of an interpreted sentence, which has a truth value, but also provides its truth conditions upon occasions of use.

Likewise, the base clauses of the recursive definition of truth, those for reference and satisfaction, are taken to state the relevant semantic properties of constituents of an interpreted sentence. In discussing Tarski’s theory of truth in section 2, we focused on how these determine the truth value of a sentence. But they also show us the truth conditions of a sentence are determined by these semantic properties. For instance, for a simple sentence like ‘Snow is white’, the theory tells us that the sentence is true if the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies ‘white’. This can be understood as telling us that the truth conditions of ‘Snow is white’ are those conditions in which the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’.

As we saw in sections 3 and 4, the Tarskian apparatus is often seen as needing some kind of supplementation to provide a full theory of truth. A full theory of truth conditions will likewise rest on how the Tarskian apparatus is put to use. In particular, just what kinds of conditions those in which the referent of ‘snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’ are will depend on whether we opt for realist or anti-realist theories. The realist option will simply look for the conditions under which the stuff snow bears the property of whiteness; the anti-realist option will look to the conditions under which it can be verified, or asserted with warrant, that snow is white.

There is a broad family of theories of truth which are theories of truth conditions as well as truth values. This family includes the correspondence theory in all its forms – classical and modern. Yet this family is much wider than the correspondence theory, and wider than realist theories of truth more generally. Indeed, virtually all the theories of truth that make contributions to the realism/anti-realism debate are theories of truth conditions. In a slogan, for many approaches to truth, a theory of truth is a theory of truth conditions.

Any theory that provides a substantial account of truth conditions can offer a simple account of truth values: a truth-bearer provides truth conditions, and it is true if and only if the actual way things are is among them. Because of this, any such theory will imply a strong, but very particular, biconditional, close in form to the Tarski biconditionals. It can be made most vivid if we think of propositions as sets of truth conditions. Let $p$ be a proposition, i.e., a set of truth conditions, and let $a$ be the ‘actual world’, the condition that actually obtains. Then we can almost trivially see:

$p$ is true if and only if $a \in p$.

This is presumably necessary. But it is important to observe that it is in one respect crucially different from the genuine Tarski biconditionals. It makes no use of a non-quoted sentence, or in fact any sentence at all. It does not have the disquotational character of the Tarski biconditionals.

Though this may look like a principle that deflationists should applaud, it is not. Rather, it shows that deflationists cannot really hold a truth-conditional view of content at all. If they do, then they inter alia have a non-deflationary theory of truth, simply by linking truth value to truth conditions through the above biconditional. It is typical of thoroughgoing deflationist theories to present a non-truth-conditional theory of the contents of sentences: a non-truth-conditional account of what makes truth-bearers meaningful. We take it this is what is offered, for instance, by the use theory of propositions in Horwich (1990). It is certainly one of the leading ideas of Field (1986; 1994), which explore how a conceptual role account of content would ground a deflationist view of truth. Once one has a non-truth-conditional account of content, it is then possible to add a deflationist truth predicate, and use this to give purely deflationist statements of truth conditions. But the starting point must be a non-truth-conditional view of what makes truth-bearers meaningful.

Both deflationists and anti-realists start with something other than correspondence truth conditions. But whereas an anti-realist will propose a different theory of truth conditions, a deflationists will start with an account of content which is not a theory of truth conditions at all. The deflationist will then propose that the truth predicate, given by the Tarski biconditionals, is an additional device, not for understanding content, but for disquotation. It is a useful device, as we discussed in section 5.3, but it has nothing to do with content. To a deflationist, the meaningfulness of truth-bearers has nothing to do with truth.

It has been an influential idea, since the seminal work of Davidson (e.g., 1967), to see a Tarskian theory of truth as a theory of meaning. At least, as we have seen, a Tarskian theory can be seen as showing how the truth conditions of a sentence are determined by the semantic properties of its parts. More generally, as we see in much of the work of Davidson and of Dummett (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1983; 1991), giving a theory of truth conditions can be understood as a crucial part of giving a theory of meaning. Thus, any theory of truth that falls into the broad category of those which are theories of truth conditions can be seen as part of a theory of meaning. (For more discussion of these issues, see Higginbotham (1986; 1989) and the exchange between Higginbotham (1992) and Soames (1992).)

A number of commentators on Tarski (e.g., Etchemendy, 1988; Soames, 1984) have observed that the Tarskian apparatus needs to be understood in a particular way to make it suitable for giving a theory of meaning. Tarski’s work is often taken to show how to define a truth predicate. If it is so used, then whether or not a sentence is true becomes, in essence, a truth of mathematics. Presumably what truth conditions sentences of a natural language have is a contingent matter, so a truth predicate defined in this way cannot be used to give a theory of meaning for them. But the Tarskian apparatus need not be used just to explicitly define truth. The recursive characterization of truth can be used to state the semantic properties of sentences and their constituents, as a theory of meaning should. In such an application, truth is not taken to be explicitly defined, but rather the truth conditions of sentences are taken to be described. (See Heck, 1997 for more discussion.)

Inspired by Quine (e.g., 1960), Davidson himself is well known for taking a different approach to using a theory of truth as a theory of meaning than is implicit in Field (1972). Whereas a Field-inspired representational approach is based on a causal account of reference, Davidson (e.g., 1973) proposes a process of radical interpretation in which an interpreter builds a Tarskian theory to interpret a speaker as holding beliefs which are consistent, coherent, and largely true.

This led Davidson (e.g. 1986) to argue that most of our beliefs are true – a conclusion that squares well with the coherence theory of truth. This is a weaker claim than the neo-classical coherence theory would make. It does not insist that all the members of any coherent set of beliefs are true, or that truth simply consists in being a member of such a coherent set. But all the same, the conclusion that most of our beliefs are true, because their contents are to be understood through a process of radical interpretation which will make them a coherent and rational system, has a clear affinity with the neo-classical coherence theory.

In Davidson (1986), he thought his view of truth had enough affinity with the neo-classical coherence theory to warrant being called a coherence theory of truth, while at the same time he saw the role of Tarskian apparatus as warranting the claim that his view was also compatible with a kind of correspondence theory of truth.

In later work, however, Davidson reconsidered this position. In fact, already in Davidson (1977) he had expressed doubt about any understanding of the role of Tarski’s theory in radical interpretation that involves the kind of representational apparatus relied on by Field (1972), as we discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2. In the “Afterthoughts” to Davidson (1986), he also concluded that his view departs too far from the neo-classical coherence theory to be named one. What is important is rather the role of radical interpretation in the theory of content, and its leading to the idea that belief is veridical. These are indeed points connected to coherence, but not to the coherence theory of truth per se. They also comprise a strong form of anti-representationalism. Thus, though he does not advance a coherence theory of truth, he does advance a theory that stands in opposition to the representational variants of the correspondence theory we discussed in section 3.2.

For more on Davidson, see Glanzberg (2013) and the entry on Donald Davidson .

The relation between truth and meaning is not the only place where truth and language relate closely. Another is the idea, also much-stressed in the writings of Dummett (e.g., 1959), of the relation between truth and assertion. Again, it fits into a platitude:

Truth is the aim of assertion.

A person making an assertion, the platitude holds, aims to say something true.

It is easy to cast this platitude in a way that appears false. Surely, many speakers do not aim to say something true. Any speaker who lies does not. Any speaker whose aim is to flatter, or to deceive, aims at something other than truth.

The motivation for the truth-assertion platitude is rather different. It looks at assertion as a practice, in which certain rules are constitutive . As is often noted, the natural parallel here is with games, like chess or baseball, which are defined by certain rules. The platitude holds that it is constitutive of the practice of making assertions that assertions aim at truth. An assertion by its nature presents what it is saying as true, and any assertion which fails to be true is ipso facto liable to criticism, whether or not the person making the assertion themself wished to have said something true or to have lied.

Dummett’s original discussion of this idea was partially a criticism of deflationism (in particular, of views of Strawson, 1950). The idea that we fully explain the concept of truth by way of the Tarski biconditionals is challenged by the claim that the truth-assertion platitude is fundamental to truth. As Dummett there put it, what is left out by the Tarski biconditionals, and captured by the truth-assertion platitude, is the point of the concept of truth, or what the concept is used for. (For further discussion, see Glanzberg, 2003a and Wright, 1992.)

Whether or not assertion has such constitutive rules is, of course, controversial. But among those who accept that it does, the place of truth in the constitutive rules is itself controversial. The leading alternative, defended by Williamson (1996), is that knowledge, not truth, is fundamental to the constitutive rules of assertion. Williamson defends an account of assertion based on the rule that one must assert only what one knows.

For more on truth and assertion, see the papers in Brown and Cappelen (2011) and the entry on assertion .

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Josh Parsons for advice on metaphysics, and to Jc Beall, Justin Khoo, Jason Stanley, Paul Teller, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on earlier drafts.

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Of Truth by Francis Bacon: Multiple Type Questions with Answers

very useful compilation of objective questions. thank you so much