empathy skill essay

Understanding others’ feelings: what is empathy and why do we need it?

Senior Lecturer in Social Neuroscience, Monash University

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Pascal Molenberghs receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC Discovery Early Career Research Award: DE130100120) and Heart Foundation (Heart Foundation Future Leader Fellowship: 1000458).

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This is the introductory essay in our series on understanding others’ feelings. In it we will examine empathy, including what it is, whether our doctors need more of it, and when too much may not be a good thing.

Empathy is the ability to share and understand the emotions of others. It is a construct of multiple components, each of which is associated with its own brain network . There are three ways of looking at empathy.

First there is affective empathy. This is the ability to share the emotions of others. People who score high on affective empathy are those who, for example, show a strong visceral reaction when watching a scary movie.

They feel scared or feel others’ pain strongly within themselves when seeing others scared or in pain.

Cognitive empathy, on the other hand, is the ability to understand the emotions of others. A good example is the psychologist who understands the emotions of the client in a rational way, but does not necessarily share the emotions of the client in a visceral sense.

Finally, there’s emotional regulation. This refers to the ability to regulate one’s emotions. For example, surgeons need to control their emotions when operating on a patient.

Another way to understand empathy is to distinguish it from other related constructs. For example, empathy involves self-awareness , as well as distinction between the self and the other. In that sense it is different from mimicry, or imitation.

Many animals might show signs of mimicry or emotional contagion to another animal in pain. But without some level of self-awareness, and distinction between the self and the other, it is not empathy in a strict sense. Empathy is also different from sympathy, which involves feeling concern for the suffering of another person and a desire to help.

That said, empathy is not a unique human experience. It has been observed in many non-human primates and even rats .

People often say psychopaths lack empathy but this is not always the case. In fact, psychopathy is enabled by good cognitive empathic abilities - you need to understand what your victim is feeling when you are torturing them. What psychopaths typically lack is sympathy. They know the other person is suffering but they just don’t care.

Research has also shown those with psychopathic traits are often very good at regulating their emotions .

Why do we need it?

Empathy is important because it helps us understand how others are feeling so we can respond appropriately to the situation. It is typically associated with social behaviour and there is lots of research showing that greater empathy leads to more helping behaviour.

However, this is not always the case. Empathy can also inhibit social actions, or even lead to amoral behaviour . For example, someone who sees a car accident and is overwhelmed by emotions witnessing the victim in severe pain might be less likely to help that person.

Similarly, strong empathetic feelings for members of our own family or our own social or racial group might lead to hate or aggression towards those we perceive as a threat. Think about a mother or father protecting their baby or a nationalist protecting their country.

People who are good at reading others’ emotions, such as manipulators, fortune-tellers or psychics, might also use their excellent empathetic skills for their own benefit by deceiving others.

Interestingly, people with higher psychopathic traits typically show more utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas such as the footbridge problem. In this thought experiment, people have to decide whether to push a person off a bridge to stop a train about to kill five others laying on the track.

The psychopath would more often than not choose to push the person off the bridge. This is following the utilitarian philosophy that holds saving the life of five people by killing one person is a good thing. So one could argue those with psychopathic tendencies are more moral than normal people – who probably wouldn’t push the person off the bridge – as they are less influenced by emotions when making moral decisions.

How is empathy measured?

Empathy is often measured with self-report questionnaires such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) or Questionnaire for Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE).

These typically ask people to indicate how much they agree with statements that measure different types of empathy.

The QCAE, for instance, has statements such as, “It affects me very much when one of my friends is upset”, which is a measure of affective empathy.

Cognitive empathy is determined by the QCAE by putting value on a statement such as, “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.”

Using the QCAE, we recently found people who score higher on affective empathy have more grey matter, which is a collection of different types of nerve cells, in an area of the brain called the anterior insula.

This area is often involved in regulating positive and negative emotions by integrating environmental stimulants – such as seeing a car accident - with visceral and automatic bodily sensations.

We also found people who score higher on cognitive empathy had more grey matter in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.

This area is typically activated during more cognitive processes, such as Theory of Mind, which is the ability to attribute mental beliefs to yourself and another person. It also involves understanding that others have beliefs, desires, intentions, and perspectives different from one’s own.

Can empathy be selective?

Research shows we typically feel more empathy for members of our own group , such as those from our ethnic group. For example, one study scanned the brains of Chinese and Caucasian participants while they watched videos of members of their own ethnic group in pain. They also observed people from a different ethnic group in pain.

The researchers found that a brain area called the anterior cingulate cortex, which is often active when we see others in pain, was less active when participants saw members of ethnic groups different from their own in pain.

Other studies have found brain areas involved in empathy are less active when watching people in pain who act unfairly . We even see activation in brain areas involved in subjective pleasure , such as the ventral striatum, when watching a rival sport team fail.

Yet, we do not always feel less empathy for those who aren’t members of our own group. In our recent study , students had to give monetary rewards or painful electrical shocks to students from the same or a different university. We scanned their brain responses when this happened.

Brain areas involved in rewarding others were more active when people rewarded members of their own group, but areas involved in harming others were equally active for both groups.

These results correspond to observations in daily life. We generally feel happier if our own group members win something, but we’re unlikely to harm others just because they belong to a different group, culture or race. In general, ingroup bias is more about ingroup love rather than outgroup hate.

Yet in some situations, it could be helpful to feel less empathy for a particular group of people. For example, in war it might be beneficial to feel less empathy for people you are trying to kill, especially if they are also trying to harm you.

To investigate, we conducted another brain imaging study . We asked people to watch videos from a violent video game in which a person was shooting innocent civilians (unjustified violence) or enemy soldiers (justified violence).

While watching the videos, people had to pretend they were killing real people. We found the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, typically active when people harm others, was active when people shot innocent civilians. The more guilt participants felt about shooting civilians, the greater the response in this region.

However, the same area was not activated when people shot the soldier that was trying to kill them.

The results provide insight into how people regulate their emotions. They also show the brain mechanisms typically implicated when harming others become less active when the violence against a particular group is seen as justified.

This might provide future insights into how people become desensitised to violence or why some people feel more or less guilty about harming others.

Our empathetic brain has evolved to be highly adaptive to different types of situations. Having empathy is very useful as it often helps to understand others so we can help or deceive them, but sometimes we need to be able to switch off our empathetic feelings to protect our own lives, and those of others.

Tomorrow’s article will look at whether art can cultivate empathy.

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Understanding others' feelings

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What Is Empathy?

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Amy Morin, LCSW, is a psychotherapist and international bestselling author. Her books, including "13 Things Mentally Strong People Don't Do," have been translated into more than 40 languages. Her TEDx talk, "The Secret of Becoming Mentally Strong," is one of the most viewed talks of all time.

Verywell / Bailey Mariner

Empathy is the ability to emotionally understand what other people feel, see things from their point of view, and imagine yourself in their place. Essentially, it is putting yourself in someone else's position and feeling what they are feeling.

Empathy means that when you see another person suffering, such as after they've lost a loved one , you are able to instantly envision yourself going through that same experience and feel what they are going through.

While people can be well-attuned to their own feelings and emotions, getting into someone else's head can be a bit more difficult. The ability to feel empathy allows people to "walk a mile in another's shoes," so to speak. It permits people to understand the emotions that others are feeling.

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Signs of Empathy

For many, seeing another person in pain and responding with indifference or even outright hostility seems utterly incomprehensible. But the fact that some people do respond in such a way clearly demonstrates that empathy is not necessarily a universal response to the suffering of others.

If you are wondering whether you are an empathetic person, here are some signs that show that you have this tendency:

You are good at really listening to what others have to say.
People often tell you about their problems.
You are good at picking up on how other people are feeling.
You often think about how other people feel.
Other people come to you for advice.
You often feel overwhelmed by tragic events.
You try to help others who are suffering.
You are good at telling when people aren't being honest .
You sometimes feel drained or overwhelmed in social situations.
You care deeply about other people.
You find it difficult to set boundaries in your relationships.

Types of Empathy

There are several types of empathy that a person may experience. The three types of empathy are:

Affective empathy involves the ability to understand another person's emotions and respond appropriately. Such emotional understanding may lead to someone feeling concerned for another person's well-being, or it may lead to feelings of personal distress.
Somatic empathy involves having a physical reaction in response to what someone else is experiencing. People sometimes physically experience what another person is feeling. When you see someone else feeling embarrassed, for example, you might start to blush or have an upset stomach.
Cognitive empathy involves being able to understand another person's mental state and what they might be thinking in response to the situation. This is related to what psychologists refer to as the theory of mind or thinking about what other people are thinking.

Empathy vs. Sympathy vs. Compassion

While sympathy and compassion are related to empathy, there are important differences. Compassion and sympathy are often thought to be more of a passive connection, while empathy generally involves a much more active attempt to understand another person.

Uses for Empathy

Being able to experience empathy has many beneficial uses.

Empathy allows you to build social connections with others . By understanding what people are thinking and feeling, you are able to respond appropriately in social situations. Research has shown that having social connections is important for both physical and psychological well-being.
Empathizing with others helps you learn to regulate your own emotions . Emotional regulation is important in that it allows you to manage what you are feeling, even in times of great stress, without becoming overwhelmed.
Empathy promotes helping behaviors . Not only are you more likely to engage in helpful behaviors when you feel empathy for other people, but other people are also more likely to help you when they experience empathy.

Potential Pitfalls of Empathy

Having a great deal of empathy makes you concerned for the well-being and happiness of others. It also means, however, that you can sometimes get overwhelmed, burned out , or even overstimulated from always thinking about other people's emotions. This can lead to empathy fatigue.

Empathy fatigue refers to the exhaustion you might feel both emotionally and physically after repeatedly being exposed to stressful or traumatic events . You might also feel numb or powerless, isolate yourself, and have a lack of energy.

Empathy fatigue is a concern in certain situations, such as when acting as a caregiver . Studies also show that if healthcare workers can't balance their feelings of empathy (affective empathy, in particular), it can result in compassion fatigue as well.

Other research has linked higher levels of empathy with a tendency toward emotional negativity , potentially increasing your risk of empathic distress. It can even affect your judgment, causing you to go against your morals based on the empathy you feel for someone else.

Impact of Empathy

Your ability to experience empathy can impact your relationships. Studies involving siblings have found that when empathy is high, siblings have less conflict and more warmth toward each other. In romantic relationships, having empathy increases your ability to extend forgiveness .

Not everyone experiences empathy in every situation. Some people may be more naturally empathetic in general, but people also tend to feel more empathetic toward some people and less so toward others. Some of the factors that play a role in this tendency include:

How you perceive the other person
How you attribute the other individual's behaviors
What you blame for the other person's predicament
Your past experiences and expectations

Research has found that there are gender differences in the experience and expression of empathy, although these findings are somewhat mixed. Women score higher on empathy tests, and studies suggest that women tend to feel more cognitive empathy than men.

At the most basic level, there appear to be two main factors that contribute to the ability to experience empathy: genetics and socialization. Essentially, it boils down to the age-old relative contributions of nature and nurture .

Parents pass down genes that contribute to overall personality, including the propensity toward sympathy, empathy, and compassion. On the other hand, people are also socialized by their parents, peers, communities, and society. How people treat others, as well as how they feel about others, is often a reflection of the beliefs and values that were instilled at a very young age.

Barriers to Empathy

Some people lack empathy and, therefore, aren't able to understand what another person may be experiencing or feeling. This can result in behaviors that seem uncaring or sometimes even hurtful. For instance, people with low affective empathy have higher rates of cyberbullying .

A lack of empathy is also one of the defining characteristics of narcissistic personality disorder . Though, it is unclear whether this is due to a person with this disorder having no empathy at all or having more of a dysfunctional response to others.

A few reasons why people sometimes lack empathy include cognitive biases, dehumanization, and victim-blaming.

Cognitive Biases

Sometimes the way people perceive the world around them is influenced by cognitive biases . For example, people often attribute other people's failures to internal characteristics, while blaming their own shortcomings on external factors.

These biases can make it difficult to see all the factors that contribute to a situation. They also make it less likely that people will be able to see a situation from the perspective of another.

Dehumanization

Many also fall victim to the trap of thinking that people who are different from them don't feel and behave the same as they do. This is particularly common in cases when other people are physically distant.

For example, when they watch reports of a disaster or conflict in a foreign land, people might be less likely to feel empathy if they think that those who are suffering are fundamentally different from themselves.

Victim Blaming

Sometimes, when another person has suffered a terrible experience, people make the mistake of blaming the victim for their circumstances. This is the reason that victims of crimes are often asked what they might have done differently to prevent the crime.

This tendency stems from the need to believe that the world is a fair and just place. It is the desire to believe that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get—and it can fool you into thinking that such terrible things could never happen to you.

Causes of Empathy

Human beings are certainly capable of selfish, even cruel, behavior. A quick scan of the news quickly reveals numerous unkind, selfish, and heinous actions. The question, then, is why don't we all engage in such self-serving behavior all the time? What is it that causes us to feel another's pain and respond with kindness ?

The term empathy was first introduced in 1909 by psychologist Edward B. Titchener as a translation of the German term einfühlung (meaning "feeling into"). Several different theories have been proposed to explain empathy.

Neuroscientific Explanations

Studies have shown that specific areas of the brain play a role in how empathy is experienced. More recent approaches focus on the cognitive and neurological processes that lie behind empathy. Researchers have found that different regions of the brain play an important role in empathy, including the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula.

Research suggests that there are important neurobiological components to the experience of empathy. The activation of mirror neurons in the brain plays a part in the ability to mirror and mimic the emotional responses that people would feel if they were in similar situations.

Functional MRI research also indicates that an area of the brain known as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) plays a critical role in the experience of empathy. Studies have found that people who have damage to this area of the brain often have difficulty recognizing emotions conveyed through facial expressions .

Emotional Explanations

Some of the earliest explorations into the topic of empathy centered on how feeling what others feel allows people to have a variety of emotional experiences. The philosopher Adam Smith suggested that it allows us to experience things that we might never otherwise be able to fully feel.

This can involve feeling empathy for both real people and imaginary characters. Experiencing empathy for fictional characters, for example, allows people to have a range of emotional experiences that might otherwise be impossible.

Prosocial Explanations

Sociologist Herbert Spencer proposed that empathy served an adaptive function and aided in the survival of the species. Empathy leads to helping behavior, which benefits social relationships. Humans are naturally social creatures. Things that aid in our relationships with other people benefit us as well.

When people experience empathy, they are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors that benefit other people. Things such as altruism and heroism are also connected to feeling empathy for others.

Tips for Practicing Empathy

Fortunately, empathy is a skill that you can learn and strengthen. If you would like to build your empathy skills, there are a few things that you can do:

Work on listening to people without interrupting
Pay attention to body language and other types of nonverbal communication
Try to understand people, even when you don't agree with them
Ask people questions to learn more about them and their lives
Imagine yourself in another person's shoes
Strengthen your connection with others to learn more about how they feel
Seek to identify biases you may have and how they affect your empathy for others
Look for ways in which you are similar to others versus focusing on differences
Be willing to be vulnerable, opening up about how you feel
Engage in new experiences, giving you better insight into how others in that situation may feel
Get involved in organizations that push for social change

A Word From Verywell

While empathy might be lacking in some, most people are able to empathize with others in a variety of situations. This ability to see things from another person's perspective and empathize with another's emotions plays an important role in our social lives. Empathy allows us to understand others and, quite often, compels us to take action to relieve another person's suffering.

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Cleveland Clinic. Empathy fatigue: How stress and trauma can take a toll on you .

Duarte J, Pinto-Bouveia J, Cruz B. Relationships between nurses' empathy, self-compassion and dimensions of professional quality of life: A cross-sectional study . Int J Nursing Stud . 2016;60:1-11. doi:10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2016.02.015

Chikovani G, Babuadze L, Iashvili N, Gvalia T, Surguladze S. Empathy costs: Negative emotional bias in high empathisers . Psychiatry Res . 2015;229(1-2):340-346. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2015.07.001

Lam CB, Solmeyer AR, McHale SM. Sibling relationships and empathy across the transition to adolescence . J Youth Adolescen . 2012;41:1657-1670. doi:10.1007/s10964-012-9781-8

Kimmes JG, Durtschi JA. Forgiveness in romantic relationships: The roles of attachment, empathy, and attributions . J Marital Family Ther . 2016;42(4):645-658. doi:10.1111/jmft.12171

Kret ME, De Gelder B. A review on sex difference in processing emotional signals . Neuropsychologia . 2012; 50(7):1211-1221. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.12.022

Schultze-Krumbholz A, Scheithauer H. Is cyberbullying related to lack of empathy and social-emotional problems? Int J Develop Sci . 2013;7(3-4):161-166. doi:10.3233/DEV-130124

Baskin-Sommers A, Krusemark E, Ronningstam E. Empathy in narcissistic personality disorder: From clinical and empirical perspectives . Personal Dis Theory Res Treat . 2014;5(3):323-333. doi:10.1037/per0000061

Decety, J. Dissecting the neural mechanisms mediating empathy . Emotion Review . 2011; 3(1): 92-108. doi:10.1177/1754073910374662

Shamay-Tsoory SG, Aharon-Peretz J, Perry D. Two systems for empathy: A double dissociation between emotional and cognitive empathy in inferior frontal gyrus versus ventromedial prefrontal lesions . Brain . 2009;132(PT3): 617-627. doi:10.1093/brain/awn279

Hillis AE. Inability to empathize: Brain lesions that disrupt sharing and understanding another's emotions . Brain . 2014;137(4):981-997. doi:10.1093/brain/awt317

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Empathy 101: 3+ Examples and Psychology Definitions

Has a book, film, or photograph ever driven you to tears?

Or have you ever felt driven to ease someone else’s emotions?

If you have answered yes to at least one of these, then you have experienced empathy.

Empathy is a complex psychological process that allows us to form bonds with other people. Through empathy, we cry when our friends go through hard times, celebrate their successes, and rage during their times of hardship. Empathy also allows us to feel guilt, shame, and embarrassment, as well as understand jokes and sarcasm.

In this article, we explore empathy, its benefits, and useful ways to measure it. We also look at empathy fatigue – a common experience among clinicians and people in the caring professions – and provide beneficial resources.

Before you continue, we thought you might like to download our three Emotional Intelligence Exercises for free . These science-based exercises will not only enhance your ability to understand and work with your emotions but will also give you the tools to foster the emotional intelligence of your clients, students, or employees.

This Article Contains

What is empathy in psychology, the empathy quotient, 7 real-life examples, is it important 3+ benefits of empathy, empathy vs sympathy and compassion, assessing empathy: 4 helpful questionnaires, a note on empathy fatigue, positivepsychology.com resources, a take-home message.

In psychology, empathy is loosely defined as an ability to understand and experience someone else’s feelings and to adopt someone else’s viewpoint (Colman, 2015). The term ‘empathy’ comes from the German word Einfuhlung, which means “projecting into” (Ganczarek, Hünefeldt, & Belardinelli, 2018) and may explain why empathy is considered the ability to place yourself in someone else’s shoes.

Difficulties with defining empathy

Defining empathy clearly and exhaustively enough to be studied in psychology is difficult. For example, is empathy the ability to understand or feel or share or interpret someone else’s feelings?

Each of these verbs differs slightly, providing a different meaning to empathy. As a result, the underlying psychological mechanism and part of the brain responsible for empathy also differ.

Part of the difficulty defining empathy is that it comprises multiple components. For example, Hoffman (1987) argued that empathy in children develops across four different stages and that each stage lays down the foundation for the next.

These four stages are:

Global empathy or ‘emotion contagion,’ where one person’s emotion evokes the same emotional reaction in another person (or the observer).
Attention to others’ feelings, where the observer is aware of another person’s feelings but doesn’t mirror them.
Prosocial actions, where the observer is aware of another person’s feelings and behaves in a way to comfort the other person.
Empathy for another’s life condition, where the observer feels empathy toward someone else’s broader life situation, rather than their immediate situation right at this instance.

Fletcher-Watson and Bird (2020) provide an excellent overview of the challenges associated with defining and studying empathy. They argue that empathy results from a four-step process:

Step 1: Noticing/observing someone’s emotional state
Step 2: Correctly interpreting that emotional state
Step 3: ‘Feeling’ the same emotion
Step 4: Responding to the emotion

Empathy is not achieved if any of these four steps fail.

This multi-component conception of empathy is echoed across other research. For example, Decety and Cowell (2014) also posit that empathy arises from multiple processes interacting with each other.

These processes are:

Emotional: The ability to share someone else’s feelings
Motivational: The need to respond to someone else’s feelings
Cognitive: The ability to take someone else’s viewpoint

Part of this confusion stems from their corresponding definitions.

Empathy is the ability to share someone else’s emotions and perspectives. Emotional intelligence is the ability to understand, interpret, and manage other people’s emotions, as well as your own. This last inclusion – your own emotions – is what distinguishes emotional intelligence from empathy.

The Empathy Quotient is a measurement of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). It is akin to the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) but is a measure of empathy rather than intelligence. Like IQ, higher scores of the Empathy Quotient are meant to represent higher abilities of empathy.

Importantly, the Empathy Quotient differs from the Emotional Quotient. Emotional Quotient is measured using the BarOn Emotional Quotient-Inventory (Bar-On, 2004) and aims to measure emotional intelligence rather than empathy. It’s easy to confuse them because “EQ” is used to refer to both.

To determine whether the Empathy Quotient is a suitable test of empathy, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) administered the measurement to a group of neurotypical people and a group of people diagnosed with Asperger syndrome and compared their scores.

On average, individuals with Asperger syndrome scored significantly lower than neurotypical people. From this study, a score of 30 was determined to be a critical cut-off mark. Scores less than 30 were typically found among the participants with Asperger syndrome. Furthermore, the test-retest reliability of the Empathy Quotient was high, suggesting that the test reliably measures empathy.

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Since empathy is so complex and involved in so many social interactions, there are many examples of empathy in the real world.

In a discussion with a friend, have you ever felt so moved that you experienced the same emotion that they did? Or maybe a friend shared a cringe-worthy story of sheer humiliation, and that feeling was mirrored in you.

These situations when you experienced the same emotions as your friends are examples of empathy. Other examples of empathy include understanding someone else’s point of view during an argument, feeling guilty when you realize why someone might have misunderstood what you said, or realizing something you said was a faux pas . These scenarios require you to take someone else’s viewpoint.

Some of the best examples of empathy can be found in the work by Oliver Sacks and Atul Gawande. Sacks was a neurologist who had a profound impact through his thoughtful, patient-driven books on the field of psychiatry and neuropsychology.

Atul Gawande is a surgeon who worked with the World Health Organization and has published several books on improving healthcare and healthcare systems. Both authors address their patients in a sensitive, thoughtful manner that evokes a lot of empathy in the reader.

The following books are highly recommended:

Awakenings by Oliver Sacks
The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat by Oliver Sacks
Being Mortal by Atul Gawande

We participate in many scenarios in which we convey and receive information with other people, verbally and nonverbally.

Regardless of whether or not these interactions are important, we have to perceive, interpret, and respond to numerous cues.

Empathy is more than ‘just’ the ability to feel what someone else is feeling. Empathy is an essential skill that allows us to effectively engage with other people in social contexts (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).

Without empathy, we would struggle to:

understand other people’s feelings, motivations, and behaviors;
respond appropriately to someone else’s feelings; and
understand social interactions that rely on subtle behaviors, cues, and social norms, such as jokes, faux pas, and sarcasm.

The ability to respond appropriately to someone else’s emotions is extremely important for forming bonds. Empathy underlines the bond that forms between parent and child (Decety & Cowell, 2014).

Some researchers even consider some aspects of empathy to be a defining feature of humans. Our ability to consider another person’s viewpoint is considered uniquely human (Decety & Cowell, 2014).

Jean Decety and Jason Cowell (2014) argue that empathy is one process that contributes to understanding and engaging in complex social behavior, such as prosocial behavior, which includes volunteering as well as providing care for people who are terminally ill.

Earlier in this article, we mentioned the studies by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) in which they compared Empathy Quotient scores between people with Asperger syndrome and neurotypical people.

People on the autism–Asperger spectrum are believed to have a diminished capacity for empathy and, as a result, struggle with social contexts. However, their lower empathy scores do not mean that they are without feeling or should be considered psychopaths (who also have lower scores of empathy).

People on the autism spectrum often report that their intention is not to hurt other people’s feelings, and they feel guilty if they caused someone else’s hurt feelings (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).

Furthermore, people on the autism spectrum often report that they want human connections; however, they struggle to make them because they are not aware of how their behavior affects how other people perceive them (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). This shows how important empathy is in developing relationships and interpreting subtle social cues.

The three terms – empathy, sympathy, and compassion – are often confused with each other, because they are often used when referring to someone else’s feelings. For example, in response to a friend’s bad news, do you feel empathy, sympathy, or compassion? The terms are used in similar contexts, but they refer to different behaviors.

From the definitions provided above, empathy involves interpreting, understanding, feeling, and acting on other people’s feelings. Empathy is a multidimensional process and relies on affective, cognitive, behavioral, and moral components (Jeffrey, 2016). Remember, empathy is the ability to adopt someone else’s viewpoint or to put yourself into someone else’s shoes.
Sympathy is the feeling of pity for someone else’s misfortune or circumstances.
Compassion is the desire and act of wanting to alleviate someone else’s suffering. Compassion includes the affective components of empathy and sympathy, but it is accompanied by an action to change the circumstances of the person who is suffering (Sinclair et al., 2017). A compassionate act can also result in our suffering alongside the other person; this is referred to as co-suffering. Compassion is also linked to altruistic behavior (Jeffrey, 2016).

Examples of Empathy vs Sympathy vs Compassion

To further cement the difference between these three terms, consider the following examples:

Emma relays a recent event where she was extremely embarrassed. As she retells the story, her friend, Tamika, groans and mutters “Oh my word, I would feel so embarrassed. I would want the world to swallow me whole!”

In this example, Tamika doesn’t actually want to disappear into a hole. Instead, she’s correctly understanding and interpreting the situation that Emma found herself in. She is most likely experiencing empathy for Emma’s situation. She is not feeling pity, nor is she acting compassionately.

Jerome’s mother recently suffered a near-fatal heart attack. He listens to his mother retell her sisters about her experience. As she recounts her experience, she starts crying, because she was so afraid, and she realized that she might never see her loved ones again. Jerome starts crying as he listens to his mother.

In this example, Jerome is feeling sympathy (pity) for his mother and what she went through.

On his route to university, Jamal sees the same homeless man every day. The homeless man sits in the same place, regardless of the weather, with a sign next to him that asks for assistance. Jamal decides to donate some of his clothing to the homeless man.

Jamal’s behavior is an act of compassion . By donating his clothing, he is trying to alleviate the homeless man’s suffering. He may also be experiencing sympathy towards the man, but the act of trying to change the man’s situation is an act of compassion.

Use these questionnaires to determine what your current level of empathy is.

Empathy Quotient

The Empathy Quotient, including the entire questionnaire, its psychometric properties, and the scoring, is described in the original paper by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004). Professor Simon Baron-Cohen works with the Autism Research Centre (ARC), and the 60-item Empathy Quotient, as well as the scoring matrix, is available from the ARC website .

The Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue)

The Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue), designed by Rieffe, Ketelaar, and Wiefferink (2010), measures empathy in young children (average age of around 30 months) and reflects Hoffman’s (1987) theory of how empathy developed in children.

The questionnaire comprises three subscales, which map onto the first three stages of empathy development posited by Hoffman (1987). The questionnaire correlates well with other measures that aim to capture similar constructs. You can access this questionnaire on the Academia website .

The Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA)

A similar version of the EmQue also exists for older children. This version is known as the Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA; Overgaauw, Rieffe, Broekhof, Crone, & Güroğlu, 2017).

Unlike the EmQue, the EmQue-CA is a self-report measure. In other words, the adolescents and children must answer how much they agree with each statement, rather than their parents observing their behaviors.

The final version of the EmQue-CA measures the following three subscales: affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and intention to comfort. The 14 questions and the psychometric properties of the questionnaire are reported in the original paper, which can be accessed on the Frontiers in Psychology website as a free downloadable PDF .

The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ)

The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ) was developed by refining a collection of questionnaires that measure empathy into a core set of questions (Spreng, McKinnon, Mar, & Levine, 2009).

Researchers collected questions from multiple empathy questionnaires, administered these questions to a large sample of students, and then using exploratory factor analysis, refined the questions to a core set of 16.

The questionnaire and scoring rules are described in the appendix of the original paper (Spreng et al., 2009), which can be accessed on the Measurement Instrument Database for the Social Sciences .

Finally, the TEQ and the Empathy Quotient have a strong, positive correlation, confirming that the questions in both measure the same psychological construct.

Empathy is often confused with sympathy, which involves a lack of truly understanding another person’s experience.

For instance, if your friend recently lost their job, expressing sympathy would include feeling sorry for them and wishing them luck finding another job.

In contrast, empathy entails relating to your friend’s frustrations and fears about unemployment and actively experiencing those negative emotions by putting yourself in their shoes.

An example of compassion would be assisting your friend in applying for other jobs and updating their resume.

While empathy and sympathy drive acts of compassion, compassion stands out due to its proactive nature of motivating individuals to alleviate suffering.

Recognizing the distinctions between sympathy, empathy, and compassion can help you adjust your emotional responses when someone is going through hardship, enabling you to provide better support.

Feeling empathy is a very useful skill, especially for health professionals such as clinicians, therapists, and psychologists. But the ability to feel empathy for other people comes at the cost of empathy fatigue.

Empathy fatigue refers to the feeling of exhaustion that health professionals experience in response to constantly revisiting their emotional wounds through their clients’ experience (Stebnicki, 2000). For example, a therapist whose client is going through bereavement may be reminded of their own grief and trauma.

By being emotionally available for their client through emotional and stressful periods, the therapist experiences fatigue at a psychological, emotional, and physiological level (Stebnicki, 2000).

Besides manifesting as a sense of fatigue, we can consider empathy fatigue as a form of re-trauma, and as a result, the symptoms resemble that of secondary traumatic stress disorder.

Empathy fatigue in the clinical domain is also referred to as ‘counselor impairment’ because the clinician’s ability to perform their job is impaired (Stebnicki, 2007). An outcome of empathy fatigue is burnout, with a particularly sudden onset (Stebnicki, 2000).

Stebnicki (2007) provides a comprehensive list of strategies that clinicians can use to prevent empathy fatigue:

Self-awareness of the symptoms of empathy fatigue
Self-care strategies and lifestyle behaviors that protect the clinician from empathy fatigue
Using a support group and supervisor during periods of empathy fatigue

Finally, PositivePsychology.com’s post detailing self-care for therapists can be easily adapted to other industries. For example, these tips could be incorporated into a wellness session in the workplace to help prevent empathy fatigue.

17 Exercises To Develop Emotional Intelligence

These 17 Emotional Intelligence Exercises [PDF] will help others strengthen their relationships, lower stress, and enhance their wellbeing through improved EQ.

Created by Experts. 100% Science-based.

Below is a list of four items, each targeting a different aspect of empathy.

To help children better understand what is meant by empathy, we recommend the What is Empathy? worksheet. In this worksheet, children are asked to recall scenarios when they experienced a similar emotion as someone else. Children are also asked to think of reasons why empathy is a good thing and how they can improve their sense of empathy.

To practice looking at things from a fresh perspective, we recommend the 500 Years Ago Worksheet and the Trading Places Worksheet. Both worksheets can be used in group exercises, but only the second one is also appropriate for individual clients.

In five steps, the Listening Accurately Worksheet lays out an easy-to-follow guide to better develop empathy through active listening .

This worksheet is especially useful for clinicians and health professionals but is also very appropriate for anyone working in a profession where they need to communicate with other people constantly.

If you’re looking for more science-based ways to help others develop emotional intelligence, this collection contains 17 validated EI tools for practitioners. Use them to help others understand and use their emotions to their advantage.

If we show a little tolerance and humility, and if we are willing to stand in the other person’s shoes — as my mom would say — just for a moment, stand in their shoes. Because here’s the thing about life: there’s no accounting for what fate will deal you. Some days, when you need a hand. There are other days when we’re called to lend a hand.

U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Inauguration speech

And that is what empathy is: being able to put yourself in someone else’s shoes. Humans are social creatures, and empathy is an important skill. Without empathy, we will struggle to connect and form bonds. Underdeveloped empathy results in awkward social interactions, which can also weaken social bonds.

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.

By connecting, by understanding, by having empathy, we can all stand together, lend a hand when needed, and be given a hand when we, in turn, may need it.

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don’t forget to download our three Emotional Intelligence Exercises for free .

Bar-On, R. (2004). The Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): Rationale, description and summary of psychometric properties. In G. Geher (Ed.), Measuring emotional intelligence: Common ground and controversy (pp. 115–145). Nova Science Publishers.
Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (2004). The Empathy Quotient: An investigation of adults with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex differences. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders , 34 (2), 163–175.
Colman, A. M. (2015). A dictionary of psychology . Oxford University Press.
Decety, J., & Cowell, J. M. (2014). The complex relation between morality and empathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 18 , 337–339.
Fletcher-Watson, S., & Bird, G. (2020). Autism and empathy: What are the real links? Autism , 24 (1), 3–6.
Ganczarek, J., Hünefeldt, T., & Belardinelli, M. O. (2018). From “Einfühlung” to empathy: Exploring the relationship between aesthetic and interpersonal experience. Cognitive Processing , 19 (4), 141–145.
Gawande, A. (2017). Being mortal: Medicine and what matters in the end. Picador.
Hoffman, M. L. (1987). The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment. In N. Eisenberg & J. Strayer (Eds.), Cambridge studies in social and emotional development. Empathy and its development (pp. 47–80). Cambridge University Press.
Jeffrey, D. (2016). Empathy, sympathy and compassion in healthcare: Is there a problem? Is there a difference? Does it matter? Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine , 109 (12), 446–452.
John Donne. (2020, October 17). Wikiquote . Retrieved January 20, 2021, from https://en.wikiquote.org/w/index.php?title=John_Donne&oldid=2878168
Overgaauw, S., Rieffe, C., Broekhof, E., Crone, E. A., & Güroğlu, B. (2017). Assessing empathy across childhood and adolescence: Validation of the Empathy Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents (EmQue-CA). Frontiers in Psychology , 8 , Article 870.
Rieffe, C., Ketelaar, L., & Wiefferink, C. H. (2010). Assessing empathy in young children: Construction and validation of an Empathy Questionnaire (EmQue). Personality and Individual Differences , 49 (5), 362–367.
Sacks, O. (1998). The man who mistook his wife for a hat: And other clinical tales. Touchstone.
Sacks, O. W. (2011). Awakenings (New ed.). Picador.
Sinclair, S., Beamer, K., Hack, T. F., McClement, S., Raffin Bouchal, S., Chochinov, H. M., & Hagen, N. A. (2017). Sympathy, empathy, and compassion: A grounded theory study of palliative care patients’ understandings, experiences, and preferences. Palliative Medicine , 31 (5), 437–447.
Spreng, R. N., McKinnon, M. C., Mar, R. A., & Levine, B. (2009). The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire: Scale development and initial validation of a factor-analytic solution to multiple empathy measures. Journal of Personality Assessment , 91 (1), 62–71.
Stebnicki, M. A. (2000). Stress and grief reactions among rehabilitation professionals: Dealing effectively with empathy fatigue. Journal of Rehabilitation , 66 (1).
Stebnicki, M. A. (2007). Empathy fatigue: Healing the mind, body, and spirit of professional counselors. American Journal of Psychiatric Rehabilitation , 10 (4), 317–338.

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Im positive that the origin of the word ’empathy’ comes from Greek, with ‘pathos’ being an umbrella word for emotions (sympathy, apathy, antipathy, and from there passion, compassion etc).

It’s important to mention that empathy is not a sign of a weak personality. I did a huge work before I could finally cry when touched by my friend’s story. Because “men shouldn’t show their tears in public.” But don’t you dare tell me how I should react! 😀

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What is empathy?

The different components of empathy, why is empathy so important, signs you or a loved one lack empathy, causes of lack of empathy, building empathy tip 1: practice listening skills, tip 2: learn to read body language, tip 3: embrace your vulnerability, tip 4: improve emotional intelligence, tip 5: explore new perspectives, empathy: how to feel and respond to the emotions of others.

Empathy helps you see things from another person’s perspective, sympathize with their emotions, and build stronger relationships—at work, school, and in your personal life. Here’s how to become more empathetic.

Empathy is the ability to see things from another’s perspective and feel their emotions. Putting yourself in another person’s shoes might lead you to act with compassion and do what you can to improve their situation. In doing so, you can reduce the other person’s distress as well as your own.

Imagine you come home to find out your spouse or partner is ill. Even if you were having a good day, you would suddenly feel their distress and tend to their needs. If a friend is angry about the way a boss treated them, you’d likely share their sense of frustration. Maybe you can’t solve their problem, but you can understand that they need to vent their emotions.

Empathy isn’t just about hardships. When your child is excited about something, you feel their joy. When your friend is laughing at a joke, you experience their amusement. Empathy allows you to deepen your relationships as you connect with friends’ and loved ones’ thoughts and feelings, and they connect with yours.

Empathy can extend to people you don’t know as well. If you saw someone sitting alone at a party, for example, you might empathize with their loneliness and chat with them. If you saw images of other people suffering on the other side of the world, you might be moved to donate resources to help alleviate their suffering. On the other hand, when you see a televised crowd roaring with joy, you might feel your spirits rise. Their delight becomes your delight.

Empathy vs sympathy

While the two words are often used interchangeably, there is a difference between sympathy and empathy. Unlike empathy, sympathy doesn’t involve sharing what someone else feels. When you’re sympathetic, you care about the person’s problem or misfortune and feel sorry for their suffering, but you don’t fully feel their pain.

When a friend experiences a bereavement, for example, if you’re sympathetic you understand why they feel sad and are grieving, and feel sorry for their loss. If you’re empathetic, though, you can also feel the grief they’re going through. Sympathy is more of a feeling of pity for the person, while empathy is more a feeling of compassion for them.

Researchers tend to recognize at least two components of empathy: affective and cognitive.

Affective (or emotional) empathy is the ability to feel what others are feeling. If your spouse is stressed and sad, you might mirror those emotions. If a friend is jovial and upbeat, you might find yourself grinning as their happiness seems contagious.

Cognitive empathy is the ability to recognize and understand another person’s mental state. It gives you insight into the other person’s perspective and emotions. If you recognize that your spouse is angry, you can predict that your joke isn’t going to land well. If you can tell that your friend is feeling helpless, you won’t be surprised by their sudden outburst.

These two components of empathy require different neural networks in your brain. So, it’s possible to have high cognitive empathy but low emotional empathy and vice versa.

Empathy differences between sexes

Research shows that women are more likely to report feeling sad when they hear about the suffering of others. This matches the results of a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, which showed that female brains appear more receptive to feeling other people’s pain. However, the study showed no differences between the sexes in cognitive empathy.

Empathy has an important role to play in your life. First, it can strengthen your bonds with the people you interact with. As you try to understand others, you also make them feel heard and understood. They’re then more likely to take the time to empathize with you as well. This deepens your relationship and promotes that feeling of connection that all of us desire.

Research shows that having a strong social support network tends to increase a person’s happiness. Because empathy leads to better relationships, it can be a key component to building a more satisfying life.

Empathy can also:

Motivate prosocial behavior . Empathy can motivate you to take actions that improve the lives of others. These actions might include anything from donating to a charity to encouraging a friend to seek help for alcohol abuse to simply comforting someone with a hug.

Guide decision-making . In social situations, empathy can help you decide on the wisest course of action. If your spouse seems stressed out from work, you can infer that it’s not the best time to ask them to take on more responsibilities.

Reduce burnout . The results of one study suggest that empathy might be useful in reducing burnout . This is because empathy allows for more effective communication and collaboration, even in difficult work environments.

Help diffuse conflict . If you’re in a bitter argument with your coworker, for example, empathizing with them can prevent you from being overly critical or needlessly cruel. Once you have a better understanding of someone else’s perspective, it’s easier to move on to proposing a compromise .

Speak to a Licensed Therapist

BetterHelp is an online therapy service that matches you to licensed, accredited therapists who can help with depression, anxiety, relationships, and more. Take the assessment and get matched with a therapist in as little as 48 hours.

Empathy isn’t something that you either have or don’t have. Some people have a high degree of empathy, while others have lower empathy.

If your empathic abilities are on the lower end of the spectrum, you might feel indifferent to other people’s pain. For example, if a friend’s house is burglarized, you might say or think, “Well, that wouldn’t have happened if you were more careful.” Or maybe you look down on family members who are dealing with financial hardship and chalk it up to their failure to work hard. You might even hold the misguided belief that bad things like that would never happen to you.

Low empathy can also lead you to believe that the people around you are too sensitive. You might constantly be surprised that your friends are offended by your jokes. Maybe you don’t understand how your words and actions wound your loved ones. This can lead to all sorts of arguments and misunderstandings.

If you have low empathy, you might have a lack of patience when dealing with people who are in distress. Perhaps your go-to piece of advice for other people is, “Just get over it.” Despite this, you tend to hold grudges and don’t forgive people for mistakes. You never seem to have the time or bandwidth to listen to other people’s perspectives or reflect on their emotional states.

Recognizing a lack of empathy in others

If a loved one is lacking in empathy, you’re likely to have some turbulent interactions. They might be impatient and overly critical, leading you to feel as if you’re walking on eggshells.

[Read: Dealing with Difficult Family Relationships]

You might notice that they’re constantly dismissing your problems or tuning out when you talk about your feelings. You might feel unheard or start to question if you really are being too sensitive. Realize that their lack of empathy is an issue only they can correct.

In some circumstances, it’s natural to feel low empathy. You might have a hard time empathizing with someone who bullied you or mistreated your loved ones. This could just be a situational lack of empathy and not reflective of how well you empathize with people in general.

Certain experiences might decrease your empathy. For example, some research indicates that empathy can decline as medical students go through training. This might be due to burnout , as med students struggle with stressful workloads and increased responsibilities. Med students might also use emotional detachment to protect themselves from psychological distress while on the job or to maintain professionalism when dealing with patients.

However, it’s by no means set in stone that experiences will have this effect. Other studies show that empathy levels in medical students either increase or remain unchanged.

Several mental health conditions, developmental disorders, and personality disorders might involve low empathy:

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) . BPD involves intense insecurity, extreme emotional swings, and an unstable self-image. People with BPD may have a normal level of cognitive empathy, but difficulty with emotional empathy.

Narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) . Narcisists often exhibit a pattern of extreme self-centeredness and arrogance, as well as a high need for admiration. Some research shows that people with NPD may have low empathy, perhaps specifically emotional empathy. It’s also possible that they have a degree of empathy but little motivation to act on those feelings.

[Read: Personality Disorders]

Machiavellianism . This is a personality trait that involves a tendency to be manipulative and disregard morality. People with this trait may have a low drive to act on empathy.

Psychopathy . Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by callousness and antisocial behavior . Lack of emotional empathy, but not necessarily cognitive empathy, is a hallmark of this disorder.

Autism and empathy

There’s a common myth that autistic individuals lack empathy. Some, but not all, autistic people may struggle with cognitive empathy. For example, an autistic person might have trouble immediately pinpointing why another person is upset. They might even have a hard time expressing a response that matches societal norms. This shouldn’t be confused with a lack of caring.

Read: Adult Autism and Relationships .

Empathy isn’t a fixed trait. Think of it as a muscle that can be developed with exercise. Developing your listening skills, paying attention to body language , and increasing emotional intelligence can heighten your ability to empathize with others. Embracing your own vulnerability and exploring new perspectives can also help.

You can’t put yourself in another person’s shoes if you’re unwilling to hear what they have to say. That’s why listening skills are a vital part of building empathy. You’ll need to go beyond just pretending to listen. Aim to listen so intently that you gain an understanding of the person’s situation, views, and emotions.

Identify and remove barriers to listening . If you’re stressed out, you’re going to have a harder time focusing on the other person. Consider addressing the stressor —whether it’s a looming deadline or a toothache—before continuing the conversation. Multitasking is another common barrier to active listening. Put away your phone and stop whatever else you’re doing so you can give the other person your undivided attention. This is especially important during disagreements or when broaching sensitive or complex subjects.

Don’t interrupt . When you cut people off, you not only interrupt their train of thought but you also risk misunderstanding the point they were trying to make. In addition, if you’re formulating your next sentence while the other person is still talking, you’re not completely listening.

Withhold judgment . If you know you disagree with someone, you might find yourself mentally discrediting their words as they speak. But it’s best to listen with an open mind. Don’t immediately criticize or assign blame while they’re talking. Make a real effort to understand where they’re coming from.

Let the other person know you’re listening . Non-verbal cues, such as maintaining eye contact, a head nod, and verbal cues, such as a quick “uh-huh,” let the other person know they have your attention. You’re essentially inviting them to continue. If you appear to be daydreaming or thinking about something else, the speaker might take that as a sign that you don’t care.

[Read: Effective Communication]

Provide feedback . If you think you might’ve misheard or misunderstood something, pose a few follow-up questions. The person can then clarify their point if necessary.

Listening isn’t just about receiving verbal messages. People also convey information about their emotional state through nonverbal body cues. The ability to read body language is useful in all sorts of social situations.

Perhaps you have a friend who frequently says, “I’m doing OK,” but you can tell by their sullen expression that something is wrong. Or maybe you can gauge a date’s interest in you based on their level of eye contact.

People often convey messages through:

Facial expression . Frowns, grins, hesitant smiles, and other facial expressions can convey mood.
Eye contact . A person’s eyes might be aimed at whatever they’re focused on. Wide eyes can convey excitement. Drooping lids might imply that the person is tired or calm.
Voice . A person’s vocal tone can tell you if they’re joking or being serious. The speed at which they talk can convey confidence or nervousness.
Posture . Stiff, tense shoulders might indicate apprehension. Relaxed shoulders and a slouching posture might be a sign that the person is at ease or bored.
Gestures . Lack of hand gestures may indicate shyness or discomfort. Someone who’s feeling relaxed and friendly might use their hands more. The speed and intensity of the gestures can also convey aggression or excitement.

[Read: Nonverbal Communication and Body Language]

Reading body language can be tricky. Not everyone uses the exact same nonverbal cues. And certain cues can mean multiple things. For example, is a person tapping their finger on the table because they’re feeling impatient or because they’re enjoying the song playing in the background? Here’s what to consider when trying to understand someone’s body language:

Look for consistency . Nonverbal cues should match what the other person is saying. If your spouse says they’re anxious, their fidgeting or furrowed brow might reinforce this message. In situations where body language doesn’t match what’s being said, you might need to make more of an effort to understand how the other person is feeling.

Don’t read too much into individual cues . If you focus too much on any one cue, you’re likely to misunderstand the other person. For example, just because a person is looking away from you doesn’t mean they’re disinterested. They might simply be gathering their thoughts. When reading body language, look at multiple cues to gain a more complete understanding.

Being aware of your own body language

Remember that your nonverbal cues are also conveying messages to people around you. If you’re sitting with your arms crossed and looking away from the other person, they might take that as a sign that you don’t want to talk.

If you want to encourage the person to engage with you, use positive cues, such as a gentle smile and relaxed eye contact, to project warmth. Learning ways to manage stress can help you avoid unconscious negative cues, such as frowning and holding a rigid posture.

Being empathetic requires you to make yourself vulnerable. When you hide behind an air of indifference, you make it harder for other people to trust or understand you. You also hold yourself back from feeling and understanding the full range of other people’s emotions. Here are some tips on opening up:

Reframe how you think of vulnerability . Maybe you’ve been taught that it’s a sign of weakness. Opening up to others—trusting them to listen and accept you and your flaws—requires courage.

Speak up . Tell your loved ones how you’re truly feeling. This requires you to reflect on your own emotional state as well as practice being open with others. Be prepared to accept and communicate intense emotions, including shame, jealousy, and grief . The more you talk about emotions, the more comfortable you’ll become. You’ll also notice that other people will be more willing to open up to you in return.

Say what you need . Make a habit of vocalizing your needs. Do you need someone to vent to? Or maybe you need physical help with something. Talking about your needs is healthier than suffering in silence. Not only does it make your life easier, but it also makes your loved ones feel trusted and needed.

Ease into it . If you have a hard time talking about your emotions or voicing your needs, just take things one step at a time. Maybe you can tell your friend about something that frustrated you about your workday. You can also tell them about parts of your day that made you feel excited and joyful. Or start by making a small request of your partner: “Can we go for a walk together this evening? Walking helps me feel less stressed.”

Don’t dwell too much on your reputation or perfection . If you’re overly focused on how other people perceive you, you might hesitate to be forthcoming. Maybe you feel you need to put up a facade to appear strong and unbothered. Try to let go of that idea and begin to embrace your imperfections. Being honest will draw you closer to the people who matter.

Emotional intelligence (sometimes called emotional quotient or EQ) is your ability to identify emotions and use them in ways that improve your life. For example, someone with high EQ knows how to relieve their own stress as well as deescalate heated arguments. EQ also enhances your ability to empathize with others, since it involves recognizing and understanding their emotions.

Emotional intelligence is often defined by four attributes: self-management, self-awareness, social awareness, and relationship management. Here are tips for building on each one:

Improve self-management by learning ways to cope with stress . Stress can make it difficult for you to be present, impairing your ability to assess emotions and social situations. So, learning a few stress-relieving strategies is an important step in enhancing your EQ. Practice relaxation techniques, such as deep breathing, to help you stay calm in the moment. Other practices, including exercise and meditation , are actions you can take each day to lower your overall stress.

Heighten self-awareness with mindfulness practices . Mindfulness involves focusing on the present moment but withholding judgment. You can use this to connect with and accept whatever emotions you’re currently feeling. Are you upset? Are you anxious? Rather than label these emotions as “bad” or “negative,” foster curiosity about them. What caused them? What do they physically feel like? Are they affecting your interactions with others? In addition to making you more self-aware, this practice can improve your ability to process emotions and increase emotional well-being.

[Read: Emotional Intelligence Toolkit]

Increase social awareness by focusing on other people . Mindfulness can help you with this task as well. Aim to be present with whoever you’re interacting with. What’s their body language like? Is there a topic they keep circling back to? Connect this social awareness to your self-awareness. Is the person saying or doing anything that is stirring your emotions? Maybe their body language is putting you at ease. Or maybe they’re saying something that makes you anxious.

Use conflict resolution skills to manage relationships . Even when you’re interacting with your best friend or closest family member, disagreements are bound to arise. You might have differing opinions on politics. Or perhaps your plans for a joint vacation don’t match up. Maybe one of you accidentally offends the other. Knowing how to pick your battles, compromise, and practice forgiveness can help you navigate these inevitable conflicts.

People are more likely to feel empathy toward people who are similar to them. You might feel more inclined to empathize with and help someone who looks like you, behaves like you, shares your goals, or experiences similar hardships. Unfortunately, this can lead to empathy biases when it comes to differences in factors like race, religion, or culture. Here are a few ways to counter that.

Actively expose yourself to new perspectives . If you’re an atheist, attend a religious ceremony. If you’re politically conservative, listen to podcasts that present a liberal perspective. If you’re used to city life, spend some time in rural communities. Look for common ground, but also acknowledge differences. You don’t necessarily have to agree with every perspective you come across. However, taking the time to simply listen with an open mind can help you see the humanity in people with different backgrounds or views.

Enjoy fiction . Even engaging with the perspectives of fictional characters can enhance your empathy. As you read a novel, you try to understand a character’s motives, goals, and emotional states. In other words, you’re exercising your ability to empathize. The same is true whenever you watch a character-driven television show or movie. Consider embracing novels, movies, and other works of art made by people from different cultural backgrounds. For example, if you’re white, read more books by Latino authors.

Be willing to question your assumptions . As you engage with people of different backgrounds, you’ll likely find that many of your earlier notions of them were inaccurate. It’s okay to admit to being wrong. Frame it as a learning experience. You can also begin to question your assumptions in daily situations. Perhaps your friend has a good reason for running late. Maybe that taxi driver was rude because he was under heavy stress. Practice using “what-ifs” to consider other perspectives.

It’s true that building empathy is a way to expand your social circle and boost your happiness. But don’t overlook the benefits it has for the people you encounter as well. Empathy can have a ripple effect. As you take the time to truly listen to others, you’re providing them with some level of emotional comfort. And it’s possible that you’re making it easier for them to trust, comfort, and empathize with even more people.

More Information

Five Ways Empathy Is Good for Your Health - Focusing on others is important for them, but can also be good for you. (Psychology Today)
Can I Have Empathy If I Am Autistic? - People with ASD can experience empathy—sometimes overwhelmingly. (Psychology Today)
Want to feel more connected? Practice empathy - Three ways to practice empathy. (Harvard Health Publishing)
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The concept of empathy is used to refer to a wide range of psychological capacities that are thought of as being central for constituting humans as social creatures allowing us to know what other people are thinking and feeling, to emotionally engage with them, to share their thoughts and feelings, and to care for their well–being. Ever since the eighteenth century, due particularly to the influence of the writings of David Hume and Adam Smith, those capacities have been at the center of scholarly investigations into the underlying psychological basis of our social and moral nature. Yet, the concept of empathy is of relatively recent intellectual heritage. Moreover, since researchers in different disciplines have focused their investigations on very specific aspects of the broad range of empathy-related phenomena, one should probably not be surprised by a certain amount of conceptual confusion and a multiplicity of definitions associated with the empathy concept in a number of different scientific and non-scientific discourses. The purpose of this entry is to clarify the empathy concept by surveying its history in various philosophical and psychological discussions and by indicating why empathy was and should be regarded to be of such central importance in understanding human agency in ordinary contexts, in the human sciences, and for the constitution of ourselves as social and moral agents. More specifically, after a short historical introduction articulating the philosophical context within which the empathy concept was coined, the second and third sections will discuss the epistemic dimensions associated with our empathic capacities. They will address the contention that empathy is the primary epistemic means for knowing other minds and that it should be viewed as the unique method distinguishing the human from the natural sciences. Sections 4 and 5 will then focus on claims that view empathy as the fundamental social glue and that understand empathy as the main psychological mechanism enabling us to establish and maintain social relations and taking an evaluative stance towards each other.

1. Historical Introduction

2.1 mirror neurons, simulation, and the discussion of empathy in the contemporary theory of mind debate, 3.1 the critique of empathy in the context of a hermeneutic conception of the human sciences, 3.2 the critique of empathy within the context of a naturalist conception of the human sciences, 4. empathy as a topic of scientific exploration in psychology, 5.1 empathy and altruistic motivation, 5.2 empathy, its partiality, susceptibility to bias, and moral agency, 5.3 empathy, moral judgment, and the authority of moral norms, other internet resources, related entries.

Before the psychologist Edward Titchener (1867–1927) introduced the term “empathy” in 1909 into the English language as the translation of the German term “Einfühlung” (or “feeling into”), “sympathy”was the term commonly used to refer to empathy-related phenomena. If one were to point to a conceptual core for understanding these phenomena, it is probably best to point to David Hume’s dictum that “the minds of men are mirrors to one another,”(Hume 1739–40 [1978], 365) since in encountering other persons, humans can resonate with and recreate that person’s thoughts and emotions on different dimensions of cognitive complexity. While, as we will see, not everybody shares such resonance conception of empathy(some philosophers in the phenomenological tradition emphatically reject it), it certainly constitutes the center of Theodor Lipps’s understanding, who Titchener had in mind in his translation of “Einfühlung” as “empathy.”

Theodor Lipps (1851–1914)was also very familiar with the work of David Hume (see the introduction to Coplan and Goldie 2011 in this respect). More importantly, it was Theodor Lipps, whose work transformed empathy/Einfühlung from a concept of nineteenth century German aesthetics into a central category of the philosophy of the social and human sciences. To understand this transformation we first need to appreciate the reasons why philosophers of the nineteenth century thought it necessary to appeal to empathy in order to account for our ability to appreciate natural objects and artefacts in an aesthetic manner. According to the dominant (even though not universally accepted) positivistic and empiricist conception, sense data constitute the fundamental basis for our investigation of the world. Yet from a phenomenological perspective, our perceptual encounter with aesthetic objects and our appreciation of them as being beautiful—our admiration of a beautiful sunset, for example—seems to be as direct as our perception of an object as being red or square. By appealing to the psychological mechanisms of empathy, philosophers intended to provide an explanatory account of the phenomenological immediacy of our aesthetic appreciation of objects. More specifically, for Lipps, our empathic encounter with external objects trigger inner “processes” that give rise to experiences similar to ones that I have when I engage in various activities involving the movement of my body. Since my attention is perceptually focused on the external object, I experience them—or I automatically project my experiences—as being in the object. If those experiences are in some way apprehended in a positive manner and as being in some sense life-affirming, I perceive the object as beautiful, otherwise as ugly. In the first case, Lipps speaks of positive; in the later of negative empathy. Lipps also characterizes our experience of beauty as “objectified self-enjoyment,” since we are impressed by the “vitality” and “life potentiality” that lies in the perceived object (Lipps 1906, 1903 a,b. For the contemporary discussion of empathy’s role in aesthetics see particularly Breithaupt 2009; Coplan and Goldie 2011 (Part II); Curtis & Koch 2009; and Keen 2007. For a recent history of the empathy concept see also Lanzoni 2018).

In his Aesthetik, Lipps closely links our aesthetic perception and our perception of another embodied person as a minded creature. The nature of aesthetic empathy is always the “experience of another human” (1905, 49) . We appreciate another object as beautiful because empathy allows us to see it in analogy to another human body. Similarly, we recognize another organism as a minded creature because of empathy. Empathy in this context is more specifically understood as a phenomenon of “inner imitation,” where my mind mirrors the mental activities or experiences of another person based on the observation of his bodily activities or facial expressions. Empathy is ultimately based on an innate disposition for motor mimicry, a fact that is well established in the psychological literature and was already noticed by Adam Smith (1853). Even though such a disposition is not always externally manifested, Lipps suggests that it is always present as an inner tendency giving rise to similar kinaesthetic sensations in the observer as felt by the observed target. In seeing the angry face of another person we instinctually have a tendency of imitating it and of “imitating” her anger in this manner. Since we are not aware of such tendencies, we see the anger in her face (Lipps 1907). Despite the fact that Lipps’s primary examples of empathy focus on the recognition of emotions expressed in bodily gestures or facial expressions, his conception of empathy should not be understood as being limited to such cases. As his remarks about intellectual empathy suggest (1903b/05), he regards our recognition of all mental activities—insofar as they are activities requiring human effort—as being based on empathy or on inner imitation (See also the introductory chapter in Stueber 2006).

2. Empathy and the Philosophical Problem of Other Minds

It was indeed Lipps’s claim that empathy should be understood as the primary epistemic means for gaining knowledge of other minds that was the focus of a lively debate among philosophers at the beginning of the 20 th century (Prandtl 1910, Stein 1917, Scheler 1973). Even philosophers, who did not agree with Lipps’s specific explication, found the concept of empathy appealing because his argument for his position was closely tied to a thorough critique of what was widely seen at that time as the only alternative for conceiving of knowledge of other minds, that is, Mill’s inference from analogy. Traditionally, the inference from analogy presupposes a Cartesian conception of the mind according to which access to our own mind is direct and infallible, whereas knowledge of other minds is inferential, fallible, and based on evidence about other persons’ observed physical behavior. More formally one can characterize the inference from analogy as consisting of the following premises or steps.

i.) Another person X manifests behavior of type B . ii.) In my own case behavior of type B is caused by mental state of type M . iii.) Since my and X ’s outward behavior of type B is similar, it has to have similar inner mental causes. (It is thus assumed that I and the other persons are psychologically similar in the relevant sense.) Therefore: The other person’s behavior ( X ’s behavior) is caused by a mental state of type M .

Like Wittgenstein, but predating him considerably, Lipps argues in his 1907 article “Das Wissen von fremden Ichen” that the inference from analogy falls fundamentally short of solving the philosophical problem of other minds. Lipps does not argue against the inference from analogy because of its evidentially slim basis, but because it does not allow us to understand its basic presupposition that another person has a mind that is psychologically similar to our own mind. The inference from analogy thus cannot be understood as providing us with evidence for the claim that the other person has mental states like we do because, within its Cartesian framework, we are unable to conceive of other minds in the first place. For Lipps, analogical reasoning requires the contradictory undertaking of inferring another person’s anger and sadness on the basis of my sadness and anger, yet to think of that sadness and anger simultaneously as something “absolutely different” from my anger and sadness. More generally, analogical inference is a contradictory undertaking because it entails “entertaining a completely new thought about an I, that however is not me, but something absolutely different” (Lipps 1907, 708, my translation).

Yet while Lipps diagnoses the problem of the inference of analogy within the context of a Cartesian conception of the mind quite succinctly, he fails to explain how empathy is able to provide us with an epistemically sanctioned understanding of other minds or why our “feeling into” the other person’s mind is more than a mere projection. More importantly, Lipps does not sufficiently explain why empathy does not encounter similar problems to the ones diagnosed for the inference from analogy and how empathy allows us to conceive of other persons as having a mind similar to our own if we are directly acquainted only with our own mental states(See Stueber 2006). Wittgenstein’s critique of the inference from analogy is in the end more penetrating because he recognizes that its problem depends on a Cartesian account of mental concepts. If my grasp of a mental concept is exclusively constituted by me experiencing something in a certain way, then it is impossible for me to conceive of how that very same concept can be applied to somebody else, given that I cannot experience somebody else’s mental states. I therefore cannot conceive of how another person can be in the same mental state as I am because that would require that I can conceive of my mental state as something, which I do not experience. But according to the Cartesian conception this seems to be a conceptually impossible task. Moreover, if one holds on to a Cartesian conception of the mind, it is not clear how appealing to empathy, as conceived of by Lipps, should help us in conceiving of mental states as belonging to another mind.

Within the phenomenological tradition, the above shortcomings of Lipps’s position of empathy were quite apparent (see for example Stein 1917, 24 and Scheler 1973, 236). Yet despite the fact that they did not accept Lipps’s explication of empathy as being based on mechanisms of inner resonance and projection, authors within the phenomenological tradition of philosophy were persuaded by Lipps’s critique of the inference from analogy. For that very reason, Husserl and Stein, for example, continued using the concept of empathy and regarded empathy as an irreducible “type of experiential act sui generis” (Stein 1917, 10), which allows us to view another person as being analogous to ourselves without this “analogizing apprehension” constituting an inference of analogy (Husserl 1931 [1963], 141). Scheler went probably the furthest in rejecting the Cartesian framework in thinking about the apprehension of other minds, while keeping committed to something like the concept of empathy. [ 1 ] (In order to contrast his position from Lipps, Scheler however preferred to use the term “nachfühlen” rather than “einfühlen.”) For Scheler, the fundamental mistake of the debate about the apprehension of other minds consists in the fact that it does not take seriously certain phenomenological facts. Prima facie, we do not encounter merely the bodily movements of another person. Rather, we are directly recognizing specific mental states because they are characteristically expressed in states of the human body; in facial expressions, in gestures, in the tone of voice, and so on. Empathy within the phenomenological tradition then is not conceived of as a resonance phenomenon requiring the observer to recreate the mental states of the other person in his or her own mind but as a special perceptual act (See Scheler 1973, particularly 232–258; For a succinct explication of the debate about empathy in the phenomenological tradition consult Zahavi 2010)

The idea that empathy understood as inner imitation is the primary epistemic means for understanding other minds has however been revived in the 1980’s by simulation theorists in the context of the interdisciplinary debate about folk psychology; an empirically informed debate about how best to describe the underlying causal mechanisms of our folk psychological abilities to interpret, explain, and predict other agents. (See Davies and Stone 1995). In contrast to theory theory, simulation theorists conceive of our ordinary mindreading abilities as an ego-centric method and as a “knowledge–poor” strategy, where I do not utilize a folk psychological theory but use myself as a model for the other person’s mental life. It is not the place here to discuss the contemporary debate extensively, but it has to be emphasized that contemporary simulation theorists vigorously discuss how to account for our grasp of mental concepts and whether simulation theory is committed to Cartesianism. Whereas Goldman (2002, 2006) links his version of simulation theory to a neo-Cartesian account of mental concepts, other simulation theorists develop versions of simulation theory that are not committed to a Cartesian conception of the mind. (Gordon 1995a, b, and 2000; Heal 2003; and Stueber 2006, 2012).

Moreover, neuroscientific findings according to which so called mirror neurons play an important role in recognizing another person’s emotional states and in understanding the goal-directedness of his behavior have been understood as providing empirical evidence for Lipps’ idea of empathy as inner imitation. With the help of the term “mirror neuron,” scientists refer to the fact that there is significant overlap between neural areas of excitation that underlie our observation of another person’s action and areas that are stimulated when we execute the very same action. A similar overlap between neural areas of excitation has also been established for our recognition of another person’s emotion based on his facial expression and our experiencing the emotion. (For a survey on mirror neurons see Gallese 2003a and b, Goldman 2006, chap. 6; Keysers 2011; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004; and particularly Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008). Since the face to face encounter between persons is the primary situation within which human beings recognize themselves as minded creatures and attribute mental states to others, the system of mirror neurons has been interpreted as playing a causally central role in establishing intersubjective relations between minded creatures. For that very reason, the neuroscientist Gallese thinks of mirror neurons as constituting what he calls the “shared manifold of intersubjectivity” (Gallese 2001, 44). Stueber (2006, chap. 4)—inspired by Lipps’s conception of empathy as inner imitation—refers to mirror neurons as mechanisms of basic empathy; [ 2 ] as mechanisms that allow us to apprehend directly another person’s emotions in light of his facial expressions and that enable us to understand his bodily movements as goal-directed actions, that is, as being directed towards an external object like a person reaching for the cup. The evidence from mirror neurons—and the fact that in perceiving other people we use very different neurobiological mechanisms than in the perception of physical objects—does suggest that in our primary perceptual encounter with the world we do not merely encounter physical objects. Rather, even on this basic level, we distinguish already between mere physical objects and objects that are more like us (See also Meltzoff and Brooks 2001). The mechanisms of basic empathy have to be seen as Nature’s way of dissolving one of the principal assumptions of the traditional philosophical discussion about other minds shared by opposing positions such as Cartesianism and Behaviorism; that is, that we perceive other people primarily as physical objects and do not distinguish already on the perceptual level between physical objects like trees and minded creatures like ourselves. Mechanisms of basic empathy might therefore be interpreted as providing us with a perceptual and non-conceptual basis for developing an intersubjectively accessible folk psychological framework that is applicable to the subject and observed other (Stueber 2006, 142–45).

It needs to be acknowledged however that this interpretation of mirror neurons crucially depends on the assumption that the primary function of mirror neurons consists in providing us with a cognitive grasp of another person’s actions and emotions. This interpretation has however been criticized by researchers and philosophers who think that neural resonance presupposes rather than provides us with an understanding of what is going on in the minds of others (Csibra 2007, Hickok 2008 and 2014). They have also pointed out that in observing another person’s emotion or behavior, we never fully “mirror” another person’s neural stimulation. The neuroscientist Jean Decety has argued that in observing another person’s pain our vicariously stimulated pain matrix is not sensitive to the phenomenal quality of pain. Rather it is sensitive to pain as an indicator of “aversion and withdrawal when exposed to danger and threats”(Decety and Cowell 2015, 6 and Decety 2010). At least as far as empathy for pain is concerned, our neural resonance is also modulated by a variety of contextual factors, such as how close we feel to the observed subject, whether we regard the pain to be morally justified (as in the case of punishment, for example) or whether we regard it as unavoidable and necessary, such as in a medical procedure (Singer and Lamm 2009; but see also Allen 2010, Borg 2007, Debes 2010, Gallese 2016, Goldman 2009, Iacoboni 2011, Jacob 2008, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2016, and Stueber 2012a).

Yet it should be noted that everyday mindreading is not restricted to the realm of basic empathy. Ordinarily we not only recognize that other persons are afraid or that they are reaching for a particular object. We understand their behavior in more complex social contexts in terms of their reasons for acting using the full range of psychological concepts including the concepts of belief and desire. Evidence from neuroscience shows that these mentalizing tasks involve very different neuronal areas such as the medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal cortex, and the cingulate cortex. (For a survey see Kain and Perner 2003; Frith and Frith 2003; Zaki and Ochsner 2012). Low level mindreading in the realm of basic empathy has therefore to be distinguished from higher levels of mindreading (Goldman 2006). It is clear that low level forms of understanding other persons have to be conceived of as being relatively knowledge– poor as they do not involve a psychological theory or complex psychological concepts. How exactly one should conceive of high level mindreading abilities, whether they involve primarily knowledge–poor simulation strategies or knowledge–rich inferences is controversially debated within the contemporary debate about our folk psychological mindreading abilities(See Davies and Stone 1995, Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997, Gordon 1995, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Heal 2003, Nichols and Stich 2003, Goldman 2006, and Stueber 2006). Simulation theorists, however, insist that even more complex forms of understanding other agents involve resonance phenomena that engage our cognitively intricate capacities of imaginatively adopting the perspective of another person and reenacting or recreating their thought processes (For various forms of perspective-taking see Coplan 2011 and Goldie 2000). Accordingly, simulation theorists distinguish between different types of empathy such as between basic and reenactive empathy (Stueber 2006) or between mirroring and reconstructive empathy (Goldman 2011). Interestingly, the debate about how to conceive of these more complex forms of mindreading resonates with the traditional debate about whether empathy is the unique method of the human sciences and whether or not one has to strictly distinguish between the methods of the human and the natural sciences. Equally noteworthy is the fact that in the contemporary theory of mind debate voices have grown louder that assert that the contemporary theory of mind debate fundamentally misconceives of the nature of social cognition. In light of insights from the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions in philosophy, they claim that on the most basic level empathy should not be conceived of as a resonance phenomenon but as a type of direct perception. (See particularly Zahavi 2010; Zahavi and Overgaard 2012, but Jacob 2011 for a response). More complex forms of social cognition are also not to be understood as being based on either theory or empathy/simulation, rather they are better best conceived of as the ability to directly fit observed units of actions into larger narrative or cultural frameworks (For this debate see Gallagher 2012, Gallagher and Hutto 2008, Hutto 2008, and Seemann 2011, Stueber 2011 and 2012a, and various articles in Matravers and Waldow 2018). For skepticism about empathic perspective-taking understood as a complete identification with the perspective of the other person see also Goldie 2011). Regardless of how one views this specific debate it should be clear that ideas about mindreading developed originally by proponents of empathy at the beginning of the 20 th century can no longer be easily dismissed and have to be taken seriously.

3. Empathy as the Unique Method of the Human Sciences

At the beginning of the 20 th century, empathy understood as a non-inferential and non-theoretical method of grasping the content of other minds became closely associated with the concept of understanding (Verstehen); a concept that was championed by the hermeneutic tradition of philosophy concerned with explicating the methods used in grasping the meaning and significance of texts, works of arts, and actions. (For a survey of this tradition see Grondin 1994). Hermeneutic thinkers insisted that the method used in understanding the significance of a text or a historical event has to be fundamentally distinguished from the method used in explaining an event within the context of the natural sciences. This methodological dualism is famously expressed by Droysen in saying that “historical research does not want to explain; that is, derive in a form of an inferential argument, rather it wants to understand” (Droysen 1977, 403), and similarly in Dilthey’s dictum that “we explain nature, but understand the life of the soul” (Dilthey 1961, vol. 5, 144). Yet Droysen and authors before him never conceived of understanding solely as an act of mental imitation or solely as an act of imaginatively “transporting” oneself into the point of view of another person. Such “psychological interpretation” as Schleiermacher (1998) used to call it, was conceived of as constituting only one aspect of the interpretive method used by historians. Other tasks mentioned in this context involved critically evaluating the reliability of historical sources, getting to know the linguistic conventions of a language, and integrating the various elements derived from historical sources into a consistent narrative of a particular epoch. The differences between these various aspects of the interpretive procedure were however downplayed in the early Dilthey. For him, grasping the significance of any cultural fact had to be understood as a mental act of “transposition.” (See for example Dilthey 1961, vol. 5, 263–265). .

Ironically, the close association of the concepts of empathy and understanding and the associated claim that empathy is the sole and unique method of the human sciences also facilitated the decline of the empathy concept and its almost utter disregard by philosophers of the human and social sciences later on, in both the analytic and continental/hermeneutic traditions of philosophy. Within both traditions, proponents of empathy were—for very different reasons—generally seen as advocating an epistemically naïve and insufficiently broad conception of the methodological proceedings in the human sciences. As a result, most philosophers of the human and social sciences maintained their distance from the idea that empathy is central for our understanding of other minds and mental phenomena. Notable exceptions in this respect are R.G. Collingwood and his followers, who suggested that reenacting another person’s thoughts is necessary for understanding them as rational agents (Collingwood 1946, Dray 1957 and 1995). Notice however that in contrast to the contemporary debate about folk psychology, the debate about empathy in the philosophy of social science is not concerned with investigating underlying causal mechanisms. Rather, it addresses normative questions of how to justify a particular explanation or interpretation.

Philosophers arguing for a hermeneutic conception of the human and social sciences insist on a strict methodological division between the human and the natural sciences. [ 3 ] Yet they nowadays favor the concept of understanding (Verstehen) and reject the earlier identification of understanding and empathy for two specific reasons. First, empathy is no longer seen as the unique method of the human sciences because facts of significance, which a historian or an interpreter of literary and non-literary texts are interested in, do not solely depend on facts within the individual mind. A historian, for example, is not bound by the agent’s perspective in telling the story of a particular historical time period(Danto 1965). Similarly, philosophers such as Hans Georg Gadamer, have argued that the significance of a text is not tied to the author’s intentions in writing the text. In reading a text by Shakespeare or Plato we are not primarily interested in finding out what Plato or Shakespeare said but what these texts themselves say.(Gadamer 1989; for a critical discussion see Skinner (in Tully 1988); “Introduction” in Kögler and Stueber 2000; and Stueber 2002).

The above considerations, however, do not justify the claim that empathy has no role to play within the context of the human sciences. It justifies merely the claim that empathy cannot be their only method, at least as long as one admits that recognizing the thoughts of individual agents has to play some role in the interpretive project of the human sciences. Accordingly, a second reason against empathy is also emphasized. Conceiving of understanding other agents as being based on empathy is seen as an epistemically extremely naïve conception of the interpretation of individual agents, since it seems to conceive of understanding as a mysterious meeting of two individual minds outside of any cultural context. Individual agents are always socially and culturally embedded creatures. Understanding other agents thus presupposes an understanding of the cultural context within which an agent functions. Moreover, in the interpretive situation of the human sciences, the cultural background of the interpreter and the person, who has to be interpreted, can be very different. In that case, I can not very easily put myself in the shoes of the other person and imitate his thoughts in my mind. If understanding medieval knights, to use an example of Winch (1958), requires me to think exactly as the medieval knight did, then it is not clear how such a task can be accomplished from an interpretive perspective constituted by very different cultural presuppositions. Making sense of other minds has, therefore, to be seen as an activity that is a culturally mediated one; a fact that empathy theorists according to this line of critique do not sufficiently take into account when they conceive of understanding other agents as a direct meeting of minds that is independent of and unaided by information about how these agents are embedded in a broader social environment. (See Stueber 2006, chap.6, Zahavi 2001, 2005; for the later Dilthey see Makreel 2000. For a critical discussion of whether the concept of understanding without recourse to empathy is useful for marking an epistemic distinction between the human and natural sciences consult also Stueber 2012b. Within the context of anthropology, Hollan and Throop argue that empathy is best understood as a dynamic, culturally situated, temporally extended, and dialogical process actively involving not only the interpreter but also his or her interpretee. See Hollan 20012; Hollan and Throop 2008, 2001; Throop 2010).).

Philosophers, who reject the methodological dualism between the human and the natural sciences as argued for in the hermeneutic context, are commonly referred to as naturalists in the philosophy of social science. They deny that the distinction between understanding and explanation points to an important methodological difference. Even in the human or social sciences, the main point of the scientific endeavor is to provide epistemically justified explanations (and predictions) of observed or recorded events (see also Henderson 1993). At most, empathy is granted a heuristic role in the context of discovery. It however can not play any role within the context of justification. As particularly Hempel (1965) has argued, to explain an event involves—at least implicitly—an appeal to law-like regularities providing us with reasons for expecting that an event of a certain kind will occur under specific circumstances. Empathy might allow me to recognize that I would have acted in the same manner as somebody else. Yet it does not epistemically sanction the claim that anybody of a particular type or anybody who is in that type of situation will act in this manner.

Hempel’s argument against empathy has certainly not gone unchallenged. Within the philosophy of history, Dray (1957), following Collingwood, has argued that empathy plays an epistemically irreducible role, since we explain actions in terms of an agent’s reasons. For him, such reason explanations do not appeal to empirical generalizations but to normative principles of actions outlining how a person should act in a particular situation. Similar arguments have been articulated by Jaegwon Kim (1984, 1998). Yet as Stueber (2006, chap. 5) argues such a response to Hempel would require us to implausibly conceive of reason explanations as being very different from ordinary causal explanations. It would imply that our notions of explanation and causation are ambiguous concepts. Reasons that cause agents to act in the physical world would be conceived of as causes in a very different sense than ordinary physical causes. Moreover, as Hempel himself suggests, appealing to normative principles explains at most why a person should have acted in a certain manner. It does not explain why he ultimately acted in that way. Consequently, Hempel’s objection against empathy retain their force as long as one maintains that reason explanations are a form of ordinary causal explanations and as long as one conceives of the epistemic justification of such explanations as implicitly appealing to some empirical generalizations (For Kim’s recent attempt to account for the explanatory character of action explanations by acknowledging the centrality of the first person perspective see also Kim 2010).

Despite these concessions to Hempel, Stueber suggests that empathy (specifically reenactive empathy) has to be acknowledged as playing a central role even in the context of justification. For him, folk psychological explanations have to be understood as being tied to the domain of rational agency. In contrast to explanations in terms of mere inner causes, folk psychological explanations retain their explanatory force only as long as agents’ beliefs and desires can also be understood as reasons for their actions. The epistemic justification of such folk psychological explanations implicitly relies on generalizations involving folk psychological notions such as belief and desire. Yet the existence of such generalizations alone does not establish specific beliefs and desires as reasons for a person’s actions. Elaborating on considerations by Heal (2003) and Collingwood (1946), Stueber suggests that recognizing beliefs and desires as reasons requires the interpreter to be sensitive to an agent’s other relevant beliefs and desires. Individual thoughts function as reasons for rational agency only relative to a specific framework of an agent’s thoughts that are relevant for consideration in a specific situation. Most plausibly—given our persistent inability to solve the frame problem—recognizing which of another agent’s thoughts are relevant in specific contexts requires the practical ability of reenacting another person’s thoughts in one’s own mind. Empathy’s central epistemic role has to be admitted, since beliefs and desires can be understood only in this manner as an agent’s reasons (See Stueber 2006, 2008, 2013. For a related discussion about the role of understanding in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science see Grimm 2016 and Grimm, Baumberger, and Ammon 2017).

The discussion of empathy within psychology has been largely unaffected by the critical philosophical discussion of empathy as an epistemic means to know other minds or as the unique method of the human sciences. Rather, psychologists’ interest in empathy–related phenomena harks back to eighteenth century moral philosophy, particularly David Hume and Adam Smith (See also Wispe 1991). Here empathy, or what was then called sympathy, was regarded to play a central role in constituting human beings as social and moral creatures allowing us to emotionally connect to our human companions and care for their well-being. Throughout the early 20 th century, but particularly since the late 1940’s, empathy has, therefore, been an intensively studied topic of psychological research.

More broadly one can distinguish two psychological research traditions studying empathy–related phenomena; that is, the study of what is currently called empathic accuracy and the study of empathy as an emotional phenomenon in the encounter of others. The first area of study defines empathy primarily as a cognitive phenomenon and conceives of empathy in general terms as “the intellectual or imaginative apprehension of another’s condition or state of mind,” to use Hogan’s (1969) terminology. Within this area of research, one is primarily interested in determining the reliability and accuracy of our ability to perceive and recognize other persons’ enduring personality traits, attitudes and values, and occurrent mental states. One also investigates the various factors that influence empathic accuracy. One has, for example, been interested in determining whether empathic ability depends on gender, age, family background, intelligence, emotional stability, the nature of interpersonal relations, or whether it depends on specific motivations of the observer. (For a survey see Ickes 1993 and 2003; and Taft 1955). A more detailed account of the research on empathic accuracy and some of its earlier methodological difficulties can be found in the

Supplementary document on the Study of Cognitive Empathy and Empathic Accuracy .

Philosophically more influential has been the study of empathy defined primarily as an emotional or affective phenomenon, which psychologists in the middle of the 1950’s started to focus on. In this context, psychologists have also addressed issues of moral motivation that have been traditionally topics of intense discussions among moral philosophers. They were particularly interested in investigating (i) the development of various means for measuring empathy as a dispositional trait of adults and of children and as a situational response in specific situations, (ii) the factors on which empathic responses and dispositions depend, and (iii) the relation between empathy and pro-social behavior and moral development. Before discussing the psychological research on emotional empathy and its relevance for moral philosophy and moral psychology in the next section, it is vital to introduce important conceptual distinctions that one should keep in mind in evaluating the various empirical studies.

Anyone reading the emotional empathy literature has to be struck by the fact that empathy tended to be incredibly broadly defined in the beginning of this specific research tradition. Stotland, one of the earliest researcher who understood empathy exclusively as an emotional phenomenon, defined it as “an observer’s reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing or is about to experience an emotion” (1969, 272). According to Stotland’s definition very diverse emotional responses such as feeling envy, feeling annoyed, feeling distressed, being relieved about, feeling pity, or feeling what Germans call Schadenfreude (feeling joyful about the misfortune of another) have all to be counted as empathic reactions. Since the 1980’s however, psychologists have fine tuned their understanding of empathy conceptually and distinguished between different aspects of the emotional reaction to another person; thereby implicitly acknowledging the conceptual distinctions articulated by Max Scheler (1973) almost a century earlier. In this context, it is particularly useful to distinguish between the following reactive emotions that are differentiated in respect to whether or not such reactions are self or other oriented and whether they presuppose awareness of the distinction between self and others. (See also the survey in the Introduction to Eisenberg/Strayer 1987 and Batson 2009)

Emotional contagion: Emotional contagion occurs when people start feeling similar emotions caused merely by the association with other people. You start feeling joyful, because other people around you are joyful or you start feeling panicky because you are in a crowd of people feeling panic. Emotional contagion however does not require that one is aware of the fact that one experiences the emotions because other people experience them, rather one experiences them primarily as one’s own emotion (Scheler 1973, 22). A newborn infant’s reactive cry to the distress cry of another, which Hoffman takes as a “rudimentary precursor of empathic distress” (Hoffman 2000, 65), can probably be understood as a phenomenon of emotional contagion, since the infant is not able to properly distinguish between self and other.

Affective and proper Empathy: More narrowly and properly understood, empathy in the affective sense is the vicarious sharing of an affect. Authors however differ in how strictly they interpret the phrase of vicariously sharing an affect. For some, it requires that the empathizers and the persons they empathize with need to be in very similar affective states (Coplan 2011; de Vignemont and Singer 2006; Jacob 2011). For Hoffman, on the other hand, it is an emotional response requiring only “the involvement of psychological processes that make a person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than with his own situation” (Hoffman 2000, 30). According to this definition, empathy does not necessarily require that the subject and target feel similar emotions (even though this is most often the case). Rather the definition also includes cases of feeling sad when seeing a child who plays joyfully but who does not know that it has been diagnosed with a serious illness (assuming that this is how the other person himself or herself would feel if he or she would fully understand his or her situation). In contrast to mere emotional contagion, genuine empathy presupposes the ability to differentiate between oneself and the other. It requires that one is minimally aware of the fact that one is having an emotional experience due to the perception of the other’s emotion, or more generally due to attending to his situation. In seeing a sad face of another and feeling sad oneself, such feeling of sadness should count as genuinely empathic only if one recognizes that in feeling sad one’s attention is still focused on the other and that it is not an appropriate reaction to aspects of one’s own life. Moreover, empathy outside the realm of a direct perceptual encounter involves some appreciation of the other person’s emotion as an appropriate response to his or her situation. To be happy or unhappy because one’s child is happy or sad should not count necessarily as an empathic emotion. It cannot count as a vicarious emotional response if it is due to the perception of the outside world from the perspective of the observer and her desire that her children should be happy. My happiness about my child being happy would therefore not be an emotional state that is more congruent to his situation. Rather, it is an emotional response appropriate to my own perspective on the world. In order for my happiness or unhappiness to be genuinely empathic it has to be happiness or unhappiness about what makes the other person happy. Accordingly, if I share another person’s emotion vicariously I do not merely have to be in an affective state with a similar phenomenal quality. Rather my affective state has to be directed toward the same intentional object. (See Sober and Wilson 1998, 231–237 and Maibom 2007. For a critical discussion of how and whether such vicarious sharing is possible see also Deonna 2007 and Matravers 2018). It should be noted, however, that some authors conceive of proper empathy more broadly as not merely being concerned with the vicarious reenactment of affective states but more comprehensively as including non-affective states such as beliefs and desires. This is especially true if they are influenced by the discussion of of empathy as an epistemic means such as Goldman (2011) and Stueber (2006). However, already Adam Smith (1853) constitutes a good example for such broad understanding of proper empathy. Finally, others suggest that it is best to distinguish between affective sharing and perspective taking (Decety and Cowell 2015).

Sympathy: In contrast to affective empathy, sympathy—or what some authors also refer to as empathic concern—is not an emotion that is congruent with the other’s emotion or situation such as feeling the sadness of the other person’s grieving for the death of his father. Rather, sympathy is seen as an emotion sui generis that has the other’s negative emotion or situation as its object from the perspective of somebody who cares for the other person’s well being (Darwall 1998). In this sense, sympathy consists of “feeling sorrow or concern for the distressed or needy other,” a feeling for the other out of a “heightened awareness of the suffering of another person as something that needs to be alleviated.” (Eisenberg 2000a, 678; Wispe 1986, 318; and Wispe 1991).

Whereas it is quite plausible to assume that empathy—that is, empathy with negative emotions of another or what Hoffman (2000) calls “veridical empathic distress”—under certain conditions (and when certain developmental markers are achieved) can give rise to sympathy, it should be stressed that the relation between affective empathy and sympathy is a contingent one; the understanding of which requires further empirical research. First, sympathy does not necessarily require feeling any kind of congruent emotions on part of the observer, a detached recognition or representation that the other is in need or suffers might be sufficient. (See Scheler 1973 and Nichols 2004). Second, empathy or empathic distress might not at all lead to sympathy. People in the helping professions, who are so accustomed to the misery of others, suffer at times from compassion fatigue. It is also possible to experience empathic overarousal because one is emotionally so overwhelmed by one’s empathic feelings that one is unable to be concerned with the suffering of the other (Hoffman 2000, chap. 8). In the later case, one’s empathic feeling are transformed or give rise to mere personal distress, a reactive emotional phenomenon that needs to be distinguished from emotional contagion, empathy, and sympathy.

Personal Distress: Personal distress in the context of empathy research is understood as a reactive emotion in response to the perception/recognition of another’s negative emotion or situation. Yet, while personal distress is other-caused like sympathy, it is, in contrast to sympathy, primarily self-oriented . In this case, another person’s distress does not make me feel bad for him or her, it just makes me feel bad, or “alarmed, grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, perturbed, distressed,and troubled;” to use the list of adjectives that according to Batson’s research indicates personal distress (Batson et al. 1987 and Batson 1991). And, in contrast to empathic emotions as defined above, my personal distress is not any more congruent with the emotion or situation of another. Rather it wholly defines my own outlook onto the world.

While it is conceptually necessary to differentiate between these various emotional responses, it has to be admitted that it is empirically not very easy to discriminate between them, since they tend to occur together. Think or imagine yourself attending the funeral of the child of a friend or good acquaintance. This is probably one reason why early researchers tended not to distinguish between the above aspects in their study of empathy related phenomena. Yet since the above distinctions refer to very different psychological mechanisms, it is absolutely central to distinguish between them when empirically assessing the impact and contribution of empathy to an agent’s pro-social motivation and behavior. Given the ambiguity of the empathy concept within psychology—particularly in the earlier literature—in evaluating and comparing different empirical empathy studies, it is always crucial to keep in mind how empathy has been defined and measured within the context of these studies. For a more extensive discussion of the methods used by psychologists to measure empathy see the

Supplementary document on Measuring Empathy .

5. Empathy, Moral Philosophy, and Moral Psychology

Moral philosophers have always been concerned with moral psychology and with articulating an agent’s motivational structure in order to explicate the importance of morality for a human life. After all, moral judgments supposedly make demands on an agent’s will and are supposed to provide us with reasons and motivations for acting in a certain manner. Yet moral judgments, at least in the manner in which we conceive of them in modern times, are also regarded to be based on normative standards that, in contrast to mere conventional norms, have universal scope and are valid independent of the features of specific social practices that agents are embedded in. One only needs to think of statements such as “cruelty to innocent children or slavery is morally wrong,” which we view as applying also to social practices where the attitude of its population seem to condone such actions. Moral judgements thus seem to address us from the perspective of the moral stance where we leave behind the perspective of self-love and do not conceive of each other either as friends or foes (see Hume 1987, 75) or as belonging to the in–group or out–group, but where we view each other all to be equal part of a moral community. Finally, and relatedly, in order to view morality as something that is possible for human beings we also seem to require that our motivations based on or associated with moral reasons have a self-less character. Given to charity for merely selfish reasons, for example, seems to clearly diminish its moral worth and implicitly deny the universal character of a moral demand. Philosophically explicating the importance of morality for human life then has to do the following: It has to explain how it is that we humans as a matter of fact do care about morality thusly conceived, it has to address the philosophically even more pertinent question of why it is that we should care about morality or why it is that we should regard judgments issued from the perspective of the moral stance to have normative authority over us; and it has to allow us to understand how it is that we can act self-lessly in a manner that correspond to the demands made on us from the moral stance. Answering all of these questions however necessitates at one point to explain how our moral interests are related to our psychological constitution as human beings and how moral demands can be understood as being appropriately addressed to agents who are psychologically structured in that manner.

Prima facie, the difficulty of this enterprise consists in squaring a realistic account of human psychology with the universal scope and intersubjective validity of moral judgments, since human motivation and psychological mechanisms seem to be always situational, local, and of rather limited scope. Moreover, as evolutionary psychologists tell us in–group bias seems to be a universal trait of human psychology. One of the most promising attempts to solve this problem is certainly due to the tradition of eighteenth century moral philosophy associated with the names of David Hume and Adam Smith who tried to address all of the above philosophical desiderata by pointing to the central role that our empathic and sympathetic capacities have for constituting us as social and moral agents and for providing us with the psychological capacities to make and to respond to moral judgments. While philosophers in the Kantian tradition, who favor reason over sentiments, have generally been skeptical about this proposal, more recently the claim that empathy is central for morality and a flourishing human life has again been the topic of an intense and controversial debate. On the one hand, empathy has been hailed by researchers from a wide range of disciplines and also by some public figures, President Obama most prominently among them. Slote (2010) champions empathy as the sole foundation of moral judgment, de Waal (2006) conceives of it as the unique evolutionary building block of morality, Rifkin (2009) regards it even as a force whose cultivation has unique revolutionary powers to transform a world in crisis, and Baron-Cohen (2011, 194) views it as a “universal solvent” in that “any problem immersed in empathy becomes soluble.” On the other hand, such empathy enthusiasm has encountered penetrating criticism by Prinz (2011 a,b) and Bloom (2016), who emphasize its dark side, that is, its tendency to fall prey to so–called “here and now” biases. The following subsections will address these issues by surveying the relevant empirical research on the question whether empathy motivates us in a self-less manner, the question of whether empathy is inherently biased and partial to the in-group, and it will discuss how we might think of the normative character of moral judgments in light of our empathic capacities.(For a survey of other relevant issues from social psychology, specifically social neuroscience, consult also Decety and Lamm 2006; Decety and Ickes 2009, and Decety 20012. For a discussion of the importance empathy for medical practice see Halpern 2001)

In a series of ingeniously designed experiments, Batson has accumulated evidence for what he calls the empathy-altruism thesis. In arguing for this thesis, Batson conceives of empathy as empathic concern or what others would call sympathy. More specifically, he characterized it in terms of feelings of being sympathetic, moved by, being compassionate, tender, warm and soft-hearted towards the other’s plight (Batson et al. 1987, 26) The task of his experiments consists in showing that empathy/sympathy does indeed lead to genuinely altruistic motivation, where the welfare of the other is the ultimate goal of my helping behavior, rather than to helping behavior because of predominantly egoistic motivations. According to the egoistic interpretation of empathy–related phenomena, empathizing with another person in need is associated with a negative feeling or can lead to a heightened awareness of the negative consequences of not helping; such as feelings of guilt, shame, or social sanctions. Alternatively, it can lead to an enhanced recognition of the positive consequences of helping behavior such as social rewards or good feelings. Empathy according to this interpretation induces us to help through mediation of purely egoistic motivations. We help others only because we recognize helping behavior as a means to egoistic ends. It allows us to reduce our negative feelings (aversive arousal reduction hypothesis), to avoid “punishment,” or to gain specific internal or external “rewards” (empathy-specific punishment and empathy-specific reward hypotheses).

Notice however that in arguing for the empathy-altruism thesis, Batson is not claiming that empathy always induces helping behavior. Rather, he argues against the predominance of an egoistic interpretation of an agent’s motivational structure. He argues for the existence of genuinely altruistic motivations and more specifically for the claim that empathy causes such genuinely altruistic motivation. These genuinely altruistic motives (together with other egoistic motives) are taken into account by the individual agent in deliberating about whether or not to help. Even for Batson, the question of whether the agent will act on his or her altruistic motivations depends ultimately on how strong they are and what costs the agent would incur in helping another person.

The basic set up of Batson’s experiments consists in the manipulation of the situation of the experimental subjects (dependent on the egoistic alternative to be argued against) and the manipulation of empathy/sympathy felt for an observed target in need. The decisive evidence for the empathy/sympathy-altruism thesis is always the recorded behavior of the subject, who is in a high empathy condition and in a situation where his helping behavior can not plausibly be seen as a means for the satisfaction of a personal goal. Since here is not the place to extensively describe the details of Batson’s experiments, a brief description of the experimental set up—focusing on Batson’s argument against the aversive arousal interpretation of empathy—and a brief evaluation of the success of his general argumentative strategy has to suffice (for more details see Batson 1991 and 2011). In all of his experiments, Batson assumes—based on Stotland (1969) and others—that empathy/sympathy can be manipulated either by manipulating the perceived similarity between subjects and targets or by manipulating the perspective taking attitude of the subjects. Empathy according to these assumptions can be increased by enhancing the perceived similarity between subject and target or by asking the subject to imagine how the observed person would feel in his or her situation rather than asking the subject to attend carefully to the information provided. [Note also that instructing the subject to imagine how they themselves would feel in the other’s situation, rather than instructing them to imagine how the other feels, is associated with an increase in personal distress and not only sympathetic feelings. (Batson et al. 1997b and Lamm, Batson, and Decety 2007).]

In trying to argue against the aversive arousal reduction interpretation, Batson also manipulates the ease with which a subject can avoid helping another person (in this case taking his place when they see him getting electric shocks). He reasons that if empathy leads to genuinely altruistic motivations, subjects in the high empathy/easy escape condition should still be willing to help. If they were only helping in order to reduce their own negative feelings, they would be expected to leave in this situation, since leaving is the less costly means for reaching an egoistic goal. As Batson was happy to report, the results confirmed his empathy/sympathy-altruism hypothesis, not only in the above experiments but also in experiments testing other alternative interpretations of empathy such as the empathy- specific punishment and the empathy-specific award hypotheses.

Researchers generally agree in finding Batson’s experimental research program and the accumulated evidence for the empathy-altruism thesis to be impressive. Yet they disagree about how persuasive one should ultimately regard his position. In particular it has been pointed out that his experiments have limited value, since they target only very specific egoistic accounts of why empathy might lead to helping behavior. Batson is not able to dismiss conclusively every alternative egoistic interpretation. In addition, it has been claimed that egoism has the resources to account for the result of his experiments. For example, one might challenge the validity of Batson’s interpretation by speculating whether empathy/sympathy leads to a heightened awareness of the fact that one will be troubled by bad memories of seeing another person in need, if one does nothing to help him or her. In this case even an egoistically motivated person would help in the high empathy/easy escape condition. (For this reply and various other egoistic interpretations of Batson’s experiments see Sober and Wilson 1998, 264–271).

Cialdini and his collaborators have suggested an even more elaborate non-altruistic interpretation of helping behavior in high empathy/easy escape conditions. According to their suggestions, conditions of high empathy are also conditions of increased “interpersonal unity, wherein the conception of self and other are not distinct but are merged to some degree” (Cialdini et al. 1997, 490). It is this increased feeling of oneness rather than empathy that is causally responsible for motivating helping behavior (See however Batson et al. 1997a, Neuberg et al. 1997, and Batson 1997 and 2011 for a plausible reply and May 2018, 144–153 for a probing discussion of the relation between empathic concern and oneness). One therefore has to be cautious in claiming that Batson has conclusively proven that the empathy/sympathy-altruism hypothesis is true, if that means one has logically excluded every egoistic alternative in accounting for helping behavior. But it has to be acknowledged that Batson has radically changed the argumentative dialectic of the egoism-altruism debate by forcing the egoistic account of human agency to come up with ever more elaborate alternative interpretations in order to account for helping behavior within its framework. Egoism was supposed to provide a rather unified and relatively simple account of the motivational structure of human agency. In challenging the predominance and simplicity of this framework in an empirically acute fashion, Batson has at least established altruism—claiming that besides egoistic motivations we are also motivated by genuinely altruistic reasons—as an empirically plausible hypothesis. He has shown it to be a hypothesis one is almost persuaded to believe that it is true, as he himself recently has characterized his own epistemic attitude (Batson 1997, 522.) More positively expressed, Batson’s research has at least demonstrated that empathy/sympathy is a causal factor in bringing about helping behavior. Regardless of the question of the exact nature of the underlying motivation for helping or prosocial behavior, psychologists generally assume that in adults and children a positive, even if weak, correlation between empathy—measured in a variety of ways—and prosocial behavior has been established; and this despite the fact that the above aspects of emotional responding to another person have not always been sufficiently distinguished.(For a survey see Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Eisenberg/Fabes 1998, Spinrad and Eisenberg 2014. For a general survey of the various factors contributing to prosocial behavior see Bierhoff 2002).

Regardless of how exactly one views the strength of Batson’s position, his research alone does not validate the thesis, articulated by various traditional moral philosophers, that sympathy or empathy is the basis of morality or that it constitutes the only source for moral motivation. First, nothing in his research has shown that empathy/sympathy is empirically necessary for moral agency. Second, some of Batson’s own research casts doubt on the claim that sympathy/empathy is the foundation of morality as empathy induced altruism can lead to behavior that conflicts with our principles of justice and fairness. One, for example, tends to assign a better job or a higher priority for receiving medical treatment to persons with whom one has actually sympathized, in violation of the above moral principles (See Batson et al. 1995). For that very reason, Batson himself distinguishes between altruistic motivation concerned with the well-being of another person and moral motivation guided by principles of justice and fairness (Batson 2011). Unfortunately we do not always realize this fact when we abstractly contrast moral motivation broadly with egoistic motivation. For that very reason, we also do not realize that we need to be more conscious in “orchestrating” the relationship between altruistic and moral motivations in order to fully utilize the motivational power of altruism for moral purposes (Batson 2014). Finally, the research discussed so far is not relevant for deciding the question of whether sophisticated mindreading abilities are required for full blown moral agency, since Batson understands empathy primarily as an emotional phenomenon. (See Nichols 2001 and Batson et al. 2003 in this respect.)

Within the psychological literature, one of the most comprehensive accounts of empathy and its relation to the moral development of a person is provided by the work of Martin Hoffman (for a summary see his 2000). Hoffman views empathy as a biologically based disposition for altruistic behavior (Hoffman 1981). He conceives of empathy as being due to various modes of arousal allowing us to respond empathically in light of a variety of distress cues from another person. Hoffman mentions mimicry, classical conditioning, and direct association—where one empathizes because the other’s situation reminds one of one’s own painful experience—as “fast acting and automatic” mechanisms producing an empathic response. As more cognitively demanding modes, Hoffman lists mediated association—where the cues for an empathic response are provided in a linguistic medium—and role taking.

Hoffman distinguishes between six (or more) developmental stages of empathic responses ranging from the reactive newborn cry, egocentric empathic distress, quasi-ego-centric empathic distress, to veridical empathy, empathy for another beyond the immediate situation, and empathy for whole groups of people. Accordingly, empathic responses constitute a developmental continuum that ranges from emotional contagion (as in the case of a reactive newborn cry) to various forms of proper empathy reached at the fourth stage. At the developmentally later stages, the child is able to emotionally respond to the distress of another in a more sophisticated manner due to an increase of cognitive capacities, particularly due to the increased cognitive ability to distinguish between self and other and by becoming aware of the fact that others have mental states that are independent from its own. Only at the fourth stage of empathic development (after the middle of the second year) do children acquire such abilities. They do no longer try to comfort themselves, when emotionally responding to another child’s distress—like seeking comfort from their own mother—, or use helping strategies that are more appropriate to comfort themselves than the other person—like using their own teddy-bear in trying to comfort the other child. Only at the fourth stage does empathy become also transformed or associated with sympathy leading to appropriate prosocial behavior. Hoffman’s developmental view is further supported by Preston and DeWaal’s account of empathy as a phenomenon to be observed across species at various levels of complexities related to different degrees of cognitive development. (Preston and DeWaal 2002a,b. For a discussion of the philosophical relevance of DeWaal’s view see also DeWaal 2006).

Significantly, Hoffman combines his developmental explication of empathy with a sophisticated analysis of its importance for moral agency. He is thereby acutely aware of the limitations in our natural capacity to empathize or sympathize with others, particularly what he refers to as “here and now” biases, that is, the fact that we tend to empathize more with persons that are in some sense perceived to be closer to us. (For a neuro-scientific investigation of how racial bias modulates empathic responses see Xuo, Zuo, Wang and Han 2009). Like Batson, Hoffman does not regard the moral realm as being exclusively circumscribed by our ability to empathize with other people. Besides empathic abilities, moral agency requires also knowledge of abstract moral principles, such as the principles of caring and justice. Hoffman seems to conceive of those principles as being derived from cognitive sources that are independent from our empathic abilities. Yet Hoffmann is rather optimistic about the natural compatibility of empathic motivation and our commitment to moral principles. He regards stable and effective moral agency as requiring empathy so that moral principles can have a motivational basis in an agent’s psychology. Within this context, he has lately emphasized a final stage of empathy development or what he calls “witnessing”, an empathic response to the suffering of others that is so intense that we “become fully committed to help”(Hoffman 2014, 82). As he explains—in light of examples from the history of abolitionism, the civil rights movement, serfdom reform in Russia, and various cases before the Supreme Court— it is particularly such witnessing that has contributed towards bending the arc of the moral universe towards justice. Accordingly, and despite our natural limitations in empathizing with others, Hoffman still regards empathy as the “bedrock of morality” and “the glue of society”(Hoffman 2014, 96. Besides Hoffman 2011 and 2014, see also Deigh 2011 for a measured evaluation of empathy in the legal context ).

More recently, such ultimately positive evaluation of empathy’s contributing role in constituting us as moral agents, as agents who address each other from the moral stance, has encountered penetrating criticism, particularly by Prinz (2011a,b) and Bloom (2016). Both emphasize the dark side of empathy, that is, the aforementioned “here and now” biases. More specifically Prinz mentions explicitly the cuteness, salience, and proximity effects—the fact that we tend to empathize more easily with attractive persons, with persons that are in close proximity and only if their suffering is particularly noteworthy— similarity biases and the fact that we tend to be rather selective in choosing whom to empathize with. Empathy is also very easily modulated by a variety of top-down factors that influence our perception of the social world and that let us register social divisions that seem to be prima facie incompatible with the more impartial stance demanded by the moral perspective. Research has documented these biases in a more fine-grained manner and shown that subjects generally “reported experiencing more empathy for the in–group then the out–group targets and more counter–empathy for the out–group than in–group targets”(Cikara et. al. 2014, 120), counter–empathy here being understood as the feeling of pleasure at the misfortune of another (Schadenfreude) or the feeling displeasure at something fortunate happening to another (Glückschmerz). This is particularly true if the other group is viewed to be in competition with one’s own group. Empathy can also be further reduced through various dehumanizing and objectifying strategies, strategies that have certainly employed in the context of the genocides of the twentieth century and the system of racial slavery in the United States (See Fuchs 2019, Kteily and Bruneau 2017). Heightened empathy for perceived wrongs done to members of the in–group can also lead to violent and immoral behavior (Bloom 2016, chap. 5). In addition, empathy tends to focus on the one (particularly if he or she is identifiable) rather than the many, what Bloom refers to as its spotlight feature. Empathy can mislead us particularly in contexts where we need to take into account statistically relevant information when addressing a moral or social problem, such as when thinking about the benefits of vaccination where it is more appropriate to think about the large numbers of children saved rather than empathizing with the bad effects such vaccination might have on one specific child. For all of these reasons, Prinz favors the moral emotions such as anger, guilt and shame as the foundation for morality, while Bloom prefers sympathy guided by reason as a more viable means than empathy to steer us in moral matters.

Here is not the place for a final evaluation of empathy’s contribution in regard to pro-social and moral motivation or moral and pro-social behavior, since this question is still very much the topic of an ongoing empirical investigation. Yet the following observations are certainly justified in light of the empirical evidence so far and might help to further clarify the debate. First, it seems to be pretty well established that however one defines our natural capacity for empathy, it is on its own not sufficient to keep us reliably on the path of morality (See also Decety and Cowell 2015). Whether that ultimately means that we should think of our capacity for empathy as a limited resource or whether it would be better to think of empathy as a motivated phenomenon and its limitations as being due to our reluctance to activate that capacity (Zaki 2014), is certainly another intriguing question for further empirical inquiry. One might also wonder why we should expect that the emotions such as sympathy and anger, which Bloom and Prinz point to, are less prone to bias and less affected by a universal human tendency to favor the in–group. Certainly sympathy within the context of Buddhism, to which Bloom appeals to is a highly regulated emotion, controlled through mindfulness practices or meditation and guided by an intellectual grasp about the detriments of various forms of attachment to this world. Persson and Savulescu (2018) therefore suggest that rather than giving up on empathy completely one should reform empathy by regulating it through one’s reflective capacities in light of our knowledge of its natural shortcomings or focus one’s empathy (cognitive and affective) particularly on another person’s concerns for his or her well-being as such empathy includes sympathy for the other (Simmons 2014). Such suggestions are also very much in line with proposals by David Hume and Adam Smith, who suggested already in the eighteenth century that we need to regulate empathy with the help of certain corrective mechanisms such as “some steady and general points of view” or the perspective of the“impartial spectator” in order to compensate for empathy’s limited scope. (For a good analysis of the philosophical discussion about empathy/sympathy in the eighteenth century see Frazer 2010).

Most importantly, in order to evaluate the empirical discussion about empathy’s role for morality, one needs to be very sensitive to how researchers define and measure empathy in arguing for and against empathy’s relation to moral motivation or moral judgment. Prinz and Bloom are quite explicit in defining empathy merely as an affective phenomenon, as our ability to feel what the other person feels. Evidence suggests indeed that merely sharing another person’s emotion empathically does not increase our concern or motivation for moral or pro-social action. Interestingly, however, perspective–taking and empathic concern/sympathy, which have always been seen as an integral part of empathy-related phenomena, are a slightly different matter. They do seem to be positively related to cooperation and charitable giving (Jordon et. al. 2016), to reducing prejudices against particular groups (Galinski and Morowitz 2011), and to an increase in one’s sensitivity to injustices done to others (Decety and Yoder 2015). Yet even here further research is needed as the effects of such perspective–taking could be modulated by the power differential between groups. It has, for example, been shown that in active intergroup conflicts, positive intergroup interaction can increase empathy for the other group. Yet within such contexts, taking the perspective of a person from the other group while interacting with them might also hinder the development of intergroup empathy if the dominant group is reminded through such perspective–taking of how they might be viewed by the non-dominant group. Even perspective taking by the non–dominant group might increase rather than decrease established negative stereotypes in thinking about the other group (Cikara et. al. 2014). It seems more effective if the non–dominant group is asked to articulate the difficulties of their lives (perspective–giving) and the dominant group is asked to translate that description into their own words (perspective–taking), even if the positive effects of such interaction is relatively short-lived (Bruneau and Saxe 2012).

So far, this entry has discussed mainly research exploring the relation between empathy and prosocial/moral behavior or motivation. Other important areas for considering empathy’s role in moral matters have to do with addressing the questions of how and whether empathy contributes to our ability to distinguish between moral and conventional norms, to the making of moral judgments, and how empathy can be appealed to in explicating the normative authority of such judgments. In considering the first question, psychologists and philosophers have generally followed Turiel in understanding moral norms as expressing concerns for “rights, justice, and the welfare of other people” (Turiel 1983, 3) and as having a very specific “signature response patterns” (Kelly et. al. 2007) associated with it. Moral norms are generally regarded to be more important than conventional norms in that their normative validity is conceived as being independent of social authority or specific social practices and agreements. Their scope is also judged to be much broader—they are thought of to be valid in other countries, for example—, and violation of moral norms is generally understood to be a more serious offense than the violation of other norms. Notice however that in distinguishing between moral and conventional norms subjects do not necessarily associate a strict universality in the Kantian sense with moral norms and view them as applicable to all rational beings. Indeed there is some evidence that 6–9 year old children, for example, view the moral/conventional distinction as being fully applicable only to behavior of individuals in the in-group and view prescription against harming members of the out-group to be more like conventional norms (Rhodes and Chalik 2013). Accordingly, the fact that empathy shows considerable in-group bias, as discussed above, does not automatically count as evidence against it playing a role in allowing humans to distinguish between moral and conventional norms within a social context.

Of central importance for assessing the role of empathy for grasping the moral/conventional distinction has been the research on the nature of psychopathy and autism. Both pathologies are seen as involving deficits in different dimensions of empathy but only psychopaths have great difficulties in living up to moral standards of their societies and only they were originally thought of as having difficulties in appropriately distinguishing between moral and conventional norms (Blair 1995 and 1996). More specifically, psychopaths show a selective deficit in affective or emotional empathy particularly in “processing fearful, sad, and possibly disgusted facial expressions”(Blair 2010, 710). In contrast to persons with autism they however do not show similar deficits in perspective taking or theory of mind capacities. In his 1995 article, Blair therefore blames the absence of what he calls the Violence Inhibition Mechanism(VIM) that allows us to respond appropriately to the observed distress cues in others for the psychopaths’ moral deficits and their inability to draw the moral/conventional distinction. In his later work, he speaks more broadly of a dysfunction of our Integrated Emotion System (IES), caused by a deficit in the amygdala to properly represent negative emotions. (Blair, Mitchel, and Blair 2005, for a recent survey regarding the very specific deficit of psychopaths in feeling and recognizing fear see also Marsh 2014). Yet one has to tread very carefully in drawing definite conclusions about the role of empathy for morality from the empirical research about psychopathy. The results of the empirical investigations are far from unified and do not point in the same direction (For a concise survey see Maibom 2017). Newer studies, for example, seem to suggest that psychopaths, as measured by the overall score of the revised psychopathy checklist (PCL–R), are able to understand the distinction between moral and conventional norms if tested under a forced choice paradigm (Aharoni et. al 2012.)Nevertheless even that study seems to allow for the possibility that emotional deficits are responsible for the psychopath’s shortcomings in accurately drawing the distinction since they are somewhat linked to the affective and antisocial facets of the PCL–R. Given the inconsistent results of the various studies, other researchers prefer to view a psychopath’s immorality not as a specific deficit in empathy, but understand it to be caused by their general inability to feel strong emotions, by their general coldheartedness, or even by shortcomings in their rational and prudential capacities. From that perspective, a psychopath might understand in an abstract manner that certain things are morally wrong to do, but he just does not care for morality, the welfare of another person, or even for himself. (For further discussion see Maibom 2005 and 2009, Nichols 2004, and Prinz 2011a,b). Similar considerations apply also to research regarding subjects with autism. Kennett (2002)has argued that evidence from autistic individuals, whose imaginative role-play and thus empathic capacities are diminished, does not support the claim that empathy is necessary for moral agency. Yet in her arguments she only considers the fact that persons with autism have difficulties with putting themselves in another person’s shoes but does not consider that they seem to have some ability to pick up on the emotional states of other people as revealed by their facial expressions. Moreover, while autistic subjects in general can distinguish between moral and conventional norms they do seem to lack a certain flexibility in evaluating the seriousness of the violation of a moral norm when they reflect on moral dilemmas or when they encounter an accidental or unintentional violation of such norms. (See McGeer 2008, Zalla et. al 2011, but see also Kennett 2011 and Leslie et. al. 2006 in response).

Philosophers have however not been merely be interested in appealing to empathy for explicating the psychological basis for our thinking that certain norms have moral status. Within the general framework of moral sentimentalism, which sees morality generally linked to our emotional responsiveness to the actions of others and ourselves, they have also appealed to empathy in explicating more generally the nature of moral judgments (see also Kauppinen 2014 and 2017a). David Hume, for example, has suggested that moral judgments are based on peculiar sentiments of moral approbations and disapprobation, which are causally mediated by our ability to empathize— or what he called sympathy— with the pain and pleasures of others (See also Sayre-Mcord 1994 and 2014). More specifically, sentiments of moral approbations arise in response to our ability to think about and enliven the pleasure and pain that others feel with the help of our empathic/sympathetic capacities when we consider the benefits (the pleasure and pain) which a person’s character traits and actions provide to himself and others. Yet Hume was already quite aware of some of the above mentioned limitations and biases of our natural willingness and capacity to empathize with others. Accordingly, he insisted that sentiments of approbations can only be conceived of as moral approbation if empathy/sympathy is regulated or corrected by what he refers to as “steady and general points of view” (Hume 1739–40 [1978], 581/2) so that our capacity for sympathy enables us to “touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony” (Hume 1748 [1983], 75). There are certainly a number of issues that can be raised in response to Hume’s proposal. Suffice it here to point out that it is difficult to fully understand how Hume is ultimately able distinguish between judgments about something being bad and something being morally wrong. Certainly natural disasters also cause us to sympathize/empathize with the pain it causes others, yet such sympathy is not mediating any judgments about the moral impermissibility of natural disasters. Hume himself might have thought to have solved this problem by thinking that sentiments of moral approbation have a peculiar or distinct character (see in this respect particularly Debes 2012). Yet pointing to the peculiarity of such sentiments seems to be rather unsatisfying for answering this challenge.

Michael Slote, one of the main contemporary proponents of the claim that empathy plays a constitutive role for moral judgments, does not follow Hume in thinking that empathy plays a moral role in allowing us to pick up on a subject’s pleasure and pain. Rather Slote, who also has been influenced by a feminist ethics of care (Slote 2007, 2010), suggests that empathy is central for moral approval in that we as spectators empathically pick up on whether or not an agent acted out of empathic concern for another subject. Moral approval of an action consists then in the subsequent reflective feeling of warmth when empathizing with an agent’s empathic concern, while moral disapproval is equivalent with a reflective feeling of chill due to our recognition that the agent acted without any empathic concern. Actions are then judged to be morally right or wrong in terms of whether they can be conceived of the actions of an agent we would morally approve of in that they are actions done out of empathic concern. Notice also that while Slote does regard empathy in the above sense to be constitutive of moral approval only if it is fully or well–developed, he does not follow Hume in thinking that empathy needs to be regulated in order to correct for some of its natural partiality. Indeed Slote thinks that this is a virtue of his account since he regards such partiality reflected in our moral intuitions. For example, he thinks that we have a greater moral obligation to help the child in front of us or members of our family rather than people who are more removed from us. Slote certainly deserves credit for reviving the debate about the role of empathy for morality in contemporary metaethics. Yet his conception of the relation between empathy and morality has also encountered some skepticism. First of all, it is questionable that only motivations of empathic concern, rather than the thought that one is doing the right thing, constitute proper moral motivations. Second, in light of the above research on empathy’s bias and natural shortcomings, it is rather questionable to maintain that all aspects of empathy’s partiality are sanctioned by our our moral intuitions. It is therefore hard to see how empathy’s moral role can be justified without appeal to some form of corrective mechanism. Third, phenomenologically speaking, moral disapproval is not necessarily based on a “chilly” feeling. At times we are rather upset and angry in encountering violations of moral norms. Finally, Slote’s proposed empathic mechanism underlying moral approval seems to lack a certain psychological plausibility. For Slote, we approve of an action because we recreate the empathic concern that the agent feels towards his or her subjects and that causes us to feel warmly towards the agent. Yet if a positive moral judgment of an actions is tied to providing us with the motivation or with a reason for doing a specific action, it is hard to see how moral approval, consisting in us feeling warmly towards the agent, should help us accomplish this. If Slote is right, it would rather provide us with a reason for merely praising or being nice towards the agent (See D’Arms 2011, Kauppinen 2014 and 2017a, Prinz 2001a,b, and Stueber 2011c).

There is one additional element to consider when debating empathy’s contribution to morality. Philosophers are not merely interested in answering factual and causal questions of why we care about morality, what causal role empathy plays in this respect, or how empathy causally contributes in allowing us to distinguish between moral and conventional norms and judging what is morally right or wrong. Rather they are also interested in genuinely normative questions in attempting to answer the question of why we should care about morality and why we should regard moral judgments as making normative demands on us. In morally blaming other persons we do assume that we evaluate their behavior according to standards that they as persons are in some sense already committed to. We assume that these standards are their own standards rather than standards that we impose from an external perspective on them. Unfortunately, even if one would agree with either David Hume or Michael’s Slote’s account of the causal role of empathy outlined above, it is doubtful that their account would help us to answer the genuinely normative question appropriately. Why exactly should I take a particular emotional reaction of another person towards me and my action, even if it is a feeling of warmth caused by empathy, as something that is normatively relevant for me. Certainly we all like to be liked and try to fit in with our peer group, but then moral judgments would be nothing more than a glorified form of peer pressure. Hume might respond that we should take them seriously because they are responses from the general point of view, but that in itself seems to be begging the question of why such perspective is articulating the appropriate normative standard for judging our behavior and character. This is also exactly the reason, why philosophers with Kantian inclinations have been in general skeptical about moral sentimentalism and positions that think of empathy as a foundation of morality (for a nice explication of Kant’s critical view of sympathy see Deimling 2017). Contemporary “Kantians” do at times, however, admit that empathy and perspective taking is epistemically relevant for moral deliberations, even if it is not solely constitutive for moral agency (Deigh 1996 and 2018; Darwall 2006, Shermann 1998, For a review see also Oxley 2011). Interestingly, philosophers sympathetic to moral sentimentalism have particularly turned to Adam Smith for inspiration in developing empathy based accounts of morality and in responding to the above normativity problem. In contrast to Hume, Smith conceives of empathy/sympathy not merely as the enlivening of a perceived emotion or feeeling but as imaginative perspective–taking. In taking up another person’s perspective we put ourselves in his situation and imagine how he would respond to the situation, how he would think and feel about it. If in bringing another person’s point of view “home to ourselves” in this manner, we recognize that we ourselves might have felt or acted like the other person, then we approve of the other person’s sentiment or action, otherwise we disapprove. Moreover, such approval constitutes moral approval if we have empathized with the other from the perspective of the impartial spectator, a perspective that Smith, like Hume, appeals to in order to correct for empathy’s natural shortcomings. More importantly, some authors think that within the Smithian framework we also find some answers to the normativity problem. They think that the impartial spectator perspective can be recast as an implicit commitment of our ordinary practice of making sense of each other as rational and emotional creatures with the help of empathic perspective taking (Stueber 2017) or argue that Smithian perspective–taking involves quasi-Kantian commitments to the dignity of a person, including his or her affective dimension. (Debes 2017, but see also Fricke 2005, Kauppinen 2017b, and Roughley 2018).

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Further Important Surveys of Empathy

Maibom, H. (ed.), 2017. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Empathy , New York: Routledge.
Matraver, D., 2017. Empathy , Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Social Skills/Mastering the Social Skill of Empathy

—The Heartfelt Connection

Introduction: [ edit | edit source ]

1 Introduction:
2 Understanding Empathy:
3 Importance of Empathy:
4 When Empathy is Important:
5 Concrete Suggestions for Becoming Skillful at Empathy:
6 Conclusion:

Empathy , often described as the ability to understand and share the feelings of another, is a profound social skill that transcends communication barriers and fosters meaningful connections. [1] This essay delves into the concept of empathy, emphasizing its importance in various contexts, the occasions when it is crucial, and practical suggestions on how individuals can become skillful at harnessing this powerful ability.

Understanding Empathy: [ edit | edit source ]

Empathy involves the capacity to recognize and comprehend the emotions , perspectives, and experiences of others. It goes beyond sympathy by allowing individuals to truly connect with others on an emotional level, sharing in their joys, sorrows, and challenges. Empathy is a dynamic skill that encompasses both cognitive and emotional components, enabling individuals to navigate diverse social landscapes with sensitivity and understanding.

Importance of Empathy: [ edit | edit source ]

Empathy is a cornerstone of successful social interactions, contributing to the fabric of healthy relationships, effective communication, and a compassionate society. In personal relationships, empathy fosters intimacy, trust , and mutual support. In professional settings, it enhances teamwork, leadership, and client relationships. The ability to empathize creates a harmonious social environment, fostering a sense of belonging and understanding.

When Empathy is Important: [ edit | edit source ]

Empathy is crucial in numerous situations where emotional understanding and connection play pivotal roles. It is particularly important during times of distress, grief, or celebration when individuals seek genuine understanding and support. Empathy becomes indispensable in conflict resolution , negotiations, and any scenario where acknowledging and validating emotions is essential for positive outcomes.

Concrete Suggestions for Becoming Skillful at Empathy: [ edit | edit source ]

Active Listening : Engage in active listening by giving full attention to the speaker. Focus on understanding their words, emotions, and nonverbal cues without judgment or interruption.
Put Yourself in Their Shoes: Imagine yourself in the other person's situation. Consider their feelings, experiences, and perspectives to gain a deeper understanding of their emotional state.
Practice Nonverbal Empathy: Use nonverbal cues such as facial expressions, body language, and gestures to convey empathy. A comforting touch, a nod of understanding, or a warm smile can speak volumes.
Ask Open-Ended Questions: Encourage others to share their thoughts and feelings by asking open-ended questions . This invites deeper communication and provides insight into their emotions.
Validate Emotions : Acknowledge and validate the emotions of others without judgment. Express understanding and empathy by recognizing the legitimacy of their feelings.
Express Empathy Verbally: Use empathetic language to convey your understanding and support. Phrases like "I can (hardly) imagine how that must feel" or "I understand why you might be feeling that way" demonstrate empathy.
Cultivate Emotional Intelligence: Develop emotional intelligence by becoming aware of your own emotions and recognizing them in others. Understanding emotional cues contributes to more authentic and empathetic interactions.
Show Compassion : Demonstrate genuine care and concern for the well-being of others. Acts of kindness, supportive gestures, and offering assistance convey a sense of compassion and empathy.
Avoid Making Assumptions: Refrain from making assumptions about others' experiences. Instead, approach each situation with an open mind, allowing individuals to share their unique perspectives.
Continuous Learning: Strive for continuous learning and improvement in the practice of empathy. Seek feedback, reflect on your interactions, and be open to refining your empathetic skills over time.
Effective Intergroup Contact: According to the contact hypothesis , intergroup contact under appropriate conditions can effectively reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members. Acting on these findings, organizations such as the Braver Angles run workshops, debates, and other events where diverse participants attempt to better understand one another's positions and discover their shared values .

Conclusion: [ edit | edit source ]

Empathy is a transformative social skill that holds the power to deepen connections, resolve conflicts, and build a more compassionate and understanding society. By incorporating these concrete suggestions into daily interactions, individuals can cultivate and enhance their ability to empathize, creating a positive ripple effect in their personal and professional relationships. As empathy is a skill that evolves with practice and self-awareness, the journey toward mastery involves a commitment to ongoing learning, reflection, and the genuine desire to connect with others on a profound emotional level.

↑ ChatGPT generated this text responding to the prompt: "Write an essay on the social skill of Empathy. Describe what is meant by Empathy, why it is important, when it is important and provide concrete suggestions for how someone can become skillful at Empathy."

Social Skills

Empathy Defined

What is empathy.

The term “empathy” is used to describe a wide range of experiences. Emotion researchers generally define empathy as the ability to sense other people’s emotions, coupled with the ability to imagine what someone else might be thinking or feeling.

Contemporary researchers often differentiate between two types of empathy : “Affective empathy” refers to the sensations and feelings we get in response to others’ emotions; this can include mirroring what that person is feeling, or just feeling stressed when we detect another’s fear or anxiety. “Cognitive empathy,” sometimes called “perspective taking,” refers to our ability to identify and understand other people’s emotions. Studies suggest that people with autism spectrum disorders have a hard time empathizing .

Empathy seems to have deep roots in our brains and bodies, and in our evolutionary history . Elementary forms of empathy have been observed in our primate relatives , in dogs , and even in rats . Empathy has been associated with two different pathways in the brain, and scientists have speculated that some aspects of empathy can be traced to mirror neurons , cells in the brain that fire when we observe someone else perform an action in much the same way that they would fire if we performed that action ourselves. Research has also uncovered evidence of a genetic basis to empathy , though studies suggest that people can enhance (or restrict) their natural empathic abilities.

Having empathy doesn’t necessarily mean we’ll want to help someone in need, though it’s often a vital first step toward compassionate action.

For more: Read Frans de Waal’s essay on “ The Evolution of Empathy ” and Daniel Goleman’s overview of different forms of empathy , drawing on the work of Paul Ekman.

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Why Practice It?

Empathy is a building block of morality—for people to follow the Golden Rule, it helps if they can put themselves in someone else’s shoes. It is also a key ingredient of successful relationships because it helps us understand the perspectives, needs, and intentions of others. Here are some of the ways that research has testified to the far-reaching importance of empathy.

Seminal studies by Daniel Batson and Nancy Eisenberg have shown that people higher in empathy are more likely to help others in need, even when doing so cuts against their self-interest .
Empathy is contagious : When group norms encourage empathy, people are more likely to be empathic—and more altruistic.
Empathy reduces prejudice and racism : In one study, white participants made to empathize with an African American man demonstrated less racial bias afterward.
Empathy is good for your marriage : Research suggests being able to understand your partner’s emotions deepens intimacy and boosts relationship satisfaction ; it’s also fundamental to resolving conflicts. (The GGSC’s Christine Carter has written about effective strategies for developing and expressing empathy in relationships .)
Empathy reduces bullying: Studies of Mary Gordon’s innovative Roots of Empathy program have found that it decreases bullying and aggression among kids, and makes them kinder and more inclusive toward their peers. An unrelated study found that bullies lack “affective empathy” but not cognitive empathy, suggesting that they know how their victims feel but lack the kind of empathy that would deter them from hurting others.
Empathy reduces suspensions : In one study, students of teachers who participated in an empathy training program were half as likely to be suspended, compared to students of teachers who didn’t participate.
Empathy promotes heroic acts: A seminal study by Samuel and Pearl Oliner found that people who rescued Jews during the Holocaust had been encouraged at a young age to take the perspectives of others.
Empathy fights inequality. As Robert Reich and Arlie Hochschild have argued, empathy encourages us to reach out and want to help people who are not in our social group, even those who belong to stigmatized groups , like the poor. Conversely, research suggests that inequality can reduce empathy : People show less empathy when they attain higher socioeconomic status.
Empathy is good for the office: Managers who demonstrate empathy have employees who are sick less often and report greater happiness.
Empathy is good for health care: A large-scale study found that doctors high in empathy have patients who enjoy better health ; other research suggests training doctors to be more empathic improves patient satisfaction and the doctors’ own emotional well-being .
Empathy is good for police: Research suggests that empathy can help police officers increase their confidence in handling crises, diffuse crises with less physical force, and feel less distant from the people they’re dealing with.

For more: Learn about why we should teach empathy to preschoolers .

How Do I Cultivate It?

Humans experience affective empathy from infancy, physically sensing their caregivers’ emotions and often mirroring those emotions. Cognitive empathy emerges later in development, around three to four years of age , roughly when children start to develop an elementary “ theory of mind ”—that is, the understanding that other people experience the world differently than they do.

From these early forms of empathy, research suggests we can develop more complex forms that go a long way toward improving our relationships and the world around us. Here are some specific, science-based activities for cultivating empathy from our site Greater Good in Action :

Active listening: Express active interest in what the other person has to say and make him or her feel heard.
Shared identity: Think of a person who seems to be very different from you, and then list what you have in common.
Put a human face on suffering: When reading the news, look for profiles of specific individuals and try to imagine what their lives have been like.
Eliciting altruism: Create reminders of connectedness.

And here are some of the keys that researchers have identified for nurturing empathy in ourselves and others:

Focus your attention outwards: Being mindfully aware of your surroundings, especially the behaviors and expressions of other people , is crucial for empathy. Indeed, research suggests practicing mindfulness helps us take the perspectives of other people yet not feel overwhelmed when we encounter their negative emotions.
Get out of your own head: Research shows we can increase our own level of empathy by actively imagining what someone else might be experiencing.
Don’t jump to conclusions about others: We feel less empathy when we assume that people suffering are somehow getting what they deserve .
Show empathic body language : Empathy is expressed not just by what we say, but by our facial expressions, posture, tone of voice, and eye contact (or lack thereof).
Meditate: Neuroscience research by Richard Davidson and his colleagues suggests that meditation—specifically loving-kindness meditation, which focuses attention on concern for others—might increase the capacity for empathy among short-term and long-term meditators alike (though especially among long-time meditators).
Explore imaginary worlds: Research by Keith Oatley and colleagues has found that people who read fiction are more attuned to others’ emotions and intentions.
Join the band: Recent studies have shown that playing music together boosts empathy in kids.
Play games : Neuroscience research suggests that when we compete against others, our brains are making a “ mental model ” of the other person’s thoughts and intentions.
Take lessons from babies: Mary Gordon’s Roots of Empathy program is designed to boost empathy by bringing babies into classrooms, stimulating children’s basic instincts to resonate with others’ emotions.
Combat inequality: Research has shown that attaining higher socioeconomic status diminishes empathy , perhaps because people of high SES have less of a need to connect with, rely on, or cooperate with others. As the gap widens between the haves and have-nots, we risk facing an empathy gap as well. This doesn’t mean money is evil, but if you have a lot of it, you might need to be more intentional about maintaining your own empathy toward others.
Pay attention to faces: Pioneering research by Paul Ekman has found we can improve our ability to identify other people’s emotions by systematically studying facial expressions. Take our Emotional Intelligence Quiz for a primer, or check out Ekman’s F.A.C.E. program for more rigorous training.
Believe that empathy can be learned : People who think their empathy levels are changeable put more effort into being empathic, listening to others, and helping, even when it’s challenging.

For more : The Ashoka Foundation’s Start Empathy initiative tracks educators’ best practices for teaching empathy . The initiative gave awards to 14 programs judged to do the best job at educating for empathy . The nonprofit Playworks also offers eight strategies for developing empathy in children .

What Are the Pitfalls and Limitations of Empathy?

According to research , we’re more likely to help a single sufferer than a large group of faceless victims, and we empathize more with in-group members than out-group members . Does this reflect a defect in empathy itself? Some critics believe so , while others argue that the real problem is how we suppress our own empathy .

Empathy, after all, can be painful. An “ empathy trap ” occurs when we’re so focused on feeling what others are feeling that we neglect our own emotions and needs—and other people can take advantage of this. Doctors and caregivers are at particular risk of feeling emotionally overwhelmed by empathy.

In other cases, empathy seems to be detrimental. Empathizing with out-groups can make us more reluctant to engage with them, if we imagine that they’ll be critical of us. Sociopaths could use cognitive empathy to help them exploit or even torture people.

Even if we are well-intentioned, we tend to overestimate our empathic skills. We may think we know the whole story about other people when we’re actually making biased judgments—which can lead to misunderstandings and exacerbate prejudice.

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v.7(4); Fall 2003

An Overview of Empathy

Empathy is a powerful communication skill that is often misunderstood and underused. Initially, empathy was referred to as “bedside manner”; now, however, authors and educators consider empathetic communication a teachable, learnable skill that has tangible benefits for both clinician and patient: Effective empathetic communication enhances the therapeutic effectiveness of the clinician-patient relationship. Appropriate use of empathy as a communication tool facilitates the clinical interview, increases the efficiency of gathering information, and honors the patient.

Introduction

That the medical care experience is enhanced by effective communication between clinicians and their patients is a well established fact. Byproducts of this enhanced communication include improved health outcomes, 1 better patient compliance, 2 reduction in medical-legal risk, 3 – 5 and improved satisfaction of clinicians and patients. 6 , 7 Of all the elements involved in effective communication, empathy seems to be the component that is most powerful yet is easily overlooked—and some commentators have asserted that in medical practice the importance of empathy cannot be overemphasized. 8

What is Empathy?

The origin of the word empathy dates back to the 1880s, when German psychologist Theodore Lipps coined the term “einfuhlung” (literally, “in-feeling”) to describe the emotional appreciation of another’s feelings. Empathy has further been described as the process of understanding a person’s subjective experience by vicariously sharing that experience while maintaining an observant stance. 9 Empathy is a balanced curiosity leading to a deeper understanding of another human being; stated another way, empathy is the capacity to understand another person’s experience from within that person’s frame of reference. 10

Even more simply stated, empathy is the ability to “put oneself in another’s shoes.” In an essay entitled “Some Thoughts on Empathy,” Columbia University psychiatrist Alberta Szalita stated, “I view empathy as one of the important mechanisms through which we bridge the gap between experience and thought.” A few sentences earlier in her essay, she had emphasized that … “[empathy is] consideration of another person’s feelings and readiness to respond to his [or her] needs … without making his [or her] burden one’s own.” 11:p151

Can Empathy Be Taught?

Unfortunately, many physicians were trained in the world of “Find it and Fix it” medicine, a world where empathetic communication was only an afterthought—if this behavior was considered at all. Empathy was known as “bedside manner,” a quality considered innate and impossible to acquire—either you were born with it or you weren’t. More recently, greater emphasis has been placed on empathy as a communication tool of substantial importance in the medical interview, and many experts now agree that empathy and empathetic communication are teachable, learnable skills. 12 , 13 As we might therefore expect, empathy is the cornerstone of several communication models, including “The Four Habits” model (Invest in the Beginning, Elicit the Patient’s Perspective, Demonstrate Empathy, Invest in the End) developed by The Permanente Medical Group’s Terry Stein with Richard Frankel; 14 “The 4 E’s” (Engage, Empathize, Educate, and Enlist) model used by the Bayer Institute for Health Care Communication; 15 the “PEARLS” (Partnership, Empathy, Apology, Respect, Legitimization, Support) framework adopted by the American Academy on Physician and Patient; 16 and other models. 17 , 18

Many medical schools have developed curricula with a strong focus on physician-patient communication and empathy. Delivery of these curricula begins early in the students’ training. At the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, this curriculum is known as the “Foundations of Doctoring” program, a curriculum whose teaching staff includes several physicians and trainers from the Colorado Permanente Medical Group (CPMG). CPMG has also developed an eight-hour clinician-patient communication course based on The Four Habits model which is offered to all newly hired physicians in the Kaiser Permanente (KP) Colorado Region. In this course, plenty of time is set aside to explore empathy and to practice empathetic communication with patients selected according to standard criteria.

Practical Empathetic Communication

Making practical use of an otherwise esoteric concept such as empathy requires division of the concept into its simplest elements. As outlined by Frederic Platt, 19 key steps to effective empathy include:

recognizing presence of strong feeling in the clinical setting (ie, fear, anger, grief, disappointment);
pausing to imagine how the patient might be feeling;
stating our perception of the patient’s feeling (ie, “I can imagine that must be …” or “It sounds like you’re upset about …”);
legitimizing that feeling;
respecting the patient’s effort to cope with the predicament; and
offering support and partnership (ie, “I’m committed to work with you to …” or “Let’s see what we can do together to …”).

Being a psychiatrist or mental health expert is not necessary for using empathetic communication; the only requirement is an awareness of opportunities for empathy as they arise during the interview with a patient. This type of opportunity arises from a patient’s emotion (either directly expressed or implied): This emotion creates the opportunity for an empathetic response by the physician. In a study by Wendy Levinson et al, 20 116 office visits to primary care and surgical physicians were audiotaped and transcribed to look at the frequency of empathy opportunities or “clues.” More than half of visits in each setting included one or more clues. In more than half of cases, patients presented these clues not overtly but in more subtle ways. Unfortunately, physicians responded to those clues in only 38% of surgical cases and in only 21% of primary care cases and frequently missed opportunities to adequately acknowledge a patient’s feelings. 20 Clues are often hidden in the fabric of discussion about medical problems and thus may be easily missed by physicians who are busy attending to biomedical details of diagnosis and management. In fact, when opportunities for empathy are missed by physicians, patients tend to offer them again, sometimes repeatedly. This phenomenon can lead to longer, more frustrating interviews, return visits, and “doctor shopping” by patients who feel dismissed or alienated.

After an opportunity for empathy has been presented, the clinician should consider offering a gesture or statement of empathy. Statements that facilitate empathy have been categorized as queries, clarifications, and responses. 21 Examples of each are as follows:

“Can you tell me more about that?”
“What has this been like for you?”
“How has all of this made you feel?”
“Let me see if I’ve gotten this right … ”
“Tell me more about … ”
“I want to make sure I understand what you’ve said … ”
“Sounds like you are … ”
“I imagine that must be … ”
“I can understand that must make you feel … ”

Ideally, after perceiving the clinician’s statement of empathy, the patient expresses agreement or confirmation (“You got it, Doc!” or “Yeah, that’s exactly how I feel”). When we have not understood the patient’s experience exactly, we must allow the patient to correct our perception. Use of the Hypothesis-Test-Feedback Loop allows the patient to clarify his or her experience and thus allow the physician to restate an empathetic statement that originally missed its mark. The following exchange is an example of this Hypothesis-Test-Feedback Loop used in the doctor-patient encounter:

Patient: I am sick and tired of living with these headaches. No one has been able to help me, and none of the medications are working. Doctor (stating the hypothesis): I can see that you are frustrated by the lack of improvement in your symptoms. Patient (giving feedback): Yeah, but I’m really more worried that we’re missing something serious. I’ve got a wife and kids who are depending on me. Doctor (correcting the hypothesis): So, it sounds like you’re really more concerned that something serious could be going on that is causing these headaches. Patient (closing the empathy loop): Yes, exactly.

In this example, the physician makes an empathetic statement (hypothesis) about what he or she surmises is the chief aspect of the patient’s experience: frustration about an unrelenting headache. When the hypothesis is tested, the patient clarifies that although frustrated, he is mainly experiencing worry about the situation. Armed with this feedback, the physician restates the hypothesis back to the patient, who lets the physician know that he or she “got it exactly right.”

Barriers to Giving Empathy

Because empathy is such a powerful communication skill, we might suppose that clinicians would scramble to learn about and use it at every available opportunity. However, this is not necessarily the case. Clinicians have many reasons for not offering empathy to patients. An informal survey of practicing clinicians participating in a recent clinician-patient communication course revealed misgivings (and misconceptions) about empathetic communication. Concerns mentioned included:

“There is not enough time during the visit to give empathy.”
“It is not relevant, and I’m too busy focusing on the acute medical problem.”
“Giving empathy is emotionally exhausting for me.”
“I don’t want to open that Pandora’s box.”
“I haven’t had enough training in empathetic communication.”
“I’m concerned that if I use up all my empathy at work I won’t have anything left for my family.”

In our experience, empathy facilitates the clinical interview, increases efficiency of gathering information, and honors the patient. Empathy need not be awkward nor emotionally exhausting; unlike sympathy, empathy does not require emotional effort on the part of the clinician. An appropriate statement or gesture of empathy takes only a moment and can go a long way to enhance rapport, build positive relationships, and even improve difficult ones. Studies have shown that when opportunities for empathy were repeatedly missed, visits tended to be longer and more frustrating for both physician and patient. 18 , 20 Conversely, empathy may save time and expense and often is a cost-effective method of facilitating early diagnosis and proper treatment. 10

Empathy Versus Sympathy (and Versus Pity)

Despite some divergent opinion on the matter, we may propose a subtle but important distinction between empathy and sympathy.

Whereas empathy is used by skilled clinicians to enhance communication and delivery of care, sympathy can be burdensome and emotionally exhausting and can lead to burnout. Sympathy implies feeling shared with the sufferer as if the pain belonged to both persons: We sympathize with other human beings when we share and suffer with them. It would stand to reason, therefore, that completely shared suffering can never exist between physician and patient; otherwise, the physician would share the patient’s plight and would therefore be unable to help.

Empathy is concerned with a much higher order of human relationship and understanding: engaged detachment. In empathy, we “borrow” another’s feelings to observe, feel, and understand them— but not to take them onto ourselves. By being a participant-observer, we come to understand how the other person feels. An empathetic observer enters into the equation and then is removed.

Harry Wilmer 22 summarizes these three emotions—Empathy, Sympathy, and Pity—as follows:

Pity describes a relationship which separates physician and patient. Pity is often condescending and may entail feelings of contempt and rejection.
Sympathy is when the physician experiences feelings as if he or she were the sufferer. Sympathy is thus shared suffering.
Empathy is the feeling relationship in which the physician understands the patient’s plight as if the physician were the patient. The physician identifies with the patient and at the same time maintains a distance. Empathetic communication enhances the therapeutic effectiveness of the clinician-patient relationship.

Empathy is a powerful, efficient communication tool when used appropriately during a medical interview. Empathy extends understanding of the patient beyond the history and symptoms to include values, ideas, and feelings. Benefits of improved empathetic communication are tangible for both physician and patient.

Acknowledgments

Ilene Kasper, MS, and Andrew M Lum, MD of Kaiser Permanente Colorado; and Brian Dwinnell, MD, and Frederic W Platt, MD, FACP, of the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, reviewed the article.

James T Hardee, MD , Obtained his medical degree from the University of New Mexico School of Medicine, where he also completed his Internal Medicine residency. He joined the Colorado Permanente Medical Group in 1998 and is currently on the CPMG Board of Directors. He is the physician lead for Clinician-Patient Communication in the Colorado Region. E-mail: [email protected] .

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Two Things Stand

Life is mostly froth and bubble, Two things stand like stone, Kindness in another’s trouble, Courage in your own. Adam Lindsay Gordon, 1833–1870, poet

Empathy and Self-Awareness

Personal perspective: why cultivating empathy towards others is a skill..

Posted March 15, 2023 | Reviewed by Kaja Perina

The Importance of Empathy
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People cannot eliminate empathy from their decision-making because of how human brains' cognitive processes work.
People instinctively possess empathy toward those they perceive as looking, acting, and thinking as they do.
Empathy as a skill involves the ability and willingness to have it toward that which falls outside one's worldview.
Objective self-awareness may be a key to cultivating empathy toward those who look, act, and think differently from themselves.

It is well established that people are naturally more comfortable with and trusting toward those they perceive as looking, acting, and thinking as they do. When people are perceived as thinking the same as oneself, even though they look and act differently, people are more likely to accept or “tolerate” them. That reality has to do with empathy.

Having empathy toward those we perceive as being members of our own tribe is not a skill; rather, it is instinctual. This process cannot be turned off; however, it can be kept in check by being cognizant of it when making important decisions that impact ourselves and others. Doing so requires humility and is known as objective self-awareness, which is defined as follows:

“ a reflective state of self-focused attention in which a person evaluates himself or herself and attempts to attain correctness and consistency in beliefs and behaviors. This involves the viewing of oneself as a separate object, acknowledging limitations and the existing disparity between the ideal self and the actual self. Objective self-awareness is often a necessary part of self-regulation . ”

Such self-awareness is a skill, which needs to be developed and honed, like any other skill. If one moves away from empathy toward those perceived as looking, acting, and thinking differently from themselves, they are also moving away from the skill of objective self-awareness.

This self-reflection is the very foundation of emotional intelligence , and is essential to keeping one’s biases in check, to the extent possible. Awareness of a bias is the necessary first step to managing it, and one cannot hope to manage that of which one is unaware. Objective self-awareness is a necessary part of self-other awareness because one cannot even hope to understand someone different from themselves if they lack the humility to realize that their perception is merely their perception and not reality.

Absent objective self-awareness, people sincerely believe that their perceptions and opinions are objective, verifiable, and unquestionable facts. In other words, they conflate their beliefs and opinions with facts, which leads to impaired thinking, injustice, unethical, and immoral behavior, among other harmful things.

When people are objectively self-aware in any given instance, they are able to suspend judgment, thereby allowing them to receive information that conflicts with their beliefs and opinions, try to understand that information, and consider it in a fair manner. When people are able and willing to do this, that is how empathy toward people and information that falls outside of one’s existing worldview works. That is what it means to have “self-other awareness.” This is essential to active or empathic listening.

The research that reflects that people’s empathy has been declining since at least the 1970s is referring to empathy towards those whom people perceive as looking, acting, and thinking differently from themselves. It is one reason that there has been an increase in tribalism and polarization. In other words, people’s empathy toward those they perceive as members of their own tribes has increased as their empathy towards "others" has declined. That is not a decrease in empathy; rather, it is a decrease in empathy toward that which falls outside of one’s worldview. This has occurred due to a decrease in people’s objective self-awareness, the very foundation of emotional intelligence and the means through which human beings are able to calibrate their ethical and moral compasses.

People can talk about the downsides of empathy and the need to move away from it because we know a lot less about other people than we think we do; however, addressing those concerns requires objective self-awareness. People tend not to be able and willing to have compassion toward those for whom they lack empathy. If we want to decease the downsides associated with empathy, the solution is not moving away from that which is instinctive; rather, it involves helping people to develop their objective self-awareness.

Mark B. Baer, Esq. is a mediator, collaborative law practitioner, conflict resolution consultant, co-author of Putting Kids First in Divorce, and co-founder of Family Dynamics Assistance Center.

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People Who Typically Lack Empathy Have These 20 Traits

Posted: March 30, 2024 | Last updated: March 30, 2024

<p>Empathy, the capacity to comprehend and empathize with another’s emotions, stands as a core attribute that enhances connectivity, dialogue, and empathy within our interpersonal bonds. Nevertheless, this trait is not uniformly present in everyone. Individuals deficient in empathy may often pose difficulties in social engagements and personal relationships. Identifying the attributes of those who find empathy challenging is vital for better comprehension and management of our interactions with them. In this exploration, we will uncover 25 traits frequently linked to an absence of empathy, illuminating the ways in which these characteristics appear and influence our relationships with others.</p>

Empathy, the capacity to comprehend and empathize with another’s emotions, stands as a core attribute that enhances connectivity, dialogue, and empathy within our interpersonal bonds. Nevertheless, this trait is not uniformly present in everyone. Individuals deficient in empathy may often pose difficulties in social engagements and personal relationships. Identifying the attributes of those who find empathy challenging is vital for better comprehension and management of our interactions with them. In this exploration, we will uncover 25 traits frequently linked to an absence of empathy, illuminating the ways in which these characteristics appear and influence our relationships with others.

<p>Listening is a critical component of empathy, allowing us to understand and connect with others’ experiences, but those with low empathy often fail to listen effectively, which hinders meaningful communication. Instead, focusing on their own thoughts or waiting for their turn to speak, this behavior can make meaningful conversations difficult, as others feel unheard and unvalued. It creates a barrier to understanding and resolving conflicts, making it hard for relationships to grow and thrive.</p>

Poor Listening Skills

Listening plays an essential role in empathy, enabling us to grasp and resonate with the experiences of others. However, individuals with low empathy frequently fall short in listening attentively, obstructing significant exchanges. Their tendency to concentrate on their own ideas or to bide their time until it’s their turn to speak undermines the possibility of meaningful dialogue. As a result, others may feel disregarded and devalued, erecting obstacles to comprehension and conflict resolution. This issue makes it challenging for relationships to develop and flourish.

<p>Social norms and etiquette are partly based on mutual respect and understanding, aspects grounded in empathy that some may ignore, leading to socially awkward or offensive behaviors. Ignoring these norms can lead to behavior that others find rude, offensive, or inappropriate, as the individual fails to consider or care about the social and emotional impact of their actions. Such disregard can alienate others and create barriers to social integration and acceptance.</p>

Disregard for Social Norms

Social norms and etiquette, fundamentally reliant on mutual respect and comprehension, are concepts that those lacking empathy might overlook, resulting in behaviors that can be socially awkward or offensive. The neglect of these norms can manifest in actions perceived as rude, offensive, or inappropriate by others, due to the individual’s failure to acknowledge or concern themselves with the social and emotional repercussions of their actions. This indifference can lead to alienation and erect obstacles to social integration and acceptance.

<p>Feeling guilt or remorse after causing harm is a direct consequence of empathy, a feeling that might be absent in those with low empathy, leading them to repeat harmful behaviors without understanding the need for change. Without it, individuals may not genuinely feel sorry for the effects of their actions, leading to repeated harmful behaviors without learning or growth. This lack of remorse can make it difficult for others to trust or forgive, knowing that the harmful actions might easily be repeated.</p>

Lack of Guilt or Remorse

Experiencing guilt or remorse following harmful actions is inherently linked to empathy, an emotion that may be missing in individuals with low levels of empathy, prompting them to persist in damaging behaviors unaware of the necessity for modification. Absent this capacity, individuals might not sincerely regret the outcomes of their actions, resulting in a cycle of repeated harm without any real learning or development. This deficiency in remorse complicates the ability of others to trust or forgive, with the understanding that harmful conduct could recur with ease.

<p>While competition can be healthy, those lacking empathy might pursue victory or success without regard for the harm or detriment caused to others, often justifying their actions as part of the game or necessary for success. Their focus is on winning or achieving at all costs, rather than on fair play or the well-being of competitors. This approach can damage relationships and create a hostile environment, whether in the workplace, in personal relationships, or in social settings.</p>

Competitiveness at the Expense of Others

Although competition can foster growth, individuals with a deficit in empathy may seek triumph or achievement with little concern for the adverse effects on others, frequently rationalizing their behavior as part of the competitive process or as essential for success. Their primary aim is to win or succeed at any expense, neglecting principles of fairness or the welfare of their rivals. Such an attitude can strain relationships and cultivate a contentious atmosphere, whether in professional settings, personal interactions, or social contexts.

<p>Individuals with low empathy may steer clear of discussions about feelings or emotions, finding them uncomfortable or irrelevant, and missing opportunities for deeper connection. This avoidance can make it difficult for them to connect on a deeper level or to engage in conversations that require emotional openness. It can lead to a lack of emotional depth in relationships, leaving partners or friends feeling unfulfilled and disconnected.</p>

Avoidance of Emotional Topics

People exhibiting low empathy tend to avoid conversations centered on feelings or emotions, deeming them either uncomfortable or insignificant, thereby bypassing chances for a more profound rapport. This reluctance complicates their ability to form deeper connections or partake in dialogues that demand emotional transparency. Consequently, relationships may suffer from a dearth of emotional depth, causing partners or friends to experience feelings of dissatisfaction and detachment.

<p>Empathetic people are often motivated to help those in need, driven by a shared sense of humanity and understanding, but an absence of empathy can result in indifference towards others’ struggles. An individual may show little interest in offering assistance unless there’s a direct benefit to themselves, highlighting a transactional approach to interactions that undermines the spirit of community and mutual support.</p>

Unwillingness to Help Others

Empathetic individuals are frequently inspired to aid those in distress, fueled by a collective sense of human connection and insight. However, the lack of empathy might lead to apathy concerning the hardships of others. Such a person may display minimal enthusiasm in providing support, except when it serves their immediate interests, illustrating a quid pro quo mindset in dealings that erodes the essence of communal solidarity and reciprocal assistance.

<p>Empathy fosters understanding and tolerance for diverse perspectives, but its absence can result in an uncompromising stance toward any differing opinion. Without it, there’s a tendency to view one’s own opinions as superior, leading to conflict and an inability to appreciate the richness of diverse viewpoints and experiences. This intolerance can isolate individuals and groups, creating echo chambers that stifle personal and collective growth.</p>

Intolerance to Differing Viewpoints

Empathy nurtures an appreciation for and tolerance of diverse viewpoints, but lacking it can lead to a rigid attitude against any differing perspectives. In its absence, there’s a propensity to consider one’s own opinions as paramount, giving rise to disputes and a failure to recognize the value of diverse insights and experiences. Such intolerance can segregate individuals and communities, fostering echo chambers that hinder both personal and communal development.

<p>Genuine apologies require acknowledging one’s impact on others and feeling remorse, a process deeply tied to empathy that is absent in some. Those lacking in empathy might offer insincere apologies that skirt around accepting real responsibility, if they apologize at all. This reluctance to genuinely apologize can prevent the healing of wounds in relationships, leaving unresolved issues to fester and erode trust over time.</p>

Inability to Apologize Sincerely

Authentic apologies entail recognizing the effect one’s actions have on others and experiencing regret, a mechanism intrinsically linked to empathy, which some individuals lack. Those deficient in empathy may extend insincere apologies that evade embracing true accountability, assuming they apologize at all. This aversion to offering heartfelt apologies can hinder the mending of relational rifts, allowing unresolved matters to deteriorate and trust to diminish gradually.

<p>Charm can be used manipulatively by those lacking deep empathy, as a way to navigate social situations or achieve specific goals without forming genuine connections, often leaving others feeling used once the charm fades. This charm often lacks depth, serving more as a tool than an expression of genuine interest or affection. The transient nature of such charm can lead to disillusionment and mistrust among those who were initially swayed by it, as they realize the lack of genuine connection.</p>

Superficial Charm

Charm, when employed by those deficient in profound empathy, can serve as a tactical means to maneuver through social scenarios or attain particular aims without establishing authentic bonds, frequently resulting in feelings of exploitation among those affected once the allure dissipates. This type of charm usually lacks substance, functioning more as a mechanism than a manifestation of sincere interest or warmth. The ephemeral quality of this charm can cause feelings of disenchantment and distrust among those initially captivated by it, upon recognizing the absence of a real connection.

<p>A flexible mindset allows for the consideration of various perspectives and solutions, but a lack of empathy can result in rigid thinking, preventing productive dialogue and problem-solving. Without empathy, thinking can become rigid, characterized by a refusal to see beyond one’s own viewpoint or to consider alternative approaches to problems. This inflexibility can hinder personal and professional growth, as well as the ability to adapt to new situations or resolve conflicts effectively.</p>

Inflexibility in Thinking

A flexible mindset enables the exploration of different viewpoints and solutions, yet the absence of empathy may foster inflexible thinking, which obstructs constructive conversations and problem resolution. Devoid of empathy, thought processes tend to solidify, marked by an unwillingness to look past personal perspectives or to entertain different problem-solving methods. Such rigidity can impede both personal and professional development, along with the capacity to adjust to novel scenarios or to settle disputes efficiently.

<p>Self-reflection and the willingness to change are often prompted by recognizing the impact of our actions on others, but without empathy, there is little drive to engage in this introspective process. Without empathy, there might be little motivation to self-reflect or adapt behaviors, even in the face of negative outcomes or feedback. This resistance to change can prevent personal growth and development, keeping individuals stuck in patterns of behavior that are harmful to themselves and others.</p>

Unwillingness to Change or Self-Reflect

Self-reflection and a readiness to evolve typically stem from an awareness of how our actions affect those around us, yet in the absence of empathy, the incentive for such introspection significantly dwindles. Lacking empathy, individuals may find scant reason to engage in self-examination or alter their conduct, even when confronted with adverse results or criticism. This aversion to modification can stifle personal progression and maturation, trapping individuals in detrimental behavioral cycles that not only harm themselves but also negatively impact others.

Dominating Conversations

Monopolizing discussions without allowing others room to contribute signifies a deficit in empathy and an indifference to the importance of dialogue and exchange. It reveals a lack of appreciation for the contributions and viewpoints of others, rendering equitable and substantive interactions challenging. Such dominance can suppress the voices of others, resulting in a skewed relationship where authentic exchange and comprehension are scarce.

<p>A short temper can indicate an inability to understand and empathize with others’ intentions or feelings, leading to explosive reactions over minor issues. Frustration arises quickly when one cannot understand or relate to others’ perspectives or feelings, leading to quick and intense expressions of anger over perceived slights or disagreements. This volatility can create an environment of tension and unease, deterring open communication and collaboration.</p>

Quick to Anger

A short fuse may signal a lack of capacity to grasp and empathize with the intentions or emotions of others, prompting overblown responses to trivial matters. Irritation mounts swiftly in someone unable to comprehend or sympathize with differing viewpoints or feelings, resulting in rapid and vehement outbursts of anger over minor provocations or conflicts. This unpredictability fosters an atmosphere of stress and discomfort, discouraging frank dialogue and cooperative efforts.

<p>Setting unrealistic expectations for others, without considering their capabilities, circumstances, or feelings, can lead to persistent disappointment and frustration, often placing undue pressure on relationships. Without empathy to understand others’ limitations and challenges, an individual may hold unrealistic expectations, leading to disappointment and conflict. This can strain relationships, as others may feel unable to meet these expectations and discouraged by the lack of understanding and support.</p>

Unrealistic Expectations of Others

Imposing unattainable expectations on others, neglecting their abilities, conditions, or emotions, frequently results in ongoing disillusionment and irritation, exerting excessive strain on interpersonal connections. In the absence of empathy to acknowledge others’ restrictions and hurdles, a person might maintain impractical anticipations, culminating in disenchantment and strife. Such demands can burden relationships, leaving others feeling incapable of fulfilling these expectations and disheartened by the absence of comprehension and encouragement.

<p>Empathy helps us accurately interpret social cues, but a deficiency can lead to awkward or inappropriate responses, contributing to social misunderstandings and conflict. A deficiency in empathy can result in misreading signals, leading to misunderstandings and miscommunications. This can hinder effective communication and relationship building, as others may feel misunderstood or overlooked.</p>

Misinterpreting Social Cues

Empathy plays a crucial role in correctly deciphering social signals, yet a lack thereof can provoke clumsy or unsuitable reactions, fueling social misinterpretations and discord. Insufficient empathy can cause the misinterpretation of cues, paving the way for misunderstandings and miscommunications. This impairment can obstruct efficient communication and the formation of relationships, as individuals may feel neglected or misconstrued.

<p>Compromise requires recognizing and valuing another’s perspective, but a reluctance to do so can stem from an inability to empathize, leading to rigid stances that hinder resolution and mutual understanding. Those lacking empathy may find it difficult to meet halfway, insisting on their own way instead. This can lead to unresolved conflicts and a breakdown in communication, as both parties feel unheard and unvalued, undermining the foundation of trust and cooperation necessary for healthy relationships.</p>

Reluctance to Compromise

Compromise is predicated on the acknowledgment and appreciation of another person’s viewpoint, yet a hesitancy to engage in this process can arise from a lack of empathy, resulting in inflexible positions that obstruct agreement and mutual comprehension. Individuals with low empathy may struggle to concede or find common ground, preferring to adhere to their perspectives. This stubbornness can culminate in persistent disagreements and a deterioration of dialogue, leaving all involved feeling disregarded and devalued, thus eroding the trust and collaboration essential for nurturing relationships.

<p>Humor that comes at the expense of others’ feelings or sensitivities can be a sign of lacking empathy, often causing unintended harm and alienation. Making jokes or comments without considering how they might affect others can lead to hurt feelings and strained relationships. This insensitivity can alienate individuals and contribute to a culture of disrespect, undermining the sense of safety and belonging needed for healthy communities.</p>

Insensitive Jokes or Comments

Using humor at the expense of others’ feelings or sensitivities indicates a deficiency in empathy, potentially leading to unintended offense and estrangement. Making light of situations or commenting without pondering the impact on others can result in wounded sentiments and damaged relationships. This lack of sensitivity can isolate people and foster an environment of disrespect, eroding the sense of security and inclusiveness essential for thriving communities.

<p>Individuals showing a strong self-focus often overlook the needs and feelings of those around them, making it hard for them to engage in reciprocal relationships. This self-centered approach can alienate friends and family, who may feel neglected or undervalued when their needs and emotions are consistently sidelined. The inability to see beyond one’s own perspective can severely limit the depth and quality of personal connections.</p>

Self-Centeredness

People with a pronounced focus on themselves tend to neglect the needs and emotions of others, hindering their ability to participate in mutual relationships. This self-absorbed behavior can lead to estrangement from friends and family, who might feel overlooked or underappreciated as their own needs and feelings are repeatedly disregarded. The incapacity to look beyond one’s own viewpoint severely restricts the depth and richness of personal interactions.

<p>People who lack empathy find it hard to provide comfort or understanding in times of need, often appearing indifferent or awkward in emotionally charged situations. They may struggle to respond appropriately to others’ emotional distress, offering solutions instead of sympathy or simply avoiding the situation altogether. This inability to offer emotional support can strain relationships, leaving loved ones feeling isolated in times of emotional need and questioning the strength of their bond.</p>

Difficulty with Emotional Support

Individuals deficient in empathy struggle to extend comfort or comprehension during moments of need, frequently seeming detached or clumsy in situations laden with emotion. They might find it challenging to react suitably to the emotional turmoil of others, opting to propose solutions rather than express empathy or choosing to evade these scenarios entirely. This lack of emotional support can stress relationships, causing loved ones to feel abandoned during their times of emotional requirement and doubting the solidity of their connection.

<p>A lack of patience for others’ issues is a hallmark of low empathy, leading such individuals to dismiss or trivialize the concerns of others. Such individuals may view discussions about problems not directly affecting them as tedious or unnecessary. Their impatience can manifest as dismissive comments, a lack of attention, or even irritation, further discouraging open communication and deepening the emotional divide between them and others.</p>

Impatience with Others’ Problems

A deficiency in patience for the troubles of others marks a significant indicator of low empathy, resulting in these individuals minimizing or belittling the worries of others. They might regard conversations on issues that don’t personally impact them as boring or unwarranted. This impatience can surface through dismissive remarks, inattentiveness, or even annoyance, thereby further inhibiting open dialogue and exacerbating the emotional rift with others.

<p>Without empathy, taking responsibility for one’s actions in conflicts or misunderstandings is rare, as it’s easier to blame others without considering one’s role in the situation. Instead, people might blame others entirely, not considering the complex interplay of actions and reactions that contribute to situations, thereby avoiding personal accountability. This blame-shifting can erode trust and hinder the resolution of conflicts, perpetuating cycles of misunderstanding and resentment.</p>

Blaming Others for Misfortunes

In the absence of empathy, individuals seldom take accountability for their actions during disputes or misunderstandings, finding it simpler to fault others without reflecting on their own contribution to the issue. Rather than acknowledging the intricate dynamics of actions and responses that fuel situations, they may place the blame solely on others, dodging personal responsibility. This tendency to shift blame undermines trust and impedes conflict resolution, further entrenching cycles of miscommunication and bitterness.

<p>Manipulation involves using others for personal gain without regard for their feelings or well-being, a strategy that those lacking empathy might employ without moral qualms. Those lacking empathy might employ deceit, charm, or coercion to achieve their ends, seeing others more as means to an end rather than as individuals with their own rights and feelings. This can lead to relationships based on deceit and exploitation, ultimately unsustainable and damaging to all parties involved.</p>

Manipulative Behavior

Manipulation entails exploiting others for personal advantage, disregarding their emotions or welfare—a tactic easily adopted by individuals devoid of empathy, without ethical reservations. They may resort to dishonesty, allure, or pressure to fulfill their objectives, perceiving others more as tools to an end rather than beings with inherent rights and emotions. This approach fosters relationships grounded in duplicity and exploitation, proving ultimately unviable and harmful to everyone concerned.

<p>Empathy allows us to form deep, meaningful connections by understanding and valuing others’ feelings and perspectives, a critical foundation missing in those with low empathy. Without it, relationships may lack depth and emotional intimacy, leading to superficial connections that can easily fray under stress or conflict. This makes it challenging to build and maintain close, lasting relationships that are resilient in the face of challenges.</p>

Difficulty in Maintaining Close Relationships

Empathy facilitates the creation of profound, significant bonds through the appreciation and comprehension of others’ emotions and viewpoints, an essential element absent in individuals with low empathy. In its absence, relationships often lack substance and emotional closeness, resulting in shallow connections prone to deterioration amid tension or disagreement. Consequently, forging and preserving intimate, enduring relationships capable of withstanding adversities becomes a daunting task.

<p>An individual who appears emotionally distant or cold may struggle with empathy, making it hard for others to connect with them on a meaningful emotional level. They may have difficulty expressing their own emotions or responding to others’ emotions in a warm and understanding manner, making emotional connections with them challenging. This emotional coldness can leave a lasting impression of aloofness and detachment, pushing others away and hindering the formation of close relationships.</p>

Emotional Coldness

An individual perceived as emotionally detached or aloof might grapple with empathy, rendering it difficult for others to forge a significant emotional bond with them. They may encounter challenges in articulating their own emotions or in responding to the emotions of others with warmth and empathy, which complicates emotional engagement. This apparent emotional detachment can create an enduring perception of disconnection and distance, repelling others and obstructing the development of intimate connections.

<p>A lack of empathy can result in focusing on others’ flaws or mistakes without recognizing their efforts or the context of their actions, often demoralizing those on the receiving end. This critical stance can demoralize and hurt those around them, damaging relationships and undermining self-esteem. Constant criticism can wear down the resilience and confidence of others, making it difficult for them to share openly or engage in mutual growth.</p>

Overly Critical Attitude

The absence of empathy may lead to an emphasis on the shortcomings or errors of others, neglecting to acknowledge their endeavors or the circumstances surrounding their actions, which can have a disheartening effect on those targeted. This critical approach can demoralize and injure those in proximity, impairing relationships and diminishing self-worth. Persistent criticism can erode the resilience and self-assurance of individuals, making it challenging for them to communicate freely or participate in reciprocal development.

<p>Understanding these traits is not about labeling or condemning those who struggle with empathy but about fostering awareness and compassion in our interactions. Empathy is a skill that can be developed over time, with patience and effort. By recognizing the signs of its absence, we can better navigate our relationships, offer support where needed, and work towards more empathetic connections. It’s important to approach this topic with sensitivity and an open mind, remembering that everyone’s capacity for empathy can grow with understanding and practice.</p><p><a href="https://lifestylogy.com/?utm_source=msnstart">For the Latest Lifestyle, Food, Health & Fitness, head to Lifestylogy</a></p>

Recognizing these characteristics aims not to stigmatize or criticize individuals facing challenges with empathy but to cultivate consciousness and kindness in our dealings. Empathy is a competence that can be nurtured over time through dedication and perseverance. By identifying indicators of its scarcity, we can more adeptly manage our relationships, provide assistance where necessary, and strive for connections imbued with empathy. It’s crucial to approach this matter with delicacy and an open heart, bearing in mind that everyone’s potential for empathy can expand through insight and exercise.

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Guest Essay

Do Not Empower the Criminals in Haiti

A hand reaches through a plant to touch a pane of glass that has been shattered by a bullet hole.

By Jean-Philippe Austin

Dr. Austin is a Miami-based oncologist and a co-founder of the Haitian American Foundation for Democracy.

Here’s what I remember most about my childhood growing up under a dictatorship in Haiti: fear.

We could never speak against the president-for-life, François Duvalier. My classmates, the children of regime officials, were dropped off at school by big men with guns. One night, men came to take our neighbor’s father, and no one ever saw him again. Sometimes we would walk by the National Palace and avert our eyes, too afraid to even look onto the grounds.

It is agonizing to watch yet another generation of Haitians living with terror. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the country’s network of gangs, some sponsored by government officials, have gained territory, arms and audacity. Earlier this month, they formed a confederation and effectively launched war on the state, blocking Ariel Henry, the unelected and unpopular acting prime minister, from flying back into the country. They overran the capital, orchestrated multiple jail breaks, burned government buildings and police stations and attacked the central bank.

I am safe in Miami, but my relatives and friends in Port-au-Prince have told me they are not. One recently had his car shot up; another fled his home after the neighborhood was taken over by gangs; another saw gang members shoot into his convenience store and threaten his employees; another had his house burned to the ground. Most people I know there are terrified they will run out of food and water.

Now some of the same individuals imposing this chaos and destruction are jockeying for power as Haiti’s next government takes shape. Haitians deserve better. Haitians have always deserved security and a say over the fate of their country. They deserve to be led by people who represent the population and strive to keep them safe — not the criminals who have caused their fear and misery, year after year.

For several weeks, Haitian political parties, civil society organizations and diaspora groups have been negotiating what Haiti’s transitional government will look like after Prime Minister Henry resigns , as he has pledged to do. Many hope for a representative council that can re-establish security, rebuild institutions and inspire Haitians’ confidence to vote for a new government in elections later next year. The Caribbean Community , or Caricom, has brokered negotiations, mostly over Zoom, that have created a transitional presidential council, including both democracy advocates and members of several political parties. That council will select a new interim prime minister.

As these negotiations have taken place, the violent leaders controlling the streets of Port-au-Prince are vying for legitimacy. Both Jimmy Chérizier, known as Barbecue, whose gangs have reportedly massacred and raped civilians, and Guy Philippe, who recently served time in U.S. prison for money laundering related to drug trafficking, are casting themselves as freedom fighters and legitimate political leaders . They have said they will reject any internationally organized agreement, raising questions about how the Caricom-brokered council will be able to regain control of the country.

Some observers of Haiti say that involving those criminal leaders in the next phase of Haiti’s governance could help restore order. That is both a dangerous misconception and a ludicrous idea: It is these men who are currently fomenting violence in a bid to gain power. More than 1,500 Haitians have died in gang violence since the start of the year, according to a new United Nations report . After a bully knocks everyone down, you don’t give him what he wants and expect him to stop. He will always want more and use violence to get it.

Haitians deserve governance by the talented, capable people of integrity and technical skill who have been reluctant, and often afraid, to participate in public life, which has been taken over by a criminally connected political class. The transition government in formation must not include criminals, their deputies or any political party with ties to drug trafficking, arms dealing or gangs.

I have watched state violence destroy lives. When I was a child in Haiti, my father’s twin brothers, Roger and Rodrigue Austin, were involved in a plot to overthrow President Duvalier. Roger helped hide other conspirators in cane fields near where my father worked for the Haitian American Sugar Company. Soldiers eventually burned the fields, killed some of the men and imprisoned my uncles. They never came home. My grandfather was briefly imprisoned as well — Mr. Duvalier believed in collective punishment — and died soon after his release. My father went into hiding, and eventually my parents, siblings and I fled to the United States.

The gangs holding Haiti hostage today are in some ways the direct heirs of that era. Mr. Duvalier governed by violent enforcers: the feared Tonton Macoutes, who imposed state power with machetes. After the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship, other leaders followed, employing neighborhood gangs to safeguard their power. Politicians’ use of gangs has gone even further in the past dozen or so years, as a series of manipulated elections allowed Haitian leaders with little popular support to gain office. Instead of winning people over with good policy, empathy and transparency, leaders relied on gangs to intimidate the electorate.

The United States has had a defining role in Haitian politics for generations. Washington supported the savage Duvalier regime, valuing its stability and its opposition to communism during the Cold War. Recently, for more than a decade, the United States has supported Haitian leaders as they dismantled democratic institutions and instrumentalized gangs, and even as the country devolved into gang warfare.

Now the United States is taking a back role in the ongoing negotiations for the transition government, ceding the position of deal maker to Caricom. That is a mistake. Despite Washington’s less than helpful interventions in the past, Haitians need more forceful U.S. involvement to ensure that gang leaders and those connected with them receive a strong message that this time, the United States will not tacitly support their participation in running the country. The U.S. government should not work with gang affiliates and should guard against the engagement of any of their associates with power in this transition.

And the United States will need to take specific actions. Washington should immediately release funds so that an international force led by Kenya can deploy to help restore order and provide security. The installation of the government will need international security support — or there will be no installation.

Washington has a longer-term role to play as well. It should help ensure over time that the new transition government is both functional and remains unbeholden to gangs. Haiti needs to rebuild its police force and establish effective vetting and other processes that will ensure its independence from corrupt politicians and gangs. The judiciary, too, must be rebuilt so that courts work and prosecutors and judges cannot be bought off. The United States and the international community have sponsored elections in the past, but have not meaningfully invested in building these critical institutions and developing citizens’ participation in the system. Only strong institutions and government agencies can support security and stability — and eventually, democracy.

The new transitional government offers a chance — now it is up to Haitians in every sector of society, the Haitian diaspora, the United States and the international community to support it. Without that, the gangs will keep winning, and will extinguish Haitians’ chance to live in a democratic country without fear.

Dr. Jean-Philippe Austin is a Miami-based oncologist. He is a co-founder of the Haitian American Foundation for Democracy.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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