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• CORE - Deprivation, Violence,and Conflict: An Analysis of “Naxalite” Activity in the Districts of India
• GlobalSecurity.org - Naxalite
• The Guardian - Naxalites, the Red guards of India – archive
• Maps of India - Naxalite Movement in India
• The European Foundation for South Asian Studies - A historical introduction to Naxalism in India

Naxalite , general designation given to several Maoist -oriented and militant insurgent and separatist groups that have operated intermittently in India since the mid-1960s. More broadly, the term—often given as Naxalism or the Naxal movement—has been applied to the communist insurgency itself.

The name Naxalite is derived from the town of Naxalbari (Naksalbari) in far northern West Bengal state in northeastern India, which was the centre of a tribal peasant uprising against local landlords in 1967. Although the rebellion was suppressed, it became the focus of a number of communist-led separatist movements that sprung up in remote, often tribal areas in India—at first primarily in northeastern India but later more widely in other parts of the country. The rise of Naxalism corresponded to the growth of militant communism in India, particularly the creation of the Communist Party of India–Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) in 1969, and to the emergence of such rebel groups as the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the Peoples’ War Group (PWG).

Naxalite groups generally have claimed to represent the poorest and most socially marginalized members of Indian society (notably tribal peoples and Dalits [formerly untouchables ]) and to adhere to the Maoist doctrine of sustained peasant-led revolution . For decades they have waged guerrilla warfare against such targets as landlords, businesspeople, politicians, and security forces, and they have disrupted infrastructure by damaging transportation, communication, and power lines. In the process, they often have been able to establish bases of operation in remote forested areas. Naxalite groups have come to control large territories in many of the states of eastern India—notably Andhra Pradesh , Bihar , Chhattisgarh , Jharkhand , Orissa , and West Bengal—and their influence has spread even wider beyond those areas. Often Naxalite groups have taken over governing functions and provided social services within areas under their control, although they also have been accused of using harsh enforcement tactics.

National and state governments in India consistently have labeled Naxalite groups as terrorist organizations and declared them to be illegal. The original CPI-ML has not operated as a legal political party (though several offshoots of it have), and the more recent Communist Party of India-Maoist (formed in 2004 by the merger of the MCC and the PWG) has been outlawed. Police and security forces have responded to the Naxalites with various raids and military campaigns aimed at counteracting the guerrilla attacks and flushing the rebels out of their sanctuaries . Those operations have had mixed success, in part because authorities often have not provided adequate services in the territories where they have reestablished control. In addition, the fighting frequently has reverted to the government and Naxalite sides each retaliating against the other. Thousands of people have been killed during the decades of the insurgency, and tens of thousands have fled the fighting to become refugees.

India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem

October 2011, volume 4, issue 10.

Sameer Lalwani

Categories:

• Cooperation, Competition, & Fissures
• Counterterrorism

Since its independence in 1947, India has fought dozens of campaigns against four distinct and independent insurgencies on its soil—in Punjab, Kashmir, the Northeast, and the Maoist insurgents of central India—as well as one foreign campaign in Sri Lanka. While India has accumulated a wealth of counterinsurgency (COIN) experience that has varied in terms of terrain, insurgent goals, force structure(s), foreign involvement, and outcomes, most COIN scholars have focused on Western foreign incumbent experiences to the neglect of India and other indigenous incumbents.[1] Nevertheless, as both Iraq and Afghanistan move toward assuming greater responsibility for their internal security amidst continued insurgent activity, India’s COIN strategies can offer important lessons for these states and others that resemble its highly federalized political system, developing economy, and still evolving democracy.

One analyst has argued that India has “one of the world’s most successful records in fighting insurgencies,” noting that “it has not yet lost a counterinsurgency campaign within the country.”[2] This claim, however, is puzzling given the current struggles of the Indian government to curb a raging Maoist insurgency. Today, while the insurgencies of the Northeast and Kashmir are largely contained, if not under control, and the Punjab insurgency soundly defeated, India has been earnestly testing different COIN strategies to combat a growing Maoist threat throughout its center and east known generally as the Naxalite insurgency. Since resurging in the last decade, the Naxalite uprising has been described by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as “a great national security threat” and the “biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”[3] This article will briefly describe some of the lessons of success and failure that can be drawn from India’s decades of COIN experience and their application in the current fight against the Naxalite insurgency.

India’s Alternative Approach to COIN Generally speaking, the Indian take on COIN appears to depart from the approach advocated by Western doctrine that promotes a population-centric strategy to win “hearts and minds.”[4] Despite Indian official doctrine formally espousing this concept[5] and some contentions that India has always seen COIN as a “political rather than military problem,”[6] a closer look reveals that the Indian approach may be better characterized as a strategy of attrition[7] with the deployment of “raw state coercion”[8] and “enemy-centric” campaigns[9] to suffocate an insurgency through a “saturation of forces.”[10] At times it may involve the co-optation of elites to “buy-out” and contain an insurgency.[11] When the military has been deployed, it operates under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which includes “the power of the security forces to make preventative arrests, search premises without warrant, and shoot and kill civilians.”[12]

In each major counterinsurgency campaign, the Indian state developed a number of innovative tactics and organizational capacities that yielded some success along with some negative fallout. During the Punjab campaign, India militarized the police and reversed their role with the military to harness local knowledge and legitimacy and lead kinetic operations.[13] As a result, the police structure remained highly militarized, bloated, inefficient, and incapable of investigative police work more than a decade later.[14] In Kashmir, the creation of a dedicated COIN force—the Rashtriya Rifles, integrating an army ethos into a paramilitary force especially equipped and trained to conduct counterinsurgency—achieved some success, but it ultimately had to be fully manned by army personnel and faced a number of operational and coordination problems with other forces.[15]

The co-optation and transformation of insurgents into local assets was a tactic employed both in Punjab (called “CATs,” for Covert Apprehension Technique) and Kashmir (ikhwanis).[16] Turning insurgents was sometimes achieved through money[17] as well as abduction and torture,[18] but these tactics eventually led to new problems, such as increased criminal activity and corrupted security forces, for the respective governments.[19] Moreover, the highly kinetic approach of both campaigns entailed tremendous brutality, torture, disappearances, “encounter killings,” and mass graves that created a litany of human rights investigations and public disaffection, and today continues to fuel simmering resentment and potentially violence.[20]

A slight variant of this approach—the buyout and political incorporation of insurgents—has enabled India to keep a lid on a whole host of insurgent separatist movements in the seven states of India’s eastern extremity, India’s Northeast, since 1956.[21] Yet while eliminating the prospect of separatism, it has perversely created spirals of insecurity, splinter groups (there are more than 100 distinct armed groups in the Northeast), and a dysfunctional insurgent political economy of violence, development aid, and interminable militia politics.[22]

Overall, the Indian strategy of coercion, co-optation, and containment has achieved moderate success in mitigating the threat to the state, and this is being applied today against the re-emergent Naxalite insurgency.

The Naxalite Insurgency The Naxalites first emerged in 1967 in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal and spread throughout the central states of Bihar, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh until it was violently suppressed by state and paramilitary forces by 1972. This militant left-wing movement fractured into more than 40 distinct groups, which began to remobilize, consolidate and become more active in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the state of Andhra Pradesh.[23] Since 2004, with the merger of the two largest factions—the Peoples War Group and the Maoist Communist Center—to form the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), violence has climbed dramatically, with 2,200 incidents and 1,200 killed in 2010 alone.[24]

It is estimated that Naxals have a presence in one-third of districts in India,[25] but with the strongest foothold in parts of seven states—West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra. The difference today is that this region also happens to sit atop tremendous iron ore, coal, and aluminum deposits as well as irrigation and hydroelectric potential.[26]

While some parts of the left-wing movement in India are willing to partly or fully embrace parliamentary politics to address issues of class, inequality, and distribution, the hardcore Naxalites remain unwilling to countenance democratic politics and seek the violent overthrow of the state through a variety of tactics.[27] Although conventional accounts describe them as motivated by the broad economic deprivation and absence of the state in much of rural central India,[28] a more specific reason is resentment at the local exploitative power configurations—whether feudal landlords, land-expropriating state governments, or extractive corporations—that continue to dominate and suppress the lower castes and aboriginal tribes that reside in these areas and constitute the Naxalite support base.[29] The Naxalites, however, are a protean movement that has expertly exploited a variety of caste, ethnic, or sectarian cleavages in India.[30]

Unlike some of the ethno-sectarian insurgencies of recent years, the Naxalite insurgency—posturing itself as a “people’s war”—comports more with classic COIN theory that was built on notions of competitive state building to address economic and governance deficiencies.[31] In step with their historical experience, however, the Indian state has generally favored a more kinetic approach to counterinsurgency over winning “hearts and minds.”[32]

There appears to be an explicit awareness that the Western COIN model may not be the right fit for India. One Indian military analyst and practitioner praised the Andhra Pradesh approach for its “enemy-centric” character, an anathema in current Western COIN discourse.[33] Another well-regarded Indian analyst defended a kinetic focus and derided the hearts and minds “myth” by recalling that even Sir Gerald Templar regarded it as “that nauseating phrase I think I invented.”[34] Moreover, a well-known defense journalist wrote that a population-centric approach “has proved to be flawed.”[35]

Indian State Response to the Naxalites State Strategies Given India’s federalist structure, the onus for responding to the rising Naxalite threat has fallen upon individual states, although with substantial federal support during the past five years.[36] The hardest hit states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh—where roughly half of Naxalite activity is concentrated and continues to escalate—have raced to scale up the manpower of their state and local police forces, while being supplemented with about 40 battalions of central paramilitary forces.[37] Meanwhile, states such as Bihar and West Bengal have also seen a rise in violence in recent years as their police manpower has declined or held steady. The composition of police is another variable that may adversely affect outcomes. The police forces of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Orissa are composed of a much higher percentage of paramilitary forces (as opposed to civil police) relative to the Indian average, potentially rendering them less locally knowledgeable or legitimate.[38]

Central and state governments have been criticized for their paramilitary forces’ shortfalls in size, antiquated organizational structure and age profile, inadequate training (for instance, only firing 20 rounds per year), and most importantly the absence of coordination or a coherent strategy.[39]

The Limits of Indian Responses True to its past history, the Indian central and state governments’ COIN responses have been heavily kinetic, disregarding local public perceptions. One Indian commentator wrote, “exceeding Maoist rebels they accuse of brutality, the police, paramilitary and Salwa Judum recruits continue to freely kill unarmed men and women. It has wrecked any short- to medium-term hope of winning tribals and forest dwellers back to the fold of the state.”[40] With the launch of additional major sweep operations and expansion of commando units, collateral damage of civilians caught in the crossfire and through retribution is expected to rise.[41] Violence, whether premeditated or spontaneous, “can be completely indiscriminate, leading to the burning of the homes of innocents and their torture, maiming, rape, and death.”[42]

While there have been centralized efforts to coordinate the use of force and economic development, these have largely faltered due to poor coordination, misutilization, and co-optation by local elites and corporations.[43] The Indian government has repeatedly set up unified commands to better coordinate the use of central paramilitary forces, state armed (paramilitary) police, and state local or civil police, but these have been riddled with problems and at times hindered local innovation.[44] A major attempt was launched with Operation Green Hunt in late 2009, a massive search-and-destroy operation meant to clear out the Naxalite strongholds in the forests of central India. The fissures of this unified command, however, were exposed when a company of central paramilitary forces short on local police support and intelligence were ambushed and more than 80 killed after being tracked for three days by Naxalite insurgents.[45]

The two states that appear to be relatively successful at reducing insurgent activity or keeping it at bay are Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. Maharashtra seems to have had a relatively higher police to population ratio at the beginning of the decade, potentially buffering it from the spillover of Naxalite insurgency from neighboring areas. While Andhra Pradesh’s manpower ratio rose somewhat over the past decade, its success in dramatically reducing Naxalite activity in its territory is generally attributed by Indian analysts to a rather different strategy of raising a special commando force known as the Greyhounds.[46]

The Greyhound Force The Greyhound force, an elite anti-Maoist commando unit, was raised beginning in 1987 from within the Andhra Pradesh police to conduct small unit counterguerrilla offensives against Naxalite insurgents.[47] Roundly believed to have been tremendously successful, the Andhra Pradesh police have drawn inspiration from the infamous Selous Scouts of Rhodesia to prosecute the equivalent of a “bush war” against the Naxalites.[48]

The 2,000-strong Greyhound force is better paid and equipped than federal or state paramilitary forces with state of the art weapons and technology, better trained in jungle warfare, and moves in nimbler, highly capable units to target, track, and destroy insurgent networks by modeling guerrilla tactics.[49] The Greyhounds are also well supported by the entire state police force.[50] Two companies of Greyhounds would be deployed at a joint operational base with two platoons of local home guards for intelligence and logistical support.[51] Between 2005 and 2008, they have been credited with bringing down the Maoist cadre in Andhra Pradesh from 1,200 to 500 and Naxalite activity in the state this decade has dropped from a peak of roughly 600 attacks in 2003 to around 100 in 2010.[52] Their success was attributed to signals intelligence exploitation, careful operational planning, jungle survival training, night operations, and decapitation of Maoist leadership.[53]

The Greyhound model is perceived to be so successful that many states are starting to develop their own small unit commando police battalions. While the Indian central government continues to pour central paramilitary forces into the region (now on the order of about 70 battalions), it is also raising 10 Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA) and deploying them alongside state and federal units.[54] Yet one should be leery of the triumphant claims made of Andhra Pradesh as well as the potential to model the Greyhound success.

First, there is reason to believe that the Greyhounds did not defeat the Maoist insurgents outright but merely displaced them to neighboring states. This corresponds with data that shows Naxalite activity skyrocketed in neighboring Chhattisgarh as it declined in Andhra Pradesh.[55] Second, intelligence officers and other analysts believe gains in Andhra Pradesh are unsustainable and the state remains highly vulnerable to Maoist activity.[56] This fear was validated by a recent Times of India-IMMRB survey of five northern districts of Andhra Pradesh recently cleared of Maoist insurgents where the majority of those surveyed still sympathized with Naxalite motives, methods, and results, and viewed actions by state forces such as encounter killings as suspect and unjustified. Meanwhile, a plurality believed nothing had improved and exploitation had increased since their departure.[57] Even if the Naxalite presence and violence has been structurally reduced, the survey revealed that the strategy has certainly not relied upon winning hearts and minds to achieve this end.

Finally, even if the Greyhound approach was actually successful, the background conditions required to achieve operational effectiveness are currently absent or underdeveloped in the rest of the country. Andhra Pradesh began raising the Greyhounds in 1987 but did not achieve marked success until almost two decades later. Despite the state having a relatively efficient policing system, both the Greyhound commandos and the state police and security force serving as the logistical and intelligence “tail” took substantial time to mature.[58] New police inductees served first in the Greyhound support unit for about four years before rotating to the district level where they might continue to support operations.[59] This gradually built up inter-organizational familiarity and cooperation within the state, and the substantial network of well-trained local police—features noticeably absent in the rest of Naxal-affected India—were able to funnel high quality intelligence for Greyhound targeting.[60]

Conclusion Three points are worth noting about Indian counterinsurgency strategy. First, rather than abiding by a singular formula, strategies have varied over time and space depending on the context and nature of the insurgency. Second, India has routinely departed from the traditional “hearts and minds” or population-centric COIN for a highly kinetic and coercive enemy-centric COIN. Third, Indian successes are never “clean” and always involve uncomfortable tradeoffs, whether by way of criminal activity, organizational dysfunction and corruption, or further insurgency. These should all be expected as India faces down the Naxalite insurgency over what might be a full decade or more.[61]

This third point is in part related to India’s democratic character. The mobilization capacity of insurgents creates perverse interests by political parties to harness these assets for their own ends.[62] In fact, for much of the earlier part of this decade, most Naxal-affected states “abdicated their authority over vast regions, as long as the semblance of normalcy could be maintained and the electoral interests of the dominant political party could be taken care of.”[63]

Moreover, Indian counterinsurgency has been and will likely continue to look both brutal and incomplete (by Western standards) because the incumbent is unwilling to countenance the types of institutional overhauls needed to fully quell insurgent impulses. If the fundamental conflict is not over the distribution of resources that can be mended with economic development, but rather the distribution of power controlled by the state and elite cadres, then the disease is the system.[64] The cure then may deeply threaten not only India’s growth engine that has relied upon land appropriation and displacement for industrialization and mining, but also the power, composition, and identity of the Indian state stretching from the local level up to the state and national governments.

Sameer Lalwani is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Fieldwork for this research was partly supported by the Tobin Project.

[1] Indigenous incumbent is meant to distinguish states fighting insurgency on their own soil from foreign incumbents. One notable exception is a recent volume edited by Sumit Ganguly and David Fidler, India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[2] Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Force and Compromise: India’s Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30:1 (2007).

[3] Manmohan Singh, “PM’s Speech at the Chief Minister’s Meet on Naxalism,” April 13, 2006; Manmohan Singh, “PM’s Valedictory Address at the Seminar on the Occasion of Golden Jubilee of National Defence College,” October 22, 2010.

[4] For instance, see David J. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); John Nagl, David Petraeus, James Amos, U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Stephen Biddle, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics 6:2 (2008).

[5] Lawrence Cline, “The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 17:2 (2006).

[6] Rajagopalan, “Force and Compromise: India’s Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy.”

[7] Prem Mahadevan, “The Gill Doctrine: A Model for 21st Century Counterterrorism?” Faultlines 19 (2008); K.P.S. Gill, “Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993,” Faultlines 1 (1999); Namrata Goswami, “India’s Counter-insurgency Experience: The ‘Trust and Nurture’ Strategy,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20:1 (2009).

[8] Paul Staniland, “Counterinsurgency is a Bloody, Costly Business,” Foreign Policy, November 24, 2009.

[9] Deepak Aneel Boyini, “Explaining Success and Failure: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and India,” unpublished masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2010.

[10] Anit Mukherjee,  “India’s Experiences with Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” in Sumit Ganguly ed.,  Handbook of Asian Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2010).

[11] Anit Mukherjee, “Lessons from Another Insurgency,” New York Times, May 4, 2006.

[12] Sanjib Baruah, Postfrontier Blues: Toward a New Policy Framework for Northeast India (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2007).

[13] Mahadevan, “The Gill Doctrine: A Model for 21st Century Counterterrorism?”; C. Christine Fair, “Lessons from India’s Experience in the Punjab, 1978-93,” in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler eds., India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[14] On subsequent police failures, see Arvind Verma and Srinagesh Gavirneni, “Measuring Police Efficiency in India: An Application of Data Envelopment Analysis,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 29:1 (2006); H.S. Sidhu and S.S. Bains, “Public Expenditure on Police Services in India: With Special Reference to Punjab,” The Indian Police Journal 55:1 (2008); Pramod Kumar, Community Policing Programme in Punjab: A Guide (Chandigarh, India: Institute for Development and Communication, 2011).

[15]  Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Innovations in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles,” Contemporary South Asia 31:1 (2004); Moeed Yusuf and Anit Mukherjee, “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from India,” AEI National Security Outlook, September 2007.

[16] Fair; Mukherjee, “Lessons from Another Insurgency.”

[17] Ibid.; Prem Mahadevan, “Counter Terrorism in the Indian Punjab: Assessing the ‘Cat’ System,” Faultlines 18 (2007).

[18] Joyce Pettigrew, “Parents and Their Children in Situations of Terror: Disappearances and Special Police Activity in Punjab,” in Jeffrey A. Sluka ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).

[19] Sidhu and Bains; Mukherjee, “Lessons from Another Insurgency.”

[20] On Punjab human rights violations, see Romesh Silva, Jasmine Marwaha, and Jeff Kligner, “Violent Deaths and Enforced Disappearances During Counterinsurgency in Punjab, India: A Preliminary Quantitative Analysis,” A Joint Report by Benetech’s Human Rights Data Analysis Group & Ensaaf, Inc., January 2009. On Kashmir mass graves, see Lydia Polgreen, “Mass Graves Hold Thousands, Kashmir Inquiry Finds,” New York Times, August 22, 2011.

[21] Cline.

[22] Baruah.

[23] P.V. Ramana, “India’s Maoist Insurgency: Evolution, Current Trends, and Responses,” in Michael Kugelman ed.,  India’s Contemporary Security Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011); Jennifer L. Oetken, “Counterinsurgency Against Naxalites in India,” in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler eds., India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[24] These figures are from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Reports, Government of India.

[25] Rahul Bedi estimates that Naxals have a presence in 20 of India’s 29 states, or 223 of 603 administrative districts, roughly one-third of the country. See Rahul Bedi, “State Told to Disband Militia Fighting Maoist Guerillas,” New Zealand Herald, July 13, 2011.

[26] J.K. Achuthan, “Tackling Maoists: The Andhra Paradigm,” Indian Defence Review 25:2 (2010).

[27] Naxalite insurgents have targeted “class enemies” (sometimes through beheadings), police and security forces, infrastructure such as police stations, schools, local government buildings, roads, power lines, railways, and economic targets like mining and energy infrastructure. They have been able to carry out these activities through the acquisition as well as indigenous production of a wide variety of weapons including automatic firearms, rocket launchers, and a whole host of mines for which they use to conduct IED attacks and small unit ambushes. See Ramana; Achuthan; Sudeep Chakravarti, “No End in Sight,” Seminar 605 (2010). The Naxalites are also reported to provide public goods to local residents such as security, swift justice in “people’s courts,” education, irrigation, community kitchens, medical units, and minimum wage enforcement in part through extortion and taxation of local government offices, contractors, businessmen, and industrialists. See Bedi; Oetken; Chakravarti; Pratul Ahuja and Rajat Ganguly, “The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18:2 (2007).

[28] For example, the Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report from 2006-07 states, “Naxalites typically operate in a vacuum created by inadequacy of administrative and political institutions, espouse local demands and take advantage of the prevalent disaffection, perceived injustice among the underprivileged and remote segments of population.” Also see “India’s Naxalites: A Spectre Haunting India,” Economist, August 17, 2006; Vani K. Borooah, “Deprivation, Violence, and Conflict: An Analysis of Naxalite Activity in the Districts of India,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 2:2 (2008).

[29] Nandani Sundar, “At War With Oneself: Constructing Naxalism as India’s Biggest Security Threat,” in Michael Kugelman, India’s Contemporary Security Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011); Manoj Mate and Adnan Naseemullah, “State Security and Elite Capture: The Implementation of Antiterrorist Legislation in India,” Journal of Human Rights 9 (2010).

[30] Kirpal S. Dhillon, “Police and Terrorism,” in P.J. Alexander ed., Policing India in the New Millennium (Mumbai, India: Allied Publishers, 2002).

[31] Biddle; Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics 6:2 (2008).

[32] Ramana; Bedi.

[33] Boyini.

[34] Ajai Sahni, “India’s Maoists and the Dreamscape of ‘Solutions,’” South Asia Terrorism Portal, February 2010.

[35] Praveen Swami, “Anti-Maoist War in Serious Trouble,” Hindu, August 10, 2011.

[36] The minister of Home Affairs recently announced that there are currently 71 battalions of Central Paramilitary Forces deployed in the Naxalite-affected region. See “P. Chidambaram Inaugurates DGPs/IGPs Conference,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, September 15, 2011.

[37] Chhattisgarh has 28 battalions and Jharkhand has 15. See Vinay Kumar, “In Chhattisgarh, Central Forces Don New Mantle,” Hindu, April 23, 2011; Amit Gupta, “CRPF’s Rain Offensive,” Telegraph, July 12, 2011.

[38] This assessment is based on data from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

[39] Sahni, “India’s Maoists and the Dreamscape of ‘Solutions’”; Achuthan; Bhavna Vij-Aurora, “Armed and Dangerous,” India Today, April 25, 2011.

[40] The local vigilantes in part recruited by the state governments, sometimes as special police officers or village defense committees, are known as the Salwa Judum (“peace hunt”) movement. They have brutally abused the population and in fact escalated violence. See Sundar; Chakravarti.

[41] Chakravarti.

[43] Sundar; Ajai Sahni, “India and her Maoists,” Wars Within Borders, November 2009.

[44] Supriya Sharma, “Unified Command Flopped Last Time, Will it Work Now?” Times of India, July 17, 2010; Bibhi Prasad Routray, “India’s Anti-Maoist Operations: Where Are the Special Forces?” Eurasia Review, January 5, 2011.

[45] Anuj Chopra, “India’s Failing Counterinsurgency Campaign,” Foreign Policy, May 14, 2010; “A Disaster Foretold,” The Pioneer, April 11, 2010.

[46] The different approaches to counterinsurgency employed by the U.S. Army (modeled on FM 3-24) and U.S. special forces are analyzed by Jon Lindsay in “Commandos, Advisors, and Diplomats: Special Operations Forces and Counterinsurgency,” presented to the International Studies Association Annual Conference, New York, February 15, 2009.

[47] Boyini; Madhavi Tata, “Lessons from Andhra,” Outlook India, April 19, 2010; Ajai Sahni, “Andhra Pradesh: The State Advances, the Maoists Retreat,” South Asia Intelligence Review 6:10 (2007).

[48] Achuthan.

[49] Boyini.

[50] Sahni, “Andhra Pradesh: The State Advances, the Maoists Retreat.”

[51]  Ibid.; Achuthan.

[52] This data is from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Also see Sreenivas Janyala, “The Andhra Fightback,” Indian Express, June 27, 2009.

[53] Ibid.; Achuthan; Tata.

[54] Routray.

[55] This data is from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Also see Vij-Aurora.

[56] Chakravarti; KP Narayana Kumar, “Naxalites ‘Tamed’ in Andhra Pradesh, Hub of Movement,” MINT, July 2, 2009.

[57] “58% in AP Say Naxalism is Good, Finds TOI Poll,” Times of India, September 28, 2010. Although the survey did not specifically pose questions about the Greyhounds, they are likely included in the forces viewed with suspicion as unjust since they were the lead operational forces in these areas over the last decade.

[58] On initial police efficiency, see Verma and Gavirneni. On maturation, see Sahni, “Andhra Pradesh: The State Advances, the Maoists Retreat.”

[59] Achuthan; Sahni, “Andhra Pradesh: The State Advances, the Maoists Retreat.”

[61] Ramana estimates 7-10 years for government strategy to start seeing results and Vij-Aurora reports that one intelligence official estimated 8-10 years simply to properly train the required force.

[62] Mukherjee,  “India’s Experiences with Insurgency and Counterinsurgency”; Paul Staniland, “Cities on Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (2010).

[63] Achuthan.

[64] This borrows a concept used by Anatol Lieven to explain some elements of another South Asian state. See Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

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Understanding india’s counterinsurgency strategy against the naxal threat.

On the campaign trail, Chief Minister Narendra Modi touted muscular rhetoric and a “zero tolerance” policy towards Naxalism, but those expecting Prime Minister Modi’s government to overhaul the existing strategy – his plan to tinker at the margins notwithstanding – should not hold their breath. The Naxal insurgency was described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as India’s “single biggest internal-security challenge” and estimated to affect one-third of India’s districts. In practice, the threat has been met with “vacillation and ad hocism,” as few in the center take it seriously. Naxals do not threaten major urban centers or critical regions that the Indian state most values, nor do they trigger the kind of fear or distrust elicited by other socially distant rebel groups. Instead, the Naxal insurgency has been, and likely will continue to be, treated as a chronic but manageable problem amongst a group deserving empathy and rehabilitation.  Naxals re-emerged in a big way in 2004 with the formation of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M). By 2009, Naxal violence had escalated to eclipse separatist violence in the Northeast and Kashmir. Armed cadres have grown from 5,000 in 2001 to as high as 20,000 with another 50,000-militia support. These trends likely motivated Singh’s warning and the flurry of government activity including new security programs, development schemes, and paramilitary deployments. But despite these efforts, noted analysts derided government efforts as timid and weak, inchoate, fabricated, and indifferent. While it is true that the Indian state has clearly chosen to fight Naxals with armed force, it relies on a minimalist strategy. States facing rebellion can select from different counterinsurgency options balanced against competing crises and priorities. Even strong states generally only employ significant effort to defeat rebels when their valued, core regions are threatened. Furthermore, governments are relatively more restrained against groups tied to the dominant national identity compared to those seen as outsiders. Consequently, the Indian state is unwilling to employ significant effort or violence against the Naxal insurgency, resulting in a strategy narrowly focused on mitigating violence rather than defeating political subversion. Despite facing a comparatively large, cohesive, ambitious, and effective insurgent organization, the Indian state has been relatively restrained in its use of violence. It has eschewed the deployment of battle-tested counterinsurgency forces in favor of an often-criticized “developmental” approach, limited collateral damage, and tolerated much lower combat exchange rates that favor the rebel forces. There is a certain humanism expressed about the Naxals that has not been afforded many other insurgent groups. Indian leaders describe them in inclusive language – “backward Hindus” and “true Indians” – characterizing them as less distant than Kashmiri or Naga rebels, demanding greater restraint. Former Home Minister Shivraj Patil described Naxals as “our children” and a leading police official explained that “Naxals are our own people” requiring selective action. Many regard Naxals as “misguided” people who only rebel “tactically.” This empathy then restricts how broadly state institutions define the category of insurgent, the threshold of irreconcilability, and the levels of permissible violence. In the past, India has marshaled tremendous manpower, money, and materiel to defeat insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir. However, when it comes to insurgency in less important territory like the Northeast or the Naxal belt, the Indian government has preferred limited strategies of containment. The Naxal belt remains a “peripheral zone” that is underdeveloped, physically inaccessible, and politically disconnected, where disorder is deemed inherent and therefore manageable. For now, Naxals do not project violence in major urban areas. State elites, in step with public opinion, generally treat the Naxal threat as a nuisance and, as one retired officer argued, maintain the appearance of doing something. Whether for security or development purposes, the Indian state has marshaled limited resources, skill, sustainment, and focus. Since Delhi has opted not to deploy the military, police forces are the main line of defense despite being 20 percent under strength and often misused. Police can prove effective counterinsurgents with major investments and overhauls as demonstrated in Punjab, and eventually Kashmir. But neither state nor federal police forces have been adequately trained, equipped, or reinforced enough to contend with the Naxals. Even when central paramilitary battalions are sprinkled throughout states, they are used sporadically, while offensives are short and “fitful” with little effect. The exception may be Andhra Pradesh’s efforts, but even its storied Greyhound force only made gains after almost two decades of vacillating policies and drove a Naxal tactical retreat by displacing violence to neighboring states. While Andhra Pradesh claimed victory, India continued to play whack-a-mole. Even the government’s developmental approach has failed to seriously introduce political and economic reforms. A focus on infrastructure has crowded out spending on human development to 3 percent of allocated funds. When accounting for the affected population size, the annual spending on security related expenditures and the Integrated Action Plan (Rs. 700 crores/year) is still a drop in the bucket compared to counterinsurgency spending in Kashmir and Punjab. General development schemes have had some positive effects but these are non-targeted or inconsistent programs depleted by significant corruption and insurgent extortion. Federalism certainly poses some obstacles to comprehensive strategies but it cannot sufficiently explain current ambivalence. When sufficiently threatened, the Indian central government has deployed coordinated counterinsurgency campaigns across multiple states, as it did with the Army’s 1971 Operation Steeplechase (in West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa) or even some coordinated operations during the Punjab campaign (across Haryana, Chandigarh, and Delhi). Federalism also did not prevent Operation Green Hunt in 2009 across multiple states, but disinterest may explain why it was poorly planned, under resourced, unsustained, and overextended. The central government can still invoke Article 355 to protect states from internal threats and exercise its powers of coordination and inducement for a more comprehensive campaign. But the Naxal belt is not considered to be worth the material and political costs. Experts admit the Naxal insurgency receives lower priority compared to other threats because of where it is located. As one journalist explained, “there’s nothing to be made of it, there’s nothing there.” What the state most values – economic and strategically critical regions – remain unthreatened. Numerous governments (even the British Raj) have conserved resources and deployed minimalist strategies against rebels that do not threaten their core. A threatened region of strategic or economic import may compel the costly and sustained inputs that an effective counterinsurgency campaign demands, but in other regions, the costs prove prohibitive for anything more than containment. A more efficient, less-corrupt Modi government is unlikely to significantly change strategy towards the Naxal insurgency, either in terms of violence or effort. Modi recently expressed compassion for the Naxal base and has previously called for dialogue over violence against “our people.” Along with other national security voices, his Tribal Affairs Minister recently described Naxalism as a “social problem,” empathized with the historic mistreatment of tribals, and advocated development and dialogue to “woo them back” by winning their hearts and minds. Significant escalation of effort is equally unlikely as Modi’s primary constituency is more concerned about corruption, economic issues, religious extremism, and border threats over Naxalism. With attention dispersed elsewhere, and little incentive to reorient an approach that has managed conflict for decades, the government may tinker with but largely retain current strategy.   Sameer Lalwani is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a pre-doctoral fellow at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University.

India in Transition (IiT) is published by the Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI) of the University of Pennsylvania and partially funded by the Nand and Jeet Khemka Foundation. All viewpoints, positions, and conclusions expressed in IiT are solely those of the author(s) and not specifically those of CASI and the Khemka Foundation. IiT articles are re-published in the op-ed pages of The Hindu: Business Line . This article can be read here .

© 2014 Center for the Advanced Study of India and the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania. All rights reserved.

Nonviolent Measures to Deal with Naxalism in India: An Assessment of Government’s Response

• S.Y. Surendra Kumar Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science Bangalore University, Bangalore

Naxalism has sprouted in India and has been invigorated by decades of inequality, displacement, poverty, failure to deliver on promised land reforms, denial of community rights over forests, and recourse to excessive military measures, all of which essentially boils down to failure of governance. To address the problem, successive governments have initiated a mixed baggage of both violent and nonviolent measures. Statistically, failure of this strategy is indicated by the fact that over the decades, Naxalism has spread to around 223 of India’s 640 districts. In this context, this paper examines government-initiated nonviolent measures like development, socio-economic integration and political dialogue, their practical consequences, and their major limitations. It concludes that if government fails to rethink its policy approaches, the Maoist-led struggle would drastically curtail India’s development and growth.

Keywords: Naxalism, Nonviolent, Development, Political Dialogue

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Unveiling the complexities of Naxalism: Socio-economic disparities, violence, and resistance in contemporary India

The narratives elucidate how historical marginalisation, compounded by contemporary socio-economic inequities, lays fertile ground for the propagation of naxalite ideology, which promises liberation from caste-based oppression and economic deprivation..

The Naxalite movement, originating from the Naxalbari village in West Bengal, is a significant socio-political uprising in India. Emerged in the late 1960s, it advocates for the rights of oppressed and marginalised rural communities, mainly peasants and tribal groups. Characterised by ultra-left Maoist ideology, it seeks to overthrow the existing power structures through armed struggle and establish a communist state.

In his work titled "Underdevelopment and the Naxal Movement," Rajat Kumar Kujur meticulously examines the intricate interplay between economic disparity and the proliferation of Naxalism in India. Kujur asserts that governmental neglect and inadequately conceived development projects have significantly contributed to the rise of the Naxalite insurgency, its latest manifestation seen in the killing this week of nearly 30 Naxalites in a "clash" with security forces in the tribal-dominated forested region of Bastar in Chhattisgarh.

Central to Kujur's argument is the plight of tribal communities residing in regions abundant in natural resources but plagued by underdevelopment, such as Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. Despite substantial mineral wealth, these communities often derive minimal benefits from extractive industries due to systemic underdevelopment. This disparity fosters deep-seated grievances among the populace, rendering them susceptible to the allure of Naxalite ideology.

Kujur offers a pointed critique of the government's development strategies, which frequently prioritize infrastructure projects over community engagement and addressing underlying socio-economic issues. The case of the Rourkela Steel Plant project exemplifies this disconnect, wherein tribal communities were displaced through land acquisition without adequate measures to mitigate the adverse impacts on their livelihoods. The disconnect between development initiatives and the genuine needs of the local populace exacerbates alienation among tribal communities, thereby providing fertile ground for Naxalite recruitment.

Funding of movement

Furthermore, Kujur delves into the complex funding mechanisms of the Naxalites, elucidating their practice of extorting "levies" from local populations and businesses. He highlights the formidable challenges the government faces in preventing Naxalite infiltration into development projects and stemming the diversion of allocated funds.

In a complementary analysis titled "Oppression and Resistance: An Analysis of Conflict and Violence Through the Shift in Naxal Movement of Bihar, India," authored by Archana and Yagati Chinna Rao, a nuanced examination of the evolving trajectory of the Naxalite movement in Bihar is provided. The authors meticulously dissect the disillusionment pervading among erstwhile supporters, notably within the marginalised Musahar community, who were initially drawn to the movement's promise of combating caste-based oppression but later distanced themselves due to its recourse to violence.

The narrative is deeply entrenched in the historical context of Bihar, elucidating the entrenched caste-based exploitation endured by the Mushahars. This historical oppression provided fertile ground for the propagation of Naxalite ideology, which ostensibly championed armed resistance against systemic exploitation.

Through a rigorous analysis of interviews conducted within Musahar communities, the authors elucidate the initial appeal of the Naxalite movement, particularly its advocacy for land rights and defiance of the status quo. However, a discernible shift in sentiment emerges over time, with the movement's escalating propensity for violence and callous disregard for civilian casualties precipitating disillusionment among the Musahars. This disillusionment, compounded by a palpable lack of substantive progress on core issues such as land reform, led to the estrangement of many Musahars from the Naxalites.

Exploitation of women

In "Naxal Movement in India: A Feminist Critique," Kujur delves into the oft-overlooked aspect of the Naxalite conflict's impact on women, offering a trenchant critique of the movement's failure to address the specific vulnerabilities and exploitation endured by women within its ranks and afflicted communities.

The discourse centres on the pervasive prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict zones, with Kujur drawing a sobering parallel to instances of mass sexual assault as a weapon of war in other contexts like the Rwandan genocide. While acknowledging disparities in scale, Kujur contends that India's scenario presents an equally disconcerting reality, with women ensnared amidst the crossfire of Naxalites, security forces and entrenched patriarchal structures, thereby heightening their vulnerability to violence.

Kujur critiques the Naxalite movement itself for failing to address this issue adequately. He highlights the lack of clear guidelines within the movement to prevent violence against women.  The article doesn't delve into specific examples within the Naxalite ranks, but the implication is clear – the movement that promises liberation may be perpetuating its own form of oppression.

Kujur's critique extends beyond physical brutality to encompass the socio-economic ramifications of the conflict, elucidating how the disruption of traditional gender roles precipitates a surge in domestic violence and exploitation of women's labour. By highlighting instances wherein women are coerced into assuming traditionally male roles, such as procuring forest produce or catering to the needs of Naxalites, owing to displacement or the loss of male kin, Kujur underscores how the conflict perpetuates extant gender disparities within ostensibly liberatory movements.

Facing uncomfortable truths

In reflecting on the collective insights gleaned from the articles examining various facets of the Naxalite movement in India, a multifaceted narrative emerges, shedding light on the complex interplay between socio-economic disparities, violence, and resistance. Collectively, these analyses underscore the profound ramifications of governmental neglect, exploitative development practices, and the ideological evolution of the Naxalite movement on marginalised communities.

At the heart of these discussions lies a poignant indictment of entrenched power structures and systemic injustices that perpetuate cycles of exploitation and violence. The narratives elucidate how historical marginalisation, compounded by contemporary socio-economic inequities, lays fertile ground for the propagation of Naxalite ideology, which promises liberation from caste-based oppression and economic deprivation.

Yet, as the discourse unfolds, a sobering realisation dawns: the very movement purportedly championing social justice often becomes ensnared in its web of violence and coercion. The disillusionment among erstwhile supporters, particularly marginalised communities like the Musahars, underscores the inherent tension between ideological rhetoric and lived realities.

Moreover, the analysis extends beyond the immediate manifestations of violence to illuminate the gendered dimensions of conflict, wherein women bear the brunt of intersecting forms of oppression and exploitation.

In navigating these complexities, the articles collectively challenge us to confront uncomfortable truths about the nature of resistance movements and the complexities inherent in the pursuit of social change. They beckon us to interrogate not only the oppressive structures of power but also the efficacy and integrity of the mechanisms deployed in the pursuit of liberation.

Ultimately, these reflections compel us to envision alternative pathways towards a social transformation that prioritizes inclusivity, equity, and genuine empowerment, transcending the binaries of violence and non-violence, rhetoric and praxis, to forge a more just and equitable society.

(The writer is an undergraduate student at Christ (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru. Views are personal. She can be reached at  [email protected] )

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Naxalism in India: Causes, Government Response & its Outcomes

From Current Affairs Notes for UPSC » Editorials & In-depths » This topic

Left-wing extremism has been a major threat to India since the 1960s. Many of these militant groups, for many years, had held the mineral-rich lands under their influence. Both the states and Central government, through a series of measures, had significantly improved their presence in the Naxal-infested regions. Currently, these militant groups are only operating in a few isolated regions. However, they still pose a substantial threat to India’s national security.

This topic of “Naxalism in India: Causes, Government Response & its Outcomes” is important from the perspective of the UPSC IAS Examination , which falls under General Studies Portion.

What is Naxalism?

• The term Naxalism derives the name of the Naxalbari village in West Bengal where a peasant revolt took place against local landlords who had beaten up a peasant over a land dispute in 1967.
• The Naxalites are considered to be the far-left communists who support Mao Zedong’s political ideology.
• Initially, the Naxalite movement originated in West Bengal and had later moved to the less developed rural areas in Southern and Eastern India, including in the states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana.
• Some Naxalite groups have legal organisations as representatives in the parliament like the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti.
• As of April 2018, the states where Naxalites are most visible are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha and Telangana.

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How did it come to be?

• Maoist movement in India is among the longest and most deadly insurgencies that originated in India.
• While the origins of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in India goes back to Telangana peasant rebellion (1946-51), the movement was at its peak in 1967, when the peasants, landless labourers, and Adivasis raided the granaries of a landlord in the Naxalbari village in West Bengal.
• This rebellion was suppressed by the police force, which consequently led to the Naxalite movement under the leadership of Charu Majumdar and his close associates, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal.
• These rebels not only were assisted by the people from nearby villages but also from the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese Media had called this movement the “Spring Thunder”.
• The movement initially took inspiration from China’s founding father, Mao Zedong, but had later become radically different from Maoism.
• In the following decades, the movement had later spread to other regions in the country.
• Most notably, in the 1980s, Andhra Pradesh saw the formation of People’s War Group (PWG) under the leadership of Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, which fought for the cause of peasants and the landless through a series of violent attacks, assassinations, and the bombing of Andhra Pradesh’s landlords, upper-caste leaders, and politicians.
• In the late 1990s, Andhra Pradesh police had decimated the PWG. However, this did not end the insurgency problem in India as it had spread across the nearby Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and parts of Maharashtra.
• In 2004, the merging of the Communist Party of India (Maoist-Leninist), PWG, Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and 40 other armed factions under the Communist Party of India (Maoist) had turned the tide in favour of the insurgents.
• Before this, the Maoists were relatively a minor force, separately operating within four states – Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Andhra Pradesh. They were so fragmented that there were even instances of conflicts and killing between these groups.
• The 2004 merger of the two major Maoist factions had led to the strategic breakthrough, allowing the insurgents to enhance their strength, spatial spread, and firepower.
• This movement had eventually spread across such vast geography that it had surpassed all other insurgent groups in India, including in the Jammu and Kashmir and the North East.
• In 2006, they controlled more than 200 districts across the country.
• The insurgents had rapidly enhanced their firepower, arms, ammunition, and cadre with improved expertise.
• In a short span of time, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PGLA), the armed wing of the CPI (Maoist) had nurtured 20,000 regular cadres who were armed with automatic weapons, shoulder rocket launchers, mines, and other explosive devices, etc.
• They are experts at making and deploying high-end bombs and some reports even claim that they have set up manufacturing centres for weapons like rocket launchers.
• By the mid-2000s, the Maoists had managed to create full-fledged administrative and military infrastructures in the states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Bihar, and West Bengal.
• The improvement in the financial resources had significantly enhanced their ability to buy weapons, attract recruits and modernise communication warfare systems including the use of Information and communication technology.
• The worst of the recent attacks by these groups include the Chintalnar massacre of 76 soldiers in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district in April 2010 and the assassination of top leaders of the Congress Party in Chattisgarh’s Jerram Ghati area in Sukma district in May 2013.

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What are the causes of Naxalism?

• Forest mismanagement was one of the main causes of the spread of Naxalism. It originated during the time of British administration when new laws were passed to ensure the monopolisation of the forest resources. Following the globalisation in the 1990s, the situation worsened when the government increased the exploitation of the forest resources. This led the traditional forest dwellers to fight for their aspirations against the government through violence.
• Haphazard tribal policy implementation , marginalisation, and displacement of the tribal communities worsened the situation of Naxalism.
• The increase in the interregional and intraregional differences and inequalities led to people choosing Naxalism. Naxal-groups mostly consist of the poor and the deprived like the anglers, small farmers, daily labourers, etc. The government policies have failed to address this issue.
• Lack of industrialisation , poor infrastructure growth and unemployment in rural areas led to disparity among the people living in these areas. This has led to an anti-government mindset among the locals in the isolated villages.
• The poor implementation of the land reforms has not yielded the necessary results. India’s agrarian set up is characterised by the absence of proper surveys and other details. Due to this reason, it has greatly damaged the rural economy and anti-government sentiments were high among those who were deprived and exploited by the local landowners.
• Forest cover in India is the main area of operation for these groups. The government is facing difficulties while dealing with the insurgents due to the lack of accessibility to these areas.
• The unemployed youth in India is one of the major supporters of the Naxalism movement. This group mostly consists of medical and engineering graduates. The universities have become one of the major breeding grounds for radical ideologies.

How did the government respond to it?

State governments:

• States’ response to the Maoist insurgency has evolved over the years, influenced by the intensity of the threat and political decisions at the state and centre.
• Since the law and order come under the state list, the critical counterinsurgency initiatives come under the jurisdiction of the State governments.
• The Centre is involved in supporting these efforts through joint strategies, providing resources, intelligence, and coordination when necessary.

Andhra Pradesh:

The undivided Andhra Pradesh saw the rise of PWG in the early 1990s. The state government’s response to this insurgent group includes:

• The rapid modernisation of the police force
• Launch of full-scale counterinsurgency operations and massive crackdown of key Maoist leaders in the state
• After the short-term strategic defensive stage, the Maoist group scaled back on its operations in 2004.
• In 2004, the government reduced its counterinsurgency operations and engaged in negotiations with the insurgent leaders.
• The failure of talks led to the relaunch of the offensive.
• The elite combat force, the Greyhounds, was used between 2004 and 2007 to successfully crack down the top Maoist leaders.
• The state had also quashed mass organisation activities by using civilian “vigilante” groups that had been carefully encouraged through the attractive Surrender and Rehabilitation package.
• The government also gained public trust and reduced the insurgent groups’ popularity through developmental projects and welfare programmes to all, including the tribal communities.
• The AP government had also provided healthcare, education , clean drinking water, pucca houses with sanitation facilities, electricity, roads, etc to all villages within three years while also providing Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.
• These measures had made the state government more popular than that of the left-wing extremist groups operating in the area.
• Thus, through the combination of police action and developmental programmes, the state government has successfully addressed the problem of left-wing extremism in the state.

Chhattisgarh:

• Today, Chhattisgarh is the epicentre of Maoist insurgency in India.
• At its peak, these groups had influenced over 18 districts out of the total 27.
• This state is the home for the so-called Red Corridor and these regions are believed to be intensively mined by the Maoists.
• The worst of the attacks in this area include the Chintalnar massacre of 76 CRPF soldiers in 2010 and the assassination of the top political leaders in 2013.
• In the initial years of the creation of Chhattisgarh as a separate state, it saw the political support to the insurgent groups leading to them expanding their base and firepower.
• Later, the government took various steps including the nurturing and strengthening of the vigilante group, popularly known as Salwa Judum and creating a local militia called Special Police Officers (SPOs) comprising of rebels and local youth.
• However, this strategy resulted in mass displacement and killing of the tribal communities who were caught between the two factions.
• In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the vigilante group was illegal and ordered the state government to disband it.
• After this incident, the state government focused on strengthening and modernising the security forces, intelligence, and combat infrastructure, particularly establishing an anti-insurgency training school for the police.
• It had also adopted a Surrender and Rehabilitation policy and had passed the Chhattisgarh Special Public Securities Act, 2006, which expanded the purview of the “unlawful” activities to verbal or oral communications.
• The roads and communication networks were also improved in the challenging terrains and the government had also launched the pioneering socio-economic schemes for the poor.
• While Maoist-led violence remains a major concern in the northern parts of Chhattisgarh, progress has been made in restricting Maoists in the state’s southern districts.
• Improvement in road connectivity, enhancement of combat capability of the local police through modernisation and fortification of the police stations and improved coordination between the Centre and the state in intelligence and paramilitary force has significantly reduced the Maoist threat.
• Jharkhand is the second most affected by the LWE after Chhattisgarh.
• At their peak in 2000, the rebels held about 20 districts across the state.
• Initially, the state government attempted negotiations with these groups. Its failure led to the formation of special force (Jharkhand Jaguar modelled after the Greyhounds of AP) and initiation of anti-Naxal operations.
• The state government had also framed a unique surrender policy for the Naxalites.
• The most crucial operation for Jharkhand’s state forces was the ambitious plan to recapture the forested region of Saranda, which had been a Maoist stronghold since the early 2000s.
• Together with central forces, the state launched Operation Anaconda to counter Maoists operating in Saranda.
• After its success in 2011, the Centre had immediately framed the Saranda Development Plan in 2012.
• The success of the Saranda strategy prompted the state government to expand the focus area approach to free more of such locations and undertake developmental projects.
• The government has so far taken control over 40 camps and freed 13 focus areas from Maoist influence.
• Currently, the government is heavily investing in the construction of infrastructure projects like roads, bridges, schools, etc.
• The past years saw a decline in the Maoist incidents in this state.
• The year 2018 had the lowest number of Maoist incidents.
• Furthermore, a large number of rebels are surrendering – as many as 108 in 2018 alone.
• While at their strongest, the Naxalites in Jharkhand held 13 districts under their control. Now, only hold four districts.
• The success is attributed to the state government’s efforts and factionalism within the Maoists’ ranks.
• However, this does not mean the LWE is completely eliminated. There still exist active rebel hotspots across the state.

West Bengal:

• West Bengal, the birthplace of the 1967 Naxalite uprisings, had witnessed an unprecedented rise in Maoist insurgency a decade ago.
• The state government had taken a series of military actions in the late 1960s and the early 1970s to deal with these insurgent groups.
• Yet, in the late 1990s, the Maoists had managed to revive their hold and had spread across the state.
• By the early 2000s, the CPI-Maoists had control over 18 districts and played a crucial role in fuelling agitations in many of them.
• Initially, the state government’s response was inconsistent and reluctant to cooperate with the Centre and other states.
• However, due to the intensity of the violence, the state government indulged in serious counterinsurgency campaigns.
• In 2009, the state government had banned various left-wing extremist groups and had created Special Battalion to deal with the insurgency in the state.
• Later, the government adopted a 3-pronged counterinsurgency strategy.
• First, the government refurbished the security strategy by setting up an elite police team to pursue the rebel leaders.
• Second, the government offered to surrender and rehabilitation package to the rebels, promising jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities to those who surrendered.
• The third was the formation of comprehensive confidence-building measures with the people living in the Maoist-infested Jangalmaha region.
• The government had combined two components to quash the left extremists:
• Political outreach
• Welfare programme and developmental schemes.
• To strengthen the intelligence and police combing operation, the government had actively incentivised the local youth to serve as informants and formed the so-called Special Police Officers (similar to vigilante groups in other Naxal-affected states.
• The political outreach and welfare programmes had greatly strengthened the government’s presence in the neglected regions like the tribal villages.
• From a peak of 425 Maoist-related violent incidents in 2010, the number had come down to zero by the end of 2018.
• The government had even successfully negotiated with several rebels, including top leaders to make them surrender to the police.
• This state has only one district (Jhargram), which remains under the category of “highly affected” by the insurgency.
• In the late 1990s, Odisha saw a rapid spurt in the LWE, especially in the most backward regions consisting of large tribal populations.
• At one point in the late 2000s, the Maoists influenced 22 of the 30 districts of Odisha.
• The hotspots of the Maoist activities were the most backward and forested, mineral-rich districts which had a large number of tribal population.
• The intensity of the attacks by the groups was so bad that a large number of people died, properties were destroyed, government systems were paralysed and the economic activities were disrupted.
• The insurgents had also fuelled protests against several projects on the issues of land acquisition and mining rights.
• Initially, the state government had negotiated and even allowed a rally in the capital. However, this did not yield the intended results.
• 2008 saw the worst of the insurgent attacks in the region, leading to the government’s rapid measures to address the issue.
• The government had immediately fortified the police stations, provided training to the police officers and announced, the necessary incentive package to the police personnel involved in the anti-Maoist operations.
• It had also trained thousands of tribal youth from the insurgency-affected areas to recruit them as Special Police Officers (SPOs).
• The state also opened a training school in each of the 7 police ranges, supplemented by 17 battalions of Central forces stationed in key Naxal-affected districts.
• Apart from law and order measures, developmental activities and political outreach were also undertaken to gain popular support in the insurgent-affected areas.
• This included land entitlements to the tribal communities across several Naxal-infested districts.
• Odisha also came up with the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy to address core issues related to land acquisition and displacement.
• Over time, the state government had achieved progress in managing the LWE in the mineral-rich regions though there are occasional attacks from these factions.
• As per the statistics, the Maoist related incidents has declined from 42 in 2016 to 9 in 2017.
• Between 2015 and 2016, more than 1,000 Maoists have surrendered to the police.
• Currently, only 8 districts remain “worst affected”.
• Bihar is among the few states where the LWE took deep root in the 1970s.
• At their peak, the Maoists enjoyed widespread popularity among the poor and the marginalised.
• The cause for this includes the failed land reforms, caste feuds and the rich suppressing the poor.
• These rebel groups had merged, leading them to become more powerful.
• In the 2000s, the rebels had extended their base to North Bihar that has borders with Nepal.
• In 2005, the state government took steps to restore law and order.
• There was an improvement in governance and the government undertook various socio-economic and developmental initiatives.
• The jailbreak and the release of 394 convicts by the insurgents had led to the state government’s greater emphasis on the anti-Naxal campaign.
• The government had set up 400-member Special Task Force along with Special Auxiliary Police for counterinsurgency operations.
• It had also established specialised counterinsurgency training schools to improve the combat operation skills of the security personnel.
• Additionally, it had fortified the long and porous Nepal border through improved infrastructure and surveillance to address other illegal activities like fake currency, drug trafficking, etc.
• The state government had revamped the surrender and rehabilitation policy to make it more attractive for the insurgents.
• The measures that saw greater results were the developmental projects and improved governance.
• These efforts were branded as “effective politics”.
• To improve law and order and gain the public’s trust, the government had ensured the speedier trials for the Maoists.
• These measures showed a significant improvement in the anti-Naxal campaigns.
• While the state saw as many as 22 of the 38 districts under the Naxal influence, it has currently come down to four.

Maharashtra:

• Maoists currently have a foothold, in varying degrees, in Maharashtra’s districts of Gadchiroli and Gondia, which have areas contiguous with the Dandakaranya region of Chhattisgarh.
• Gadchiroli has borders with both Chattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, leading to it becoming the hotspot for Maoist activities in the state.
• In 2007-2010, the Maoists had made massive inroads into this strategic belt and in recent times, had launched daring assaults against the security forces.
• Compared to other Maoist-infested states, Maharashtra responded rather seriously with a combination of developmental and security components.
• The following measures were taken by the government:
• A major offensive against the Maoists in the Gadchiroli-Chhattisgarh-Andhra border.
• Police machinery was strengthened in Naxal-infested areas through training and modernisation of equipment.
• Created a district-level force called C-60 commando,
• Surrender and Rehabilitation policy led to the surrender of more than 500 rebels, including some prominent leaders in the past 12 years.
• Special focus was given in the developmental activities, especially in Gadchiroli,
• Authorities have arrested and prosecuted individuals who were identified as Maoist “sympathisers”, giving them a pejorative name, “urban Naxals”. These individuals include academic scholars and NGO workers.
• The state police along with the Central paramilitary forces have successfully killed numerous rebels and arresting hundreds of them.
• Currently, the Maoists are still visible in the tribal districts, particularly in Gadchiroli. The Naxals are still able to launch attacks in their stronghold.

Central government:

The previous UPA government at the Centre had laid the foundation for India’s Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy and the current government has accelerated the paces and effectiveness of the COIN strategy. These strategies have integrated the population-centric and enemy-centric approaches, combining law and order mechanisms and development instruments. Centre has largely led the COIN efforts from behind by providing resources like security and financial support, paramilitary, intelligence, and strategic direction. Overall, the COIN involves a mixture of population-centric and enemy-centric approach to deal with insurgents in India with the aim to complement state initiatives. It involves the following:

Law and order approach:

• It plays a key role in the Centre’s counterinsurgency strategy.
• It is seen in the deployment of about 532 companies of the central paramilitary forces in the affected states.
• In 2006, for the first time, the government had issued a security blueprint to tackle Maoist extremism.

Police force modernisation:

• The government had realised that the Maoist insurgents were highly successful due to the lack of strong and effective policing.
• To improve the quality of policing, in the mid-2000s, the Centre had implemented a Police Modernization Scheme.
• Centre had also provided enormous financial aid to the states for the modernisation and up-gradation of police forces’ weaponry, communication, and infrastructure.
• It was recently found that the improvement in police modernisation and intelligence gathering had brought in success for the police’s anti-Maoists campaigns.

Enhancing intelligence networks:

• Poor intelligence infrastructure at the state level was a major nuisance to the counterinsurgency campaign.
• The Centre, in consultation with states, took steps to enhance and upgrade the capabilities of the intelligence agencies. This includes:
• Round-the-clock intelligence sharing through Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) at the Central level and through State Multi-Agency Centre (SMAC) at the state level.
• Setting up of the Joint Command and Control Centre at Maoist hotbeds like Jagdalpur and Gaya,
• Strengthening of technical and human intelligence through cooperation among the security forces, district police, and intelligence agencies
• providing thrust on the generation of real-time intelligence and creation/strengthening of the State Intelligence Bureaus (SIBs) in LWE-affected states for which the Central assistance is provided through the Special Infrastructure Scheme.

Assisting States in security-related infrastructure:

• The Centre had launched the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme to allow the states to reimburse 50% of their expenses on provisions like insurance scheme for police personnel, community policing, rehabilitation for the surrendered Maoists and other security-related items not covered under the Police Modernisation Scheme.
• Recently, the current government has raised the SRE reimbursement to up to 100%.
• Now it also allows the advance release of the funds to the Naxal-affected states.

Deploying Central Paramilitary forces:

• The centre had created the Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) to assist the Naxal-affected states.
• It has extended the placement of CAPFs on a long-term basis. This is similar to its approach in the Northeast and Kashmir.
• Currently, more than 70,000 CAPFs are deployed in the Maoist-affected states.
• Also, the Centre had assisted the states to raise 14 Specialised Commando Battalions (CoBRA) that are well equipped and trained in guerrilla and jungle warfare techniques.
• Furthermore, the Centre had assisted in creating a number of Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist (CIAT) schools for the long-term sustainability of the counter-offensives.
• The Centre had also announced the setting up of a Bastariya battalion in CRPF from Scheduled Tribe candidates belonging to four districts – Bijapur, Dantewada, Narayanpur and Sukma of Chhattisgarh.

Special Infrastructure Scheme

• This is to fill the infrastructure gaps that are not covered under the existing schemes.
• It includes up-gradation of roads and rail tracks to improve the mobility of the security personnel and providing secure camping grounds and helipads at a strategic location in remote areas.
• Under this scheme, about 400 Fortified Police Stations were opened in Maoist-affected states.
• Additionally, the Centre also provides funds for the creation of training schools, weaponry, vehicles and other requirements for the LWE-affected states.
• Launched in 2017, it stands for S – smart leadership, A – Aggressive strategy, M – Motivation and training, A – Actionable intelligence, D – Dashboard Based KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) and KRAs (Key Result Areas), H – Harnessing Technology, A – Action Plan for each theatre and N – No access to financing.
• Its aim is to enhance the government’s anti-Maoist initiatives, even the basic components of the counterinsurgency campaign.
• The Centre has expanded the realm of the existing provisions under the Explosives Act and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2017 to monitor the transportation of the explosive substance and hinder the flow of finances of the insurgents.
• UAV and mini-UAV were introduced for each of the CAPF battalions deployed in the Maoist hotbeds.
• Speedy infrastructure development with special focus on solar lights , mobile towers and road-rail connectivity in inaccessible areas of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

The banning of CPI (Maoist) and enactment of the UAPA Act, 1967

• The nationwide ban on CPI (Maoist) and the enactment of UAPA ensured pressure on Maoists.
• Also, the government had provided autonomy and sweeping powers to police and paramilitary forces to take legal action against the banned organisations and their activities.

Enhancement of monitoring and coordination mechanisms :

• Establishment of high-level Task Force under the Cabinet Secretary for promotion of coordination across a range of security and developmental measures.
• Coordination Centre, chaired by the Union Home Secretary, was established to review and coordinate efforts of concerned state governments in close consultation with Chief Secretaries and Director Generals of Police of respective states.
• Task Force, headed by a Special Secretary (Internal Security) in the Ministry of Home Affairs with senior officers from intelligence agencies, paramilitary forces and State Police Forces was set up to deliberate on operational strategies.
• Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG), headed by Additional Secretary (Naxal Management) was set up to oversee the effective implementation of the developmental schemes in the insurgent-infested areas.
• Naxal Management Division was brought under the MHA to oversee and provide actionable inputs.
• The government had also brought in a Unified Command to enhance the on-going anti-Naxal operations among the worst affected States – Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and West Bengal. This is unofficially called the Operation Green Hunt. The Unified Command aims to strengthen intelligence and operational coordination and launch coordinated attacks on the Maoists.

Developmental Programmes:

• COIN involves a population-centric approach to win popular support of the locals in the Maoist-infested areas.
• Since the government’s initial enemy-centric approach to deal with Naxalism failed to curb the Maoist groups completely, a series of developmental and good governance measures were taken by the government to reduce the support for insurgents.
• This approach was best illustrated in the Centre’s appointment of an expert committee to carry out a detailed study of the socio-economic development in the affected regions and suggest ways to address the deficits.
• The suggestion by the Expert Committee and the government’s own assessment had led to an unprecedented amount of resource transfer to the affected areas and the launch of the Integrated Action Plan (IAP). Later IAP was disbanded and a similar scheme – Special Central Assistance (SCA) – was launched.
• Grievances of the tribal communities were also addressed through the enactment of the Forest Dwellers Act, 2006. This was done despite the protests from environmentalists and NGOs.
• The government had also launched a new scheme, Civic Action Program (CAP), providing financial grants to the CAPFs s that they can undertake welfare activities in the Naxal-affected areas.
• Another notable scheme, Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) was also launched to provide finance and administrative support to expand mobile services in 96 districts in 10 states.
• The issue of unemployment and illiteracy was addressed through “Skill Development in 47 LWE affected districts” and PMKVY .
• Electricity was provided to the affected villages through Deen Dayal Upadhyay Gram Jyoti Yojana.
• The Centre, under the Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan (RMSA), had upgraded schools and girls’ hostels have been sanctioned in 35 most affected LWE districts.
• Launched in 2018, the Aspirational Districts Programme aims to rapidly transform districts that have made less progress in key social areas.
• ROSHNI: It is a special initiative under the Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana (Formerly Ajeevika Skills), which was launched in June 2013 to train and place rural poor youth from 27 LWE-affected districts across nine states.

What are the outcomes of these responses?

• While there is a difference in opinions in the nature and extent of their decline, available evidence points to a convincing decline of an insurgency that was once considered as posing a credible threat to the Indian state.
• Coordinated efforts from the Centre and Maoist-infested states have brought down LWE sponsored violence to drastic levels, which has resulted in the elimination of many important leaders of the insurgent groups and reducing the foothold of the insurgents to a handful of tri-junction districts in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha.
• Recently, about 44 districts were removed from Naxal Affected list, while the “worst affected category” was reduced from 36 to 30.
• According to reports, the Naxalite movement is facing a vacuum in the leadership, leading to the weakening of cooperation and coordination of the individual militants. The successful elimination of prominent leaders of the insurgent groups through various counterinsurgency operations has worsened the situations for the LWE groups.
• Furthermore, the coordinated response from the states on close intelligence-led operations, growing disillusionment among ideologically committed cadre and the shrinking base have hurt the CPI-Maoist’s finances.
• Demonetisation has reduced the insurgent’s ready financial resources to lure recruits, buy arms and critical equipment.
• Currently, the LWE groups are restricted to a few isolated hilly regions bordering 3 states.
• A combination of improved state actions, welfare programmes and security measures has seriously damaged the left-wing extremist operations.
• Loss of strongholds, the declining appeal of ideology and leadership crisis, along with the improved performance from the Naxal-affected states in socio-economic fronts has also led to significant improvement of counterinsurgency operations.

The concerted effort from both the Centre and Naxal-affected states is a rare example of cooperative federalism . Comprehensive COIN strategy, encompassing both the population-centric and enemy-centric approaches has significantly reduced the Naxal footprint in many of the militant groups in the region. Yet, the Naxalites still remain a formidable force that can nevertheless be considered a threat to India’s national security. However, unlike in the 2000s, the Indian government is well prepared in addressing this issue through a comprehensive strategy that is already in place.

Test Yourself

India’s counterinsurgency strategy is a fine example of cooperative federalism. Comment. (250 Words)

• The Director-General of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) recently stated that three states had been cleared of hotbeds of left-wing extremism (Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh). CRPF launched  Operation Octopus, Operation Double Bull, Operation Thunderstorm  and  Operation Chakarbandha in these three States

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How a Crisis for Vultures Led to a Human Disaster: Half a Million Deaths

The birds were accidentally poisoned in India. New research on what happened next shows how wildlife collapse can be deadly for people.

By Catrin Einhorn

To say that vultures are underappreciated would be putting it mildly. With their diet of carrion and their featherless heads, the birds are often viewed with disgust. But they have long provided a critical cleaning service by devouring the dead.

Now, economists have put an excruciating figure on just how vital they can be: The sudden near-disappearance of vultures in India about two decades ago led to more than half a million excess human deaths over five years, according to a forthcoming study in the American Economic Review.

Rotting livestock carcasses, no longer picked to the bones by vultures, polluted waterways and fed an increase in feral dogs, which can carry rabies. It was “a really huge negative sanitation shock,” said Anant Sudarshan, one of the study’s authors and an economics professor at the University of Warwick in England.

The findings reveal the unintended consequences that can occur from the collapse of wildlife, especially animals known as keystone species for the outsize roles they play in their ecosystems. Increasingly, economists are seeking to measure such impacts.

A study looking at the United States, for example, has suggested that the loss of ash trees to the invasive emerald ash borer increased deaths related to cardiovascular and respiratory illness . And in Wisconsin, researchers found that the presence of wolves reduced vehicle collisions with deer by about a quarter, creating an economic benefit that was 63 times greater than the cost of wolves killing livestock.

“Biodiversity and ecosystem functioning do matter to human beings,” said Eyal Frank, an economist at the University of Chicago and one of the authors of the new vulture study. “And it’s not always the charismatic and fuzzy species.”

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Who are Kamala Harris’ parents, and how did they inspire the 2024 presidential hopeful? Jamaican-born Donald J. Harris and Indian Shyamala Gopalan met at UC Berkeley, then had prominent careers

Before her nomination though, she made history as the first Black and first South Asian person to serve as veep. So just who are her parents who helped her get here?

In 1962, Jamaican-born Donald J. Harris and Shyamala Gopalan, who hails from India, met as students at the University of California, Berkeley, and quickly fell in love. Both had arrived as immigrants and went on to forge groundbreaking careers and become leaders in their respective fields. Fast forward to more than 60 years later and the firstborn daughter of these two high-achieving intellectuals may just become the first female president of the United States.

Here’s what you need to know about the two people who shaped Kamala Harris into who she is today.

Kamala Harris’ parents both left home for an American education

According to The New York Times, Gopalan had ambitions of becoming a biochemist and curing cancer. But as a woman in a recently postcolonial India, she was limited to studying “home sciences” at the British-founded Lady Irwin College. When her brother told her that women could apply for biochemistry degrees in the US, she came up with a plan to pursue her dreams. Despite having never left India before, she applied to UC Berkeley. When she received her acceptance letter, her surprised father, a civil servant, agreed to dig into his retirement savings to pay for her first year’s tuition, per People.

On the other side of the world, Donald made the decision to work towards a doctorate with the help of a prestigious scholarship, per the same publication. Most recipients of this scholarship studied in Britain, since the grant was administered by the British colonial government. But having had his fill of British culture, Donald was drawn to the more diverse and complex US. He was particularly interested in studying at UC Berkeley because he’d seen a news story about students from the campus going to the American South to campaign for civil rights.

How did Kamala Harris’ parents meet?

At UC Berkeley, both Donald and Gopalan found their way to a Black intellectual study group that would eventually become the Afro-American Association, “the most foundational institution in the Black Power movement”, reported The New York Times.

The pair crossed paths at one of the group’s meetings in 1962. He was giving a speech about the similarities between his native Jamaica and the United States, which she found compelling. Curious to know more, Gopalan introduced herself to Donald after his speech.

When did Kamala Harris’ parents get married?

According to People, Gopalan had always planned to return to India after getting her degree, but meeting Donald took her life in a different direction. He became her first boyfriend and, in 1963, a year after they met, the couple got married. Soon, they had two children – Kamala, who was born in California in October 1964, and her sister Maya, who arrived in 1967.

Breaking barriers in cancer research and economic theory

After getting her doctorate in nutrition and endocrinology, Gopalan set out to fulfil her dream of curing cancer. She began her career in the cancer research lab of UC Berkeley’s zoology department and went on to become a distinguished research scientist who worked at some of the world’s top research institutions. According to the Breast Cancer Action organisation, Gopalan’s “work in isolating and characterising the progesterone receptor gene transformed the medical establishment’s understanding of the hormone-responsiveness of breast tissue”.

Meanwhile, Donald, an accomplished economist, served as a professor at Stanford University from 1972 to 1998. Per his Stanford University biography, “his research and publications have centred on exploring the analytical conception of the process of capital accumulation and its implications for a theory of growth of the economy, with the aim of providing thereby an explanation of the intrinsic character of growth as a process of uneven development”.

Kamala Harris’ parents eventually got divorced

Per People, Kamala was nearly five years old when she realised that there was trouble in her parents’ marriage. The couple eventually divorced in 1972 – eight years after their wedding. Decades later, in her 2018 memoir The Truths We Hold: An American Journey , Kamala reflected that her parents had “become like oil and water”. Gopalan raised Kamala and her sister Maya “mostly on her own”.

In a piece written for Jamaica Global, Donald said that the couple had a “hard-fought custody battle”, stating that the “court-ordered divorce settlement [was] based on the false assumption by the State of California that fathers cannot handle parenting”. Racism around his status as a Black man from the Caribbean didn’t help, he added.

What was Kamala Harris’ relationship with her mum like?

Kamala has been open about her close relationship with her mother, often writing about how Gopalan motivated her to follow her dreams. In a 2022 Facebook post, Kamala said her mother would often say to her: “You may be the first to do many things. Make sure you are not the last.”

On Instagram, Kamala has praised her mother for teaching her the importance of striving to be better. “She taught us the good old-fashioned value of hard work … She taught us not only to dream, but to do.”

Gopalan died of colon cancer in 2009.

• President Joe Biden dropped out of the 2024 elections race, and now Kamala Harris could become the first female president of the US – before this, she made history as the first Black, South Asian veep
• Her parents – both immigrants to the US – broke boundaries, too: Gopalan was pioneer in breast cancer research while Donald served as a professor at Stanford University

Riverbank erosion induced vulnerability in India: a review for future research framework

• Review Article
• Published: 29 July 2024

Cite this article

• Nirsobha Bhuyan   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-0882-8553 1 ,
• Haroon Sajjad   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2007-1266 1 ,
• Md. Hibjur Rahaman   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-8999-7497 1 &
• Raihan Ahmed   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-0311-5519 2  

Riverbank erosion is a significant risk that results in damages and economic losses. India is severely vulnerable to riverbank erosion due to its demographic profile, socio-economic conditions, and physiographic setting. This paper attempts to analyze the studies on vulnerability to riverbank erosion in India through a systematic literature review from 2007 to 2023. A total of 68 articles were chosen for this study using keyword search. The findings revealed that studies on political as well as physical and psychological health vulnerability were underrepresented. Ecological vulnerability studies based on site-specific indicators were also found to be limited. The maximum number of studies were concentrated in West Bengal and Assam. Studies based on the use of machine learning and other automated techniques were scant in the existing literature. Most of the reviewed articles relied on a qualitative and descriptive approach. Though a substantial body of work has been carried out on riverbank erosion, the vulnerability posed by riverbank erosion requires adequate representation. The study calls for carrying out more research on specific target groups based on gender, age, and other socio-cultural parameters. Hydrodynamic models and machine learning algorithms for analyzing vulnerability to riverbank erosion are suggested for the future progression of the research.

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Bhuyan, N., Sajjad, H., Rahaman, M.H. et al. Riverbank erosion induced vulnerability in India: a review for future research framework. Nat Hazards (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-024-06789-6

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Published on July 29, 2024

Inside the spacious trailer office of Peaceful Means , young adults, many enrolled members in the Oglala Sioux Tribe, were busy preparing for their evening meeting of Survivors in Recovery Anonymous ( SIRA ), a spiritually and culturally adapted program modeled after Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) to help survivors heal from sexual violence. Others were planning their next visit to one of over 25 of schools on or near the reservation to teach kids about sexual violence prevention and empowerment.

The women wore black T-shirts that said “No!” and the men wore ones that asked, “Got consent?” On the walls were a poster of Lakota virtues, a photograph of a small child with the words “Our boss for June,” and a handwritten sign that declared, “I am worth defending!”

A visit to Peaceful Means ( Wahwala Iyohlogya ), an Indigenous-led sexual violence prevention movement, was one of several stops on a trip to the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota for the leadership team of the UI Injury Prevention Research Center (UI IPRC). Surveys have shown that one in three Native girls and one in ten Native boys across the U.S. and nearly half of Native women have been raped in their lifetimes.

On June 11, the UI IPRC team participated in a full day conference on the reservation addressing violence and injury prevention in Indian country, as part of a new regional partnership called TIPP (Tri-state Injury Prevention Partnership) Focused on Indigenous Populations with the University of Nebraska (UNL) Interpersonal Violence Research Lab /Peaceful Means Project and the University of Colorado Injury and Violence Prevention Center.

TIPP was formed with a one-year grant from the CDC. Through regular virtual meetings on workforce development, the partners learned from each other about building and sustaining center infrastructure and supporting research, outreach initiatives, and student training. They also discussed programming and service with Indigenous, tribal, and rural communities. The project culminated with the conference, which gave more opportunities to share work and discuss future collaborations.

Mona Herrington, Oglala Lakota Elder and UNL Cultural Outreach Manager said the conference was a great opportunity to meet with people willing to meet indigenous people where they’re at.

“They got to see the poverty and challenges that we face. And they recognized the efforts that these same communities are making to not just survive but to share their stories and the change we are making for children and their families,” she said. “It was such a great experience to hear them too. I hope we will continue to grow together.”

Around 70 people attended the conference (in-person and on Zoom) including researchers, practitioners, educators, students, cultural/spiritual leaders, and community members on and near the reservation. The Colorado team presented work on firearms safety, safe storage of guns, and motor vehicle safety. The UI IPRC team shared research on workplace violence, rural road safety, falls prevention, and disaster preparedness.

The Nebraska team presented on indigenized science and shared promising evaluation results of the Peaceful Means sexual violence prevention program in reservation schools.

Cassandra Saucedo (Oglala Lakota, Student Intern) said the exchange of knowledge and strategies at the conference was invaluable.

“Presenting our preliminary findings at the conference was a profound experience as a student researcher. It allowed me to share crucial preventative information about the Peaceful Means program while also learning from other experts in the field,” she said.

Peaceful Means instructors also demonstrated one of their in-school activities. The conference concluded with a talking circle (an indigenous practice) to share thoughts about the gathering.

Katie Edwards , professor of counseling psychology at UNL and co-leader of Peaceful Means said, “It has been an honor for us at the University of Nebraska to share about our Indigenous-led sexual violence prevention work on Pine Ridge, specifically student engagement to enhance Indigenous representation in violence and injury prevention fields, capacity building for sexual violence prevention within tribal communities, and the importance of community engagement and participatory processes in violence and injury prevention work in Indian country.”

Peaceful Means aims to provide all Indigenous K-12 youth with the opportunity to receive a culturally adapted version of the IMpower program by 2050. This work is currently funded by a UNL–Lincoln Grand Challenges Catalyst Competition grant and Office on Violence against Women grant.

The Nebraska team presented results from the first ever IMpower evaluation with Indigenous (mostly Lakota) girls. The evaluation found that girls who received the program reported 80% fewer instances of sexual assault than girls who did not receive the program at the 6-month follow-up. IMpower has been piloted and studied in both Africa (Kenya, Malwai) and tribal nations that share geography with South Dakota.

Preliminary findings of Peaceful Means among 3 rd -5 th graders found an increase in knowledge of sexual assault and feelings of empowerment. Among middle school children (6 th -8 th grade), girls reported an increase in feeling they can defend themselves, and boys reported an increase in valuing sexual consent. 92% of Lakota middle school children said the program made them feel like their life matters.

The Lakota people of this large, rural, and remote reservation (over 2 million acres) experience high unemployment, poverty, and historical trauma from colonization and oppression. They have poor health outcomes (e.g., diabetes, alcoholism) and low life expectancies. Most Lakota children don’t graduate from high school. The reservation population is estimated to be at least 40,000.

The day after the conference, Emily Bull Bear gave the Nebraska, Iowa, and Colorado teams a tour of the reservation to learn about the history and culture of the people. They visited a local museum and the site of the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre. Later that evening, they participated in an Inipi (sweat lodge) followed by a community meal.

Carri Casteel , director of the UI IPRC, said the immersive nature of the visit to Pine Ridge Reservation made a lasting impact on her and the Iowa team.

“Getting to meet with Lakota staff, students, and community members both at the conference and while touring the reservation, helped us better understand the challenges Indigenous peoples face and the sources of strength in their communities,” she said. “We want to continue to learn and look forward to more collaborations.”

Edwards said, “I am confident that this partnership will pave the way for future collaborations that will have a significant and sustained impact on violence and injury prevention among structurally minoritized populations, including Indigenous peoples in the U.S.”

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Visual Stories

• Existing homes sales fell by 5.4% in June to a seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 3.89M and are now down 5.4% from June 2023, according to the National Association of Realtors (NAR).
• Total housing inventory at the end of June increased to 1.32 million units from 1.28 million units in May, up 23.4% from a year ago.
• The median existing-home sales price in June was $426,900, 4.1% higher than a year ago but lower than the 5.8% year-over-year increase in May.

What happened: After falling in May, existing home sales fell again in June.

What Zillow Senior Economist Orphe Divounguy thinks:  

In June, while slightly lower mortgage rates and more inventory on the market than in recent months gave many buyers a window of opportunity to get better financing, many first time home buyers were still struggling to afford homes, leading to fewer sales. Home sales are down 5.4% from last year and price growth is easing.

Well-priced homes continue to attract swift interest and quick transactions, demonstrating that demand remains robust for properties that meet buyers’ expectations for value. According to Zillow data , homes that sold did so in just 15 days – faster than the pre-pandemic norm of 21 days.

In June, more homes became available, but the rate of inventory growth is slowing down. While the ‘rate lock’ effect is weakening, fewer homeowners sell during the slower summer season. There is still only a 4.1-months’ supply of unsold homes at the current sales pace, compared to 3.1 months in 2023. Monthly supply is higher than the 3.7 months in May.

The decrease in sales is a stark reminder that affordability is still a challenge. Looking ahead, inflation easing faster than previously anticipated should help to bring mortgage rates down slightly from the Spring highs, potentially supporting a late season rebound in home buying activity.

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• Zillow Home Value and Home Sales Forecast (June 2024)
• New U.S. Homes Are Now Cheaper by the Foot Than Existing Ones
• Price Cuts Abound as Home Sellers See Inventory Piling Up (June 2024 Market Report)
• Despite Easing Inflation, Mortgage Rates Slightly Higher This Week
• Mortgage Rates Slightly Higher This Week But Relatively Flat In June