freedom fighters of jammu and kashmir essay

Greater Kashmir

Many J&K freedom fighters with role in country’s independence have disappeared from history books: LG Sinha

Srinagar/jammu: lieutenant governor manoj sinha on monday addressed the national seminar on the theme -‘independent india & jammu kashmir’ under the ‘azadi ka amrit mahotsav’,….

GK NEWS NETWORK

Srinagar/Jammu: Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha on Monday addressed the National Seminar on the theme -‘Independent India & Jammu Kashmir’ under the ‘Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav’, organised by Central University, Jammu and Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), through virtual mode.

In his address, the Lt Governor underlined that ‘Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav’ is a golden opportunity for retrospection, paying tributes to towering patriots of ideas and ideals and the resolve to build India of their dreams.

Highlighting the need to awaken the new generation and make them aware of the rich saga of Freedom Struggle, the Lt Governor reiterated the government’s commitment to make the stories of valour and sacrifice of all those immortal heroes and saviours of Jammu Kashmir part of the educational curriculum.

“Many freedom fighters from Jammu Kashmir, who played a significant role in country’s struggle for Independence, have disappeared from history books. It is a collective responsibility of the society to recognize their supreme sacrifice and restore the honour of our forefathers,” the Lt Governor said.

The Lt Governor observed that the contributions of the people of J&K in the freedom struggle need to immortalise. He called upon the intelligentsia, historians to engage in research work on the life and struggle of the great freedom fighters who made invaluable contributions for Independence.

“The imprints of the sacrifices and contributions of great personalities like Sarvanand Kaul Premi, Giridhari Lal Dogra, Maqbool Sherwani, Brig. Rajendra Singh, Prem Nath Dogra, Kanta Wazir, Ghulam Nabi Mir, Hakim Abdul Rashid, Prithvinath Kaul is a great motivation for the present and the future generations to work on new ideas for a self-reliant India, self-reliant J&K and strengthen the resolve of ‘Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat,” the Lt Governor noted.

“We must draw inspiration from our glorious past and resolve to build a prosperous Jammu Kashmir that will both be an economic powerhouse and a major contributor to AatmaNirbhar Bharat, the Lt Governor further said.

The Lt Governor also stressed for conducting research about the great women leaders of Jammu Kashmir who made their invaluable contribution during the country’s freedom struggle.

Stories of Nari-Shakti, a voice of morality and patriotism will encourage and inspire the new generation, he further added.

The Lt Governor expressed gratitude towards Hon’ble Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi for making “Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav” a Jan Andolan by celebrating 75 years of Independence under the Five Pillars- Freedom Struggle, Ideas at 75, Achievements at 75, Actions at 75 and Resolve at 75.

While highlighting the unprecedented reforms being introduced in J&K during the last 2-3 years, the Lt Governor said that under the guidance of Hon’ble Prime Minister, the UT of J&K is witnessing a historic transformation. Apart from implementing the three-tier system of Panchayati Raj; Valmiki, Gurkha and other marginalized communities, refugees from West Pakistan have been integrated into the mainstream, he added.

The Lt Governor congratulated the Vice-Chancellor of Central University of Jammu and all the associated members for organizing the National Seminar and hoped that the deliberations would help in highlighting self-less sacrifice of unsung heroes.

Various other speakers while speaking on the occasion explained the historical perspective of the role of J&K and its people in the freedom struggle and cultural significance of the region.

Dr Sanjeev Jain, Vice-Chancellor, Central University of Jammu; Prof. Rajneesh Kumar Shukla, Vice-Chancellor, Mahatma Gandhi Antarrashtriya Hindi VishwaVidyalaya, Wardha; besides other dignitaries, faculty members and research Scholars of CUJ attended the Seminar.

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Understanding Kashmir’s struggle for independence

IN THE summer of 2010, protests erupted throughout Kashmir, the predominantly Muslim part of what India claims to be its northernmost state, Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmiris have always asserted their independence from India). Throngs of young men and women defiantly hurled rocks at Indian security forces and set tires on fire to prevent armored vehicles from entering neighborhoods. Their chants were bold—“Go, India, go!” “Azadi (independence) for Kashmir,” and “Quit Kashmir” (the last being a reference to the slogan of the Indian movement against British colonialism: Quit India). The few media outfits that did cover the protests began calling the movement the Kashmiri Intifada, drawing explicit comparison to the other longstanding occupation in Palestine. For fear of having international opinion turn against it, the Indian government quickly clamped down on all media coverage of the resistance in Kashmir and opened its playbook to its favorite page: the rock throwers in Kashmir were quickly dubbed Islamic terrorists.

At the same time, the repression in Kashmir against the population was brutal. Protests were met with shootings, lathi (baton) charges, the firing of tear gas, curfews, mass arrests, disappearances, and torture. The viciousness of the crackdown has its basis in the suspension of any legal oversight or consequence for the Indian security apparatus. Since 1990, Kashmir has come under the purview of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which allows, among other things, any soldier or officer to fire upon any group of five or more people or anyone suspected of having a weapon, arrest anyone without a warrant, and conduct home invasions. It also gives military personnel full immunity from prosecution for their actions.

Additionally, Kashmir is one of the most heavily policed and militarized places in the world, with estimates of Indian security forces in the region at well over 700,000 (the government of India refuses to release official numbers). It bears underlining that the population of Kashmir is approximately 5.5 million, which means that there is one security officer for every eight Kashmiris, a ratio which beggars Mubarak’s Egypt. The carte blanche given to the police and military and the constant rhetoric of Islamic insurgency have proven to be a deadly and humiliating mix for ordinary Kashmiri civilians. In one shocking video that was uploaded to YouTube, Indian soldiers were seen parading young Kashmiri men naked through their village en route to a military camp.

Kashmir: The Case for Freedom, with contributions from Tariq Ali, Hilal Bhatt, Angana Chatterji, Pankaj Mishra, and Arundhati Roy, and a selection of poetry by the sixteenth-century Kashmiri poet Habbah Khatun, comes at an important time, as new political and economic realities put the resistance of the Kashmiri people back on the map of global protest. The book is essentially a handbook for human rights activists across the world who have seen the protest movement in Kashmir grow but who have been left confused by the obfuscations that pass for journalism and the lies that are official politics in India, Pakistan, and the United States. The overwhelming conclusion that any reader would draw after reading the book is the simple and straightforward one that Arundhati Roy arrives at: “Does any government have the right to take away people’s liberty with military force? India needs azadi from Kashmir just as much—if not more—than Kashmir needs azadi from India.”

Kashmir has a long tradition of religious syncretism, cultural innovation, and political resistance, but an equally long legacy of feudal, colonial, and now sub-imperial conquest. The crux of the contemporary problem stems from the opportunistic way that the independence and partition of the Indian subcontinent was carried out, and the vicious way that those terms are enforced on the population. When British rule was established in Kashmir in 1846, Kashmir (recently conquered by the Sikh invader Ranjit Singh in 1819) was sold off to Dogra royalty (the Hindu rulers of neighboring Jammu) for 7.5 million rupees, 6 pairs of shawl goats, and 3 shawls (under the absurd Treaty of Amritsar). Dogra rule was economically ruinous for the population, who were reduced to a condition of abject poverty; the few young people who could, escaped to other places in India, where they were radicalized and returned to raise slogans of freedom, justice, and land reform. Before the partition of India, the dominant politics of the movement for Kashmiri independence, led by Sheikh Abdullah, were a heady mix of socialism and nationalism, not political Islam as is often claimed by contemporary analysts.

When the British left India, the 565 prince states, which had maintained a degree of political autonomy through treaties with the British, were given the choice of acceding either to India or Pakistan or remaining independent. Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, still hadn’t decided; leaders of the Muslim League were attempting to woo him to Pakistan, while his Hindu sympathies seemed to incline him in favor of India. Leaders in Pakistan decided not to wait and planned an invasion. Hari Singh, worried about being deposed militarily, quickly negotiated an accession to India in exchange for military support. But under the terms of the agreement, Kashmir was to be allowed a referendum to determine the will of the people on the question of accession. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, despite publicly proclaiming his support for the plebiscite—as Arundhati Roy’s excellent collection of excerpts of his speeches shows—ultimately reneged on his promise.

The Indian army was able to repel the Pakistani invaders only up to a point; the current Line of Control that divides Kashmir more or less marks the result of that confrontation. Since then, Kashmir has become a pawn in the cynical and deadly game between India and Pakistan. India uses Kashmir to claim that it is a democratic society (but does so by rigging elections, importing pliable Hindu rulers, imprisoning elected leaders, and brutally oppressing the population), while Pakistan claims that it is interested in Kashmiri independence (despite having flooded the valley with guns, an intolerant variant of Islam, and denying independence to its other occupied territory, Balochistan).

The book makes two important contributions to our understanding of what has happened in Kashmir since that point. The first has to do with the form of the resistance, which has shifted over the years from secular nationalism to Islamist politics and back again. The period between the 1940s and the early 1980s was dominated by the secular nationalist forces in Kashmir organized under Sheikh Abdullah, who initially sought some kind of compromise with the Indian state for greater autonomy within a larger federation. When even democratic dialogue broke down and India reneged on promises, a few groups (like the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) broke away from the dominant nationalist coalition and began waging a guerrilla struggle. At the same time, Pakistan, flush with arms and militants it was recruiting and training for the American-sponsored resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, began recruiting Kashmir youth to jihadi outfits, sending Islamist groups into Kashmir, and providing weapons and training to secular groups (though they eventually stopped backing these groups altogether).

The devastating effects of that policy on ordinary Kashmiris are documented in Hilal Bhatt’s personal essay in the collection. But by the late 1990s, Islamist organizations had exhausted whatever appeal they may have had, as their social policies came into conflict with Kashmiri ideologies, and their inability to produce a military solution meant that ordinary Kashmiris were the ones suffering the barbaric Indian crackdown that followed their terrorist activities. The last decade of resistance has been characterized by secular, democratic opposition to the policies of the Indian state, a reality that goes against all of the mainstream propaganda that Kashmir is another front in the war on terror.

The second contribution the book makes has to do with the staggering scale of violence that the Indian state perpetrates against the Kashmiri population (the condition of the Pakistani-administered section, while poor, is not nearly as bloody). As Angana Chatterji puts it, “Kashmir is a landscape of internment, where resistance is deemed ‘insurgent’ by state institutions.” Chatterji and her husband Richard Shapiro have been targeted by the Indian government for their views on Kashmir, and were both recently fired from their jobs at the California Institute of Integral Studies, in part for their outspoken political advocacy.

Part of the reason that Kashmir is so brutally repressed is because the Indian state is now governed by an ideology that requires the fiction of a massive security threat in order to justify exorbitant expenditures on its military and police forces. This fiction is propped up, as Chatterji argues, by an ideology that amalgamates Hindu chauvinism, neoliberalism, and authoritarian statecraft. The result has been the wholesale criminalization of even the mildest form of public protest.

Most recently, the police filed sedition charges against the Jammu and Kashmir Board of School Education for showing a man in blue carrying a stick under the Urdu letter zoi for zaalim (oppressor). The police have charged everyone affiliated with the book with criminal conspiracy, defamation, and provocation with the intent to breach peace, since the innocuous depiction was assumed to be a police officer. In another instance, an English professor, Noor Mohammad Bhat, was thrown in jail for administering a “provocative” examination assignment.

Despite making the case for an independent Kashmir and offering a brilliant indictment of the Indian government’s claim to being the largest democracy on the planet, the book falls short on one important point, namely in pointing out a strategy by which that independence can come about if armed struggle, mass protest, and even political compromise have all failed in turn. The unfortunate reality in Kashmir is that it is extremely similar to Palestine, where the indigenous population lacks the necessary social force to repel the violence of occupation forces and are thus forced into taking part in the opportunistic diplomacy of larger states around them. But just as the Palestinians have allies in the surrounding states, the Kashmiris have allies in both Pakistan and India who have no interest in occupation, in fact whose lives would immediately be improved if both Pakistan and India were to stop spending Himalayan sums on security personnel and instead spend money on eradicating poverty. The Indian and Pakistani working classes have common enemies—their own states—and the end to the occupation in Kashmir will only be the result of their unified struggle. This, though, is only the slightest of criticisms; the spirit if not the explicit argument of the Arab Spring runs throughout this entire book.

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Kashmiri Youth: Redefining the Movement for Self-determination

This report discusses the local dynamics of the Kashmir conflict, and focuses on the youth-led resistance against the Indian state in Kashmir that has emerged since the late 2000s. It narrates the ways in which Kashmiri youth have mobilized outside the realm of formal politics, using new technology and other means to bring awareness to the Kashmir issue. Despite these developments, their political agency remains restricted through increased state repression and surveillance.  

Introduction

After a three-year break, India and Pakistan have agreed to re-start a comprehensive bilateral dialogue, which will culminate in a high-level visit of Indian Prime Minister Modi to Pakistan in September 2016. (1) While the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir will surely be addressed, it appears once more that other issues will take priority over the voices and demands of the people, especially those of the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley. This priority is misplaced. The dialogue between India and Pakistan must take into account changing realities on the ground within the Kashmir Valley. No progress can be made unless a Kashmir-centric approach is taken into consideration.

The conflict: from partition to present The Kashmir conflict can be traced to 1947, when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned along religious lines into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. A murky transfer of sovereignty by the then Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir led a majority of the territory to be incorporated into the Indian Union. (2) Local demands for a plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir were sidelined throughout the second half of the twentieth century. (3) From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, Kashmir was embroiled in a violent uprising between Kashmiri and foreign fighters against the Indian state. The insurgency was supported by Pakistan. The Indian state managed to quash the movement through direct force, the introduction of counter-insurgency militant groups such as the Ikhwan, and a policy of divide and rule that contributed to infighting within the militant and pro-freedom ranks. (4)

For most of the 2000s it appeared that the Kashmiri movement for self-determination had been rendered obsolete, as Indian and international analysts projected a “return to normalcy” and the local populace grew disillusioned with militant groups. (5) However, in 2008 a new wave of largely non-violent protests began to emerge in Kashmir, lead by the generation that grew up during the period of heightened militancy. The triggers for this new wave of protest included the Indian state’s attempted land grabs, extrajudicial killings, and the torture and killing of Kashmiri youth. (6) This new generation of youth activists has played a critical role in redefining the Kashmiri movement for self-determination as well as the precarious political and social conditions in which they function.  

Shifting modes of activism

Much like the youth of the Arab Spring, Kashmiri youth today are empowered with new communication technologies that increase the movement’s social and cultural reach. These technologies expand activists’ network within Kashmir as well as linking the movement for self-determination with a global discourse of resistance, ranging from Palestine to Ferguson. (7)

Many from the middle class are traveling abroad for their education—either to universities in India or the UK and the US—where they encounter new modes of thinking and activism. A large number of these Kashmiri students are studying the humanities and social sciences, and in the process becoming more aware of their history and the place of Kashmir among other decolonizing struggles. This emerging awareness has led to a blossoming of young Kashmiri artists, activists, writers, journalists, filmmakers, and academics that are producing political art, literature, and scholarship. The importance of this shift is best exemplified by the student protests on Indian university campuses in February 2016 after the Modi government cracked down on student dissent. Kashmiri youth, alongside a number of Indian youth from a variety of religious and social minority groups, challenged the discourse of the Indian state as it pertains to Kashmir and the politically charged hanging of Afzal Guru, a Kashmiri Muslim accused of conspiring in the 2001 attacks on the Indian parliament. (8)

Kashmiri youth-driven activism and cultural production has crafted a new discourse that—while relying on multiple, concurrent frames of reference and inspiration—is deeply connected to the desire for justice in Kashmir.

One such example is Kashmiri cartoonist Malik Sajad’s 2015 autobiographical graphic novel, Munnu: A Boy from Kashmir. Sajad, who started drawing political cartoons for Kashmiri newspapers at a young age, narrates his personal story of growing up in Srinagar’s Batmaloo area during a period of heightened militancy and witnessing the harsh repression tactics of the Indian state and its security forces. Sajad deftly brings together the modern graphic art form with traditional Kashmiri embroidery and design, drawing upon contemporary cultural icons as well as Kashmir’s rich historical traditions and folklore. Using the language of memoir, human rights, Islamic mysticism, and political critique, Sajad does not pay homage to any particular political party or ideology, but shows the everyday struggles and heartbreaks of life under military occupation. (9) It is both the universality of his themes as well as the specificity of the Kashmir context that draws in the reader. Sajad is one of many Kashmiri youth experimenting with different cultural forms—both online and off—to bring attention to the Kashmir issue.

The activism of the new generation of Kashmiri youth points to another significant shift in Kashmir: a sphere of politics that exists outside of Kashmir’s traditional pro-freedom parties. (10)

Since the late 1980s, the pro-freedom leadership, comprised of groups such as the Hurriyat and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), dominated Kashmiri resistance against the Indian state. Mired in their own political intrigues, infighting, and allegations of corruption, the influence of these groups and their leaders waned in recent years. While supporting these groups’ ultimate aims, many in Kashmir have begun to question their modes of resistance, critiquing the overuse of hartaal, or general strike, as well as their inability to do more than “simply keep the struggle alive.” (11) Some youth also feel that there is very little space for them to be involved in these parties, unlike the pro-Indian local parties that make space for youth to take on bigger roles.

Kashmiri activist Muzzammil Thakur, who is the president of the Kashmir Institute of International Affairs and runs a number of development projects in the Valley, laments the prevailing predicament of the pro-freedom groups.

There doesn’t seem to be a committee of qualified people that can move the movement forward, and provide us with a strategy. How many of our leaders have a background in negotiations or political theory? Where are the new strategies? Either we have hartaals called by the pro-freedom leadership, or curfews called by the government. Many youth are beginning to question the leadership—what have you succeeded in getting us? Political sentiment alone will not drive us forward—we must have a real strategy forward. (12)

Yet, not all agree that this is the primary reason for the pro-freedom groups’ waning influence. Wajahat Ahmad, who teaches sociology at OP Jindal University, thinks that most middle class activists are not interested in the harsh reality of membership.

Youth do not join Hurriyat or JKLF not because these parties are not welcoming but because of the harsh reality that associating with pro-independence groups means arrest, beatings, death of a career and in a classist and status conscious society like ours, an identity crisis. Middle class youth who are journalists, cartoonists, writers, academics, and human rights activists do not consciously engage with the pro-independence parties, as they know the cost of a formal association with these groups. Pro-freedom parties are more than happy to accept young people but who would sit in a Hurriyat office all day and give up jobs or university degrees in return for a few thousand rupee monthly stipend and the risk of an arrest or beating or risk police harassment to one's family. (13)

Despite differences of opinion on the efficacy of the pro-freedom parties today, many Kashmiri youth nevertheless acknowledge the important role the parties have played since the 1980s and the difficulties they face due to the limitations placed upon them by the Indian state.

The emerging grassroots, youth-led movement, marked by its lack of leadership or formal organization, has forged new spaces for discussion on Kashmir, outside of the realm of the various political parties. This has led to a broader vision of azadi (the struggle for independence), and fierce debates on the nature of the Kashmir conflict. (14) Kashmiri youth are at the forefront of defining what constitutes azadi, and challenging long-held perspectives on the role of religion, economy, culture, and education. While they connect to feelings of being marginalized as Muslims as a result of the so-called Global War on Terror, these new perspectives do not simply rely on religious identification, but also incorporate critiques of imperialism, religious nationalism, and global capitalism. For example, many youth are critical of Pakistan’s role in Kashmir and are beginning to think beyond the ideals constructed by nationalist imaginaries—even those within Kashmir.  

An invasive state

Despite these important developments, Kashmir’s youth remain in the immediate line of fire, facing violent suppression from the Indian government, affiliated right-wing groups, and the security apparatus in Kashmir. This has led many, especially in the middle class, to refrain from participating too vocally, worried about repercussions for themselves and their families. In addition, there is also a concerted effort by the state apparatus to encourage youth to join administrative services or other careers where their ability to be political agents is restricted. (15)

Just as new technologies have played a transformative role in youth activism, new technologies are also being used by various state agencies as an advanced method of invasive surveillance. The state hires hackers to retrieve information about youth organizing online and to create fake social media accounts to troll online forums and instigate dissent in order to see who might be a potential threat to the state. (16) “There is a lot of money being pumped in this area,” says Dilnaz Boga, a journalist who covers youth issues in Kashmir. “The state is able to control youth voices by figuring out information about them and then using it against them—including information about their personal and family lives.” (17) Boga affirms that Facebook is used for multiple purposes. “The state is able to keep an eye on the likes and comments, and hire people to egg on young people. With this strategy, the government is essentially able to find out who is willing to die or not.” (18)

In moments of heightened crisis, such as dates of commemoration or after killings of youth activists, the state clamps down on communication networks, sometimes for days or weeks at a time, including social media. As a result, the youth are unable to mobilize and build momentum around particular issues. This illiberal and undemocratic muzzling of expression is meant to curtail dissent.

The struggle, of course, isn’t taking place only online. Kashmiri youth have relied on stone throwing against the Indian and local security forces as a form of protest. Many of these protestors are fired upon with live bullets or tear gas, leading to countless deaths and injuries. (19) The state also regularly arrests youth who are involved in stone throwing or agitation against the Indian state, many of whom are under the age of 18. These youth are booked under the notorious Public Security Act (PSA), which effectively brands them for the rest of their lives even if they are released. In 2011, Amnesty International called the PSA a “lawless law” and declared that it was a way for the government to circumvent the rule of law. (20) The subsequent negative media attention given to this law resulted in an increase of illegal detentions outside of the PSA, as police try to deal with dissent under the radar. (21)

Drug use has also increased in Kashmir, especially in areas such as Tral, Pulwama, Islamabad, and Sopore where resistance to Indian rule is most prominent. (22) The coincidence is not lost on Kashmiris; many believe that drugs are being pumped into Kashmir through black markets, much like they were in Punjab, to distract the youth from activism. Many become addicted while they are in jail. (23)

Suppression in Kashmir goes beyond targeting youth that are agitating against the Indian state. The entire Kashmiri student body politic is deemed suspect; students in Kashmir have no space to organize or mobilize politically. Student groups, unless they espouse the politics of mainstream Indian parties such as the Congress or BJP, are not allowed to meet in universities. As a result, the Kashmir University Students Union has been working underground in recent years. Freedom of expression is restricted. Indeed, Facebook works in tandem with the Indian state to remove or suspend any posts that it views as being controversial. Mir Suhail, another Kashmiri political cartoonist, had his cartoon marking the death anniversary of Afzal Guru removed and his account suspended for three days. (24)

The state is able to use the threat of global Islamist fear by drawing links between the youth and groups such as ISIS in an attempt to undermine their dissent. While ISIS flags have been seen in protests, experts contend this is a move to taunt Indian security forces and there is no evidence to suggest that these youth are being recruited into ISIS or even endorse their ideology. (25)

The increasing suppression and violence of the Indian state, especially since the killings of over 120 young Kashmiris in the summer of 2010, has led to an increase in Kashmiri youth joining militant groups. Unlike their predecessors in the late 1980s and 1990s, many of these youth are highly educated. Burhan Wani, a Kashmiri from Kashmir’s Tral region who joined the militancy when he was only fifteen, has inspired this new generation of militants. (26) Police estimate that he has recruited over eighty youth in recent years. (27) Many of these youth joined the militancy after facing harassment at the hands of the security forces or witnessing the death of a family member or friend.  

Kashmiri youth are well aware that their struggle for self-determination is of little international concern. With rising authoritarianism and right-wing fervor in India, and continued geopolitical interventions in Pakistan, Kashmir is simply not a policy priority. The perceived intractability of the issue continues, but this might create new opportunities for Kashmiris to take ownership of their cause. Kashmir’s initial revolt has come full circle and a new generation is testing new ways of dissent, taking ownership of their narrative, and expanding their solidarity and networks through social media and other mediums. While state surveillance and repression is likely to continue, so is youth resistance. ____________________________________________________________________ Copyright © 2016 Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, All rights reserved. * Hafsa Kanjwal is a PhD candidate in History and Women’s Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor focusing on modern South Asia. Her dissertation examines the social and cultural history of modern Kashmir.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Hafsa Kanjwal

is a PhD candidate in History and Women’s Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor focusing on modern South Asia. Her dissertation examines the social and cultural history of modern Kashmir.

(1 ) The presidential visit is planned to take place during the annual summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. See, “After 3 years of silence, India-Pakistan dialogue back on the rails; PM Modi will visit Islamabad next year,” FirstPost, 10 December 2016, www.firstpost.com/politics/india-pakistan-break-logjam-on-comprehensive… (accessed 17 February 2016)

(2 ) India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir immediately after Partition, resulting in Pakistan acquiring nearly one-third of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which it calls “Azad Kashmir.” This report is restricted to Indian-administered Kashmir.

(3 ) V. Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London: IB Tauris, 1996)

(4 ) N. Haksar, The Many Faces of Kashmiri Nationalism: From the Cold War to the Present Day (Delhi: Speaking Tiger, 2015)

(5 ) G. Pandey, “Kashmiri Youth Seek Peace and Normalcy,” South Asia One World, 2 July 2008, http://southasia.oneworld.net/news/kashmir-youth-seek-peace-and-normalc… (accessed 17 February 2016)

(6 ) S. Kak, ed., Until My Freedom Has Come: The New Intifada in Kashmir (Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2011)

(7 ) U. Falak, “Poem: PalestineKashmir,” The Electronic Intifada, 18 November 2015 https://electronicintifada.net/content/poem-palestinekashmir/15016 (accessed 17 February 2016)

(8 ) D. Palumbo-Liu, “India’s Crackdown on Anti-Nationalism on Campus and How it Can Affect Universities Here,” The Huffington Post, 17 February 2016, www.huffingtonpost.com/david-palumboliu/indias-crackdown-on-anti-nation… (accessed 17 February 2016)

(9 ) M Sajad, Munnu: A Boy from Kashmir (London: Harper Collins, 2015)

(10 ) M. Faysal, “Walking downtown, Trying to Breathe,” Kashmir Reader, 19 February 2016, http://kashmirreader.com/walking-downtown-trying-to-breathe/ (accessed 19 February 2016)

(11 ) The pro-freedom leadership usually calls for hartaals after the occurrence of human rights violations by the Indian state. Most businesses, banks, schools, and government offices remain closed and public transportation is limited. Critics of the hartaal as a protest strategy decry that it harms the Kashmiri economy and keeps children from attending school; the leadership maintains that it is the only form of resistance that Kashmiris can use given the state prohibition of protests and larger public gatherings.

(12 ) Interview with Muzzammil Thakur, conducted 7 February 2016

(13 ) Interview with Wajahat Ahmad, Faculty, O.P. Jindal Global University, India, conducted 27 February 2016

(14 ) Azadi is the Persian word for freedom, and is also used in Kashmiri and Urdu. It represents the demand in Kashmir for self-determination and an end to the Indian military occupation.

(15 ) Interview with Wajahat Ahmad

(16 ) Interview with Dilnaz Boga, journalist and filmmaker, conducted on 15 February 2016

(17 ) ibid.

(18 ) ibid.

(19 ) A. Hussain, “Police fire tear gas to quell anti-India protests in Kashmir,” Associated Press, 25 September 2015, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/8cb5ad76f3cd4e7fa87c0d14a1a51015/police-… (accessed 19 February 2016)

(20 ) Amnesty International, “A ‘Lawless’ Law: Detentions Under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Security Act,” (2011), www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/asa200012011en_11.pdf (accessed 19 February 2016)

(21 ) Interview with Dilnaz Boga

(22 ) D. Boga, “Kashmir Valley’s Spiraling Drug Abuse,” Counter Currents, 10 June 2010, http://www.countercurrents.org/boga100610.htm (accessed 19 February 2016)

(23 ) ibid.

(24 ) A. Saha, “Kashmiri Artist says Facebook Deleted Cartoon on Afzal Guru,” Hindustan Times, 9 February 2016, www.hindustantimes.com/india/kashmiri-artist-says-fb-deleted-cartoon-on… (accessed 19 February 2016)

(25 ) Interview with Dilnaz Boga

(26 ) J. Burke, “Kashmir Conflict Ebbs as New Wave of Militant Emerges,” The Guardian, 11 August 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/11/kashmir-conflict-new-wave-militan… (accessed 19 February 2016)

(27 ) B. Masood, “Guns ‘n’ Poses: The New Crop of Militants in Kashmir,” Indian Express, 26 July 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/big-picture-guns-n-… (accessed 19 February 2016)

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Contested Solidarity: Azad Kashmir, Pakistan and the Kashmiri freedom struggle

I wrote this piece in solidarity with the people and their diverse but interrelated struggles for freedom and social justice in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. I see my responsibility as a European anthropologist, implicated in colonial structures of domination and legacies of conflict in South Asia, not to advocate for a particular political solution to the Kashmir conflict, but rather to respect the diverse experiences and aspirations of Kashmiris and to work towards a culture of debate and solidarity across social and political divides, which I believe is important in confronting all forms of oppression and inequality in Kashmir and the world beyond.

Every year on 5 February, Kashmir Solidarity Day is observed across Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). This public holiday was introduced in the 1990s during the armed uprising of Kashmiris against Indian occupation. It commemorates the ongoing struggle of Kashmiris for freedom ( az ādi ) from India and aims to demonstrate Pakistan’s moral responsibility and commitment to this struggle.

In this short contribution, I will argue that Pakistan’s solidarity is crucial in drawing national and international attention to the Kashmiri freedom struggle. At the same time, however, this solidarity is contested and potentially harmful, when it comes to people’s political rights in AJK. Pakistan’s solidarity, entrenched in military nationalism and enmity against India, is fundamentally self-interested and primarily serves its military and/or political elites. Therefore, it has mostly failed to truly recognise and promote people’s right to freedom in AJK. [1]

Pakistan’s solidarity with Kashmir continues to shape AJK’s political marginalisation within the Pakistani nation-state and its role in sustaining Pakistan’s military nationalism, with India as the enemy that constantly threatens the existence of the Islamic nation. [2] Pakistan’s solidarity with Kashmir holds that, in contrast to the parts of Kashmir across the ‘border’ – the military Line of Control – AJK is ‘free’ ( azād ) from Indian occupation. However, this official narrative conceals that AJK’s ‘freedom’ has come with political and military dependence from, and domination by, Pakistan. [3]

Pakistan claims to only protect AJK from India and to support the local state and its people temporarily until the people of Kashmir—through a UN-led referendum—will determine the political future of the entire former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, including AJK. In fact, however, Pakistan dominates AJK militarily and through constitutional and bureaucratic means. Islamabad holds control over the most important political matters in AJK, including defence, security and trade, and appoints the most influential positions within the region’s administration. Conversely, AJK lacks political representation in Pakistan and the means to hold the Pakistani government and/or military accountable. While the people of AJK can elect their own government, they are affected by laws, regulations and interventions from Pakistan over which they have no or only limited control. [4]

Pakistan’s ambivalent solidarity with Kashmir is most clearly revealed by the constitution that was granted AJK in the 1970s. By stipulating that no individual or political party in AJK may challenge the ideology of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan [5] , the constitution contradicts the very right of people to freely imagine, debate and ultimately determine their political future, which Pakistan demands for Kashmiris under Indian occupation.

Recently and in response to the intensification of India’s occupation and military siege in Kashmir, following the revocation of the regions’ partial autonomy status in August 2019, Pakistan has increasingly sought to bring international attention to Kashmir and the Kashmiri freedom struggle. In contrast to previous decades, it has framed the Kashmir dispute as an international issue that needs to be resolved through a popular UN-led referendum. This stance in part reverses the bilateralism that has marginalised Kashmiris and shaped the Kashmir dispute as a territorial dispute between Pakistan and India. [6] Given the Muslim majority of the former state and the fact that the UN resolutions only mention the option of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to either India or Pakistan (and not the third option of independence), Pakistan is likely to win such a referendum. While Pakistan in public and in front of the international community calls for the referendum to determine the political future of Jammu and Kashmir, the constitution leaves the people of AJK no choice but to support Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. Alternatives such as independence can only be expressed in secret or with great caution and cannot be debated openly and freely. However, to transform the entrenched conflict, I believe, we precisely need such public and open debates that respect the social and political diversity of Kashmiris across the entire state [7] , including AJK, and work, through democratic means, towards freedom for all. [8]

Pakistan’s solidarity with Kashmir is self-interested, but the people of AJK would not have been able to run their own local state without Pakistan’s political and military support. This local state provides most administrative and social services [9] , such as the distribution of relief after the 2005 earthquake. [10] While being dependent on Pakistan, it has also enabled the people in AJK and their political leaders to limit Pakistani control by restricting the access to state resources to recognised state subjects of Kashmir. According to the so-called ‘state subject rule’, a law introduced in 1927, when Jammu and Kashmir was still a princely state, state subjects and their descendants are the only people who have the right to settle, own land and hold public office in the state. Now that India has abolished the state subject rule in Indian-controlled Kashmir, along with the region’s partial autonomy status, it is all the more important to emphasise that AJK is nowadays the only region of Jammu and Kashmir where the state subject rule is still in place. It is this law that allows people to retain some (limited) degree of political autonomy, to assert their own identity, and to confront and negotiate as Kashmiris with Pakistan over their mutual relationship, including the conditions of Pakistan’s solidarity with the freedom struggle.

Recent constitutional reforms in AJK give rise to hope for more autonomy and a more equal distribution of power between Pakistan and AJK. In June 2018, the parliament of AJK, supported by the Pakistani government, passed the 13 th amendment to the constitution. With the amendment some powers were shifted to the democratically elected AJK Legislative Assembly (including natural gas, electricity, terminal taxes, census etc.). The amendment is contested. Some commentators celebrate it as the achievement of financial autonomy for the first time in AJK’s history [11] , while others criticise it as ‘a further “colonisation” of the region (…) under the pretext of empowerment’ [12] .

Moreover, local government elections were recently held in AJK for the first time in over 30 years. Local civil society activists have long called for their reinstatement, criticising both Pakistan and the members of the AJK legislative assembly for refusing to share their power. The election of local village councils and city committees is considered an important step toward democratising the region, improving local participation in politics and distributing state resources in a more equitable and accountable way. [13] It remains to be seen whether these elections will lead to a more responsive and responsible local state or rather become another farce of democracy and freedom in AJK. After all, Pakistan and its allies in AJK have so far refrained from what would be a genuine and groundbreaking act of political solidarity: repealing a law that prohibits contesting the ideology of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, and promoting the right to freely debate and imagine alternative political futures and possibilities of azādi and social justice for Kashmir and its diverse people.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in the articles are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Research Society of International Law (RSIL), its editorial team, or its affiliated organizations. Moreover, the articles are based upon information the authors consider reliable, but neither RSIL nor its affiliates warrant its completeness or accuracy, and it should not be relied upon as such.

[1] This contribution focuses on AJK. However, Pakistan’s failure to promote people’s right to political self-determination also holds true, and even more so, for Gilgit-Baltistan, the other of the two parts of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.

[2] Ali, Nosheen (2019): Delusional states: feeling rule and development in Pakistan’s Northern frontier , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[3] Snedden, Christopher (2012): The untold story of the people of Azad Kashmir , New York: Columbia University Press; Hayat, Javaid (2020): Azad Jammu & Kashmir: polity, politics, and power-sharing , Karachi: Oxford University Press Pakistan.

[4] Schild, Pascale (2015): Local politics of reconstruction along and across Azad Kashmir’s border with Pakistan. Contemporary South Asia 23(3): 292-313. https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2015.1040736

[5] Mahmud, Ershad (2021): Azad Jammu and Kashmir’s quest for empowerment. In Society and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir, edited by Serena Hussain, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 79-97: 95.

[6] Snedden 2012; Hayat 2020.

[7] Sökefeld, Martin (2013): Jammu and Kashmir: dispute and diversity. In The modern anthropology of India: ethnography, themes and theory , edited by Peter Berger and Frank Heidemann, London: Routledge. 89-105.

[8] Schild, Pascale (2023): Peace for Kashmir? The (non-)politics of ‘civilian peacebuilding’ across the Line of Control. In Palgrave handbook of new directions in Kashmir studies , edited by Haley Duschinski, Mona Bhan and Cabeiri Robinson. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-28520-2_24

[9] Robinson, Cabeiri (2013): Body of victim, body of warrior: refugee families and the making of Kashmiri jihad , Berkeley: University of California Press.

[10] Schild, Pascale (2022): From earthquake victims to citizens: Dependencies and precarious claims on the state in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan. Citizenship Studies 26(3): 305-321. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2022.2062703

[11] Mahmud, Ershad (2018): Devolution of power in AJK. The News on Sunday , June 10, 2018. https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/565693-devolution-power-ajk

[12] Mughal, Jalaluddin (2018): Who rules Azad Jammu and Kashmir? The Friday Times , August 17, 2018. https://www.thefridaytimes.com/who-rules-azad-jammu-and-kashmir/

[13] Ali, Waqas (2020): The local government system in Azad Jammu and Kashmir: background, evaluation and the way forward , Islamabad: Center for Peace Development and Reform.

Author:  Pascale Schild

Pascale Schild is a political anthropologist working on disaster reconstruction, the state, politics of distribution, resistance, political solidarity, peace and conflict, and ethnographic vulnerability. She explores these themes mainly from the perspective of Kashmiris' struggles for freedom and social justice under conditions of coloniality that shape politics and power relations across Kashmir and its diaspora. Her work has appeared in Citizenship Studies, Peacebuilding and Contemporary South Asia, among other journals and edited volumes. Pascale holds a PhD from the LMU Munich. She is currently a visiting researcher at SOAS University of London and an associated researcher at the University of Bern, Switzerland. For her research on transnational peace initiatives and practices of solidarity with the Kashmiri freedom movement, she was awarded research grants from the Swiss National Science Foundation.

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Unsung Heroes Detail

Kanta wazir.

Srinagar, Jammu & Kashmir

July 13, 2022

Kanta Wazir was born in Srinagar in March 1930. She was married to Man Mohan Wazir (1926-2018), a Civil Servant of Jammu and Kashmir in July 1949. She was a student of Sri Pratap College, Srinagar. In 1947-48, while pursuing her FA (Fellow of Arts), she was influenced by the progressive ideology and joined the Women’s Self Defense Corps (WSDC), the women’s wing of the National militia that was raised during the turbulent times when Pakistan led tribal raiders invaded Jammu and Kashmir. Equipped with modern weapons and commanded by Major General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan army, the raiders crossed the border and entered Muzaffarabad on 22 October 1947. A reign of terror was let loose on innocent civilians. The tribesmen advanced leaving behind a trail of death and destruction, their worst orgies were murder, rape, loot, and arson in which women suffered on an unprecedented scale.

The worst fear more than getting killed was about the honour of women. In the wake of an anticipated dread engulfing the region of Srinagar anytime, the urgent concern was the empowerment of women which resulted in the setting up of the women’s militia, an exclusive women’s wing of the National militia raised by the National Conference. Its intended role was to train the women in the use of firearms so as to defend themselves against the marauding raiders.

With zeal to serve the motherland, Kanta Wazir, the bold daughter of Kashmir, joined the women’s militia and enlisted herself for training in the use of firearms. Infused with a new spirit, she shunned away the years-old conservative ideology of the traditional Kashmir society and turned this challenge into an opportunity to serve the common mission of defending women’s honour and dignity by bearing arms. Along with her team of volunteers, Kanta Wazir actively mobilized the people to defend their motherland against tribal aggression along with the Indian army which landed in Srinagar on 27 October 1947.

The response was overwhelming and subsequently, a spontaneous grass-roots movement began to emerge in the streets of Srinagar. Epitomizing supreme sacrifice and deep conviction, she along with other volunteers played an exemplary role in guiding jawans and gathering vital information about the movement of raiders on the frontlines

Gole Bagh, later named Usman zanana Park, after Brigadier Usman – the hero of the battle of Jhanger became an important site where she along with other volunteers got training in exercise, parade, and use of firearms including shooting with 303 rifles, sten guns, Bren guns, and pistols.

Kanta Wazir was active in a plethora of volunteer works ranging from military training to social work and cultural activity. Through the platform of the women’s militia, she gained a profile, confidence, and purpose which broadened her opportunities and helped in shaping her logical and pragmatic approach to life. She became a popular name in the first battalion of women militia named as Mukta battalion. Known for her sharpshooting, she displayed her marksmanship in several firing competitions. Her expertise in the skill of shots would entitle her to three packets of salt, a rare commodity in Srinagar in 1947 because of the economic blockade caused by Pakistan which led to the suspension of the supply of essential commodities in Jammu and Kashmir.

She played a substantive role that helped in building up the community spirit. After receiving a short training in first aid, Kanta Wazir along with militia women, to name a few, Krishna Misri, Girja Dhar, and Jai Kishori started delivering basic humanitarian services to the dislocated individuals and families who thronged to seek shelter in Srinagar city from the nearby areas ravaged by the raiders. Further, these militia women would go in batches of five to seven to offer support and look after the beaten, raped, and molested women arriving in Government hospitals. Additionally, to boost the morale of ailing and injured soldiers, she along with other volunteers also visited the military hospitals and spent time looking after them.

Although the women militia never fought on the frontiers, it remains a standalone event in Kashmir history in which women from every community and class equipped themselves with arms to counter the dreaded and uncouth tribesmen. With time, the forgotten women militia became synonymous with Kanta Wazir who set into motion a transformative process of women’s emancipation and empowerment in Kashmir. Later, in the 1990s, during the insurgency in Kashmir, she along with her family shifted to New Delhi.

• Kashmiri fight for freedom (1988-2001)

• Era of Confusion: 1988-2001

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Since the emergence of Pakistan, Kashmir has been the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Kashmir’s’ have been in continuous struggle for independence from India Since 1947 but as they started using arms in their liberation struggle, a new phase of history began. It was the disputed 1987s elections when some elements from the state assembly formed militant wings, this thing acted as a catalyst for the emergence of armed insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir that caused thousands of lives. The widespread violence, abuse of human rights added fuel to fire besides this there are some other reasons like religion political rights mujahedeen influence and role of Pakistan that led Kashmir’s towards armed aggression to get rid of Indian influence.

If we look into background we came to know that differences emerge from partition and violence created problems one of them was settling of boundaries and accession of the states. Kashmir emerged as the bone of caused four military clashes between Pakistan and India. The widespread violence and abuses of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir became the most important reasons behind the liberation struggle. It is estimated that the number of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir is close to 6 lacks which have engaged in violence and abuses of human rights. These troops operated under such power that allow them to curtail civil liberties kunan poshpora incident which occurred in 1991 is a biggest example of violence of human rights.

Jammu and Kashmir is a Muslim majority area perhaps the only Muslims majority state under Hindu majority India. In spite of these India has always gave preference Hindus over Muslims. This preference enhanced the feeling of deprivation and ultimately led towards the using arms in the way of liberation struggle.

The invasion of Afghanistan by USSR gave boom to insurgency. The policy of islamisation by Zia ul haq helped in spreading of theoretical Islamic ideology in Jammu and Kashmir. The mujahedeen fighters, lashkar e taiba, jash Muhammad and harkat ul mujahedeen were amongst the major splinter groups. All of them have different aims in Kashmir some wanted complete independence from Pakistan and India and others wanted unification with Pakistan.

If we look it in Pakistan’s foreign policy perspective Pakistan had always supported the cause of Kashmir’s through armed manpower and insurgency. Pakistan not only used international forum as diplomatic tool but also helped mujahedeen and various other splinter groups but after 9 11 Pakistan’s foreign policy was changed. And government stopped helping the Kashmir’s in their freedom struggle as it was doing in the history.  Since partition the Kashmir’s had been fighting for independence but after the Russian attack the violence and human rights abuses increase. Various political parties and military wings were developed which played major role in Kashmir freedom movement.

Unveiling Purpose and Agency in Kashmiri Women’s Participation in Militancy

• October 31, 2023
• Asia Pacific , Security & Conflict

The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan traces its origins back to the partition of British India in 1947, marking the beginning of a longstanding dispute that continues to ignite violence and unrest in the region.¹ However, a pivotal turning point emerged in the late 1980s when Kashmir experienced a notable surge in militancy.² Despite numerous efforts to foster peace, including negotiations and ceasefires, finding a lasting resolution has remained an elusive goal.³ One crucial element that has been overlooked throughout these peace-building endeavors is the active participation of women in militancy.⁴ The substantial presence of women in supporting and auxiliary roles within the militant movement has largely gone unnoticed by those striving for peace. The contributions of these women have been undervalued due to prevailing gender stereotypes that deny their agency and decision-making in supporting militancy. Overlooking their agency in militancy has directly translated to overlooking their agency in peacebuilding.

For example, in discussions about Kashmiri women involved in militancy, there is a tendency to overlook their active roles and reduce them to fulfilling maternal duties.⁵ , ⁶ This limited perspective fails to acknowledge the complexity of their engagement. Swati Parashar, a renowned scholar specializing in gender and militancy in South Asia, sheds light on this issue by examining a slogan from the 1990s: “ ay mard-e-mujahid jaag zara, ab waqt-e-shahadat aaya hai  (O holy warriors rise and awake. The time for your martyrdom has come).”⁷ The slogan calls upon holy warriors to embrace martyrdom, while women, assuming various roles, implore men to fight for the cause.⁸ Parashar’s analysis reveals a prevailing narrative that portrays women primarily as sacrificing mothers and their sons as heroic figures, disregarding the fact that not all women involved in the movement have male relatives affiliated with militant groups. By restricting their participation to maternal roles, these representations overlook the diverse experiences and agency of women in the region. To truly comprehend their contributions and challenges within the conflict, it is imperative to challenge and expand beyond traditional gender roles and narratives. By doing so, we can gain a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted dimensions of their involvement.

Some sources also explore how the absence of organized women’s groups advocating for gender justice and equality in Kashmir has had significant consequences, giving rise to militant-led women’s groups like the Dakhturan-e-Millat (DeM).⁹ These groups hold considerable influence over women’s support and involvement in militant organizations. In her analysis, Manisha Sobhrajani, a journalist based in Kashmir, sheds light on how fundamentalist women’s groups entice Kashmiri women into militant organizations by providing them with community and livelihood resources.¹⁰ Building upon this perspective, Urba Malik, a scholar specializing in gender and identity in the Kashmir conflict, highlights the struggles faced by half-widows, the estranged wives of missing or deceased militant fighters, in her article, “Democracy, Gender, and Armed Conflict: Exploring Women’s Narratives of Resistance in Contemporary Kashmir.”¹¹ Half-widows face numerous challenges, such as the denial of compensation and abandonment by their in-laws and families, compelling many who search for their missing husbands to turn to the DeM for solace and support.¹² As a result of this reliance, they become indebted to the group, eventually becoming involved with the Mujaheddin.¹³ This intricate web of circumstances illustrates the complex dynamics that drive women’s participation in militant activities in Kashmir, revealing the urgent need for organized women’s groups to work towards gender justice and equality to counterbalance the influence of such militant-led organizations. At the same time, it propagates a narrative of women as victims trapped into militancy for survival– portraying their association with militancy as one driven by haplessness rather than conscious ideological reasons.

Similarly, the depiction of Kashmiri women by the Indian security forces often paints a distorted picture, presenting them as passive victims coerced into hiding or supporting militants.¹⁴ According to this portrayal, these women lack agency in their decision-making and hold no ideological sympathy for the militants.¹⁵ Their actions are simply attributed to fear of retribution or violence.¹⁶ This one-dimensional narrative is widely propagated by media outlets, including the internet, TV, and newspapers, which frequently depict these women as being duped into their involvement.¹⁷ This representation was further amplified in the 2000 Bollywood film  Mission Kashmir , where a Kashmiri girl is manipulated by her childhood friend, a militant seeking revenge.¹⁸ Eventually, she cooperates with the police to expose his intentions. This cinematic portrayal reinforces the prevailing image of the Kashmiri woman caught in the crossfire between conflicting ideologies and victimized by the forces surrounding her. However, by reducing their involvement to indirect, involuntary, and circumstantial roles, these representations fail to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of women as conscious political actors. They overlook the complexity of women’s motivations and the diverse range of reasons that lead them to participate in militancy, thus offering an incomplete and limited perspective.

Therefore, this essay aims to bridge the understanding gap regarding women’s participation in militancy in Kashmir by asserting that their involvement is a means of social and political empowerment. It begins by highlighting the marginalization of women in social and political spheres within Kashmir. The essay then explores their auxiliary roles within militancy, arguing that these roles serve as a pathway to empowerment. However, the essay also recognizes the limitations of empowerment within the context of militancy. As a result, it indicates the potential for the government to capitalize on these limitations by establishing alternative avenues that foster female empowerment through non-violent means. By addressing this gap in understanding, the essay contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of women’s portrayal and participation in militancy and offers pathways for empowering women in Kashmir.

Marginalized Voices: Women’s Struggles within Kashmiri Society

In Kashmiri society, women experience marginalization across various aspects of their lives, particularly concerning the gendered consequences of security forces’ misconduct. One significant event that exemplifies this is the Kunan Poshpora incident of 1991, where Indian security forces subjected women in the village to mass sexual assault.¹⁹ Extensive documentation, including survivor testimonies²⁰ and investigations by human rights organizations, underscores the targeted and gendered nature of the violence, revealing the systematic subjugation of women.²¹ More notably though, it is the aftermath of the Kunan Poshpora incident that sheds light on the gendered treatment of women and their subsequent marginalization within society. Apart from the immediate consequences of the violence, the women in the village faced societal backlash and stigma²² as their honor and reputations were called into question due to the assaults they endured.²³ This is exemplified by the experiences of Shakeela Dar, a rape victim who struggled to find a suitable husband for her daughter.²⁴ In interviews with Urba Malik, she recounts how prospective in-laws deliberately provoked, insulted, and mistreated her daughter based on her status as the child of a rape victim.²⁵ These social responses reflect deeply ingrained patriarchal norms that place the burden of responsibility on women, reinforcing gender inequalities and perpetuating their marginalization. The women of Kunan Poshpora continue to suffer from the stigma associated with being from a village where such violence occurred.²⁶ They face immense challenges in their daily lives while concealing their pain and trauma, leading to tragic cases of suicide.²⁷ While it is essential to recognize the experiences of men who may have also suffered mistreatment and human rights abuses in the Kunan Poshpora incident and other instances of security forces’ misconduct, the lived experience of the female survivors of the Kunan Poshpora incident highlights a targeted and gendered impact on women and not men.²⁸ This underscores the unique nature of female marginalization within the context of these incidents.

The subjugation of women in Kashmir is also exemplified by the marginalization faced by half-widows—women whose husbands have gone missing during the ongoing conflict, leaving them in a state of ambiguity regarding their marital status—in Kashmiri society.²⁹ One form of marginalization experienced by half-widows is social stigmatization and isolation within their communities.³⁰ They are often labeled as “unfortunate” or “cursed,” leading to their ostracism.³¹ Within their own families, they are denied inheritance rights and excluded from decision-making processes.³² The experiences of Atiqa and Tahira, two half-widows who were unjustly denied their rightful share in the family property, highlight this exclusion.³³ Despite the existence of inheritance laws that entitle women to a portion of the family estate, male relatives took advantage of their vulnerable position to exploit them and claim the property for themselves.³⁴ This denial perpetuates economic instability and exposes the deeply ingrained gender biases prevalent in Kashmiri society, reinforcing the marginalization of half-widows.

On a more political front, the denial of government assistance based on the alleged associations of their disappeared husbands with terrorism adds another layer to the marginalization faced by half-widows.³⁵ Khalida’s story serves as a vivid example of this struggle.³⁶ After her militant husband disappeared, Khalida faced numerous unsuccessful attempts to secure job opportunities.³⁷ In desperation, she turned to the government’s Special Recruitment Order (SRO) program, which promised job opportunities to all Kashmiri citizens.³⁸ However, Khalida was denied a job through this program.³⁹ When she sought support from her local political representative, Minister Ali Sagar, hoping for assistance with the SRO, she was met with disdain and derogatory comments regarding her husband’s alleged involvement with a militant group.⁴⁰ By denying government assistance to half-widows based on the actions of their disappeared husbands, the authorities contribute to their continued marginalization. This perpetuates a cycle of discrimination that hinders their ability to rebuild their lives and maintain their dignity, further emphasizing the marginalization faced by half-widows in Kashmiri society.

Moreover, the Indian government’s recent revocation of Article 370 in Kashmir, integrating a previously more independent Kashmir more directly under the central government, has further marginalized women in the region.⁴¹ This is reflected in the remarks of politicians who suggested that Indian men could now easily find Kashmiri brides, reducing women to mere objects of desire and reinforcing harmful stereotypes.⁴² Such misogyny did not confine itself to offline spaces but spread virulently across various social media platforms.⁴³ Disturbingly, the removal of Article 370 coincided with a surge in online searches for phrases like “How to marry a Kashmiri woman” on search engines like Google,⁴⁴ further emphasizing the dehumanization of Kashmiri women and reducing them to mere commodities. These demeaning attitudes and the widespread objectification of Kashmiri women highlight the deep-rooted marginalization they face, perpetuating a culture of inequality.

From Grievances to Empowerment: Unraveling the Gendered Dimensions of Female Militancy in Kashmir

When delving into the gendered dimensions of female grievances in Kashmir, it is crucial to examine how these specific concerns influence women’s decisions to join the ranks of militancy. As women assume supportive roles within these movements, their motivation to participate may stem from a desire for increased social standing and empowerment. Within the context of militancy, women contribute by providing vital assistance such as provisions, shelter, secure routes, and medical aid to militants.⁴⁵ Additionally, female wings within militant groups aid the families of combatants, file petitions to search for missing militants, and recruit politically active women from educational institutions.⁴⁶ By assuming these roles, women have gained public trust and credibility within society, a stark departure from their previous confinement to the domestic sphere as homemakers. This transformation is exemplified by Asiya Andrabi, a member of the Mujahideen’s (militant organization) women’s wing, who recounts how senior militants regularly sought her input to mobilize auxiliary support from women before implementing major combat strategies.⁴⁷ Furthermore, Andrabi often found herself approached by widows of the Mujahideen seeking socio-economic assistance.⁴⁸ Through their interactions with both men and women in their communities, women’s engagement in militancy enables them to become trusted figures,⁴⁹ elevating their social status and granting them positions of authority.

Therefore, in exploring the gendered aspects of female grievances in Kashmir and their impact on women’s decisions to participate in militancy, it is possible that women might engage in these movements to seek higher social status. However, it is important to consider alternative perspectives that suggest women primarily take up auxiliary roles due to the predominance of men in direct combat. But even if this were the case, the organized and sustained nature of female participation across Kashmir indicates a broader ambition and a desire for social transformation among women. This can be seen in the long-standing presence of women’s wings in militant organizations such as the Muslim Khawateen Markaz (MKM) and DeM, which have gathered a membership of over 500 women throughout Kashmir over a span of 35 years.⁵⁰ While ideological motivations, familial pressures, and coercion by militants are significant factors for women’s involvement in militancy in Kashmir, it is crucial to integrate a gendered perspective without disregarding other motivating factors. Thus, rather than invalidating any specific motivations, the aim is to add a new dimension that acknowledges the gendered aspects within the broader discussion.

In addition to seeking higher social status, women in Kashmir may participate in militancy as a means to attain political agency and empowerment within a society deeply rooted in patriarchal norms and traditional gender roles. From a political perspective, their contributions to the movement encompass acting as human shields and guards, utilizing burqas to smuggle arms and militants, and providing support during raids.⁵¹ By fulfilling these supportive roles to men engaged in direct combat, they establish themselves as political agents actively contributing to the cause of militancy. This status as political agents is particularly significant in a patriarchal society like Kashmir, where cultural and religious traditions confine women to caregiving roles and limit their involvement in political activities.⁵² Furthermore, women often assist militants by engaging in attacks on security forces and facilitating the escape of militants.⁵³ Employing tactics such as stone pelting, organizing protests, and participating in civil disobedience, female participants are depicted as agents entrusted with the protection of their male counterparts, diverging from the stereotypical portrayal of women as passive figures in need of rescue.⁵⁴ Notably, news reports often highlight the roles of female participants in militancy, providing them with publicity, holding them accountable for their actions, and acknowledging their roles as conscious political agents.⁵⁵ , ⁵⁶ Therefore, women may willingly choose to support militancy and actively assume the status of political agents. This desire is explicitly expressed by a Kashmiri college teacher who describes her decision to act as a human shield for militants as a conscious choice to embrace a “public role.”⁵⁷

Here, it is crucial to understand why women might perceive militancy as the most viable path to attain political agency and empowerment. In the context of Kashmir, militancy emerges as a significant avenue for Kashmiri women to assert their political agency and pursue empowerment precisely because mainstream channels offer limited opportunities for political representation and growth.⁵⁸ With minimal gender-based political reservations in state assemblies or similar councils, except for the  panchayat  (village council), women find in militancy a pathway to exercise their agency, advance in ranks, and even provide strategic counsel to senior militants.⁵⁹ Female militant groups actively promote increased participation and empowerment for women, with women assuming leadership roles within their respective wings.⁶⁰ Anjum Zamarud Habib, leader of the MKM, contends that women’s participation in militancy enables them to “take forward the  jazba  (zeal) for  azaadi  (freedom).”⁶¹ The use of the term “take” implies active movement and underscores women’s agency in making decisions. This perspective underscores how women proactively shape their roles as political agents in militant organizations. This also becomes particularly attractive in societies like Kashmir, where women are often denied political agency. In contrast, the promises offered by the government may appear less appealing, further strengthening the appeal of militancy as a channel for political empowerment for women in Kashmir.

Unveiling the Constraints: Women’s Limited Agency in Kashmir’s Militant Groups

While it may initially appear that militant groups in Kashmir offer women opportunities for empowerment and increased agency, it is crucial to recognize that these organizations also impose limitations on the expression of such agency. Despite aspiring to be active political participants and protesting against oppressive regimes, women often find themselves confined by militant groups to auxiliary roles or limited indirect combat roles.⁶² Mothers and wives shoulder the societal responsibilities of their male family members and may assist them as human shields during military confrontations.⁶³ When assigned the role of suicide bomber, women are treated as mere instruments, outfitted with explosives and directed by male militants to detonate themselves.⁶⁴ These prescribed roles , strip women of agency and reduce their identity and political involvement to serving as tools controlled by men. Even in more direct combat roles, women are relegated to using their bodies as shields without being recognized as conscious political agents capable of making independent decisions, including the selection and targeting of adversaries. This paucity of female physical autonomy underscores the hesitancy of militant organizations to acknowledge women as conscious political actors capable of making informed military choices on the ground.

Furthermore, it is notable that militant organizations are gradually veering away from involving women in combat-centric roles.⁶⁵ This shift is evident in the diminishing number of female bombers since the early 2000s, as highlighted by Swati Parashar, a political scientist specializing in female insurgency in South Asia.⁶⁶ Parashar’s observation becomes intriguing when juxtaposed with the views expressed by Asiya Andrabi, a prominent female militant. Andrabi argues that it is “against the dignity of a Muslim woman that the parts of her body be strewn in a public place. If a combatant or a suicide bomber is a woman, her dead body is bound to fall or be scattered in a place full of men.”⁶⁷ In reducing a woman solely to her physical body, Andrabi undermines the broader capabilities and roles that women can fulfill. Moreover, her claim that it would be disastrous to have a woman’s body in the presence of men implies a sense of shame associated with women, a characteristic that she does not extend to men. This notion of shame creates a gendered distinction, portraying women as shameful and unsuitable to die publicly while disregarding any mention of men or their supposed shame in witnessing the death of a woman. Andrabi’s statement, given her influential position in the Mujahideen’s female wing, exposes the subordinate depiction of women within militant organizations. It also suggests that despite their relatively higher level of empowerment within these organizations, women still lack the means to achieve true equality with men.

Recent intelligence reports suggest that women might participate in militant training camps, such as those operated by militant organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba.⁶⁸ These camps are said to provide rigorous training in guerrilla warfare.⁶⁹ However, it is important to critically examine the purpose of such training and consider the recipients’ credentials. In many cases, most women involved in these camps are wives or relatives of high-profile militants, and their training duration is significantly shorter than that of men.⁷⁰ Lasting only 21 days, this limited and basic combat-focused training could be seen as serving primarily self-defense purposes.⁷¹ These circumstances raise important questions about the denial of female agency in actively using weapons for offensive actions. The justification of self-defense for the wives of prominent militants raises two significant points. Firstly, it suggests that women are often perceived as inherently passive, resorting to violence solely for personal safety rather than as a means to advance broader ideologies. Secondly, it implies that only women connected to higher-status men are considered capable of employing violence, thus linking a woman’s position to her relationship with a man. These instances demonstrate the constrained agency granted to women, which is also evident in cases of suicide bombing. Women are denied their status as independent military actors and are confined to tightly controlled auxiliary roles. Therefore, while militancy in Kashmir may offer women an opportunity to assert agency through alternative forms of resistance against patriarchal norms, it ultimately subverts these norms in a limited manner.

The struggles faced by women in Kashmir are deeply rooted in societal constraints and marginalization, which demand immediate attention and empowerment. While some women have found avenues for social and political agency through their participation in militancy, it is crucial to acknowledge the limitations imposed within these organizations that restrict their autonomy and perpetuate gender inequality. To address these complex gender dynamics and pursue empowerment, alternative non-violent approaches must be embraced.

For women in Kashmir to truly experience empowerment and for peace to prevail, it is imperative for the government to recognize and address the limitations imposed by militant organizations. Rather than resorting to violence, women should be encouraged to pursue non-violent means to achieve empowerment. The Indian government can draw inspiration from successful examples like Rwanda and Armenia, implementing their effective strategies. First and foremost, creating an environment that values women’s voices and involves them in policymaking is crucial. This can be achieved by implementing a quota system similar to Rwanda’s, which has successfully increased female representation in decision-making bodies.⁷² By actively shaping policies and representing diverse interests, women can contribute to gender equality and empowerment in politics.

Secondly, the government should invest in training programs that enhance women’s leadership skills, following Armenia’s successful example.⁷³ By providing opportunities for leadership development, women can become effective agents of change within their communities, leading to greater participation in decision-making processes. One way of doing so is by enhancing women’s access to economic opportunities. In post-genocide Rwanda, the government prioritized economic initiatives for women, such as establishing cooperatives and microfinance programs.⁷⁴ The government of Kashmir can also support initiatives that provide women with entrepreneurship training, access to credit, and opportunities to participate in the formal economy.

True empowerment lies in valuing women’s voices, experiences, and aspirations, providing them with equal opportunities, education, and the freedom to make choices for themselves. Government plays a crucial role in shaping a society that celebrates women for their strength, intellect, and individuality. By challenging prevailing stereotypes and misconceptions, the government can foster an environment where women are seen as agents of change rather than passive participants. The journey towards empowering women in Kashmir is undoubtedly complex, but it must be undertaken to ensure a just and equitable society. By recognizing the latent potential of women, valuing their contributions, and creating an environment that supports their aspirations, a path can be paved for a more inclusive and peaceful Kashmir. It is only through such efforts that the struggles faced by women can be overcome and a society that embraces gender equality and empowers all its members can be achieved.

¹ Outlook Web Desk, “The History of Kashmir Conflict and Its Various Phases,” https://www.outlookindia.com/, April 3, 2022, https://www.outlookindia.com/national/the-history-of-kashmir-conflict-news-189840.

⁴ Tehmeena Rizvi, “Kashmiri Women for a Shared Future,” Policy Perspectives Foundation, November 2, 2020, https://ppf.org.in/opinion/kashmiri-women-for-a-shared-future.

⁵ Swati Parashar, “Gender,  Jihad , and Jingoism: Women as Perpetrators, Planners, and Patrons of Militancy in Kashmir,”  Studies in Conflict & Terrorism  34, no. 4 (March 16, 2011): 309, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2011.551719.

⁶ Rita Manchanda, “Guns and Burqa: Women in the Kashmiri Conflict,” in  Women, War and Peace in South Asia: Beyond Victimhood to Agency , ed. Rita Manchanda (New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 2001), 53.

⁷ Parashar, “Gender,  Jihad , and Jingoism,” 309

⁹ Sobhrajani, “Women’s Role in the Post-1989 Insurgency,” 79.

¹¹ Malik, “Democracy, Gender and Armed Conflict,” 79

¹² Malik, “Democracy, Gender and Armed Conflict,” 719

¹³ Malik, “Democracy, Gender and Armed Conflict,” 723.

¹⁴ Hafsa Kanjwal, “Women in Kashmir,”  South Asia Graduate Research Journal  20 (season-03 2011): 59.

¹⁸ “Mission Kashmir,” Indian Cinema – the University of Iowa, accessed October 30, 2023, https://indiancinema.sites.uiowa.edu/mission-kashmir.

¹⁹ Urba Malik, “Democracy, Gender and Armed Conflict: Exploring Kashmir,”  AGU International Journal of Research in Social Sciences & Humanities  6, no. 1 (2018): 717.

²¹ Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, “Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War,”  Human Rights Watch  (HRW India, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/INDIA935.PDF.

²² Malik, “Democracy, Gender and Armed Conflict,” 717.

²⁹ Aliya Bashir, “Kashmir’s Half-Widows Shoulder the Burden of a Double Tragedy,”  The Guardian , October 11, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2010/oct/11/1.

³⁰ Malik, “Democracy, Gender and Armed Conflict,” 721.

³¹ Sunayana Kachroo and Danish Renzu, “The Half Widows in Kashmir,” Medium, August 31, 2018, https://medium.com/the-wvoice/the-half-widows-in-kashmir-fef80c6b88e9.

³² Safina Nabi Grantee, “How Kashmir’s Half-Widows Are Denied Their Basic Property Rights,” Pulitzer Center, January 26, 2022, https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/how-kashmirs-half-widows-are-denied-their-basic-property-rights.

³⁵ Malik, “Democracy, Gender and Armed Conflict,” 721.

⁴¹ Devina Neogi, “Women’s Struggles in the Kashmir Militancy War,”  Journal of International Women’s Studies , 7, 23, no. 6 (May 2022): 7.

⁴⁵ Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 66.

⁴⁷ Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 65.

⁴⁸ Malik, “Democracy, Gender and Armed Conflict,” 723.

⁴⁹ Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 67.

⁵⁰ Parashar, “Gender, Jihad, and Jingoism,” 304.

⁵¹ Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 66.

⁵² Nusrat Ali, “Women in Kashmir: Caught between Patriarchy and Conflict,”  Kashmir Reader , January 15, 2021, https://kashmirreader.com/2021/01/16/women-in-kashmir-caught-between-patriarchy-and-conflict/#:~:text=Kashmiri%20society%2C%20like%20other%20societies,treated%20as%20inferior%20to%20men.

⁵³ Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 66.

⁵⁴ Neogi, “Women’s Struggles in the Kashmir Militancy War,”1.

⁵⁵ Aaliya Anjum, “The Militant in Her: Women and Resistance,”  Al Jazeera , August 2, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/8/2/the-militant-in-her-women-and-resistance.

⁵⁶ Masrat Zahra and Peerzada Sheikh Muzamil, “In Photos: How Women’s Roles Are Changing in Kashmir’s Conflict,”  The New Humanitarian , April 1, 2021, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/photo-feature/2020/07/14/Kashmir-military-conflict-violence-women.

⁵⁷ Seema Kazi, “Between Democracy and Nation: Gender and Militarisation in Kashmir” (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2007), 48.

⁵⁸ Condoleezza Rice, conversation with author, Stanford, May 12, 2023.

⁵⁹ Iqbal, “Through Their Eyes,” 167.

⁶⁰ Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 66.

⁶¹ Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 67.

⁶² Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 64.

⁶³ Husain, “The Other Face of Azadi,” 66.

⁶⁴ Swati Parashar, “Feminist International Relations and Women Militants: Case Studies from Sri Lanka and Kashmir,”  Cambridge Review of International Affairs  22, no. 2 (July 1, 2009): 235–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570902877968, 248.

⁶⁷ Manisha Sobhrajani, “Jammu and Kashmir: Women’s Role in the Post-1989 Insurgency,”  Faultlines  19, no. 1 (April 2008): 71.

⁶⁸ Pradeep Thakur, “Let Training Women Militants,”  The Times of India , April 6, 2006, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/let-training-women-militants/articleshow/1862696.cms.

⁷⁰ Manchanda, “Guns and Burqa,” 78.

⁷¹ Thakur, “Let Training Women Militants.”

⁷² UN Women, “Revisiting Rwanda Five Years after Record-Breaking Parliamentary Elections,” UN Women, 2019, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/8/feature-rwanda-women-in-parliament.

⁷³ “Women in Politics | United Nations Development Programme,” UNDP, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.undp.org/armenia/projects/women-politics.

Khushmita Dhabhai

Khushmita Dhabhai is an undergraduate at Stanford University. Her areas of interest include studying conflict resolution, peacebuilding, statecraft, political philosophy, constitutional law, and the role of ethics in international affairs. Her regional focus is in the Asia-Pacific.

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Essay on Kashmir: History and Beauty in 600+ Words

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• Jan 20, 2024

Essay on Kashmir for Students: Kashmir is a region situated between India and Pakistan in South Asia. It is believed that the name Kashmir originated from the word ‘Ka’ which means water, and ‘shimera’ to desiccate. 

The story of Kashmir is complex and has historical, cultural, and political dimensions. Over the years, many rulers and empires, like the Mauryas , Kushans , and Mughals have influenced the paradise of the Earth. The region especially had the special influence of Mauryan ruler Ashoka who contributed to the cultural as well as the architectural heritage of the region.

Cultural Diversity of Kashmir

Kashmir is a region that has a rich history and ancient roots. The place has witnessed the rise and fall of many dynasties, such as the Mauryas , Kushnas , and Guptas . On top of that, these dynasties contributed to the cultural and geographic location of Kashmir, which includes the influence of the Silk Road and the blend of Hindu, Buddhist, and later Islamic influences.

Kashmir Issue

The dispute related to the sharing of borders didn’t stop after Independence. Whether it was India, Pakistan, or China, tensions related to the disputes of the region always created a heat of fire between the countries that led to wars. The list of some important wars are as follows:

1. First Indo-Pak War (1947-1948) : Fought for Jammu Kashmir shortly after India’s independence.

2. Sino-Indian War (1962): A conflict between India and China for the territorial region Aksai Chin. 

3. The War of (1965): Fought mainly over Kashmir.

4. Kargil War (1999): A conflict between India and Pakistan in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir.

Article 370 Scrapped

Geographically, Kashmir lies in the northwestern region of the Indian continent. Its total area is around 225,000 square kilometers, which is comparatively larger than the member countries of the United States. 

Out of the total area, 85,800 square kilometers have been subject to dispute between India and Pakistan since 1947. It is important to note that the areas with conflict consist of major portions called the Northern, Southern, and Southeastern portions. The 30 percent of the northern part comprises Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan and is administered by Pakistan.

India controls the portion which is more than 55 percent of the area of the land. The area consists of Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh, Kashmir Valley, and Siachen Glacier which is located in the southern and southeastern portions of India. The area is divided by a line of control and has been under conflict since 1972. 

Also Read: Speech on Article 370

Sadly, the people living near the International Border and the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir pose not only a life threat but also do not have a stable life. Replacement and relocation affect the people living in the line of control not affect the people physically but also psychologically and socially aspects. In a survey conducted by the National Library of Medicine 94 percent of the participants recognize stress. Furthermore, the youth population was facing stress and anxiety regularly.  

However, a historic decision from the Supreme Court of India that nullified Articles 370 and 35A and permitted the state to have its constitution, flag, and government except in defense, foreign affairs, and communications decisions. After the decision, many initiatives were taken by the government of India to strengthen the democratic rule of the state. Schools, colleges, and universities were opened regularly in the union territories to develop the youth academically, socially, and as well as physically. 

Furthermore, strict measures to control criminal assaults such as stone pelting have started showing positive impacts on the continuance use of technologies such as mobile networks, and internet activities. Further, the discontinuity of Technology has started showing positive impacts on the lifestyle of people. Regular opening of schools, colleges, and universities, on the one hand, is helping the students to have good career prospects. 

Additionally, the fear-free environment that further increases tourist activities will further improve the local economy and contribute to the local as well as the national economy of the country. 

Also Read: Essay on Indian Independence Day

Kashmir is also called the Paradise on Earth. The region is blessed with natural beauty, including snow-capped mountains and green and beautiful valleys. The region is surrounded by two countries, which are Pakistan and China.

Kashmir is famous for Dal Lake, Pashmina Shawls, beautiful Mughal gardens and pilgrimage sites of Amarnath and Vaishno Devi. 

According to a traditional story, Ka means water and shimira means Desiccate. 

Kashmir is known as the ‘Paradise on Earth.’

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