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Freedom of Speech

[ Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jeffrey W. Howard replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author. ]

Human beings have significant interests in communicating what they think to others, and in listening to what others have to say. These interests make it difficult to justify coercive restrictions on people’s communications, plausibly grounding a moral right to speak (and listen) to others that is properly protected by law. That there ought to be such legal protections for speech is uncontroversial among political and legal philosophers. But disagreement arises when we turn to the details. What are the interests or values that justify this presumption against restricting speech? And what, if anything, counts as an adequate justification for overcoming the presumption? This entry is chiefly concerned with exploring the philosophical literature on these questions.

The entry begins by distinguishing different ideas to which the term “freedom of speech” can refer. It then reviews the variety of concerns taken to justify freedom of speech. Next, the entry considers the proper limits of freedom of speech, cataloging different views on when and why restrictions on communication can be morally justified, and what considerations are relevant when evaluating restrictions. Finally, it considers the role of speech intermediaries in a philosophical analysis of freedom of speech, with special attention to internet platforms.

1. What is Freedom of Speech?

2.1 listener theories, 2.2 speaker theories, 2.3 democracy theories, 2.4 thinker theories, 2.5 toleration theories, 2.6 instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes, 2.7 free speech skepticism, 3.1 absoluteness, coverage, and protection, 3.2 the limits of free speech: external constraints, 3.3 the limits of free speech: internal constraints, 3.4 proportionality: chilling effects and political abuse, 3.5 necessity: the counter-speech alternative, 4. the future of free speech theory: platform ethics, other internet resources, related entries.

In the philosophical literature, the terms “freedom of speech”, “free speech”, “freedom of expression”, and “freedom of communication” are mostly used equivalently. This entry will follow that convention, notwithstanding the fact that these formulations evoke subtly different phenomena. For example, it is widely understood that artistic expressions, such as dancing and painting, fall within the ambit of this freedom, even though they don’t straightforwardly seem to qualify as speech , which intuitively connotes some kind of linguistic utterance (see Tushnet, Chen, & Blocher 2017 for discussion). Still, they plainly qualify as communicative activity, conveying some kind of message, however vague or open to interpretation it may be.

Yet the extension of “free speech” is not fruitfully specified through conceptual analysis alone. The quest to distinguish speech from conduct, for the purpose of excluding the latter from protection, is notoriously thorny (Fish 1994: 106), despite some notable attempts (such as Greenawalt 1989: 58ff). As John Hart Ely writes concerning Vietnam War protesters who incinerated their draft cards, such activity is “100% action and 100% expression” (1975: 1495). It is only once we understand why we should care about free speech in the first place—the values it instantiates or serves—that we can evaluate whether a law banning the burning of draft cards (or whatever else) violates free speech. It is the task of a normative conception of free speech to offer an account of the values at stake, which in turn can illuminate the kinds of activities wherein those values are realized, and the kinds of restrictions that manifest hostility to those values. For example, if free speech is justified by the value of respecting citizens’ prerogative to hear many points of view and to make up their own minds, then banning the burning of draft cards to limit the views to which citizens will be exposed is manifestly incompatible with that purpose. If, in contrast, such activity is banned as part of a generally applied ordinance restricting fires in public, it would likely raise no free-speech concerns. (For a recent analysis of this issue, see Kramer 2021: 25ff).

Accordingly, the next section discusses different conceptions of free speech that arise in the philosophical literature, each oriented to some underlying moral or political value. Before turning to the discussion of those conceptions, some further preliminary distinctions will be useful.

First, we can distinguish between the morality of free speech and the law of free speech. In political philosophy, one standard approach is to theorize free speech as a requirement of morality, tracing the implications of such a theory for law and policy. Note that while this is the order of justification, it need not be the order of investigation; it is perfectly sensible to begin by studying an existing legal protection for speech (such as the First Amendment in the U.S.) and then asking what could justify such a protection (or something like it).

But of course morality and law can diverge. The most obvious way they can diverge is when the law is unjust. Existing legal protections for speech, embodied in the positive law of particular jurisdictions, may be misguided in various ways. In other words, a justified legal right to free speech, and the actual legal right to free speech in the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, can come apart. In some cases, positive legal rights might protect too little speech. For example, some jurisdictions’ speech laws make exceptions for blasphemy, such that criminalizing blasphemy does not breach the legal right to free speech within that legal system. But clearly one could argue that a justified legal right to free speech would not include any such exception. In other cases, positive legal rights might perhaps protect too much speech. Consider the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional precedent, the First Amendment broadly protects speech that expresses or incites racial or religious hatred. Plainly we could agree that this is so as a matter of positive law while disagreeing about whether it ought to be so. (This is most straightforwardly true if we are legal positivists. These distinctions are muddied by moralistic theories of constitutional interpretation, which enjoin us to interpret positive legal rights in a constitutional text partly through the prism of our favorite normative political theory; see Dworkin 1996.)

Second, we can distinguish rights-based theories of free speech from non-rights-based theories. For many liberals, the legal right to free speech is justified by appealing to an underlying moral right to free speech, understood as a natural right held by all persons. (Some use the term human right equivalently—e.g., Alexander 2005—though the appropriate usage of that term is contested.) The operative notion of a moral right here is that of a claim-right (to invoke the influential analysis of Hohfeld 1917); it thereby correlates to moral duties held by others (paradigmatically, the state) to respect or protect the right. Such a right is natural in that it exerts normative force independently of whether anyone thinks it does, and regardless of whether it is codified into the law. A tyrannical state that imprisons dissidents acts unjustly, violating moral rights, even if there is no legal right to freedom of expression in its legal system.

For others, the underlying moral justification for free speech law need not come in the form of a natural moral right. For example, consequentialists might favor a legal right to free speech (on, e.g., welfare-maximizing grounds) without thinking that it tracks any underlying natural right. Or consider democratic theorists who have defended legal protections for free speech as central to democracy. Such theorists may think there is an underlying natural moral right to free speech, but they need not (especially if they hold an instrumental justification for democracy). Or consider deontologists who have argued that free speech functions as a kind of side-constraint on legitimate state action, requiring that the state always justify its decisions in a manner that respects citizens’ autonomy (Scanlon 1972). This theory does not cast free speech as a right, but rather as a principle that forbids the creation of laws that restrict speech on certain grounds. In the Hohfeldian analysis (Hohfeld 1917), such a principle may be understood as an immunity rather than a claim-right (Scanlon 2013: 402). Finally, some “minimalists” (to use a designation in Cohen 1993) favor legal protection for speech principally in response to government malice, corruption, and incompetence (see Schauer 1982; Epstein 1992; Leiter 2016). Such theorists need not recognize any fundamental moral right, either.

Third, among those who do ground free speech in a natural moral right, there is scope for disagreement about how tightly the law should mirror that right (as with any right; see Buchanan 2013). It is an open question what the precise legal codification of the moral right to free speech should involve. A justified legal right to freedom of speech may not mirror the precise contours of the natural moral right to freedom of speech. A raft of instrumental concerns enters the downstream analysis of what any justified legal right should look like; hence a defensible legal right to free speech may protect more speech (or indeed less speech) than the underlying moral right that justifies it. For example, even if the moral right to free speech does not protect so-called hate speech, such speech may still merit legal protection in the final analysis (say, because it would be too risky to entrust states with the power to limit those communications).

2. Justifying Free Speech

I will now examine several of the morally significant considerations taken to justify freedom of expression. Note that while many theorists have built whole conceptions of free speech out of a single interest or value alone, pluralism in this domain remains an option. It may well be that a plurality of interests serves to justify freedom of expression, properly understood (see, influentially, Emerson 1970 and Cohen 1993).

Suppose a state bans certain books on the grounds that it does not want us to hear the messages or arguments contained within them. Such censorship seems to involve some kind of insult or disrespect to citizens—treating us like children instead of adults who have a right to make up our own minds. This insight is fundamental in the free speech tradition. On this view, the state wrongs citizens by arrogating to itself the authority to decide what messages they ought to hear. That is so even if the state thinks that the speech will cause harm. As one author puts it,

the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. (Strauss 1991: 335)

Why are restrictions on persuasive speech objectionable? For some scholars, the relevant wrong here is a form of disrespect for citizens’ basic capacities (Dworkin 1996: 200; Nagel 2002: 44). For others, the wrong here inheres in a violation of the kind of relationship the state should have with its people: namely, that it should always act from a view of them as autonomous, and so entitled to make up their own minds (Scanlon 1972). It would simply be incompatible with a view of ourselves as autonomous—as authors of our own lives and choices—to grant the state the authority to pre-screen which opinions, arguments, and perspectives we should be allowed to think through, allowing us access only to those of which it approves.

This position is especially well-suited to justify some central doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it justifies the claim that freedom of expression especially implicates the purposes with which the state acts. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why the state might restrict speech (so-called “time, place, and manner” restrictions)—for example, noise curfews in residential neighborhoods, which do not raise serious free speech concerns. Yet when the state restricts speech with the purpose of manipulating the communicative environment and controlling the views to which citizens are exposed, free speech is directly affronted (Rubenfeld 2001; Alexander 2005; Kramer 2021). To be sure, purposes are not all that matter for free speech theory. For example, the chilling effects of otherwise justified speech regulations (discussed below) are seldom intended. But they undoubtedly matter.

Second, this view justifies the related doctrines of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality (see G. Stone 1983 and 1987) . Content neutrality is violated when the state bans discussion of certain topics (“no discussion of abortion”), whereas viewpoint neutrality is violated when the state bans advocacy of certain views (“no pro-choice views may be expressed”). Both affront free speech, though viewpoint-discrimination is especially egregious and so even harder to justify. While listener autonomy theories are not the only theories that can ground these commitments, they are in a strong position to account for their plausibility. Note that while these doctrines are central to the American approach to free speech, they are less central to other states’ jurisprudence (see A. Stone 2017).

Third, this approach helps us see that free speech is potentially implicated whenever the state seeks to control our thoughts and the processes through which we form beliefs. Consider an attempt to ban Marx’s Capital . As Marx is deceased, he is probably not wronged through such censorship. But even if one held idiosyncratic views about posthumous rights, such that Marx were wronged, it would be curious to think this was the central objection to such censorship. Those with the gravest complaint would be the living adults who have the prerogative to read the book and make up their own minds about it. Indeed free speech may even be implicated if the state banned watching sunsets or playing video games on the grounds that is disapproved of the thoughts to which such experiences might give rise (Alexander 2005: 8–9; Kramer 2021: 22).

These arguments emphasize the noninstrumental imperative of respecting listener autonomy. But there is an instrumental version of the view. Our autonomy interests are not merely respected by free speech; they are promoted by an environment in which we learn what others have to say. Our interests in access to information is served by exposure to a wide range of viewpoints about both empirical and normative issues (Cohen 1993: 229), which help us reflect on what goals to choose and how best to pursue them. These informational interests are monumental. As Raz suggests, if we had to choose whether to express our own views on some question, or listen to the rest of humanity’s views on that question, we would choose the latter; it is our interest as listeners in the public good of a vibrant public discourse that, he thinks, centrally justifies free speech (1991).

Such an interest in acquiring justified beliefs, or in accessing truth, can be defended as part of a fully consequentialist political philosophy. J.S. Mill famously defends free speech instrumentally, appealing to its epistemic benefits in On Liberty . Mill believes that, given our fallibility, we should routinely keep an open mind as to whether a seemingly false view may actually be true, or at least contain some valuable grain of truth. And even where a proposition is manifestly false, there is value in allowing its expression so that we can better apprehend why we take it to be false (1859: chapter 2), enabled through discursive conflict (cf. Simpson 2021). Mill’s argument focuses especially on the benefits to audiences:

It is is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. (1859: chapter 2, p. 94)

These views are sometimes associated with the idea of a “marketplace of ideas”, whereby the open clash of views inevitably leads to the correct ones winning out in debate. Few in the contemporary literature holds such a strong teleological thesis about the consequences of unrestricted debate (e.g., see Brietzke 1997; cf. Volokh 2011). Much evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology, as well as insights about epistemic injustice from feminist epistemology, strongly suggest that human beings’ rational powers are seriously limited. Smug confidence in the marketplace of ideas belies this. Yet it is doubtful that Mill held such a strong teleological thesis (Gordon 1997). Mill’s point was not that unrestricted discussion necessarily leads people to acquire the truth. Rather, it is simply the best mechanism available for ascertaining the truth, relative to alternatives in which some arbiter declares what he sees as true and suppresses what he sees as false (see also Leiter 2016).

Note that Mill’s views on free speech in chapter 2 in On Liberty are not simply the application of the general liberty principle defended in chapter 1 of that work; his view is not that speech is anodyne and therefore seldom runs afoul of the harm principle. The reason a separate argument is necessary in chapter 2 is precisely that he is carving out a partial qualification of the harm principle for speech (on this issue see Jacobson 2000, Schauer 2011b, and Turner 2014). On Mill’s view, plenty of harmful speech should still be allowed. Imminently dangerous speech, where there is no time for discussion before harm eventuates, may be restricted; but where there is time for discussion, it must be allowed. Hence Mill’s famous example that vociferous criticism of corn dealers as

starvers of the poor…ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer. (1859: chapter 3, p. 100)

The point is not that such speech is harmless; it’s that the instrumental benefits of permitting its expressions—and exposing its falsehood through public argument—justify the (remaining) costs.

Many authors have unsurprisingly argued that free speech is justified by our interests as speakers . This family of arguments emphasizes the role of speech in the development and exercise of our personal autonomy—our capacity to be the reflective authors of our own lives (Baker 1989; Redish 1982; Rawls 2005). Here an emphasis on freedom of expression is apt; we have an “expressive interest” (Cohen 1993: 224) in declaring our views—about the good life, about justice, about our identity, and about other aspects of the truth as we see it.

Our interests in self-expression may not always depend on the availability of a willing audience; we may have interests simply in shouting from the rooftops to declare who we are and what we believe, regardless of who else hears us. Hence communications to oneself—for example, in a diary or journal—are plausibly protected from interference (Redish 1992: 30–1; Shiffrin 2014: 83, 93; Kramer 2021: 23).

Yet we also have distinctive interests in sharing what we think with others. Part of how we develop our conceptions of the good life, forming judgments about how to live, is precisely through talking through the matter with others. This “deliberative interest” in directly served through opportunities to tell others what we think, so that we can learn from their feedback (Cohen 1993). Such encounters also offer opportunities to persuade others to adopt our views, and indeed to learn through such discussions who else already shares our views (Raz 1991).

Speech also seems like a central way in which we develop our capacities. This, too, is central to J.S. Mill’s defense of free speech, enabling people to explore different perspectives and points of view (1859). Hence it seems that when children engage in speech, to figure out what they think and to use their imagination to try out different ways of being in the world, they are directly engaging this interest. That explains the intuition that children, and not just adults, merit at least some protection under a principle of freedom of speech.

Note that while it is common to refer to speaker autonomy , we could simply refer to speakers’ capacities. Some political liberals hold that an emphasis on autonomy is objectionably Kantian or otherwise perfectionist, valorizing autonomy as a comprehensive moral ideal in a manner that is inappropriate for a liberal state (Cohen 1993: 229; Quong 2011). For such theorists, an undue emphasis on autonomy is incompatible with ideals of liberal neutrality toward different comprehensive conceptions of the good life (though cf. Shiffrin 2014: 81).

If free speech is justified by the importance of our interests in expressing ourselves, this justifies negative duties to refrain from interfering with speakers without adequate justification. Just as with listener theories, a strong presumption against content-based restrictions, and especially against viewpoint discrimination, is a clear requirement of the view. For the state to restrict citizens’ speech on the grounds that it disfavors what they have to say would affront the equal freedom of citizens. Imagine the state were to disallow the expression of Muslim or Jewish views, but allow the expression of Christian views. This would plainly transgress the right to freedom of expression, by valuing certain speakers’ interests in expressing themselves over others.

Many arguments for the right to free speech center on its special significance for democracy (Cohen 1993; Heinze 2016: Heyman 2009; Sunstein 1993; Weinstein 2011; Post 1991, 2009, 2011). It is possible to defend free speech on the noninstrumental ground that it is necessary to respect agents as democratic citizens. To restrict citizens’ speech is to disrespect their status as free and equal moral agents, who have a moral right to debate and decide the law for themselves (Rawls 2005).

Alternatively (or additionally), one can defend free speech on the instrumental ground that free speech promotes democracy, or whatever values democracy is meant to serve. So, for example, suppose the purpose of democracy is the republican one of establishing a state of non-domination between relationally egalitarian citizens; free speech can be defended as promoting that relation (Whitten 2022; Bonotti & Seglow 2022). Or suppose that democracy is valuable because of its role in promoting just outcomes (Arneson 2009) or tending to track those outcomes in a manner than is publicly justifiable (Estlund 2008) or is otherwise epistemically valuable (Landemore 2013).

Perhaps free speech doesn’t merely respect or promote democracy; another framing is that it is constitutive of it (Meiklejohn 1948, 1960; Heinze 2016). As Rawls says: “to restrict or suppress free political speech…always implies at least a partial suspension of democracy” (2005: 254). On this view, to be committed to democracy just is , in part, to be committed to free speech. Deliberative democrats famously contend that voting merely punctuates a larger process defined by a commitment to open deliberation among free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2008). Such an unrestricted discussion is marked not by considerations of instrumental rationality and market forces, but rather, as Habermas puts it, “the unforced force of the better argument” (1992 [1996: 37]). One crucial way in which free speech might be constitutive of democracy is if it serves as a legitimation condition . On this view, without a process of open public discourse, the outcomes of the democratic decision-making process lack legitimacy (Dworkin 2009, Brettschneider 2012: 75–78, Cohen 1997, and Heinze 2016).

Those who justify free speech on democratic grounds may view this as a special application of a more general insight. For example, Scanlon’s listener theory (discussed above) contends that the state must always respect its citizens as capable of making up their own minds (1972)—a position with clear democratic implications. Likewise, Baker is adamant that both free speech and democracy are justified by the same underlying value of autonomy (2009). And while Rawls sees the democratic role of free speech as worthy of emphasis, he is clear that free speech is one of several basic liberties that enable the development and exercise of our moral powers: our capacities for a sense of justice and for the rational pursuit a lifeplan (2005). In this way, many theorists see the continuity between free speech and our broader interests as moral agents as a virtue, not a drawback (e.g., Kendrick 2017).

Even so, some democracy theorists hold that democracy has a special role in a theory of free speech, such that political speech in particular merits special protection (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 154ff). One consequence of such views is that contributions to public discourse on political questions merit greater protection under the law (Sunstein 1993; cf. Cohen 1993: 227; Alexander 2005: 137–8). For some scholars, this may reflect instrumental anxieties about the special danger that the state will restrict the political speech of opponents and dissenters. But for others, an emphasis on political speech seems to reflect a normative claim that such speech is genuinely of greater significance, meriting greater protection, than other kinds of speech.

While conventional in the free speech literature, it is artificial to separate out our interests as speakers, listeners, and democratic citizens. Communication, and the thinking that feeds into it and that it enables, invariably engages our interests and activities across all these capacities. This insight is central to Seana Shiffrin’s groundbreaking thinker-based theory of freedom of speech, which seeks to unify the range of considerations that have informed the traditional theories (2014). Like other theories (e.g., Scanlon 1978, Cohen 1993), Shiffrin’s theory is pluralist in the range of interests it appeals to. But it offers a unifying framework that explains why this range of interests merits protection together.

On Shiffrin’s view, freedom of speech is best understood as encompassing both freedom of communication and freedom of thought, which while logically distinct are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Shiffrin 2014: 79). Shiffrin’s account involves several profound claims about the relation between communication and thought. A central contention is that “free speech is essential to the development, functioning, and operation of thinkers” (2014: 91). This is, in part, because we must often externalize our ideas to articulate them precisely and hold them at a distance where we can evaluate them (p. 89). It is also because we work out what we think largely by talking it through with others. Such communicative processes may be monological, but they are typically dialogical; speaker and listener interests are thereby mutually engaged in an ongoing manner that cannot be neatly disentangled, as ideas are ping-ponged back and forth. Moreover, such discussions may concern democratic politics—engaging our interests as democratic citizens—but of course they need not. Aesthetics, music, local sports, the existence of God—these all are encompassed (2014: 92–93). Pace prevailing democratic theories,

One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends. (Shiffrin 2014: 93)

The other central aspect of Shiffrin’s view appeals to the necessity of communication for successfully exercising our moral agency. Sincere communication enables us

to share needs, emotions, intentions, convictions, ambitions, desires, fantasies, disappointments, and judgments. Thereby, we are enabled to form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to appreciate and negotiate around our differences. (2014: 1)

Without clear and precise communication of the sort that only speech can provide, we cannot cooperate to discharge our collective obligations. Nor can we exercise our normative powers (such as consenting, waiving, or promising). Our moral agency thus depends upon protected channels through which we can relay our sincere thoughts to one another. The central role of free speech is to protect those channels, by ensuring agents are free to share what they are thinking without fear of sanction.

The thinker-based view has wide-ranging normative implications. For example, by emphasizing the continuity of speech and thought (a connection also noted in Macklem 2006 and Gilmore 2011), Shiffrin’s view powerfully explains the First Amendment doctrine that compelled speech also constitutes a violation of freedom of expression. Traditional listener- and speaker-focused theories seemingly cannot explain what is fundamentally objectionable with forcing someone to declare a commitment to something, as with children compelled to pledge allegiance to the American flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943). “What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge”, Shiffrin writes,

is that the motive behind the regulation, and its possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the compelled speaker. (2014: 94)

Further, Shiffrin’s view explains why a concern for free speech does not merely correlate to negative duties not to interfere with expression; it also supports positive responsibilities on the part of the state to educate citizens, encouraging and supporting their development and exercise as thinking beings (2014: 107).

Consider briefly one final family of free speech theories, which appeal to the role of toleration or self-restraint. On one argument, freedom of speech is important because it develops our character as liberal citizens, helping us tame our illiberal impulses. The underlying idea of Lee Bollinger’s view is that liberalism is difficult; we recurrently face temptation to punish those who hold contrary views. Freedom of speech helps us to practice the general ethos of toleration in a manner than fortifies our liberal convictions (1986). Deeply offensive speech, like pro-Nazi speech, is protected precisely because toleration in these enormously difficult cases promotes “a general social ethic” of toleration more generally (1986: 248), thereby restraining unjust exercises of state power overall. This consequentialist argument treats the protection of offensive speech not as a tricky borderline case, but as “integral to the central functions of the principle of free speech” (1986: 133). It is precisely because tolerating evil speech involves “extraordinary self-restraint” (1986: 10) that it works its salutary effects on society generally.

The idea of self-restraint arises, too, in Matthew Kramer’s recent defense of free speech. Like listener theories, Kramer’s strongly deontological theory condemns censorship aimed at protecting audiences from exposure to misguided views. At the core of his theory is the thesis that the state’s paramount moral responsibility is to furnish the social conditions that serve the development and maintenance of citizens’ self-respect and respect for others. The achievement of such an ethically resilient citizenry, on Kramer’s view, has the effect of neutering the harmfulness of countless harmful communications. “Securely in a position of ethical strength”, the state “can treat the wares of pornographers and the maunderings of bigots as execrable chirps that are to be endured with contempt” (Kramer 2021: 147). In contrast, in a society where the state has failed to do its duty of inculcating a robust liberal-egalitarian ethos, the communication of illiberal creeds may well pose a substantial threat. Yet for the state then to react by banning such speech is

overweening because with them the system’s officials take control of communications that should have been defused (through the system’s fulfillment of its moral obligations) without prohibitory or preventative impositions. (2021: 147)

(One might agree with Kramer that this is so, but diverge by arguing that the state—having failed in its initial duty—ought to take measures to prevent the harms that flow from that failure.)

These theories are striking in that they assume that a chief task of free speech theory is to explain why harmful speech ought to be protected. This is in contrast to those who think that the chief task of free speech theory is to explain our interests in communicating with others, treating the further issue of whether (wrongfully) harmful communications should be protected as an open question, with different reasonable answers available (Kendrick 2017). In this way, toleration theories—alongside a lot of philosophical work on free speech—seem designed to vindicate the demanding American legal position on free speech, one unshared by virtually all other liberal democracies.

One final family of arguments for free speech appeals to the danger of granting the state powers it may abuse. On this view, we protect free speech chiefly because if we didn’t, it would be far easier for the state to silence its political opponents and enact unjust policies. On this view, a state with censorial powers is likely to abuse them. As Richard Epstein notes, focusing on the American case,

the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of our constitutional structure.

“The protection of speech”, he writes, “…should be read in light of these political concerns” (Epstein 1992: 49).

This view is not merely a restatement of the democracy theory; it does not affirm free speech as an element of valuable self-governance. Nor does it reduce to the uncontroversial thought that citizens need freedom of speech to check the behavior of fallible government agents (Blasi 1977). One need not imagine human beings to be particularly sinister to insist (as democracy theorists do) that the decisions of those entrusted with great power be subject to public discussion and scrutiny. The argument under consideration here is more pessimistic about human nature. It is an argument about the slippery slope that we create even when enacting (otherwise justified) speech restrictions; we set an unacceptable precedent for future conduct by the state (see Schauer 1985). While this argument is theoretical, there is clearly historical evidence for it, as in the manifold cases in which bans on dangerous sedition were used to suppress legitimate war protest. (For a sweeping canonical study of the uses and abuses of speech regulations during wartime, with a focus on U.S. history, see G. Stone 2004.)

These instrumental concerns could potentially justify the legal protection for free speech. But they do not to attempt to justify why we should care about free speech as a positive moral ideal (Shiffrin 2014: 83n); they are, in Cohen’s helpful terminology, “minimalist” rather than “maximalist” (Cohen 1993: 210). Accordingly, they cannot explain why free speech is something that even the most trustworthy, morally competent administrations, with little risk of corruption or degeneration, ought to respect. Of course, minimalists will deny that accounting for speech’s positive value is a requirement of a theory of free speech, and that critiquing them for this omission begs the question.

Pluralists may see instrumental concerns as valuably supplementing or qualifying noninstrumental views. For example, instrumental concerns may play a role in justifying deviations between the moral right to free communication, on the one hand, and a properly specified legal right to free communication, on the other. Suppose that there is no moral right to engage in certain forms of harmful expression (such as hate speech), and that there is in fact a moral duty to refrain from such expression. Even so, it does not follow automatically that such a right ought to be legally enforced. Concerns about the dangers of granting the state such power plausibly militate against the enforcement of at least some of our communicative duties—at least in those jurisdictions that lack robust and competently administered liberal-democratic safeguards.

This entry has canvassed a range of views about what justifies freedom of expression, with particular attention to theories that conceive free speech as a natural moral right. Clearly, the proponents of such views believe that they succeed in this justificatory effort. But others dissent, doubting that the case for a bona fide moral right to free speech comes through. Let us briefly note the nature of this challenge from free speech skeptics , exploring a prominent line of reply.

The challenge from skeptics is generally understood as that of showing that free speech is a special right . As Leslie Kendrick notes,

the term “special right” generally requires that a special right be entirely distinct from other rights and activities and that it receive a very high degree of protection. (2017: 90)

(Note that this usage is not to be confused from the alternative usage of “special right”, referring to conditional rights arising out of particular relationships; see Hart 1955.)

Take each aspect in turn. First, to vindicate free speech as a special right, it must serve some distinctive value or interest (Schauer 2015). Suppose free speech were just an implication of a general principle not to interfere in people’s liberty without justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it, “Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification” (1984: 9). In such a case, then while there still might be contingent, historical reasons to single speech out in law as worthy of protection (Alexander 2005: 186), such reasons would not track anything especially distinctive about speech as an underlying moral matter. Second, to count as a special right, free speech must be robust in what it protects, such that only a compelling justification can override it (Dworkin 2013: 131). This captures the conviction, prominent among American constitutional theorists, that “any robust free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the harm it may cause” (Schauer 2011b: 81; see also Schauer 1982).

If the task of justifying a moral right to free speech requires surmounting both hurdles, it is a tall order. Skeptics about a special right to free speech doubt that the order can be met, and so deny that a natural moral right to freedom of expression can be justified (Schauer 2015; Alexander & Horton 1983; Alexander 2005; Husak 1985). But these theorists may be demanding too much (Kendrick 2017). Start with the claim that free speech must be distinctive. We can accept that free speech be more than simply one implication of a general presumption of liberty. But need it be wholly distinctive? Consider the thesis that free speech is justified by our autonomy interests—interests that justify other rights such as freedom of religion and association. Is it a problem if free speech is justified by interests that are continuous with, or overlap with, interests that justify other rights? Pace the free speech skeptics, maybe not. So long as such claims deserve special recognition, and are worth distinguishing by name, this may be enough (Kendrick 2017: 101). Many of the views canvassed above share normative bases with other important rights. For example, Rawls is clear that he thinks all the basic liberties constitute

essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a complete life. (Rawls 2005: 293)

The debate, then, is whether such a shared basis is a theoretical virtue (or at least theoretically unproblematic) or whether it is a theoretical vice, as the skeptics avow.

As for the claim that free speech must be robust, protecting harmful speech, “it is not necessary for a free speech right to protect harmful speech in order for it to be called a free speech right” (Kendrick 2017: 102). We do not tend to think that religious liberty must protect harmful religious activities for it to count as a special right. So it would be strange to insist that the right to free speech must meet this burden to count as a special right. Most of the theorists mentioned above take themselves to be offering views that protect quite a lot of harmful speech. Yet we can question whether this feature is a necessary component of their views, or whether we could imagine variations without this result.

3. Justifying Speech Restrictions

When, and why, can restrictions on speech be justified? It is common in public debate on free speech to hear the provocative claim that free speech is absolute . But the plausibility of such a claim depends on what is exactly meant by it. If understood to mean that no communications between humans can ever be restricted, such a view is held by no one in the philosophical debate. When I threaten to kill you unless you hand me your money; when I offer to bribe the security guard to let me access the bank vault; when I disclose insider information that the company in which you’re heavily invested is about to go bust; when I defame you by falsely posting online that you’re a child abuser; when I endanger you by labeling a drug as safe despite its potentially fatal side-effects; when I reveal your whereabouts to assist a murderer intent on killing you—across all these cases, communications may be uncontroversially restricted. But there are different views as to why.

To help organize such views, consider a set of distinctions influentially defended by Schauer (from 1982 onward). The first category involves uncovered speech : speech that does not even presumptively fall within the scope of a principle of free expression. Many of the speech-acts just canvassed, such as the speech involved in making a threat or insider training, plausibly count as uncovered speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said of fighting words (e.g., insults calculated to provoke a street fight),

such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 1942)

The general idea here is that some speech simply has negligible—and often no —value as free speech, in light of its utter disconnection from the values that justify free speech in the first place. (For discussion of so-called “low-value speech” in the U.S. context, see Sunstein 1989 and Lakier 2015.) Accordingly, when such low-value speech is harmful, it is particularly easy to justify its curtailment. Hence the Court’s view that “the prevention and punishment of [this speech] have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”. For legislation restricting such speech, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a “rational basis” test, which is very easy to meet, as it simply asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Note that it is widely held that it would still be impermissible to selectively ban low-value speech on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis—e.g., if a state only banned fighting words from left-wing activists while allowing them from right-wing activists.)

Schauer’s next category concerns speech that is covered but unprotected . This is speech that engages the values that underpin free speech; yet the countervailing harm of the speech justifies its restriction. In such cases, while there is real value in such expression as free speech, that value is outweighed by competing normative concerns (or even, as we will see below, on behalf of the very values that underpin free speech). In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, this category encompasses those extremely rare cases in which restrictions on political speech pass the “strict scrutiny” test, whereby narrow restrictions on high-value speech can be justified due to the compelling state interests thereby served. Consider Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010, in which the Court held that an NGO’s legal advice to a terrorist organization on how to pursue peaceful legal channels were legitimately criminalized under a counter-terrorism statute. While such speech had value as free speech (at least on one interpretation of this contested ruling), the imperative of counter-terrorism justified its restriction. (Arguably, commercial speech, while sometimes called low-value speech by scholars, falls into the covered but unprotected category. Under U.S. law, legislation restricting it receives “intermediate scrutiny” by courts—requiring restrictions to be narrowly drawn to advance a substantial government interest. Such a test suggests that commercial speech has bona fide free-speech value, making it harder to justify regulations on it than regulations on genuinely low-value speech like fighting words. It simply doesn’t have as much free-speech value as categories like political speech, religious speech, or press speech, all of which trigger the strict scrutiny test when restricted.)

As a philosophical matter, we can reasonably disagree about what speech qualifies as covered but unprotected (and need not treat the verdicts of the U.S. Supreme Court as philosophically decisive). For example, consider politically-inflected hate speech, which advances repugnant ideas about the inferior status of certain groups. One could concur that there is substantial free-speech value in such expression, just because it involves the sincere expression of views about central questions of politics and justice (however misguided the views doubtlessly are). Yet one could nevertheless hold that such speech should not be protected in virtue of the substantial harms to which it can lead. In such cases, the free-speech value is outweighed. Many scholars who defend the permissibility of legal restrictions on hate speech hold such a view (e.g., Parekh 2012; Waldron 2012). (More radically, one could hold that such speech’s value is corrupted by its evil, such that it qualifies as genuinely low-value; Howard 2019a.)

The final category of speech encompasses expression that is covered and protected . To declare that speech is protected just is to conclude that it is immune from restriction. A preponderance of human communications fall into this category. This does not mean that such speech can never be regulated ; content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations (e.g., prohibiting loud nighttime protests) can certainly be justified (G. Stone 1987). But such regulations must not be viewpoint discriminatory; they must apply even-handedly across all forms of protected speech.

Schauer’s taxonomy offers a useful organizing framework for how we should think about different forms of speech. Where does it leave the claim that free speech is absolute? The possibility of speech that is covered but unprotected suggests that free speech should sometimes be restricted on account of rival normative concerns. Of course, one could contend that such a category, while logically possible, is substantively an empty set; such a position would involve some kind of absoluteness about free speech (holding that where free-speech values are engaged by expression, no countervailing values can ever be weighty enough to override them). Such a position would be absolutist in a certain sense while granting the permissibility of restrictions on speech that do not engage the free-speech values. (For a recent critique of Schauer’s framework, arguing that governmental designation of some speech as low-value is incompatible with the very ideal of free speech, see Kramer 2021: 31.)

In what follows, this entry will focus on Schauer’s second category: speech that is covered by a free speech principle, but is nevertheless unprotected because of the harms it causes. How do we determine what speech falls into this category? How, in other words, do we determine the limits of free speech? Unsurprisingly, this is where most of the controversy lies.

Most legal systems that protect free speech recognize that the right has limits. Consider, for example, international human rights law, which emphatically protects the freedom of speech as a fundamental human right while also affirming specific restrictions on certain seriously harmful speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”—but then immediately notes that this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”. The subsequent ICCPR article proceeds to endorse legal restrictions on “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as well as speech constituting “propaganda for war” (ICCPR). While such restrictions would plainly be struck down as unconstitutional affronts to free speech in the U.S., this more restrictive approach prevails in most liberal democracies’ treatment of harmful speech.

Set aside the legal issue for now. How should we think about how to determine the limits of the moral right free speech? Those seeking to justify limits on speech tend to appeal to one of two strategies (Howard and Simpson forthcoming). The first strategy appeals to the importance of balancing free speech against other moral values when they come into conflict. This strategy involves external limits on free speech. (The next strategy, discussed below, invokes free speech itself, or the values that justify it, as limit-setting rationales; it thus involves internal limits on free speech.)

A balancing approach recognizes a moral conflict between unfettered communication and external values. Consider again the case of hate speech, understood as expression that attacks members of socially vulnerable groups as inferior or dangerous. On all of the theories canvassed above, there are grounds for thinking that restrictions on hate speech are prima facie in violation of the moral right to free speech. Banning hate speech to prevent people from hearing ideas that might incline them to bigotry plainly seems to disrespect listener autonomy. Further, even when speakers are expressing prejudiced views, they are still engaging their autonomous faculties. Certainly, they are expressing views on questions of public political concern, even false ones. And as thinkers they are engaged in the communication of sincere testimony to others. On many of the leading theories, the values underpinning free speech seem to be militate against bans on hate speech.

Even so, other values matter. Consider, for example, the value of upholding the equal dignity of all citizens. A central insight of critical race theory is that public expressions of white supremacy, for example, attack and undermine that equal dignity (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 1993). On Jeremy Waldron’s view (2012), hate speech is best understood as a form of group defamation, launching spurious attacks on others’ reputations and thereby undermining their standing as respected equals in their own community (relatedly, see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952).

Countries that ban hate speech, accordingly, are plausibly understood not as opposed to free speech, but as recognizing the importance that it be balanced when conflicting with other values. Such balancing can be understood in different ways. In European human rights law, for example, the relevant idea is that the right to free speech is balanced against other rights ; the relevant task, accordingly, is to specify what counts as a proportionate balance between these rights (see Alexy 2003; J. Greene 2021).

For others, the very idea of balancing rights undermines their deontic character. This alternative framing holds that the balancing occurs before we specify what rights are; on this view, we balance interests against each other, and only once we’ve undertaken that balancing do we proceed to define what our rights protect. As Scanlon puts it,

The only balancing is balancing of interests. Rights are not balanced, but are defined, or redefined, in the light of the balance of interests and of empirical facts about how these interests can best be protected. (2008: 78)

This balancing need not come in the form of some crude consequentialism; otherwise it would be acceptable to limit the rights of the few to secure trivial benefits for the many. On a contractualist moral theory such as Scanlon’s, the test is to assess the strength of any given individual’s reason to engage in (or access) the speech, against the strength of any given individual’s reason to oppose it.

Note that those who engage in balancing need not give up on the idea of viewpoint neutrality; they can accept that, as a general principle, the state should not restrict speech on the grounds that it disapproves of its message and dislikes that others will hear it. The point, instead, is that this commitment is defeasible; it is possible to be overridden.

One final comment is apt. Those who are keen to balance free speech against other values tend to be motivated by the concern that speech can cause harm, either directly or indirectly (on this distinction, see Schauer 1993). But to justify restrictions on speech, it is not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to show that such speech imposes or risks imposing harm. The crucial point is that the speech is wrongful (or, perhaps, wrongfully harmful or risky) , breaching a moral duty that speakers owe to others. Yet very few in the free speech literature think that the mere offensiveness of speech is sufficient to justify restrictions on it. Even Joel Feinberg, who thinks offensiveness can sometimes be grounds for restricting conduct, makes a sweeping exception for

[e]xpressions of opinion, especially about matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical, scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions. (1985: 44)

And in many cases, offensive speech may be actively salutary, as when racists are offended by defenses of racial equality (Waldron 1987). Accordingly, despite how large it looms in public debate, discussion of offensive speech will not play a major role in the discussion here.

We saw that one way to justify limits on free speech is to balance it against other values. On that approach, free speech is externally constrained. A second approach, in contrast, is internally constrained. On this approach, the very values that justify free speech themselves determine its own limits. This is a revisionist approach to free speech since, unlike orthodox thinking, it contends that a commitment to free speech values can counterintuitively support the restriction of speech—a surprising inversion of traditional thinking on the topic (see Howard and Simpson forthcoming). This move—justifying restrictions on speech by appealing to the values that underpin free speech—is now prevalent in the philosophical literature (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 1ff).

Consider, for example, the claim that free speech is justified by concerns of listener autonomy. On such a view, as we saw above, autonomous citizens have interests in exposure to a wide range of viewpoints, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe. But many have pointed out that this is not autonomous citizens’ only interest; they also have interests in not getting murdered by those incited by incendiary speakers (Amdur 1980). Likewise, insofar as being targeted by hate speech undermines the exercise of one’s autonomous capacities, appeal to the underlying value of autonomy could well support restrictions on such speech (Brison 1998; see also Brink 2001). What’s more, if our interests as listeners in acquiring accurate information is undermined by fraudulent information, then restrictions on such information could well be compatible with our status as autonomous; this was one of the insights that led Scanlon to complicate his theory of free speech (1978).

Or consider the theory that free speech is justified because of its role in enabling autonomous speakers to express themselves. But as Japa Pallikkathayil has argued, some speech can intimidate its audiences into staying silent (as with some hate speech), out of fear for what will happen if they speak up (Pallikkathayil 2020). In principle, then, restrictions on hate speech may serve to support the value of speaker expression, rather than undermine it (see also Langton 2018; Maitra 2009; Maitra & McGowan 2007; and Matsuda 1989: 2337). Indeed, among the most prominent claims in feminist critiques of pornography is precisely that it silences women—not merely through its (perlocutionary) effects in inspiring rape, but more insidiously through its (illocutionary) effects in altering the force of the word “no” (see MacKinnon 1984; Langton 1993; and West 204 [2022]; McGowan 2003 and 2019; cf. Kramer 2021, pp. 160ff).

Now consider democracy theories. On the one hand, democracy theorists are adamant that citizens should be free to discuss any proposals, even the destruction of democracy itself (e.g., Meiklejohn 1948: 65–66). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious why citizens’ duties as democratic citizens could not set a limit to their democratic speech rights (Howard 2019a). The Nazi propagandist Goebbels is said to have remarked:

This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. (as quoted in Fox & Nolte 1995: 1)

But it is not clear why this is necessarily so. Why should we insist on a conception of democracy that contains a self-destruct mechanism? Merely stipulating that democracy requires this is not enough (see A. Greene and Simpson 2017).

Finally, consider Shiffrin’s thinker-based theory. Shiffrin’s view is especially well-placed to explain why varieties of harmful communications are protected speech; what the theory values is the sincere transmission of veridical testimony, whereby speakers disclose what they genuinely believe to others, even if what they believe is wrongheaded and dangerous. Yet because the sincere testimony of thinkers is what qualifies some communication for protection, Shiffrin is adamant that lying falls outside the protective ambit of freedom of expression (2014) This, then, sets an internal limit on her own theory (even if she herself disfavors all lies’ outright prohibition for reasons of tolerance). The claim that lying falls outside the protective ambit of free speech is itself a recurrent suggestion in the literature (Strauss 1991: 355; Brown 2023). In an era of rampant disinformation, this internal limit is of substantial practical significance.

Suppose the moral right (or principle) of free speech is limited, as most think, such that not all communications fall within its protective ambit (either for external reasons, internal reasons, or both). Even so, it does not follow that laws banning such unprotected speech can be justified all-things-considered. Further moral tests must be passed before any particular policy restricting speech can be justified. This sub-section focuses on the requirement that speech restrictions be proportionate .

The idea that laws implicating fundamental rights must be proportionate is central in many jurisdictions’ constitutional law, as well as in the international law of human rights. As a representative example, consider the specification of proportionality offered by the Supreme Court of Canada:

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question[…] Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” ( R v. Oakes 1986).

It is this third element (often called “proportionality stricto sensu ”) on which we will concentrate here; this is the focused sense of proportionality that roughly tracks how the term is used in the philosophical literatures on defensive harm and war, as well as (with some relevant differences) criminal punishment. (The strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests of U.S. constitutional law are arguably variations of the proportionality test; but set aside this complication for now as it distracts from the core philosophical issues. For relevant legal discussion, see Tsesis 2020.)

Proportionality, in the strict sense, concerns the relation between the costs or harms imposed by some measure and the benefits that the measure is designed to secure. The organizing distinction in recent philosophical literature (albeit largely missing in the literature on free speech) is one between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality . While there are different ways to cut up the terrain between these terms, let us stipulatively define them as follows. An interference is narrowly proportionate just in case the intended target of the interference is liable to bear the costs of that interference. An interference is widely proportionate just in case the collateral costs that the interference unintentionally imposes on others can be justified. (This distinction largely follows the literature in just war theory and the ethics of defensive force; see McMahan 2009.) While the distinction is historically absent from free speech theory, it has powerful payoffs in helping to structure this chaotic debate (as argued in Howard 2019a).

So start with the idea that restrictions on communication must be narrowly proportionate . For a restriction to be narrowly proportionate, those whose communications are restricted must be liable to bear their costs, such that they are not wronged by their imposition. One standard way to be liable to bear certain costs is to have a moral duty to bear them (Tadros 2012). So, for example, if speakers have a moral duty to refrain from libel, hate speech, or some other form of harmful speech, they are liable to bear at least some costs involved in the enforcement of that duty. Those costs cannot be unlimited; a policy of executing hate speakers could not plausibly be justified. Typically, in both defensive and punitive contexts, wrongdoers’ liability is determined by their culpability, the severity of their wrong, or some combination of the two. While it is difficult to say in the abstract what the precise maximal cost ceiling is for any given restriction, as it depends hugely on the details, the point is simply that there is some ceiling above which a speech restriction (like any restriction) imposes unacceptably high costs, even on wrongdoers.

Second, for a speech restriction to be justified, we must also show that it would be widely proportionate . Suppose a speaker is liable to bear the costs of some policy restricting her communication, such that she is not wronged by its imposition. It may be that the collateral costs of such a policy would render it unacceptable. One set of costs is chilling effects , the “overdeterrence of benign conduct that occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope” (Kendrick 2013: 1649). The core idea is that laws targeting unprotected, legitimately proscribed expression may nevertheless end up having a deleterious impact on protected expression. This is because laws are often vague, overbroad, and in any case are likely to be misapplied by fallible officials (Schauer 1978: 699).

Note that if a speech restriction produces chilling effects, it does not follow that the restriction should not exist at all. Rather, concern about chilling effects instead suggests that speech restrictions should be under-inclusive—restricting less speech than is actually harmful—in order to create “breathing space”, or “a buffer zone of strategic protection” (Schauer 1978: 710) for legitimate expression and so reduce unwanted self-censorship. For example, some have argued that even though speech can cause harm recklessly or negligently, we should insist on specific intent as the mens rea of speech crimes in order to reduce any chilling effects that could follow (Alexander 1995: 21–128; Schauer 1978: 707; cf. Kendrick 2013).

But chilling effects are not the only sort of collateral effects to which speech restrictions could lead. Earlier we noted the risk that states might abuse their censorial powers. This, too, could militate in favor of underinclusive speech restrictions. Or the implication could be more radical. Consider the problem that it is difficult to author restrictions on hate speech in a tightly specified way; the language involved is open-ended in a manner that enables states to exercise considerable judgment in deciding what speech-acts, in fact, count as violations (see Strossen 2018). Given the danger that the state will misuse or abuse these laws to punish legitimate speech, some might think this renders their enactment widely disproportionate. Indeed, even if the law were well-crafted and would be judiciously applied by current officials, the point is that those in the future may not be so trustworthy.

Those inclined to accept such a position might simply draw the conclusion that legislatures ought to refrain from enacting laws against hate speech. A more radical conclusion is that the legal right to free speech ought to be specified so that hate speech is constitutionally protected. In other words, we ought to give speakers a legal right to violate their moral duties, since enforcing those moral duties through law is simply too risky. By appealing to this logic, it is conceivable that the First Amendment position on hate speech could be justified all-things-considered—not because the underlying moral right to free speech protects hate speech, but because hate speech must be protected for instrumental reasons of preventing future abuses of power (Howard 2019a).

Suppose certain restrictions on harmful speech can be justified as proportionate, in both the narrow and wide senses. This is still not sufficient to justify them all-things-considered. Additionally, they must be justified as necessary . (Note that some conceptions of proportionality in human rights law encompass the necessity requirement, but this entry follows the prevailing philosophical convention by treating them as distinct.)

Why might restrictions on harmful speech be unnecessary? One of the standard claims in the free speech literature is that we should respond to harmful speech not by banning it, but by arguing back against it. Counter-speech—not censorship—is the appropriate solution. This line of reasoning is old. As John Milton put it in 1644: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” The insistence on counter-speech as the remedy for harmful speech is similarly found, as noted above, throughout chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty .

For many scholars, this line of reply is justified by the fact that they think the harmful speech in question is protected by the moral right to free speech. For such scholars, counter-speech is the right response because censorship is morally off the table. For other scholars, the recourse to counter-speech has a plausible distinct rationale (although it is seldom articulated): its possibility renders legal restrictions unnecessary. And because it is objectionable to use gratuitous coercion, legal restrictions are therefore impermissible (Howard 2019a). Such a view could plausibly justify Mill’s aforementioned analysis in the corn dealer example, whereby censorship is permissible but only when there’s no time for counter-speech—a view that is also endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Whether this argument succeeds depends upon a wide range of further assumptions—about the comparable effectiveness of counter-speech relative to law; about the burdens that counter-speech imposes on prospective counter-speakers. Supposing that the argument succeeds, it invites a range of further normative questions about the ethics of counter-speech. For example, it is important who has the duty to engage in counter-speech, who its intended audience is, and what specific forms the counter-speech ought to take—especially in order to maximize its persuasive effectiveness (Brettschneider 2012; Cepollaro, Lepoutre, & Simpson 2023; Howard 2021b; Lepoutre 2021; Badano & Nuti 2017). It is also important to ask questions about the moral limits of counter-speech. For example, insofar as publicly shaming wrongful speakers has become a prominent form of counter-speech, it is crucial to interrogate its permissibility (e.g., Billingham and Parr 2020).

This final section canvasses the young philosophical debate concerning freedom of speech on the internet. With some important exceptions (e.g., Barendt 2005: 451ff), this issue has only recently accelerated (for an excellent edited collection, see Brison & Gelber 2019). There are many normative questions to be asked about the moral rights and obligations of internet platforms. Here are three. First, do internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users? Second, do internet platforms have moral duties to restrict (or at least refrain from amplifying) harmful speech posted by their users? And finally, if platforms do indeed have moral duties to restrict harmful speech, should those duties be legally enforced?

The reference to internet platforms , is a deliberate focus on large-scale social media platforms, through which people can discover and publicly share user-generated content. We set aside other entities such as search engines (Whitney & Simpson 2019), important though they are. That is simply because the central political controversies, on which philosophical input is most urgent, concern the large social-media platforms.

Consider the question of whether internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users. One dominant view in the public discourse holds that the answer is no . On this view, platforms are private entities, and as such enjoy the prerogative to host whatever speech they like. This would arguably be a function of them having free speech rights themselves. Just as the free speech rights of the New York Times give it the authority to publish whatever op-eds it sees fit, the free speech rights of platforms give them the authority to exercise editorial or curatorial judgment about what speech to allow. On this view, if Facebook were to decide to become a Buddhist forum, amplifying the speech of Buddhist users and promoting Buddhist perspectives and ideas, and banning speech promoting other religions, it would be entirely within its moral (and thus proper legal) rights to do so. So, too, if it were to decide to become an atheist forum.

A radical alternative view holds that internet platforms constitute a public forum , a term of art from U.S. free speech jurisprudence used to designate spaces “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities” ( Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad 1975). As Kramer has argued:

social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube have become public fora. Although the companies that create and run those platforms are not morally obligated to sustain them in existence at all, the role of controlling a public forum morally obligates each such company to comply with the principle of freedom of expression while performing that role. No constraints that deviate from the kinds of neutrality required under that principle are morally legitimate. (Kramer 2021: 58–59)

On this demanding view, platforms’ duties to respect speech are (roughly) identical to the duties of states. Accordingly, if efforts by the state to restrict hate speech, pornography, and public health misinformation (for example) are objectionable affronts to free speech, so too are platforms’ content moderation rules for such content. A more moderate view does not hold that platforms are public forums as such, but holds that government channels or pages qualify as public forums (the claim at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump (2019).)

Even if we deny that platforms constitute public forums, it is plausible that they engage in a governance function of some kind (Klonick 2018). As Jack Balkin has argued, the traditional model of free speech, which sees it as a relation between speakers and the state, is today plausibly supplanted by a triadic model, involving a more complex relation between speakers, governments, and intermediaries (2004, 2009, 2018, 2021). If platforms do indeed have some kind of governance function, it may well trigger responsibilities for transparency and accountability (as with new legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act).

Second, consider the question of whether platforms have a duty to remove harmful content posted by users. Even those who regard them as public forums could agree that platforms may have a moral responsibility to remove illegal unprotected speech. Yet a dominant view in the public debate has historically defended platforms’ place as mere conduits for others’ speech. This is the current position under U.S. law (as with 47 U.S. Code §230), which broadly exempts platforms from liability for much illegal speech, such as defamation. On this view, we should view platforms as akin to bulletin boards: blame whoever posts wrongful content, but don’t hold the owner of the board responsible.

This view is under strain. Even under current U.S. law, platforms are liable for removing some content, such as child sexual abuse material and copyright infringements, suggesting that it is appropriate to demand some accountability for the wrongful content posted by others. An increasing body of philosophical work explores the idea that platforms are indeed morally responsible for removing extreme content. For example, some have argued that platforms have a special responsibility to prevent the radicalization that occurs on their networks, given the ways in which extreme content is amplified to susceptible users (Barnes 2022). Without engaging in moderation (i.e., removal) of harmful content, platforms are plausibly complicit with the wrongful harms perpetrated by users (Howard forthcoming).

Yet it remains an open question what a responsible content moderation policy ought to involve. Many are tempted by a juridical model, whereby platforms remove speech in accordance with clearly announced rules, with user appeals mechanisms in place for individual speech decisions to ensure they are correctly made (critiqued in Douek 2022b). Yet platforms have billions of users and remove millions of pieces of content per week. Accordingly, perfection is not possible. Moving quickly to remove harmful content during a crisis—e.g., Covid misinformation—will inevitably increase the number of false positives (i.e., legitimate speech taken down as collateral damage). It is plausible that the individualistic model of speech decisions adopted by courts is decidedly implausible to help us govern online content moderation; as noted in Douek 2021 and 2022a, what is needed is analysis of how the overall system should operate at scale, with a focus on achieving proportionality between benefits and costs. Alternatively, one might double down and insist that the juridical model is appropriate, given the normative significance of speech. And if it is infeasible for social-media companies to meet its demands given their size, then all the worse for social-media companies. On this view, it is they who must bend to meet the moral demands of free speech theory, not the other way around.

Substantial philosophical work needs to be done to deliver on this goal. The work is complicated by the fact that artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the processes of content moderation; human moderators, themselves subjected to terrible working conditions at long hours, work in conjunction with machine learning tools to identify and remove content that platforms have restricted. Yet AI systems notoriously are as biased as their training data. Further, their “black box” decisions are cryptic and cannot be easily understood. Given that countless speech decisions will necessarily be made without human involvement, it is right to ask whether it is reasonable to expect users to accept the deliverances of machines (e.g., see Vredenburgh 2022; Lazar forthcoming a). Note that machine intelligence is used not merely for content moderation, narrowly understood as the enforcement of rules about what speech is allowed. It is also deployed for the broader practice of content curation, determining what speech gets amplified — raising the question of what normative principles should govern such amplification; see Lazar forthcoming b).

Finally, there is the question of legal enforcement. Showing that platforms have the moral responsibility to engage in content moderation is necessary to justifying its codification into a legal responsibility. Yet it is not sufficient; one could accept that platforms have moral duties to moderate (some) harmful speech while also denying that those moral duties ought to be legally enforced. A strong, noninstrumental version of such a view would hold that while speakers have moral duties to refrain from wrongful speech, and platforms have duties not to platform or amplify it, the coercive enforcement of such duties would violate the moral right to freedom of expression. A more contingent, instrumental version of the view would hold that legal enforcement is not in principle impermissible; but in practice, it is simply too risky to grant the state the authority to enforce platforms’ and speakers’ moral duties, given the potential for abuse and overreach.

Liberals who champion the orthodox interpretation of the First Amendment, yet insist on robust content moderation, likely hold one or both of these views. Yet globally such views seem to be in the minority. Serious legislation is imminent that will subject social-media companies to burdensome regulation, in the form of such laws as the Digital Services Act in the European Union and the Online Safety Bill in the UK. Normatively evaluating such legislation is a pressing task. So, too, is the task of designing normative theories to guide the design of content moderation systems, and the wider governance of the digital public sphere. On both fronts, political philosophers should get back to work.

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• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , adopted: 16 December 1966; Entry into force: 23 March 1976.
• Free Speech Debate
• Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
• van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/freedom-speech/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]

ethics: search engines and | hate speech | legal rights | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | pornography: and censorship | rights | social networking and ethics | toleration

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and anonymous referees of this Encyclopedia for helpful feedback. I am greatly indebted to Robert Mark Simpson for many incisive suggestions, which substantially improved the entry. This entry was written while on a fellowship funded by UK Research & Innovation (grant reference MR/V025600/1); I am thankful to UKRI for the support.

Copyright © 2024 by Jeffrey W. Howard < jeffrey . howard @ ucl . ac . uk >

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15.4 Censorship and Freedom of Speech

Learning objectives.

• Explain the FCC’s process of classifying material as indecent, obscene, or profane.
• Describe how the Hay’s Code affected 20th-century American mass media.

Figure 15.3

Attempts to censor material, such as banning books, typically attract a great deal of controversy and debate.

Timberland Regional Library – Banned Books Display At The Lacey Library – CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

To fully understand the issues of censorship and freedom of speech and how they apply to modern media, we must first explore the terms themselves. Censorship is defined as suppressing or removing anything deemed objectionable. A common, everyday example can be found on the radio or television, where potentially offensive words are “bleeped” out. More controversial is censorship at a political or religious level. If you’ve ever been banned from reading a book in school, or watched a “clean” version of a movie on an airplane, you’ve experienced censorship.

Much as media legislation can be controversial due to First Amendment protections, censorship in the media is often hotly debated. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press (Case Summaries).” Under this definition, the term “speech” extends to a broader sense of “expression,” meaning verbal, nonverbal, visual, or symbolic expression. Historically, many individuals have cited the First Amendment when protesting FCC decisions to censor certain media products or programs. However, what many people do not realize is that U.S. law establishes several exceptions to free speech, including defamation, hate speech, breach of the peace, incitement to crime, sedition, and obscenity.

Classifying Material as Indecent, Obscene, or Profane

To comply with U.S. law, the FCC prohibits broadcasters from airing obscene programming. The FCC decides whether or not material is obscene by using a three-prong test.

Obscene material:

• causes the average person to have lustful or sexual thoughts;
• depicts lawfully offensive sexual conduct; and
• lacks literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Material meeting all of these criteria is officially considered obscene and usually applies to hard-core pornography (Federal Communications Commission). “Indecent” material, on the other hand, is protected by the First Amendment and cannot be banned entirely.

Indecent material:

• contains graphic sexual or excretory depictions;
• dwells at length on depictions of sexual or excretory organs; and
• is used simply to shock or arouse an audience.

Material deemed indecent cannot be broadcast between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m., to make it less likely that children will be exposed to it (Federal Communications Commission).

These classifications symbolize the media’s long struggle with what is considered appropriate and inappropriate material. Despite the existence of the guidelines, however, the process of categorizing materials is a long and arduous one.

There is a formalized process for deciding what material falls into which category. First, the FCC relies on television audiences to alert the agency of potentially controversial material that may require classification. The commission asks the public to file a complaint via letter, e-mail, fax, telephone, or the agency’s website, including the station, the community, and the date and time of the broadcast. The complaint should “contain enough detail about the material broadcast that the FCC can understand the exact words and language used (Federal Communications Commission).” Citizens are also allowed to submit tapes or transcripts of the aired material. Upon receiving a complaint, the FCC logs it in a database, which a staff member then accesses to perform an initial review. If necessary, the agency may contact either the station licensee or the individual who filed the complaint for further information.

Once the FCC has conducted a thorough investigation, it determines a final classification for the material. In the case of profane or indecent material, the agency may take further actions, including possibly fining the network or station (Federal Communications Commission). If the material is classified as obscene, the FCC will instead refer the matter to the U.S. Department of Justice, which has the authority to criminally prosecute the media outlet. If convicted in court, violators can be subject to criminal fines and/or imprisonment (Federal Communications Commission).

Each year, the FCC receives thousands of complaints regarding obscene, indecent, or profane programming. While the agency ultimately defines most programs cited in the complaints as appropriate, many complaints require in-depth investigation and may result in fines called notices of apparent liability (NAL) or federal investigation.

Table 15.1 FCC Indecency Complaints and NALs: 2000–2005

Violence and Sex: Taboos in Entertainment

Although popular memory thinks of old black-and-white movies as tame or sanitized, many early filmmakers filled their movies with sexual or violent content. Edwin S. Porter’s 1903 silent film The Great Train Robbery , for example, is known for expressing “the appealing, deeply embedded nature of violence in the frontier experience and the American civilizing process,” and showcases “the rather spontaneous way that the attendant violence appears in the earliest developments of cinema (Film Reference).” The film ends with an image of a gunman firing a revolver directly at the camera, demonstrating that cinema’s fascination with violence was present even 100 years ago.

Porter was not the only U.S. filmmaker working during the early years of cinema to employ graphic violence. Films such as Intolerance (1916) and The Birth of a Nation (1915) are notorious for their overt portrayals of violent activities. The director of both films, D. W. Griffith, intentionally portrayed content graphically because he “believed that the portrayal of violence must be uncompromised to show its consequences for humanity (Film Reference).”

Although audiences responded eagerly to the new medium of film, some naysayers believed that Hollywood films and their associated hedonistic culture was a negative moral influence. As you read in Chapter 8 “Movies” , this changed during the 1930s with the implementation of the Hays Code. Formally termed the Motion Picture Production Code of 1930, the code is popularly known by the name of its author, Will Hays, the chairman of the industry’s self-regulatory Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association (MPPDA), which was founded in 1922 to “police all in-house productions (Film Reference).” Created to forestall what was perceived to be looming governmental control over the industry, the Hays Code was, essentially, Hollywood self-censorship. The code displayed the motion picture industry’s commitment to the public, stating:

Motion picture producers recognize the high trust and confidence which have been placed in them by the people of the world and which have made motion pictures a universal form of entertainment…. Hence, though regarding motion pictures primarily as entertainment without any explicit purposes of teaching or propaganda, they know that the motion picture within its own field of entertainment may be directly responsible for spiritual or moral progress, for higher types of social life, and for much correct thinking (Arts Reformation).

Among other requirements, the Hays Code enacted strict guidelines on the portrayal of violence. Crimes such as murder, theft, robbery, safecracking, and “dynamiting of trains, mines, buildings, etc.” could not be presented in detail (Arts Reformation). The code also addressed the portrayals of sex, saying that “the sanctity of the institution of marriage and the home shall be upheld. Pictures shall not infer that low forms of sex relationship are the accepted or common thing (Arts Reformation).”

Figure 15.4

As the chairman of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association, Will Hays oversaw the creation of the industry’s self-censoring Hays Code.

Wikimedia Commons – public domain.

As television grew in popularity during the mid-1900s, the strict code placed on the film industry spread to other forms of visual media. Many early sitcoms, for example, showed married couples sleeping in separate twin beds to avoid suggesting sexual relations.

By the end of the 1940s, the MPPDA had begun to relax the rigid regulations of the Hays Code. Propelled by the changing moral standards of the 1950s and 1960s, this led to a gradual reintroduction of violence and sex into mass media.

Ratings Systems

As filmmakers began pushing the boundaries of acceptable visual content, the Hollywood studio industry scrambled to create a system to ensure appropriate audiences for films. In 1968, the successor of the MPPDA, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), established the familiar film ratings system to help alert potential audiences to the type of content they could expect from a production.

Film Ratings

Although the ratings system changed slightly in its early years, by 1972 it seemed that the MPAA had settled on its ratings. These ratings consisted of G (general audiences), PG (parental guidance suggested), R (restricted to ages 17 or up unless accompanied by a parent), and X (completely restricted to ages 17 and up). The system worked until 1984, when several major battles took place over controversial material. During that year, the highly popular films Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom and Gremlins both premiered with a PG rating. Both films—and subsequently the MPAA—received criticism for the explicit violence presented on screen, which many viewers considered too intense for the relatively mild PG rating. In response to the complaints, the MPAA introduced the PG-13 rating to indicate that some material may be inappropriate for children under the age of 13.

Another change came to the ratings system in 1990, with the introduction of the NC-17 rating. Carrying the same restrictions as the existing X rating, the new designation came at the behest of the film industry to distinguish mature films from pornographic ones. Despite the arguably milder format of the rating’s name, many filmmakers find it too strict in practice; receiving an NC-17 rating often leads to a lack of promotion or distribution because numerous movie theaters and rental outlets refuse to carry films with this rating.

Television and Video Game Ratings

Regardless of these criticisms, most audience members find the rating system helpful, particularly when determining what is appropriate for children. The adoption of industry ratings for television programs and video games reflects the success of the film ratings system. During the 1990s, for example, the broadcasting industry introduced a voluntary rating system not unlike that used for films to accompany all TV shows. These ratings are displayed on screen during the first 15 seconds of a program and include TV-Y (all children), TV-Y7 (children ages 7 and up), TV-Y7-FV (older children—fantasy violence), TV-G (general audience), TV-PG (parental guidance suggested), TV-14 (parents strongly cautioned), and TV-MA (mature audiences only).

Table 15.2 Television Ratings System

Source: http://www.tvguidelines.org/ratings.htm

At about the same time that television ratings appeared, the Entertainment Software Rating Board was established to provide ratings on video games. Video game ratings include EC (early childhood), E (everyone), E 10+ (ages 10 and older), T (teen), M (mature), and AO (adults only).

Table 15.3 Video Game Ratings System

Source: http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratings_guide.jsp

Even with these ratings, the video game industry has long endured criticism over violence and sex in video games. One of the top-selling video game series in the world, Grand Theft Auto , is highly controversial because players have the option to solicit prostitution or murder civilians (Media Awareness). In 2010, a report claimed that “38 percent of the female characters in video games are scantily clad, 23 percent baring breasts or cleavage, 31 percent exposing thighs, another 31 percent exposing stomachs or midriffs, and 15 percent baring their behinds (Media Awareness).” Despite multiple lawsuits, some video game creators stand by their decisions to place graphic displays of violence and sex in their games on the grounds of freedom of speech.

Key Takeaways

• The U.S. Government devised the three-prong test to determine if material can be considered “obscene.” The FCC applies these guidelines to determine whether broadcast content can be classified as profane, indecent, or obscene.
• Established during the 1930s, the Hays Code placed strict regulations on film, requiring that filmmakers avoid portraying violence and sex in films.
• After the decline of the Hays Code during the 1960s, the MPAA introduced a self-policed film ratings system. This system later inspired similar ratings for television and video game content.

Look over the MPAA’s explanation of each film rating online at http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/what-each-rating-means . View a film with these requirements in mind and think about how the rating was selected. Then answer the following short-answer questions. Each response should be a minimum of one paragraph.

• Would this material be considered “obscene” under the Hays Code criteria? Would it be considered obscene under the FCC’s three-prong test? Explain why or why not. How would the film be different if it were released in accordance to the guidelines of the Hays Code?
• Do you agree with the rating your chosen film was given? Why or why not?

Arts Reformation, “The Motion Picture Production Code of 1930 (Hays Code),” ArtsReformation, http://www.artsreformation.com/a001/hays-code.html .

Case Summaries, “First Amendment—Religion and Expression,” http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment01/ .

Federal Communications Commission, “Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity: Frequently Asked Questions,” http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html .

Film Reference, “Violence,” Film Reference, http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/Romantic-Comedy-Yugoslavia/Violence-BEGINNINGS.html .

Media Awareness, Media Issues, “Sex and Relationships in the Media,” http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/stereotyping/women_and_girls/women_sex.cfm .

Media Awareness, Media Issues, “Violence in Media Entertainment,” http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/violence/violence_entertainment.cfm .

Understanding Media and Culture Copyright © 2016 by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Controversial Topic: Censorship and Freedom of Speech

The First Amendment in the Bill of Rights protects the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religious expression, and the right to a free press against government restriction. As a key component in the very first article of the Bill of Rights, free speech is among the most cherished and frequently-cited protections built into the U.S. Constitution. However, because the content of that speech and expression may itself provoke sharp disagreement, this controversial topic usually concerns differing ideas about what constitutes “protected speech” as well as the methods that should or shouldn’t be used to limit free speech. This underscores the debate around Freedom of Speech and Censorship. The ongoing public controversy over free speech this a popular persuasive essay topic.

Key Takeaways

• Freedom of speech enables people to express their opinions without restraints or censorship. While this component of democracy has been practiced since immemorial, some individuals still fail to see where to draw the line when practicing this freedom.
• Individuals need to understand that freedom of speech still has limitations. While the First Amendment doesn’t specifically identify what is and is not protected, the Supreme Court ruled that some forms of speech are not allowed.
• The only drawback of censorship is violating one’s freedom of speech. To prevent harmful information, censorship tends to restrict legitimate data. Therefore, people should know and understand censorship’s pros and cons.

In a sense which differentiates this topic from many other controversial topics, advocacy for free speech knows no specific political affiliation. This core principle of America’s founding-that the government shall make no law restricting or prohibiting free speech-is one shared by most Americans. And yet, there is an ongoing push and pull over how to interpret, protect, or limit free speech. The free speech debate topic in the U.S. concerns:

Advocacy for free speech knows no specific political affiliation. This core principle of America's founding-that the government shall make no law restricting or prohibiting free speech-is one shared by most Americans” – @AcademicInflux TWEET POST

• The unfettered exercise of First Amendment rights;
• Government efforts to place what are posited as approach limitations on such exercise; and
• Efforts by political groups, citizen groups and activists to confront and silence speech that it deems offensive.

The goal of this discussion is to examine the various perspectives shaping the public discussion over Censorship and Freedom of Speech, and to provide you with a look at some of the figures past and present who have influenced this discussion. The figures selected may not always be household names, but are instead selected to provide a nuanced look at the public discourse on this subject, and in some cases, even to provide you with a list of individuals to contact as part of your research.

A Brief History of The Issue

On December 15th, 1791, the first 10 amendments of the Bill of Rights were ratified as part of the United States Constitution. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

This amendment has had a far-reaching impact on the formation of public life in America, from our practice of religion and our expression of art to our political affiliation, modes of protest, and our expectations of a free and fair press. The freedoms and protections implicated by the First Amendment are held as fundamental principles of the free and democratic society intended by the U.S. Constitution. First Amendment protections inform an array of rights that have been challenged and upheld over the course of more than two centuries.

The freedoms and protections implicated by the First Amendment are held as fundamental principles of the free and democratic society intended by the U.S. Constitution.” – @AcademicInflux TWEET POST

Though the First Amendment itself is held as fundamental, the reach of its protections has been frequently challenged, most notably by way of:

• Judicial precedent;
• State-sponsored censorship; and more recently,
• Public pressure campaigns aimed toward “cancellation” of figures perceived to be guilty of offensive speech.

These challenges represent the various ways that both those in positions of authority and portions of the public can advocate for limitations on the protections accorded in the First Amendment. In some cases, these limitations are not only advocated for, but accepted as legal precedent.

Limitations on Free Speech

While the First Amendment prohibits Congress from making laws to stifle free speech, court precedent has upheld the placement of certain limitations on modes of free speech. These exceptions to the First Amendment underscore the interpretative nature of this fundamental right, as well as the impetus to use limitations and modes of censorship for the declared purpose of protecting public safety. Wikipedia notes that “Numerous holdings of [the Supreme] Court attest to the fact that the First Amendment does not literally mean that we ‘are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship.’”

The most consequential legal challenges surrounding freedom of speech do not question the basic premise of this freedom, but have instead centered on disputes around what should or should not be considered restricted speech.

• Inciting a Riot: The most famously-cited example of restricted speech comes from the 1919 case of Schenck v. United States , in which Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. analogized that the First Amendment does not make lawful the act of “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” This assessment informed a 1969 decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio that forms of speech may be restricted if it may be proven that this speech is directed toward, or likely to incite, a riot.
• The Fighting Words Doctrine: In the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U. S. 568 (1942), the court found that “Under New Hampshire’s Offensive Conduct law (chap. 378, para. 2 of the NH. Public Laws) it is illegal for anyone to address ‘any offensive, derisive or annoying word to anyone who is lawfully in any street or public place... or to call him by an offensive or derisive name.’” Case law has repeatedly confirmed this basic doctrine while substantially narrowing the definition of fighting words to the extent that a wide range of potentially offensive or hateful forms of speech remain protected as long as they are demonstrably public, and not personal, in the nature of their attack.
• Obscenity: Obscenity is perhaps the most debated area of free speech in the public forum. Obscenity is, by admission of the courts themselves, a difficult quality to define. However, precedent finds that forms of speech and expression which can be identified as obscene are not protected by the First Amendment, According to Roth v. United States , 354 U. S. 476 (1957), there is no protection for speech or expression which is “utterly without redeeming social importance,” and that, to “an average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.” In the most famous affirmation of Roth v. U.S., Justice Potter Stewart noted in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) , that “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced... [b]ut I know it when I see it.” This highly subjective standard opens the floor for ongoing legal challenge and discourse over what is defined as obscene.
• Defamation: Defamation is a form of speech which is not protected by the First Amendment. Statements in public spaces or in print (and increasingly, on social media) may not be slanderous or libelous. However, the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U. S. 254 (1964) found that there should be exceptions to the reach of defamation claims for those who are American public officials. The findings of this case denote that a statement must be proven to have been made with “actual malice”, meaning that the defendant either knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded whether or not it was true. In 1967, the case of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts extended that exception to all “public figures.”

Censorship in Media

In addition to the judicial limitations placed on First Amendment protections, there are ways that the U.S. government may place limits on the expression of free speech. These limits are referred to as censorship. Censorship is a function-typically performed by a government agency or an industry watchdog group-of identifying, preventing, and/or altering the scheduling or content contained in print or broadcast media. The stated goal of censorship is to prevent the public display of obscene material, or to prevent the exposure of indecent material to select audiences such as minors.

The standards around censorship have fluctuated over time, as has the level of strictness in the enforcement of these changing standards. The following are some prominent examples of how censorship occurs in various media sectors:

• The Hays Code: The Production Code -also called the Hays Code after the president of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) at the time-was a set of rules governing content in cinema. Adopted in 1930, and enforced with increasing strictness through the 1930s, the Hays Code determined “what was acceptable and what was unacceptable content for motion pictures produced for a public audience in the United States.” Filmmakers were required to meet the rigid standards set by the Production Code Association (PCA), which had a profound impact on film production by restricting sexual content, edgy language, and even political ideas. Though the PCA was not a government agency, Hollywood studios vested the PCA with its authority in order to be insulated from the threat of government fines and censorship. Increasing resistance and changing social mores led to the replacement of the Production Code, in 1968, with the MPAA film rating system that we know today. Rather than restricting content, this structure provides age advisories for certain content.
• Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC) : Popular music has also been a source for debate over censorship. In 1985, a bipartisan group of women who were married to prominent Washington figures formed the PMRC with the mission of “increasing parental control over the access of children to music deemed to have violent, drug-related or sexual themes via labeling albums with Parental Advisory stickers.” Identifying objectionable content in music by artists like Prince, Def Leppard, and Cyndi Lauper, the PMRC pressured record companies and broadcast outlets to disassociate with offensive artists and content. Their efforts culminated in a Senate hearing, where musicians Frank Zappa, Dee Snyder, and John Denver spoke on behalf of the music industry’s First Amendment rights. The outcome of these hearings was the industry-wide adoption of Parental Advisory stickers, warning consumers of the potentially explicit, sexual, or violent content within certain music releases. Major retailers like Wal-Mart adopted a policy thereafter of refusing to sell releases bearing this sticker, such that the PMRC’s efforts would have a direct economic impact on many artists.
• The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) : Unlike the Production Code Association and the Parents Music Resource Center, the FCC is a government agency with the power to issue fines and other penalties for violations of its standards. Though the FCC is tasked with the duty of censorship in broadcast media, it also expresses its duty to the First Amendment while outlining the judicial precedent justifying certain limitations on this Constitutional right.

Political Correctness and Cancel Culture

The First Amendment refers exclusively to the role of Congress where free speech is concerned. However, the present-day debate about freedom of speech is a bit more complex. Technically, the First Amendment protects a political figure’s right to express an unpopular opinion in a public forum, a celebrity’s right to say something offensive, or a journalist’s right to pen a racially insensitive blog post. Inherent to the First Amendment is the premise that the U.S. government may not create laws infringing on these rights.

However, this premise does not give the speaker immunity to the consequences of their speech. Unpopular speech may not incur government intervention, but it may provoke a response in the public space. Today, that public space includes the sprawling world of the internet, and by extension, social media. Online forums give every individual a public forum for free speech, but they also give broad cross-sections of the public an extremely powerful set of instruments for responding to unpopular speech.

The First Amendment refers exclusively to the role of Congress where free speech is concerned. However, the present-day debate about freedom of speech is a bit more complex.” – @AcademicInflux TWEET POST

The internet plays host to a perpetual tug of war between these two interests, and conflicts often produce real-world consequences:

• On one side of this divide are those who argue that controversial, offensive, and potentially hateful ideas should be met with debate, academic inquiry, and intellectual rigor.
• On the other side of this divide are those who view certain forms of speech as inherently destructive, and who therefore employ various forms of in-person and online activism to silence and punish offending speakers as a means of preventing the proliferation of potentially dangerous or injurious speech.

Many staunch First Amendment advocates argue that silencing offending ideas is contrary both to the spirit of the U.S. Constitution, and to the aims of honest academic inquiry. Some argue that a form of extreme “political correctness”-the policing of thoughts, ideas, and speech through public and social pressure-is counter-democratic. Those who hold this view accuse activists of using “cancel culture”-public, online campaigns aimed at shaming offending speakers and having them stripped of status, employment, and public speaking platforms. Numerous journalists, comedians, and university professors who are accused of offending speech have been subjected to this form of cultural “cancellation.”

Activists who undertake these public campaigns argue that their methods are not meant to restrict free speech, but to bring negative attention to those who use their freedom of expression for hateful, dangerous, or destructive purposes. The aim of “cancellation”, its advocates would argue, is to demand greater accountability from individuals who use public platforms to discriminate or otherwise exclude marginalized groups, as well as the organizations that provide such speakers with those platforms.

The aim of “cancellation”, its advocates would argue, is to demand greater accountability from individuals who use public platforms to discriminate or otherwise exclude marginalized groups, as well as the organizations that provide such speakers with those platforms.” – @AcademicInflux TWEET POST

Using our own backstage Ranking Analytics tools, we’ve compiled a list of the most influential figures concerning the issue of free speech in the U.S. between 1900 and 2020. This list is vetted to exclude political heads of state. The remaining figures are a combination of free speech activists, Supreme Court Justices who have made consequential rulings on the matter, and authors or thinkers who have produced content challenging limitations on free speech.

Using our own backstage Ranking Analytics tools, we’ve compiled a list of the most influential books on the topic of free speech in the U.S. between 1900 and 2020. This list is vetted to exclude religious scriptures, and is largely comprised of both texts about the topics of free speech and censorship, and books whose content has ignited debate over free speech and censorship.

The Current Controversy

This controversy is unique in that few participants in the debate would characterize themselves as opponents of free speech:

• Those rendering judicial rulings placing limitations on First Amendment protections would argue that they do so for reasons of public safety.
• Those performing in an official capacity as government-sponsored censors would argue that they are responsible for protecting the public from unwanted exposure to indecency and obscenity.
• Those engaging in social activism aimed at hateful speech would argue that they are working to make public speech less dangerous and more inclusive.

Those who perform these functions argue that such limitations are critical to the preservation of the First Amendment. And yet, in each case, there are also many First Amendment advocates who argue that our protections extend beyond these attempts at limitation.

All of this underscores the complexity surrounding the current controversy. Most of the influencers identified here-with just a few exceptions-would characterize themselves as advocates for free speech. Therefore, this is not merely a dispute between the supporters and opponents of censorship. Instead, there is a far more nuanced conversation here about what constitutes protected speech, and how different figures, both past and present, have either exercised their rights, protected the rights of others, or advocated for limitations of free speech.

A Quick Overview of Our Methods

Our goal in presenting subjects that generate controversy is to provide you with a sense of some of the figures both past and present who have driven debate, produced recognized works of research, literature or art, proliferated their ideas widely, or who are identified directly and publicly with some aspect of this debate. By identifying the researchers, activists, journalists, educators, academics, and other individuals connected with this debate-and by taking a closer look at their work and contributions-we can get a clear but nuanced look at the subject matter. Rather than framing the issue as one side versus the other, we bring various dimensions of the issue into discussion with one another. This will likely include dimensions of the debate that resonate with you, some dimensions that you find repulsive, and some dimensions that might simply reveal a perspective you hadn’t previously considered.

For a look at how we handle the risk of spotlighting a potentially repulsive influencer, check out Influence and Infamy: The Case of Osama bin Laden .

Our InfluenceRanking engine gives us the power to scan the academic and public landscape surrounding the free speech issue using key terminology to identify consequential influencers. As with any topic that generates public debate and disagreement, this is a subject of great depth and breadth. We do not claim to probe either the bottom of this depth or the borders of this breadth. Instead, we offer you one way to enter into this debate, to identify key players, and through their contributions to the debate, to develop a fuller understanding of the issue and perhaps even a better sense of where you stand.

For a closer look at how our InfluenceRankings work, check out our methodology .

Otherwise, read on for a look at influencers associated with an array of key terms.

Anti-Censorship

First amendment advocates, first amendment rights, free speech, freedom of speech.

• Obscenity Law
• Film Censors
• Political Correctness
• Cancel Culture

Individuals dedicated to anti-censorship are figures who have used activism, literature, journalism, and other public platforms to resist forms of government censorship, to support the legal and technical efforts of those impacted by what they view as unjust government censorship, and to help marginalized individuals and groups achieve equal opportunities for freedom of expression.

Influencers:

• Bennett Haselton is the founder of Circumventor.com and Peacefire.org, two US-based websites dedicated to combating Internet censorship. Peacefire.org is focused on documenting flaws in commercial Internet blocking programs. Circumventor.com is dedicated to distributing anti-censorship tools to users in countries such as China and Iran, and as of 2011 has over 3 million subscribers through distribution channels including email and Facebook pages.
• Avedon Carol is an American-born British feminist, anti-censorship, and civil liberties campaigner and a researcher in the field of sex crime, residing in England. She is a member of Feminists Against Censorship, and as part of their publishing group co-edited Bad Girls & Dirty Pictures . She is the author of Nudes, Prudes & Attitudes , and has also worked on other books by Feminists Against Censorship. On her own website, “Avedon’s Sideshow”, she publishes and compiles links to a wide array of stories and events.
• Jane Vance Rule, CM, OBC was a Canadian writer of lesbian-themed works. Her first novel, Desert of the Heart , appeared in 1964, when gay activity was still a criminal offence. It turned Rule into a reluctant media celebrity, and brought her massive correspondence from women who had never dared explore lesbianism. She did not, however, support gay marriage. Rule became an active anti-censorship campaigner, and served on the executive of the Writers’ Union of Canada.

First Amendment advocates are those who undertake efforts through journalism, activism, and legal advocacy to advance free speech rights for individuals impacted by censorship or government-sponsored silencing.

• Lawrence G. Walters is an American First Amendment attorney and anti-censorship advocate. He is the head of the Walters Law Group, focusing on First Amendment and Internet Law, and has served as an Adjunct Professor of Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida.
• Zechariah Chafee Jr. , was an American judicial philosopher and civil rights advocate, described as “possibly the most important First Amendment scholar of the first half of the twentieth century” by Richard Primus. Chafee’s avid defense of freedom of speech led to Senator Joseph McCarthy calling him “dangerous” to America.
• Vanessa Leggett is a freelance journalist, author, lecturer, and First Amendment advocate who was jailed by the U.S. Justice Department for 168 days for protecting sources and research notes for an independent book about a federal murder-for-hire case. At the time, it was the longest contempt-of-court imprisonment of a journalist in United States history for protecting sources.

The various judicial rulings surrounding the First Amendment have helped to define the Constitutionally-protected rights of Americans and the limitations on those rights. Civil rights attorneys and activists have had a particularly profound influence in this area, helping to produce legal decisions that have at once expanded and more clearly defined these rights.

• Ron Coleman is an American lawyer and journalist who is an expert on First Amendment and intellectual property rights, especially pertaining to the Internet. Coleman, general counsel for the Media Bloggers Association, wrote in 1995 the first article on intellectual property rights and the Internet published in the American Bar Association Journal. In 1998, Coleman represented Brodsky in the cybersquatting dispute Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky and defended The National Debate’s online parody of The New York Times’s corrections page. In 2015, Coleman represented Simon Tam in In Re Tam, a trademark.
• Carla Gericke is an author, activist, and attorney. Born in South Africa, she immigrated to America in the mid-Nineties after winning a green card in the Diversity Visa Lottery. She became a U.S. citizen in 2000. Gericke practiced law in South Africa, and California, working at Apple Computer, Borland, Logitech, and Scient Corporation. Gericke is President Emeritus of the Free State Project. In 2014, she won a landmark First Circuit Court of Appeals case that affirmed the First Amendment right to film police officers.
• Alexander Peter Allain became one of the United States’ most adamant fighters for the freedom of expression though his work as a lawyer and library advocate. His career was devoted to securing First Amendment rights for libraries.

Referring to the exercise of the First Amendment, free speech has frequently been challenged and tested, particularly when it runs contrary to mainstream views of decency. For this reason, many prominent disputes over free speech have involved representatives of the adult film industry, the artistic avant garde, or advocates of religious liberties.

• Gloria Leonard was an American pornographic actress who became the publisher of High Society magazine. As a board member of Adult Video Association and its successor the Free Speech Coalition, Leonard was an outspoken advocate for the adult film industry and free speech rights.
• Susan Benesch is an American journalist and scholar of speech who is known for founding the Dangerous Speech Project. Benesch is a free speech advocate, recommending the use of counterspeech rather than censorship to delegitimize harmful speech.
• Steven Gey was an American legal academic and one of the leading US scholars on religious liberties and free speech. He was David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor at Florida State University College of Law. His scholarship includes Cases and Materials on Religion and the State and dozens of articles on religious liberties, free speech, and constitutional interpretation. Gey was an active participant in national debates regarding the teaching of evolution in public schools and he served as a regular commentator on legal issues for ABC News in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election. In 2007, he received the “Friend of Darwin Award” from the National Center for Science Education, recognizing his tireless advocacy for the teaching of science in schools.

The phrase “freedom of speech” carries a Constitutional overtone, and implies the shared understanding that this is an inalienable right protected by the First Amendment. Those affiliated with the phrase are often political science scholars, legal scholars, and civil rights attorneys who have helped to more explicitly define what the First Amendment intends through this protection.

• Murray Dry is an American political scientist specializing in American constitutional law, American political thought, political philosophy, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, federalism, separation of powers, and the American founding. He is perhaps most noted for having helped to compile The Complete Anti-Federalist with his former teacher Herbert Storing. He is currently the Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College, having earned his BA, MA, and Ph.D at the University of Chicago, where he studied under Storing and Leo Strauss, among others. For the 2009-2010 academic year, he was a Visiting Professor at Yeshiva University. His current area of research is in the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, and he recently published a book on that subject.
• Harriet Fleischl Pilpel was an American attorney and women’s rights activist. She wrote and lectured extensively regarding the freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and reproductive freedom. Pilpel served as general counsel for both the American Civil Liberties Union and Planned Parenthood. During her career, she participated in 27 cases that came before the United States Supreme Court. Pilpel was involved in the birth control movement and the pro-choice movement. She helped to establish the legal rights of minors to abortion and contraception.
• Judith Fingeret Krug was an American librarian, freedom of speech proponent, and critic of censorship. Krug became director of the Office for Intellectual Freedom at the American Library Association in 1967. In 1969, she joined the Freedom to Read Foundation as its executive director. Krug co-founded Banned Books Week in 1982.

Obscenity Law/Film Censor

Though the key term search yielded zero influencers who were identified as “pro-censorship,” the terms “obscenity law” and “film censor” yielded some examples of those who, through their official capacities in law enforcement or public administration, placed limitations upon the conditions of free speech.

• Roy Early Blick was the director of the Morals Division of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia in the United States during the mid-twentieth-century. He oversaw investigation of and apprehension for offenses related to burlesque, pornography, child pornography, and other obscenity and indecency, prostitution, crimes of “sex perversion” including homosexuality, and gambling. Even before becoming director of the Morals Division, during his preceding career with the MPD, he was consulted by US federal lawmakers, testified before Congress on several occasions, and worked with the FBI on related law enforcement matters. Freedom of Information Act lawsuits in the twenty-first century revealed previously-classified documents indicating frequent meetings and correspondence between the Central Intelligence Agency and Blick during his service as a police official.
• Lloyd Tilghman Binford was an American insurance executive and film censor who was the head of the Memphis Censor Board for 28 years.
• Joseph Ignatius Breen was an American film censor with the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America who applied the Hays Code to film production.
• John Trevelyan, CBE was Secretary of the Board of the British Board of Film Censors from 1958 to 1971.

Political Correctness/Cancel Culture

These phrases are often wielded satirically or derisively to characterize those who would place limitations on free speech through forms of grassroots activism aimed at shaming or punishing those they view as being guilty of offensive, hateful, or marginalizing speech. These terms did not yield evidence of influencers who are opposed to free speech, but instead, yielded a group of influencers who tend to invoke controversy through their exercise of free speech, and who are derisive of these forms of activism.

• Milo Yiannopoulos , or pen name Milo Andreas Wagner, is a British far-right political commentator, polemicist, public speaker and writer. Through his speeches and writings, he ridicules Islam, feminism, social justice, and political correctness. Yiannopoulos is a former editor for Breitbart News , a far-right media organization. Leaked emails have shown that his book Dangerous and many of his Breitbart articles were ghost-written by a Breitbart colleague.
• Scott Norvell is a blogger and columnist for the Fox News Website, having run a column there since 2001. Norvell’s blog and column at Fox News, entitled “Tongue Tied”, details incidents of what he considers extreme “political correctness”. He is also the primary author of the former website www.tonguetied.us which deals with similar issues of language use, American politics, and international politics. The top of the site quotes the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
• Kathy Shaidle is a Canadian author, columnist, poet and blogger. A self-described “anarcho-peacenik” in the early years of her writing career, she moved to a conservative, Roman Catholic position following the September 11 attacks, and entered the public eye as the author of the popular RelapsedCatholic blog. Citing some points of friction with her faith, Shaidle relaunched her blogging career under her current FiveFeetofFury blog. Her views on Islam, political correctness, freedom of speech, and other issues have ignited controversy.
• Mona Charen Parker is a columnist, journalist, political commentator, and writer in the United States. She has written three books: Useful Idiots: How Liberals Got it Wrong in the Cold War and Still Blame America First , Do-Gooders: How Liberals Hurt Those They Claim to Help , both New York Times bestsellers, and Sex Matters: How Modern Feminism Lost Touch with Science, Love, and Common Sense . She was also a weekly panelist on CNN’s Capital Gang until it was canceled. A political conservative, she often writes about foreign policy, terrorism, politics, poverty, family structure, public morality, and culture. She is also known for her generally pro-Israel views.

Influential Organizations Involved in the Censorship and Freedom of Speech Controversy

If you would like to study this topic in more depth, check out these key organizations...

• Federal Communications Commission
• Parents Music Resource Center
• The Motion Picture Association (MPA)

Free Speech Advocates

• American Civil Liberties Union
• First Amendment Coalition
• National Coalition Against Censorship

Interested in building toward a career on the front lines of the Censorship and Freedom of Speech? As you can see, there are many different avenues into this far-reaching issue. Use our Custom College Ranking to find:

• The Most Influential Law Degrees
• The Most Influential Communications Degrees
• The Most Influential Political Science Degrees

A Further Examination of the Debate For and Against Freedom of Speech and Censorship

Freedom of expression is a fundamental right in a democratic society! Freedom of speech allows free expression thru the free exchange of ideas, information, and opinions, thus allowing people to come up with their own opinions on issues of public importance.

Free speech supports a free and independent press, transparent functioning of the state, and informed citizenship.

Conversely, censorship suppresses one’s ideas, words, or images that some people might find offensive to them. For thousands of years, censorship has been a part of human society.

Today, not only lawmakers but agencies keep our right to speech protected or safeguarded, such as the Federal Communications Commission! Specific rules and regulations are set when it comes to restricting spoken words and written information, such as in the case of crafting hate speech and communicating what could be categorized as sexual conduct!

Freedom of Expression Pros and Cons

Freedom of expression pros.

It protects everybody from the influence of special interests: When people hold power, they have this innate feeling that they can do whatever they can to hold on to that power for as long as possible.

This may include a government constitution change, a private media company favoring their Board of Directors, or the suppression of some minority groups that harms the people involved.

With the freedom of speech, this power can be significantly reduced because people are allowed to express what they truly feel about those who are in power. There is nothing to fear of losing personal freedom because everybody’s opinion will contribute to the conversation.

It eliminates compelled actions. When people have freedom of expression, the government cannot compel their actions in a way that they need to speak a specific message. You control what you want and how you want to express those words.

Granting that the government does attempt to change your words to its advantage, you will still have the chance to address the issue and correct the ‘mistakes’ that others create in your work.

Freedom of Expression Cons

Freedom of Expression does not mean you have the freedom to practice “ALL” speech: Freedom of speech allows you to express what you want in a way that does not create legal consequences for you.

Even if your comments are rude or unsavory, you still have the right to express them. However, there are four types of speech in the US that are not allowed under the First Amendment:

• You cannot express any authentic threats against somebody.
• Defaming, including slander and libel, are illegal.
• Plagiarizing any copyrighted materials is now allowed.
• You cannot share obscene materials, like child pornography.

Freedom of Expression can breed false information: Because of the rise of the Internet, some people tend to abuse freedom of speech. They can easily spread false information and still get away with it.

Interested in diving into another one of our controversial topics? Check out The 30 Most Controversial Topics Today!

For study starters, influential books, and much more, check out our full collection of study guides .

Or get tips on studying, student life, and much more with a look at our Student Resources .

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Roseanne's tweet.

NFL players kneeling.

The President blocking people on Twitter.

These stories are all about the same thing: what is free speech? Who gets to decide? And what happens when one person's speech offends another?

As Sam observes in this episode, those questions are part of a national conversation that sounds very different on the left and on the right. Nadine Strossen's new book attempts to dispel misunderstandings on both sides. It's called Hate: Why We Should Resist It With Free Speech, Not Censorship. Strossen spoke to Sam about several recent news stories with free speech entanglements, and laid out her argument for why the best response to hate speech is more speech.

--Producer Brent Baughman

Interview Highlights

Former ACLU President Nadine Strossen

On the central argument of her book

The most effective way to counter the potential negative effects of hate speech — which conveys discriminatory or hateful views on the basis of race, religion, gender, and so forth — is not through censorship, but rather through more speech. And that censorship of hate speech, no matter how well-intended, has been shown around the world and throughout history to do more harm than good in actually promoting equality, dignity, inclusivity, diversity, and societal harmony.

On hateful speech and why it's legal (most of the time)

You very frequently get public officials and even lawyers saying "hate speech is not free speech." But that is not correct! The Supreme Court never has created a category of speech that is defined by its hateful conduct, labeled it hate speech, and said that that is categorically excluded by the first amendment. Speech cannot be punished just because of its hateful con tent . But when you get beyond content and look at context, speech with a hateful message may be punished, if in a particular context it directly causes certain specific, imminent, serious harm — such as a genuine threat that means to instill a reasonable fear on the part of the person at whom the threat is targeted that he or she is going be subject to violence.

On feeling physically threatened by hateful speech

Not only threatened. You can feel emotionally disturbed. You can feel psychic trauma, which can have physiological manifestations. You can feel silenced. These are all real harms that may be suffered by people who are subject to hate speech that is not punishable.

[Because] even though we acknowledge those harms, loosening up the constraints on government to allow it to punish speech because of those less tangible, more speculative, more indirect harms — that censorial power will do more harm that good, precisely because the pendulum can swing. Not that shockingly long ago it was left-wing speakers, communists and socialist, who were kept off campuses. And civil rights activists were kept off many campuses, because their ideas were certainly hated, certainly seen as dangerous and insulting. And today, there are serious government officials who are saying that Black Lives Matter is a hate group.

Students gather in response to the election of Donald Trump at the University of California Los Angeles on November 10, 2016. College campuses have become a focal point in the free speech debate. Frederic J. Brown/AFP/Getty Images hide caption

Students gather in response to the election of Donald Trump at the University of California Los Angeles on November 10, 2016. College campuses have become a focal point in the free speech debate.

On the right of colleges to refuse to allow a controversial speaker due to security costs

First of all, nobody has a right necessarily to speak on a particular campus. Campuses can set viewpoint-neutral time-, place-, and manner-rules to allocate this scarce resource of the opportunity to speak on campus. Just the way in the city of New York, you can't automatically get a parade permit — it's first-come, first-served.

And make no mistake about it, in an ACLU case — I'm proud to say, quite a few years ago — the Supreme Court held that imposing higher security costs on the speaker because the viewpoint is seen to be more controversial and therefore it's more likely to generate protests and therefore security costs — that that is just an indirect way of discriminating against the viewpoint. And you cannot do that.

On the ACLU's public image perception becoming more aligned with the left under President Trump

That's always been a misconception. People tend not to look at the underlying principle, but instead they look at whose ox is gored in the underlying case. And the reason that we're attacking specific policies of Trump is that those specific policies violate civil liberties principles. We did the same with Barack Obama, with Bill Clinton. The ACLU will issue criticism or praise on an issue-by-issue basis. Trump, no doubt, as a record number of issues on which he is earning criticism. But I don't think there is a single official about whom we cannot issue at least some praise and some criticism.

On the ACLU defending the speech rights of groups like the KKK and NAMBLA, and whether it was ever too much for her to stomach

I think the one that to me was the most vile was the North American Man/Boy Love Association. That to me — they are advocating what I see as a form of child abuse. But I do agree with the Supreme Court that advocacy of illegal conduct, including child abuse, is constitutionally protected. And people may be surprised to hear that. [The Supreme Court] drew a distinction between advocacy of illegal conduct versus intentional incitement of illegal conduct.

Because if we say, 'Oh, well, mere advocacy as opposed to intentional incitement will be enough for this speech that's particularly distasteful to me' — well once you make one exception, you can't hold the line. I know that if we loosened the standard for what was deemed to be advocacy that might be dangerous, Black Lives Matter would probably be the first thing that's endangered. So I think you have to look at the abstract principle and just tell yourself: that is what I'm defending.

On whether the NFL's new rule against player protests violates their free speech

Most people don't know and are somewhat disappointed to find out the first amendment — with its free speech guarantee — only applies to the government. Any private-sector entity, including such a powerful one as the NFL, is not constrained by constitutional free speech guarantees. That said, one can make an argument that they should voluntarily choose to protect such a quintessential patriotic value as freedom of speech.

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Zócalo Podcasts

How Librarians Became American Free Speech Heroes

In the past and present, they’ve fought book bans and censorship.

For Banned Books Week, historian Madison Ingram highlights librarians who have fought for intellectual freedom throughout history. Illustration by Elizabeth Sanduvete .

by Madison Ingram | October 5, 2023

At almost 85 years old, the Library Bill of Rights is seeing another round of attacks.

The American Library Association (ALA)—founded in 1876 to professionalize and improve library services across the country—first published the statement in 1939 in response to the news of Nazi book burning and the suppression of information overseas. It asserted that library resources should be provided for the “interest, information, and enlightenment of all people,” and that libraries themselves should challenge censorship and “partisan disapproval” at every turn.

American librarians championed this code during the buildup and entry into World War II. But after the war, librarians went from fighting to defend these principles abroad to fighting to defend these same principles on the home front as they worked to stop book bans and book burnings in their very own libraries during the Cold War.

Now, as librarians and other educators find themselves once more tasked to fight for the public’s right to intellectual freedom, this period of history reminds us that they’ve long been on the front lines of the conflict between censorship and free speech in the U.S., a legacy that dates back to when the first public libraries were established.

The nation’s earliest libraries had high hopes for enlightenment that often fell woefully short. They were subscription-based, meaning that only those who could afford them were allowed to join. Similarly, college libraries, like the one at Harvard, were just for students and faculty. Only as immigration and the population soared in the 19th century did government-funded libraries that served working-class Americans begin to open. Though these libraries frequently held foreign newspapers and books so that patrons could check the news in their home countries, their librarians also pushed assimilation efforts to Americanize new immigrants.

The U.S. government participated in its own acts of censorship during this time. The Comstock Act of 1873, meant to curb the nascent movement of women’s reproductive healthcare, affected both the publishing industry and libraries. The New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, founded by Anthony Comstock and his supporters, was particularly hard on libraries, forcing New York public libraries to withdraw classics like James Joyce’s Ulysses and D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover from their collections. All the while, Black patrons often found themselves without library access, especially in the Jim Crow South.

In the 20th century, censorship continued with German, Italian, and even Irish works and newspapers banned and locked down at the urging of both the government and concerned citizens. At the same time, amid the growing threat of fascism abroad, U.S. libraries at this time emerged as a great symbol of democracy. In addition to the passage of the Library Bill of Rights, during the lead-up to World War II, librarians publicly championed free speech in other ways—soliciting book donations, buying war bonds, and even participating in an on-the-ground effort to save materials from war-torn Europe.

Then came the postwar whiplash as public libraries got pulled into Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s coercive campaign to fight anything he deemed “communist” and “anti-American.” As part of his Cold War witch hunt, McCarthy opened up an investigation into Voice of America, the U.S. foreign-language broadcasting company, alleging it had capitulated to communism. He attacked the VOA’s overseas libraries, which were meant to represent American ideals and information abroad, and called for a list of authors that he had condemned as communists to be stripped from the shelves. Any librarians who refused faced inquiries into their own personal lives and histories.

In response, librarians convened a meeting with publishers in May of 1953 to discuss how they could defend libraries and authors against censorship and censure. Among those present: the Librarian of Congress, Luther Evans, who had just been named the head of UNESCO; Ralph McGill, editor of the Atlanta Constitution ; Cass Canfield, chairman of Harper Brothers Publishing; and Bernard Berelson, a representative of the Ford Foundation.

During the meeting, this influential group ideated the Freedom to Read statement. Building from the Library Bill of Rights, the Freedom to Read statement was meant to send a clear message: that librarians remained defenders of democracy, and that they would not back down in the face of controversy and censorship. The meeting bolstered librarians’ coalition of support and affirmed their united front against McCarthy and his acolytes, who’d already begun attacking local schools and public libraries in the continental U.S. for housing “dangerous” and/or “inappropriate” material.

Among the Americans who took up McCarthy’s cause was a San Antonio housewife named Myrtle G. Hance. A member of the Minute Women of the U.S.A., whose stated mission was to remove “supporters and sympathizers” of communism from schools, Hance took it upon herself that same year—1953—to comb through the San Antonio Public Library’s shelves, where she “uncovered” 500 books containing communist materials. In response, San Antonio mayor Jack White (whose wife was also a Minute Woman), demanded that those books be branded with a large red sticker, so that readers would know they were “dangerous.” Another city official went further—calling for the books Hance singled out to be burned.

It was the chief librarian of San Antonio who prevented this from happening. Julia Grothaus, who’d served in her position for two decades, argued that Americans could not understand, let alone fight, a thing if they did not know anything about it first. Local writers, journalists, and civic organizations rallied behind Grothaus’ position, as did the Public Library Board of Trustees, who would not rubberstamp the mayor’s call for her resignation. Despite Mayor White’s attempts at retaliation, Grothaus and her allies did not yield; the books in San Antonio would not be labeled and would not be burned.

What happened in San Antonio happened in other communities across the country, as organizations like the Minute Women stoked the public’s fears of communism. Librarians resisted in various ways to varying degrees of success. Then, on June 14, 1953, they received major support from President Eisenhower, who offered a highly publicized message bolstering free speech during his Dartmouth College commencement speech. Addressing the new graduates, the president told them, “Don’t join the book-burners… Don’t be afraid to go to your library and read every book.”

The press interpreted the president’s words to be a direct rebuff of McCarthy. The following day, McCarthy’s actions against the VOA’s overseas libraries made the front page of the New York Times when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles confirmed that 11 books abroad had been taken and destroyed. The ALA moved quickly to capitalize on the president’s support and the public’s attention. Shortly thereafter, the Freedom to Read Statement they’d come up with that May was signed off on by the ALA and the American Book Publishers Council and officially published. Still in effect today, it states that “the freedom to read is essential to our democracy.”

Seventy years later, the conflict over censorship and free speech continues to play out in libraries. 2023 is on trend to set the record for the highest number of attempted book bans since ALA began compiling data about censorship in libraries. That means it would break last year’s peak, in which there were 1,269 demands to censor over 2,500 library books. In the summer of 2022, lawmakers in Florida also passed HB 1467, which requires books to be approved by a media specialist trained by Florida’s Department of Education. Educators and librarians found in violation of the law could be charged with a third-degree felony. Other states, like Missouri and Utah, have since published similar laws that punish librarians for “explicit” content.

Librarians and other educators are fighting back against the assault on free speech. Earlier this year, the Florida Education Association (which includes librarians), along with the Florida Freedom to Read Project, filed suit against the Florida legislature to challenge its censorship agenda. And after conservative lawmakers in Arkansas proposed Act 372, which sought to “protect children from indoctrination” by allowing librarians to be brought up on criminal charges if they were found with items “harmful to minors,” the Central Arkansas Library System took the lead in filing a federal lawsuit to question its constitutionality. A judge agreed, and the act has been blocked—for now.

Libraries have always offered more than just books. At their center, they offer a community space with safety to explore identities, histories and cultures. As librarians past and present know, the loss of this intellectual freedom would be catastrophic to American culture and democracy. Which is why, over eight decades since the Freedom to Read Act was first passed, in 2021 the ALA put forward a new statement that condemned acts of censorship and intimidation, and promised to continue to defend patrons’ constitutional rights, and the freedom to speak, publish, and read. It ended with a direct reflection on the Freedom to Read Act, proving that the fight goes on.

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“The remedy for falsehoods is more speech, not enforced silence,” says Michael Glennon, professor of constitutional and international law at The Fletcher School. Photo: Pierre Chiha

An Argument for Free Speech, the “Lifeblood of Democracy”

A Fletcher professor makes the case against censorship in a provocative new book

Free speech is the heart of democracy. But who decides what speech should be free?

Michael Glennon , professor of constitutional and international law at The Fletcher School, has been troubled by a growing trend to censor speech, from college campuses to social media to the halls of government itself. In a provocative new book, Free Speech and Turbulent Freedom: The Dangerous Allure of Censorship in the Digital Era , he argues that such bans—while often well-meaning—are almost always counterproductive, creating more problems than they solve.

The book’s sweeping argument runs from 19th-century Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who set the foundations of First Amendment law, all the way to the most recent social media controversies.

Glennon spoke with Tufts Now about the importance of free speech and why he believes a “marketplace of ideas” is the best antidote to tyranny.

In your introduction, you describe the change you’ve observed in students over the last few years when it comes to free speech. How did that inspire you to write this book?

Students’ attitudes toward free speech have changed dramatically. Nationwide, over half of college students believe that schools shouldn’t allow a speaker on campus who has previously expressed ideas they intensely dislike, and over 30 percent believe it’s acceptable to drown out speakers to prevent them from speaking.

Many of these students think that suppressing free speech is somehow necessary to preserve democracy. I wrote the book to suggest that this view is profoundly and dangerously mistaken.

Freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy. They both rest on the same premise: that people are able to sort out for themselves what’s true and what’s false, and that it’s for individuals, not the government, to judge what’s in their own best interests.

“Censorship inevitably backfires... Censorship alienates the public, generates distrust, fosters social division, and sparks political instability.” Michael Glennon Share on Twitter

You devote the first part of the book to Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and his journey into skepticism about universal morality. To whom is that relevant today?

Many of today’s students have a keen thirst for social justice, which I admire. When Holmes was their age, he shared that thirst, dropping out of college to enlist in the Union Army in a war against slavery, in which he was nearly killed several times.

He became very skeptical of people who believe they have unique access to universal, absolute truth, who view their adversaries as evil incarnate. That, he believed, leads ultimately to violence.

All of us today need to approach public debate with a bit of humility, recognizing that none of us is infallible and that rigid moral certitude leads down a dangerous path.

You argue that government censorship is wrong and even counterproductive. What are some of the reasons?

We know from centuries of experience, in many countries, that censorship inevitably backfires. It discredits the censors, who are seen as patronizing elites. It demeans listeners who are told they can’t handle the truth. It makes martyrs and heroes out of the censored and drives their speech underground where it’s harder to rebut.

Suffragettes, civil rights leaders, and LGBTQ+ activists all have relied on free speech to get their messages out. Censorship alienates the public, generates distrust, fosters social division, and sparks political instability.

It’s not that some speech isn’t harmful—it’s that trying to suppress it causes greater harm.

Many people would probably be surprised to learn that hate speech such as marching with Nazi paraphernalia or burning a cross at a demonstration deriding Black and Jewish people is protected under the First Amendment. Why is it protected?

Not all hateful speech is protected. Incitement to violence, fighting words, defamation, and true threats are all often hateful yet that speech is not protected. But other hateful speech is protected, for several reasons.

Hatred is a viewpoint. It’s for the individual to think and feel as he or she wishes; it’s only when the individual crosses the line between thought and action to incite violence or defame or threaten someone that the state can intervene.

Hate speech laws are also invariably vague and overbroad, leading to arbitrary and abusive enforcement. In the real world, speech rarely gets punished because it hurts dominant majorities. It gets punished because it hurts disadvantaged minorities.

Many Americans feel it is OK to ban clearly false information online, but you argue that would be a bad idea. Why?

The ultimate problem with banning falsehoods is that to do so you’d need an official Ministry of Truth, which could come up with an endless list of officially banned falsehoods. Not only would that list inevitably be self-serving, but it could be wrong.

Even when it comes to clear falsehoods, there are reasons to leave them up. [Former President Donald] Trump claimed, for example, that the size of the crowd at his inauguration was larger than [former President Barack] Obama’s, which was indisputably false. But the statement had the effect of calling into question not only Trump’s veracity but also his mental soundness, which is important for voters to assess.

You say after Trump’s participation in the January 6 uprising, social media platforms banned him for the wrong reasons. What do you mean?

They were wrong to apply a norm of international human rights law in banning him—a supposed prohibition against “glorifying violence.” That’s a vague, overly broad standard that can pick up everything from praising Medal of Honor winners to producing Top Gun .

We’re dealing here with an American president speaking from the White House to the American people, so I say the proper standard should have been the U.S. First Amendment and whether Trump intended to incite imminent violence and whether that violence was likely. Under that test, I think it’s a close case.

What was wrong with the way the government tried to curb “misinformation” about COVID-19?

Justice Louis Brandeis [who served on the Supreme Court from 1916 to 1939] said that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.

If someone counsels drinking bleach to cure COVID, the remedy is not to suppress it—it’s to point out why that’s wrong. But over and over, the government’s remedy for speech it didn’t like was to strongarm social media platforms to take it down.

The government wouldn’t have lost so much credibility if it had only said, “This is our best guess based on available evidence.” Instead, it spoke ex cathedra on masks, lockdowns, school closings, vaccine efficacy, infection rates, myocarditis, social distancing, you name it—claims that often turned out to be untenable—and then it bullied the platforms to censor prominent experts who took issue with its misinformation.

Many commentators are worried about disinformation and AI-generated “deep fakes” affecting the outcome of the 2024 election. What’s the best remedy for that?

The remedy for falsehoods is more speech, not enforced silence. If someone thinks a social media post contains altered imagery or audio, the initial solution is simply to say that and let the marketplace of ideas sort it out.  

Obviously counter-speech isn’t always the answer: You still run into eleventh-hour deep fakes that there’s no time to rebut. People do have privacy rights and interference with elections undercuts democracy.

The trick is to write legislation that catches malign fakery but doesn’t also pick up satire and humor that is obviously bogus. That’s not easy. Well-intended but sloppy laws often trigger serious unintended consequences.

Shadow Government

The High Cost of Online Attacks Against Women

My Way or the Highway

Freedom of expression in the Digital Age: Internet Censorship

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• Md Nurul Momen 4  

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Freedom of expression includes freedom to hold opinions and ideas and to receive and impart information without restrictions by state authorities.

Introduction

Internet is regarded as an important issue that shapes free expression in today’s volatile nature of human rights world (Momen 2020 ). In the digital age, authoritarian governments in the world always attempt to undermine political and social movement through the complete shutdown of the Internet or providing partial access to it. It is also found that the restrictions on freedom of expression on the Internet are through surveillance and monitoring the online activities. In response to any kind of political and social movement, authoritarian governments across the border occasionally shut down many websites, along with the arrest of several anti-government bloggers and political activists. However, under the international legal instruments, for instance, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), denial of the...

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Md Nurul Momen

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Scott Romaniuk

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Manish Thapa

Nemzetkozi Tanulmanyok Intezet, Rm 503, Corvinus Univ, Inst of Intl Studies, Budapest, Hungary

Péter Marton

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Momen, M.N. (2019). Freedom of expression in the Digital Age: Internet Censorship. In: Romaniuk, S., Thapa, M., Marton, P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_31-1

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The Endless Struggle Between Censorship and Free Speech

By stephen rohde march 16, 2022.

Free Speech: A History from Socrates to Social Media by Jacob Mchangama

the roots of free speech are ancient, deep, and sprawling. The Athenian statesman Pericles extolled the democratic values of open debate and tolerance of social dissent as early as 431 BCE. In the ninth century CE, the irreverent freethinker Ibn al-Rawandi used the fertile intellectual climate of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate to audaciously question prophecy and holy books. In 1582 the Dutchman Dirck Coornhert insisted that it was “tyrannical to … forbid good books in order to squelch the truth.” The first legal protection of press freedom was instituted in Sweden in 1766, and in 1770 Denmark became the first country in the world to abolish any and all censorship.

Upon the introduction of new technology that gives access to those previously unheard, the traditional gatekeepers of public opinion fear that the newcomers will manipulate the masses through dangerous ideas and propaganda, threatening the established social and political order.

there have also been those prepared to fight a long and often bloody struggle to expand free speech to include the poor and propertyless, foreigners, women, and religious, racial, ethnic, national, and sexual minorities. All of whom were once thought too credulous, fickle, immoral, ignorant, or dangerous to have a voice in public affairs.

¤           

[i]n 1210, a provincial council ordered ten of Amalric’s followers burned at the stake. The same council banned Aristotle’s natural philosophy, which was becoming increasingly popular at Paris’s Faculty of Arts, ruling that “neither the books of Aristotle on natural philosophy nor their commentaries are to be taught at Paris in public or privately.”

to defend a culture tolerant of heretical ideas, use our system of “open vigilance” to limit the reach of disinformation, agree to disagree without resorting to harassment or hate, and treat free speech as a principle to be upheld universally rather than a prop to be selectively invoked for narrow tribalist point scoring.

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The Editorial Board

America Has a Free Speech Problem

By The Editorial Board

The editorial board is a group of opinion journalists whose views are informed by expertise, research, debate and certain longstanding values . It is separate from the newsroom.

For all the tolerance and enlightenment that modern society claims, Americans are losing hold of a fundamental right as citizens of a free country: the right to speak their minds and voice their opinions in public without fear of being shamed or shunned.

This social silencing, this depluralizing of America, has been evident for years, but dealing with it stirs yet more fear. It feels like a third rail, dangerous. For a strong nation and open society, that is dangerous.

How has this happened? In large part, it’s because the political left and the right are caught in a destructive loop of condemnation and recrimination around cancel culture. Many on the left refuse to acknowledge that cancel culture exists at all, believing that those who complain about it are offering cover for bigots to peddle hate speech. Many on the right, for all their braying about cancel culture, have embraced an even more extreme version of censoriousness as a bulwark against a rapidly changing society, with laws that would ban books, stifle teachers and discourage open discussion in classrooms.

Many Americans are understandably confused, then, about what they can say and where they can say it. People should be able to put forward viewpoints, ask questions and make mistakes and take unpopular but good-faith positions on issues that society is still working through — all without fearing cancellation.

However you define cancel culture, Americans know it exists and feel its burden. In a new national poll commissioned by Times Opinion and Siena College , only 34 percent of Americans said they believed that all Americans enjoyed freedom of speech completely. The poll found that 84 percent of adults said it is a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem that some Americans do not speak freely in everyday situations because of fear of retaliation or harsh criticism.

This poll and other recent surveys from the Pew Research Center and the Knight Foundation reveal a crisis of confidence around one of America’s most basic values. Freedom of speech and expression is vital to human beings’ search for truth and knowledge about our world. A society that values freedom of speech can benefit from the full diversity of its people and their ideas. At the individual level, human beings cannot flourish without the confidence to take risks, pursue ideas and express thoughts that others might reject.

Most important, freedom of speech is the bedrock of democratic self-government. If people feel free to express their views in their communities, the democratic process can respond to and resolve competing ideas. Ideas that go unchallenged by opposing views risk becoming weak and brittle rather than being strengthened by tough scrutiny. When speech is stifled or when dissenters are shut out of public discourse, a society also loses its ability to resolve conflict, and it faces the risk of political violence.

We’ve excerpted a few of the poll’s other questions below. Choose your answers to see how your opinions compare to Americans’.

1. Over the past year, have you held your tongue because you were concerned about retaliation or harsh criticism?

Select an answer to see the poll’s results.

2. Over the past year, have you retaliated against or harshly criticized another person because of something he or she said?

3. How much of a problem is it that some Americans do not exercise their freedom of speech in everyday situations out of fear of retaliation or harsh criticism?

The Times Opinion/Siena College poll found that 46 percent of respondents said they felt less free to talk about politics compared to a decade ago. Thirty percent said they felt the same. Only 21 percent of people reported feeling freer, even though in the past decade there was a vast expansion of voices in the public square through social media.

“There’s a crisis around the freedom of speech now because many people don’t understand it, they weren’t taught what it means and why it matters,” said Suzanne Nossel, the chief executive of PEN America, a free speech organization. “Safeguards for free speech have been essential to almost all social progress in the country, from the civil rights movement to women’s suffrage to the current fights over racial justice and the police.”

Times Opinion commissioned the poll to provide more data and insight that can inform a debate mired in extremes. This editorial board plans to identify a wide range of threats to freedom of speech in the coming months and to offer possible solutions. Freedom of speech requires not just a commitment to openness and tolerance in the abstract. It demands conscientiousness about both the power of speech and its potential harms. We believe it isn’t enough for Americans to just believe in the rights of others to speak freely; they should also find ways to actively support and protect those rights.

We are under no illusion that this is easy. Our era, especially, is not made for this; social media is awash in speech of the point-scoring, picking-apart, piling-on, put-down variety. A deluge of misinformation and disinformation online has heightened this tension. Making the internet a more gracious place does not seem high on anyone’s agenda, and certainly not for most of the tech companies that control it.

But the old lesson of “think before you speak” has given way to the new lesson of “speak at your peril.” You can’t consider yourself a supporter of free speech and be policing and punishing speech more than protecting it. Free speech demands a greater willingness to engage with ideas we dislike and greater self-restraint in the face of words that challenge and even unsettle us.

It is worth noting here the important distinction between what the First Amendment protects (freedom from government restrictions on expression) and the popular conception of free speech (the affirmative right to speak your mind in public, on which the law is silent). The world is witnessing, in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the strangling of free speech through government censorship and imprisonment. That is not the kind of threat to freedom of expression that Americans face. Yet something has been lost; the poll clearly shows a dissatisfaction with free speech as it is experienced and understood by Americans today.

Consider this finding from our poll: Fifty-five percent of respondents said that they had held their tongue over the past year because they were concerned about retaliation or harsh criticism. Women were more likely to report doing so — 61 percent, compared to 49 percent of men. Older respondents were less likely to have done so than other age groups. Republicans (58 percent) were slightly more likely to have held their tongues than Democrats (52 percent) or independents (56 percent).

At the same time, 22 percent of adults reported that they had retaliated against or were harshly critical of someone over something he or she said. Adults 18 to 34 years old were far more likely to have done so than older Americans; liberals were more likely to have done so than moderates or conservatives.

Elijah Afere, a 25-year-old I.T. technician from Union, N.J., said that he worried about the larger implications of chilled speech for democracy. “You can’t give people the benefit of the doubt to just hold a conversation anymore. You’ve got to worry about feeling judged,” he said. “Political views can even affect your family ties, how you relate to your uncle or the other side. It’s really not good.”

Roy Block, 76, from San Antonio, described himself as conservative and said he has been alarmed by scenes of parents being silenced at school board meetings over the past year. “I think it’s mostly conservatives that are being silenced,” he said. “But regardless, I think it should be a two-way street. Everybody should have an opportunity to speak and especially in open gathering and open forum.”

1. Do you feel more free, less free or as free as you did before to express your viewpoint in most situations on a daily basis today than you did 10 years ago on politics?

2. Do you feel more free, less free or as free as you did before to express your viewpoint in most situations on a daily basis today than you did 10 years ago on race relations?

Pollsters asked how free people felt today to discuss six topics — including religion, politics, gender identity and race relations — compared to 10 years ago: more free, less free or the same. Those who felt freest were Black respondents: At least 30 percent of them said they felt more free to speak on every topic, including 42 percent on race relations, the highest share of any racial or ethnic group. Still, that sentiment of more freedom among Black respondents reached only 46 percent, not a majority (the 46 percent being on the issue of gender identity).

At the same time, a full 84 percent of Black people polled shared the concern of this editorial that it was a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem that some Americans do not exercise their freedom of speech out of fear of retaliation or harsh criticism. And 45 percent of Black people and nearly 60 percent of Latinos and white people polled reported that they’d held their tongues in the past year out of fear of retaliation or harsh criticism.

While the level of national anxiety around free speech is apparent, the solutions are much less clear. In the poll, 66 percent of respondents agreed with the following: “Our democracy is built upon the free, open and safe exchange of ideas, no matter how different they are. We should encourage all speech so long as it is done in a way that doesn’t threaten others.” Yet a full 30 percent agreed that “while I support free speech, sometimes you have shut down speech that is antidemocratic, bigoted or simply untrue.” Those who identified themselves as Democrats and liberals showed a higher level of support for sometimes shutting down such speech.

The full-throated defense of free speech was once a liberal ideal. Many of the legal victories that expanded the realm of permissible speech in the United States came in defense of liberal speakers against the power of the government — a ruling that students couldn’t be forced to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, a ruling protecting the rights of students to demonstrate against the Vietnam War, a ruling allowing the burning of the American flag.

And yet many progressives appear to have lost faith in that principle. This was a source of great frustration for one of those who responded to our poll, Emily Leonard, a 93-year-old from Hartford, Conn., who described herself as a liberal. She said she was alarmed about reports of speakers getting shouted down on college campuses. “We need to hear what people think, even though we disagree with them. It is the basis of our democracy. And it’s absolutely essential to a continuing democracy,” she said. “Liberal as I am — a little to the left of Lenin — I think these kids and this whole cancel culture and so-called woke is doing us so much harm. They’re undermining the Constitution. That’s what it comes down to.”

The progressive movement in America has been a force for good in many ways: for social and racial justice, for pay equity, for a fairer system and society and for calling out hate and hate speech. In the course of their fight for tolerance, many progressives have become intolerant of those who disagree with them or express other opinions and taken on a kind of self-righteousness and censoriousness that the right long displayed and the left long abhorred. It has made people uncertain about the contours of speech: Many know they shouldn’t utter racist things, but they don’t understand what they can say about race or can say to a person of a different race from theirs. Attacking people in the workplace, on campus, on social media and elsewhere who express unpopular views from a place of good faith is the practice of a closed society.

The Times does not allow hate speech in our pages, even though it is broadly protected by the Constitution, and we support that principle . But there is a difference between hate speech and speech that challenges us in ways that we might find difficult or even offensive.

At the same time, all Americans should be deeply concerned about an avalanche of legislation passed by Republican-controlled legislatures around the country that gags discussion of certain topics and clearly violates the spirit of the First Amendment, if not the letter of the law.

It goes far beyond conservative states yanking books about race and sex from public school libraries . Since 2021 in 40 state legislatures, 175 bills have been introduced or prefiled that target what teachers can say and what students can learn, often with severe penalties. Of those, 13 have become law in 11 states, and 106 are still under consideration. All told, 99 bills currently target K-12 public schools, 44 target higher education, and 59 include punishment for violators, according to a running tally kept by PEN America . In some instance s, the proposed bills failed to become law. In other cases, the courts should declare them unconstitutional.

These bills include Florida’s “Don’t Say Gay” bill , which would restrict what teachers and students can talk about and allows for parents to file lawsuits. If the law goes into force, watch for lawsuits against schools that restrict the free speech rights of students to discuss things like sexuality, established by earlier Supreme Court rulings.

The new gag laws coincide with a similar barrage of bills that ostensibly target critical race theory, an idea that has percolated down from law schools to the broader public in recent years as a way to understand the pervasiveness of racism. The moral panic around critical race theory has morphed into a vast effort to restrict discussions of race, sex, American history and other topics that conservatives say are divisive. Several states have now passed these gag laws restricting what can be said in public schools, colleges and universities, and state agencies and institutions.

In passing laws that restrict speech, conservatives have adopted the language of harm that some liberals used in the past to restrict speech — the idea that speech itself can cause an unacceptable harm, which has led to a proliferation of campus speech codes and the use of trigger warnings in college classrooms.

Now conservatives have used the idea of harmful speech to their own ends: An anti-critical-race-theory law in Tennessee passed last year , for instance, prohibits promoting the concept that “an individual should feel discomfort, guilt, anguish or another form of psychological distress solely because of the individual’s race or sex” — a measure aimed at avoiding the “distress” that students might feel when learning about racist or misogynist elements of American history. (Unmentioned, of course, is the potential discomfort felt by students who are fed a whitewashed version of American history.)

Liberals — and anyone concerned with protecting free speech — are right to fight against these pernicious laws. But legal limits are not the only constraints on Americans’ freedom of speech. On college campuses and in many workplaces, speech that others find harmful or offensive can result not only in online shaming but also in the loss of livelihood. Some progressives believe this has provided a necessary, and even welcome, check on those in power. But when social norms around acceptable speech are constantly shifting and when there is no clear definition of harm, these constraints on speech can turn into arbitrary rules with disproportionate consequences.

Free speech is predicated on mutual respect — that of people for one another and of a government for the people it serves. Every day, in communities across the country, Americans must speak to one another freely to refine and improve the elements of our social contract: What do we owe the most vulnerable in our neighborhoods? What conduct should we expect from public servants? What ideas are so essential to understanding American democracy that they should be taught in schools? When public discourse in America is narrowed, it becomes harder to answer these and the many other urgent questions we face as a society.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram .

An earlier version of this editorial mischaracterized a Tennessee law banning the teaching of critical race theory. It prohibits promoting the concept that “an individual should feel discomfort, guilt, anguish or another form of psychological distress solely because of the individual’s race or sex.” It does not ban lesson plans that could cause students distress.

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Home — Essay Samples — Social Issues — Human Rights — Freedom of Speech

Argumentative Essays on Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech essay topic examples, argumentative essays.

Argumentative essays on freedom of speech require you to take a stance on a specific aspect of this topic and provide evidence to support your viewpoint. Consider these topic examples:

• 1. Argue for the importance of protecting hate speech as a form of free expression, emphasizing the principles of free speech and the potential consequences of limiting it.
• 2. Debate the ethical implications of social media platforms censoring or moderating content, exploring the balance between maintaining a safe online environment and upholding free speech rights.

Example Introduction Paragraph for an Argumentative Freedom of Speech Essay: Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of democratic societies, but it often challenges our notions of what should be protected. In this argumentative essay, we will examine the importance of safeguarding hate speech as a form of free expression, exploring the principles of free speech and the potential ramifications of its restriction.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for an Argumentative Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the argument for protecting hate speech within the bounds of free expression highlights the enduring principles of democracy and free speech. As we navigate these complex debates, we must remain committed to preserving the foundations of our democratic society.

Compare and Contrast Essays

Compare and contrast essays on freedom of speech involve analyzing the similarities and differences between various aspects of free speech laws, practices, or the historical development of free speech rights in different countries. Consider these topics:

• 1. Compare and contrast the approach to freedom of speech in the United States and European Union, examining the legal frameworks, historical context, and key differences in their protection of free expression.
• 2. Analyze the evolution of freedom of speech in the digital age, comparing the challenges and opportunities presented by online platforms and the traditional forms of free expression.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Compare and Contrast Freedom of Speech Essay: Freedom of speech varies across different countries and contexts, raising questions about the boundaries of this fundamental right. In this compare and contrast essay, we will explore the approaches to freedom of speech in the United States and the European Union, shedding light on their legal frameworks, historical backgrounds, and notable distinctions.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Compare and Contrast Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the comparison and contrast of freedom of speech in the United States and the European Union reveal the multifaceted nature of this fundamental right. As we examine these diverse perspectives, we gain a deeper appreciation for the complexities surrounding free expression in our globalized world.

Descriptive Essays

Descriptive essays on freedom of speech allow you to provide detailed accounts and analysis of specific instances, historical events, or contemporary debates related to free speech. Here are some topic ideas:

• 1. Describe a landmark Supreme Court case related to freedom of speech, such as the "Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District" case, and its significance in shaping free speech rights for students.
• 2. Paint a vivid picture of a recent protest or demonstration where freedom of speech played a central role, discussing the motivations of the protesters, the public's response, and the outcomes of the event.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Descriptive Freedom of Speech Essay: Freedom of speech is often tested and defined in the courtroom and in the streets. In this descriptive essay, we will delve into the landmark Supreme Court case "Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District" and its profound impact on the free speech rights of students within the educational system.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Descriptive Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the descriptive exploration of the "Tinker" case illustrates the enduring struggle to balance students' free speech rights with the need for a productive educational environment. As we reflect on this historical event, we are reminded of the ongoing challenges in preserving and defining freedom of speech in schools.

Persuasive Essays

Persuasive essays on freedom of speech involve advocating for specific actions, policies, or changes related to the protection or limitations of free speech rights. Consider these persuasive topics:

• 1. Persuade your audience of the importance of enacting legislation to combat "cancel culture" and protect individuals' right to express unpopular opinions without fear of social or professional consequences.
• 2. Advocate for greater transparency and accountability in social media content moderation practices, highlighting the potential impact on free speech and the public's right to access diverse information.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Persuasive Freedom of Speech Essay: The boundaries of free speech are continually tested in our rapidly changing society. In this persuasive essay, I will make a compelling case for the necessity of legislation to combat "cancel culture" and preserve individuals' right to express dissenting views without facing severe social or professional repercussions.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Persuasive Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the persuasive argument for legislation against "cancel culture" underscores the importance of safeguarding free speech in the face of societal pressures. As we advocate for change, we contribute to the preservation of a diverse and inclusive marketplace of ideas.

Narrative Essays

Narrative essays on freedom of speech allow you to share personal stories, experiences, or observations related to free speech, your encounters with debates or controversies, or the impact of free expression on your life. Explore these narrative essay topics:

• 1. Narrate a personal experience where you exercised your right to free speech, detailing the circumstances, motivations, and reactions from others, and reflecting on the significance of your actions.
• 2. Share a story of your involvement in a community or online discussion where freedom of speech played a central role, emphasizing the challenges and rewards of engaging in open dialogue.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Narrative Freedom of Speech Essay: Freedom of speech is not just an abstract concept; it is a lived experience. In this narrative essay, I will take you through a personal journey where I exercised my right to free speech, recounting the circumstances, motivations, and the impact of my actions on those around me.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Narrative Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the narrative of my personal experience with free speech highlights the transformative power of open dialogue and individual expression. As we share our stories, we contribute to the rich tapestry of voices that define our commitment to this essential democratic principle.

The Significance of Freedom of Speech

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A Study of The True Meaning of Free Speech in Today's Society

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Freedom of speech is a fundamental human right that encompasses the liberty to express thoughts, opinions, beliefs, and ideas without fear of censorship, reprisal, or governmental interference.

1. The right to seek information and ideas; 2. The right to receive information and ideas; 3. The right to impart information and ideas.

The concept of freedom of speech has deep historical roots, originating from ancient civilizations and evolving through various historical contexts. The ancient Greeks, particularly in Athens, valued free expression and public debate, considering it essential for democratic governance. Similarly, the Roman Republic allowed citizens the freedom to express their opinions in political matters. The modern understanding of freedom of speech emerged during the Age of Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries. Prominent thinkers like John Locke and Voltaire advocated for the right to express ideas without censorship or persecution. Their ideas influenced the development of democratic societies and the recognition of freedom of speech as a fundamental human right. The historical context of freedom of speech also includes pivotal moments, such as the American Revolution and the French Revolution. These revolutions challenged the existing oppressive regimes and led to the inclusion of free speech protections in their respective declarations of rights. Since then, the concept of freedom of speech has been enshrined in numerous international human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. It guarantees individuals the right to express their opinions, beliefs, and ideas without fear of government censorship or retaliation. The historical context of freedom of speech in the US can be traced back to the country's founding. The American Revolution and the subsequent establishment of the Constitution were driven by a desire for individual liberties, including the right to freely express oneself. Over the years, the interpretation and application of freedom of speech in the US have been shaped by landmark court cases. For instance, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of protecting political and symbolic speech, even if it was controversial or dissenting. This period also saw the rise of the free speech movement, which advocated for greater rights on college campuses. However, the freedom of speech in the US is not absolute. Certain types of speech, such as obscenity, defamation, incitement to violence, and hate speech, are subject to limitations and can be legally restricted.

Thomas Jefferson: As one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, Jefferson was a staunch advocate for freedom of speech. He believed that a free exchange of ideas was vital for a democratic society and emphasized its protection in the First Amendment. Voltaire: A French philosopher and writer, Voltaire championed the principles of free expression and tolerance. His writings challenged oppressive regimes and promoted the idea that individuals should have the right to speak their minds without fear of persecution. Martin Luther King Jr.: Known for his leadership in the American civil rights movement, King passionately defended free speech as a means to advocate for social justice. His powerful speeches and peaceful protests were instrumental in promoting equality and challenging systemic racism. John Stuart Mill: An influential philosopher and political economist, Mill articulated the concept of the "marketplace of ideas" and argued for unrestricted freedom of speech. He believed that through open and robust debate, society could discover the truth and prevent the suppression of minority viewpoints.

Public opinion on the freedom of speech varies widely, reflecting the diversity of perspectives within societies around the world. While many individuals staunchly uphold the value and importance of free speech as a fundamental human right, others harbor concerns and reservations regarding its boundaries and potential consequences. Additionally, cultural and societal factors significantly shape public opinion on freedom of speech. Different countries and communities may have distinct historical experiences, cultural norms, and legal frameworks that influence their perspectives. The balance between individual freedoms and collective well-being may vary across societies, leading to differing opinions on where the boundaries of free speech should lie. Technological advancements and the rise of social media platforms have further complicated public opinion on freedom of speech. The digital age has enabled individuals to express their views on a global scale, amplifying the impact and reach of their words. However, it has also highlighted concerns about online harassment, the spread of misinformation, and the potential for manipulation and abuse of free speech rights. As a result, debates emerge around the role of platforms in regulating speech and ensuring the responsible use of online communication tools.

1. Protection of democratic principles 2. Advancement of knowledge and progress 3. Promotion of individual autonomy 4. Protection of minority rights 5. Defense against tyranny

1. Harmful and hateful speech 2. Protection of vulnerable groups 3. Misinformation and propaganda 4. Privacy and dignity 5. Societal stability and public safety

1. The recognition of speech protection can be traced back to the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, marking an early milestone in safeguarding the freedom of expression. 2. In 399 BC, the renowned Greek philosopher Socrates faced persecution for his advocacy of unrestricted speech, showcasing the historical roots of the ongoing struggle for free speech rights. 3. A significant majority, approximately 70% of Americans, believe in the importance of granting individuals the right to free speech, even if their words are deemed highly offensive or controversial. 4. A pivotal moment for student rights came in 1969 with the Supreme Court case Tinker v. Des Moines, which affirmed that students maintain their right to free speech even within the confines of school hours.

The topic of freedom of speech is of immense importance for writing an essay due to its fundamental role in society. Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of democracy, enabling individuals to express their opinions, ideas, and beliefs openly without fear of censorship or retribution. It serves as a catalyst for societal progress, allowing for the exchange of diverse perspectives, critical thinking, and the challenging of established norms. Exploring the concept of freedom of speech in an essay provides an opportunity to delve into its historical significance and the ongoing struggles for its protection. It allows for an examination of the complex balance between free expression and the limitations necessary to prevent harm or hate speech. Additionally, discussing the importance of freedom of speech facilitates a deeper understanding of its role in fostering social justice, political discourse, and the protection of minority voices. Moreover, the topic invites exploration of contemporary issues such as online censorship, fake news, and the challenges posed by the digital age. By analyzing case studies, legal frameworks, and international perspectives, an essay on freedom of speech can shed light on the ongoing debates, dilemmas, and potential solutions to ensure its preservation in an ever-evolving society.

1. Sullivan, K. M. (2010). Two concepts of freedom of speech. Harvard Law Review, 124(1), 143-177. (https://www.jstor.org/stable/20788316) 2. Van Mill, D. (2002). Freedom of speech. (https://plato.stanford.edu/ENTRIES/freedom-speech/) 3. Bogen, D. (1983). The origins of freedom of speech and press. Md. L. Rev., 42, 429. (https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/mllr42&div=20&id=&page=) 4. Yong, C. (2011). Does freedom of speech include hate speech?. Res Publica, 17, 385-403. (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-011-9158-y) 5. McHugh, M. R. (2004). Historiography and freedom of speech: the case of Cremutius Cordus. In Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (pp. 391-408). Brill. (https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789047405689/B9789047405689-s018.xml) 6. Milo, D. (2008). Defamation and freedom of speech. (https://academic.oup.com/book/2591) 7. Helwig, C. C. (1998). Children's conceptions of fair government and freedom of speech. Child Development, 69(2), 518-531. (https://srcd.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06205.x) 8. Cheung, A. S. (2011). Exercising freedom of speech behind the great firewall: A study of judges’ and lawyers’ blogs in China. Harvard International Law Journal Online. (https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2011/04/HILJ-Online_52_Cheung1.pdf) 9. Nieuwenhuis, A. (2000). Freedom of speech: USA vs Germany and Europe. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 18(2), 195-214. (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/092405190001800203)

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Censoring Free Speech: Pros and Cons Research Paper

Introduction, why support freedom of speech, why censor free speech.

Freedom of speech is something that is practiced in many countries today. Most governments have their bills amended in support of freedom of speech. However, there are various developments in communication such that most nations are moving towards amending these bills again in support of censorship of free exercise of speech. Free speech refers to the right of an individual to express their opinions without any censorship from the government (Kevin, p31). Censorship of speech simply refers to the act of suppressing the freedom of free speech. Freedom of speech has been very affected today and in whichever way we look at it, no country exclusively practices free speech (Henry, p8). This is because some individuals will take advantage of free speech and they will deliver speeches such as hate speech, incitement speeches, or speeches that do not have any supporting facts. For this reason, the government must move to protect its citizens from such speeches. This paper intends to analyses censorship of free speech and why or why not it should be supported.

Expression of truth

Free speech should not be censored since it allows individuals to freely express their views and ideas concerning different subjects. Through such expression it allows the society to be very informed about the happenings that are unfolding within the society. This is especially important when it comes to the government. Society is not always aware of what happens behind the curtains of the government. Through free speech, we can discover the truth. With censorship, such truth and information may never get to the public.

Self-governance

A state that lacks freedom of speech lacks self-governance. Having self-governance means being able to make decisions based on the information that you have. With free speech, the individuals in the society are always informed and they can make very informed decisions (Alan, p61). This is especially important during the time of elections when then society is electing its leaders. Through the freedom of speech, society can influence the policies that the government is undertaking. People are more enlightened about what they want and they can campaign for it. Without free speech, society will be afraid of expressing themselves and this means that the government will never respond to their grievances.

Free speech is an avenue of attaining democracy within a country. This can be traced to the days of Martin Luther King who was an eloquent leader and made very powerful speeches in a bid to attaining democracy. Martin’s speeches influenced a lot of people and he was able to compel the government to honor the civil rights of the people (Kevin, p39). If a government censors free speech it will be an avenue to dictatorship and authoritarian regimes. This again was observed during Hitler’s era who after using free speech to gain power retrieved and denied the freedom of speech to individuals. He only supported free speech on those agendas that were of interest to him. He knew the strength of the power of speech in attaining democracy and this would have been a threat to his dictatorial regime. Lack of free speech undermines the people’s human rights.

Accountability

The presence of free speech within a country will determine the quality of governance in that country (Alan, p75). Through free speech, individuals can criticize the performance of the government and also public officials. With such criticisms being allowed, the performance of the government is improved. The government and other people serving the public can be accountable for their actions. With censorship, the government easily escapes accountability by silencing its critics.

Social Interaction

Free speech allows individuals to improve their communication skills within society. Through free speech, they can establish new relationships within the society and also maintain the already established relationships. People can participate in the development of the nation and also the society through sharing of ideas and knowledge.

Conflict of values and rights

Freedom of speech cannot be supported if it interferes with the values and the rights of the individuals within the society (Arthur, p63). For example, some individuals take advantage of the freedom of speech to spread bad morals such as pornographic materials and other unacceptable morals such as lesbianism and homosexuality. The government should censorship such motives of freedom of speech since this amounts to the spread of bad morals. The freedom of speech especially on the internet has been censured by the government to protect society from such information especially to the children and also teenagers who might engage in irresponsible behaviors upon exposure to such kind of information (Sunstein, p36). In other instances, it results in defamation of individuals within the society which is not acceptable. In such cases, the government should be supported in the censorship of free speech.

National security

Censoring of free speech is practiced by the government as a matter of protecting the public from insecurities that may be spread by individuals to the public (Erik, p16). Politicians are especially the ones who are greatly involved in this kind of censorship. If a politician is involved in giving hate speeches or speeches that incite people to go into war or commit crimes, they should be banned from exercising their freedom of speech. This is because such leaders may incite the society to get involved in crime if the motives they want to be achieved in the government are not accomplished according to their wishes. This may bring a lot of instability to the government and this is a major threat to the national security of a country.

Therefore censorship of freedom of speech should not always be viewed as a bad motive in the government. Sometimes it is done to protect the citizens of the country. This ensures public safety and thus people can confidently live in a safe environment (Arthur, p71). This can be traced to the days of Hitler. Hitler and his Nazi power rose to power due to their freedom of the press but this eventually led to the death of millions of people due to his dictatorship. If there had been censorship of the free press during that period, many lives would have been saved since his hate speeches would not have had such great influence on society.

Political propagandas

Free speech is just a platform used by politicians to spread their propaganda to society. The opposition to the government especially takes advantage of the situation to spread negative motives of the government which might lead to a lack of confidence in the government (Sunstein, p42). Through control of free speech, the government can defend its position to the people by avoiding the spread of such propaganda. Some politicians also use free speech to spread evil motives especially racial negativity (Arthur, p77). This might divide the people of one nation through cheap propaganda of favoritism towards some races. The government uses censorship to protect the citizens from being fed with such information. On the other hand, politicians only use free speech for their benefits for climbing the power ladder by creating and making promises to the public which will never be achieved. In this case, free speech encourages individuals to spread information that lacks facts and support. Whether it comes to fulfillment or not is not their problem as long as they achieved what they wanted from the public. The government should in such cases censor the spread of information that lacks facts since it adds no value to society (Erik, p25).

In conclusion, Censorship of free speech is of great disadvantage to society than benefits. It denies individuals the right to freely express and share ideas that are essential in the development of a nation. Free speech allows people to listen to a different view of individuals and make very informed decisions. With censorship, it amounts to selecting what people will talk and listen to. This amounts to manipulation of their decisions and thus dictatorship and lack of democracy. However, censorship is not evil in all circumstances. It serves an important role in maintaining national security and preserving the social values and morals of the society (Henry, p17).

Alan Haworth. Free speech. Routledge, 1998, 54-78.

Arthur James Anderson. Problems in intellectual freedom and censorship. R. R. Bowker Co. 2001, p62-93.

Erik Ringmar. Free Speech and Censorship in the Age of the Internet. Anthem Press, 2007, p14-28.

Henry Reichman. Censorship and the freedom of speech. ALA Editions, 2001, p8-17.

Hoffman, Frank. Intellectual Freedom and Censorship. The Scarecrow Press, 1989, p27-49.

Kevin C. O’Rourke. John Stuart Mill and Freedom of Expression: The Genesis of a Theory. Routledge, 2001, p31-57.

Sava. The Suppressed Serbian Voice and the Free Press in America. Sage publications, P23-43.

Sunstein, Cass. Democracy and the problem of free speech. McGraw Hill, 1995, p34-46.

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IvyPanda. (2024, March 12). Censoring Free Speech: Pros and Cons. https://ivypanda.com/essays/censoring-free-speech-pros-and-cons/

"Censoring Free Speech: Pros and Cons." IvyPanda , 12 Mar. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/censoring-free-speech-pros-and-cons/.

IvyPanda . (2024) 'Censoring Free Speech: Pros and Cons'. 12 March.

IvyPanda . 2024. "Censoring Free Speech: Pros and Cons." March 12, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/censoring-free-speech-pros-and-cons/.

1. IvyPanda . "Censoring Free Speech: Pros and Cons." March 12, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/censoring-free-speech-pros-and-cons/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Censoring Free Speech: Pros and Cons." March 12, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/censoring-free-speech-pros-and-cons/.

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Freedom of Speech and Censorship

How it works

The government needs to also look at the First amendment that gives Americans the freedom of speech. Although freedom of speech gave the Americans an opportunity to express themselves, it came with some disadvantages. Some individuals used this freedom to propagate hatred especially racism. Individuals who had something against the blacks would use the freedom of expression clause to protect themselves before making hateful remarks. They would propagate hate between the African Americans and the whites. Some leaders were known for not censoring what they wanted to say no matter how it was interpreted due to the protection that the clause held.

This led to the exceptions to free speech in the united states. This clause outlines limitations on the 1st amendment guarantee of free speech and expression. They include speech that incites lawless action in the state. In the case Schenk v. United states. this law however has since been replaced by Brandenburg V. Ohio where the court ruled” government cannot punish an inflammatory speech unless that speech incites people or leads to imminent lawless action. On the matte of inciting, that has to narrow down to moral principle where as an individual you have to narrow down your words to decide if they will bring more harm or good

The greatest challenge when it comes to controlling the freedom of speech is in the social media platform is the freedom of seech. Over the year’s social media has become the major platform where we express our views whether politics, social problems or economic problems. social media has also become a great platform where the leaders have had the opportunity to interacts with its citizen. Twitter specifically is one famous social media platform that is mostly used in engaging leaders and the citizen. The social media has provided a space where you can reach a large number of people and over the years it has even been used to campaign, explain manifestos or create a live session where individuals are able to engage with their leaders on matters pertaining their manifesto and their promises to the people.

Although social media has incredibly changed the way we convey our messages, it has also become problematic as there are no laws guiding freedom of speech in the internet (Byrd). Because of the web, it is presently conceivable to communicate all the more unreservedly and secretly on issues, be they political, social or monetary with almost no cost. However, concerns have been raised over the utilization of the web in methods for putting limits on what we say and post on the web. This has realized the subject of restriction on the substance we access or post however again it winds up almost impossible as it is viewed as a way of stepping on the freedom of expression.

With occurrence of things such as cyberbullying, the debate on internet censorship has emerged. The internet censorship is no longer a matter of legislation but now narrows down to moral questions. Even while James Madison was advocating for freedom of speech, he did not envision a situation we are in now, this may probably be because social media is a result of technology which was not there when the constitution was created. If the government tries to intervene on the censorship, the human activist will be on the road in a couple of hour accusing the government of infringing on the first amendment freedom of expression. It is in the interest of the public to come up with laws that will restrict the freedom of speech on the social media sites.

These sites have been used to propagate hate message, bully, troll innocent people as well as spread fake news. Spreading of fake news my result in a lot of panic in the country. Twitter is one social media site that is notorious for spreading of fake news or hatred. Just one tweet can be retweeted by a million of people in matter of hours. With the freedom of speech, you find individuals advocating against a certain race or even religion in these platforms. They cannot be arrested for this as they are protected by the 1st Amendment act. It is such loopholes in the bill of rights that have made some legislators to try and come up with legislations that will save such situations.

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Student Advocates for Speech

Home » Projects » Student Advocates for Speech

EMPOWERING THE NEXT GENERATION OF ADVOCATES

NCAC’s Student Advocates for Speech Leadership Program is the only one of its kind dedicated to creating high school-level student anti-censorship advocates. SAS students learn about and fight back against all forms of censorship that harm their ability to learn and engage in free inquiry and critical thinking.

The SAS Leadership Program will create, train, and connect a nationwide network of student leaders who will become front line advocates on free speech and censorship issues happening in their communities. NCAC will provide personalized advocacy skills and training to enable high schoolers to become their communities’ free speech leaders.

The SAS program builds off of NCAC’s expertise and resources – to help organize, educate, and organize the next generation of anti-censorship advocates. This includes access to key First Amendment and free expression experts, training in media strategy, advocacy tactics, best practices in the fight against book bans, and more. The program also offers opportunities to partner and advocate with another NCAC program: the Kids’ Right to Read Network (KRRN). KRRN is a national grassroots network of local community organizers who advocate at school board meetings and in the local community to support and defend the right to read. They speak at school board meetings and public library boards, and organize book drives to expand access to banned books and raise awareness about the harms of censorship. Involving students in their efforts enables the KRRN to work with directly affected students and enables young people to play a critical role in their communities.

Please visit the Student Advocates for Speech FAQ to learn more about our program.

SAS provides the next generation of leaders with tools to hone and promote the essential principles of free expression and to be lifelong advocates for free speech as both a fundamental human right and a keystone of democracy.

Watch our leaders in action .

The goals of SAS are to help students fight for their own free speech rights as well as the rights of others, including those they disagree with; and amplifying the voices of young people in democratic civic life.

Learn more about the SAS program .

NCAC will provide free speech education, advocacy training, guidance on activism to defend banned books, and opportunities for leadership on issues including student free press freedom and policy advocacy. Meet the Trainers .

SAS Leaders will meet monthly to discuss and learn how to promote the essential principles of free expression as they relate to contemporary issues.

UPCOMING EVENTS

Past events.

SCBWI Impact and Legacy Fund: Student Advocates for Speech

Watch Student Advocates for Speech at the SCBWI ILF 2024 Changemakers Special.

Student Leaders discuss banned books that have changed their lives and then engage in a lively conversation with award-winning author Lois Lowry. Don’t miss it!

Defending Student Press Freedom

A Conversation with High School Students to celebrate Student Free Press Day 2024

This virtual event featured student leaders from NCAC’s Student Advocates for Speech and Student Press Law Center’s New Voices programs! Students led a conversation about the value of student journalists and their role in shaping civic culture in their schools and communities in an election year.

Contest Winners Announced: How a Banned Book Changed My Life

The National Coalition Against Censorship (NCAC) and The Society of Children’s Book Writers and Illustrators (SCBWI) Impact and Legacy Fund have co-sponsored an essay contest for high school students!

A panel of judges selected Neve Bonura-Learnard (Newbury, Ma.) and Harsidak Singh (Arlington, Va.) who received a $250 credit for Kindle or Apple Books and read their essays during the 2023 SCBWI Impact and Legacy Fund Children’s Book Changemakers virtual conference on June, 8 2023. Winners also interviewed (and were interviewed by) Ellen Hopkins, acclaimed banned author of “Crank.” Honorable Mention was awarded to Mariama Cisse (Dunwoody, GA) who received a $100 credit for Kindle or Apple Books.

STUDENT TESTIMONIALS

The best part of the program so far this year was crafting our review of a banned book that impacts us. Being able to discuss and learn from successful and insightful authors was immensely beneficial and I really enjoyed being able to hear their takes. It was fun to make something about a book I really cared about.

I’ve enjoyed being able to form connections within the national side of the program…Using the skills and tools from NCAC, I have been able to further defend free speech in my county.

I think my favorite part was actually during the summer when we had just begun delving into various free speech cases.

There’s so many things I can do with SAS that I didn’t have before. A supportive backing is amazing.

MEDIA COVERAGE

Friends of sas.

Student Advocates for Speech is administered by the National Coalition Against Censorship’s Youth Free Expression Program. Please contact NCAC’s Youth Free Expression Coordinator Gianmarco Antosca at [email protected] .

Your donation will help us foster the next generation of advocates.  Each dollar equals endless opportunities for our nation’s youth. Please contact NCAC’s Development Director  Josh Corday  [email protected] to  learn how you can lend your support.

Open Letter to College and University Presidents on Student Protests

Dear College and University Presidents:

We write in response to the recent protests that have spread across our nation’s university and college campuses, and the disturbing arrests that have followed. We understand that as leaders of your campus communities, it can be extraordinarily difficult to navigate the pressures you face from politicians, donors, and faculty and students alike. You also have legal obligations to combat discrimination and a responsibility to maintain order. But as you fashion responses to the activism of your students (and faculty and staff), it is essential that you not sacrifice principles of academic freedom and free speech that are core to the educational mission of your respected institution.

The ACLU helped establish the right to protest as a central pillar of the First Amendment. We have defended those principles for more than a century. The First Amendment compels public universities and colleges to respect free speech rights. And while the Constitution does not apply directly to private institutions, academic freedom and free inquiry require that similar principles guide private universities. We approach this moment with appreciation for the challenges you confront. In the spirit of offering constructive solutions for a way forward, we offer five basic guardrails to ensure freedom of speech and academic freedom while protecting against discriminatory harassment and disruptive conduct.

Schools must not single out particular viewpoints for censorship, discipline, or disproportionate punishment

First , university administrators must not single out particular viewpoints — however offensive they may be to some members of the community — for censorship, discipline, or disproportionate punishment. Viewpoint neutrality is essential. Harassment directed at individuals because of their race, ethnicity, or religion is not, of course, permissible. But general calls for a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea,” or defenses of Israel’s assault on Gaza, even if many listeners find these messages deeply offensive, cannot be prohibited or punished by a university that respects free speech principles.

These protections extend to both students and faculty, and to speech that supports either side of the conflict. Outside the classroom, including on social media, students and professors must be free to express even the most controversial political opinions without fear of discipline or censure. Inside the classroom, speech can be and always has been subject to more restrictive rules to ensure civil dialogue and a robust learning environment. But such rules have no place in a public forum like a campus green. Preserving physical safety on campuses is paramount; but “safety” from ideas or views that one finds offensive is anathema to the very enterprise of the university.

Schools must protect students from discriminatory harassment and violence

Second , both public and private universities are bound by civil rights laws that guarantee all students equal access to education, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. This means that schools can, and indeed must, protect students from discriminatory harassment on the basis of race or national origin, which has been interpreted to include discrimination on the basis of “shared ancestry or ethnic characteristics,” or “citizenship or residency in a country with a dominant religion or distinct religious identity.”

So, while offensive and even racist speech is constitutionally protected, shouting an epithet at a particular student or pinning an offensive sign to their dorm room door can constitute impermissible harassment, not free speech. Antisemitic or anti-Palestinian speech targeted at individuals because of their ethnicity or national origin constitutes invidious discrimination, and cannot be tolerated. Physically intimidating students by blocking their movements or pursuing them aggressively is unprotected conduct , not protected speech . It should go without saying that violence is never an acceptable protest tactic.

Speech that is not targeted at an individual or individuals because of their ethnicity or national origin but merely expresses impassioned views about Israel or Palestine is not discrimination and should be protected. The only exception for such untargeted speech is where it is so severe or pervasive that it denies students equal access to an education — an extremely demanding standard that has almost never been met by pure speech. One can criticize Israel’s actions, even in vituperative terms, without being antisemitic. And by the same token, one can support Israel’s actions in Gaza and condemn Hamas without being anti-Muslim. Administrators must resist the tendency to equate criticism with discrimination. Speech condoning violence can be condemned, to be sure. But it cannot be the basis for punishment, without more.

Schools can announce and enforce reasonable content-neutral protest policies but they must leave ample room for students to express themselves

Third , universities can announce and enforce reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on protest activity to ensure that essential college functions can continue. Such restrictions must be content neutral, meaning that they do not depend on the substance of what is being communicated, but rather where, when, or how it is being communicated. Protests can be limited to certain areas of campus and certain times of the day, for example. These policies must, however, leave ample room for students to speak to and to be heard by other members of the community. And the rules must not only be content neutral on their face; they must also be applied in a content-neutral manner. If a university has routinely tolerated violations of its rules, and suddenly enforces them harshly in a specific context, singling out particular views for punishment, the fact that the policy is formally neutral on its face does not make viewpoint-based enforcement permissible.

Schools must recognize that armed police on campus can endanger students and are a measure of last resort

Fourth , when enforcement of content-neutral rules may be warranted, college administrators should involve police only as a last resort, after all other efforts have been exhausted. Inviting armed police into a campus protest environment, even a volatile one, can create unacceptable risks for all students and staff. University officials must also be cognizant of the history of law enforcement using inappropriate and excessive force on communities of color, including Black, Brown, and immigrant students. Moreover, arresting peaceful protestors is also likely to escalate, not calm, the tensions on campus — as events of the past week have made abundantly clear.

Schools must resist the pressures placed on them by politicians seeking to exploit campus tensions

Finally , campus leaders must resist the pressures placed on them by politicians seeking to exploit campus tensions to advance their own notoriety or partisan agendas. Recent congressional hearings have featured disgraceful attacks by members of Congress on academic freedom and freedom of speech. Universities must stand up to such intimidation, and defend the principles of academic freedom so essential to their integrity and mission.

The Supreme Court has forcefully rejected the premise that, “because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.”

“Quite to the contrary,” the court stated, “the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.” In keeping with these values, we urge you to resist the temptation to silence students or faculty members because powerful voices deem their views offensive. Instead, we urge you to defend the university’s core mission of encouraging debate, fostering dissent, and preparing the future leaders of our pluralistic society to tolerate even profound differences of opinion.

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Left silences right, right silences left. But censorship stops us pushing for change

In Brussels and Berlin, flimsy excuses were trotted out to stifle political debate

T wo conferences in two European cities. Two attempted bans (though only one successful). Two different responses from politicians and the media. All of which tells us something about the state of free speech today.

Last Tuesday, Emir Kir, a mayor in Brussels, created international headlines when he tried to ban a National Conservative conference in the city. The attempt failed, denounced as “unacceptable” by the Belgian prime minister, Alexander de Croo, and ruled unlawful by the top administrative court.

Five days earlier, with far less comment or condemnation, Berlin police forcibly shut down a conference on Palestine. Ghassan Abu-Sittah, rector of Glasgow University, and a reconstructive surgeon who was due to talk of his experiences in Gazan hospitals, was prohibited from entering Germany. The former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, now secretary-general of the leftwing DiEM25 movement, was served with a betätigungsverbot , a ban on any political activity in Germany, including participation by video from another country.

Speakers at the NatCon conference denounced the role of the “liberal elite” and the EU in trying to silence them. It was, in fact, the act of a maverick mayor who had been expelled from the Socialist party because of his links with Turkish far-right politicians . In contrast, the Berlin conference was shuttered with the full force of the state. Yet, no prime minister condemned the action, and few in the mainstream media criticised it.

The issue of free speech is commonly viewed as a left-right issue: the left as supportive of censorship, the right as “free-speech warriors”. That, though, is to take conservative myth-making at face value. Certainly, the left’s historic commitment to free speech has been eroded in recent years. The right’s hostility to censorship has, though, rarely been more than hypocritical.

Nigel Farage, who had been speaking as the police turned up at the NatCon conference, was interviewed on BBC Radio 4’s  PM programme. He was asked about Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s censorious policies. Orbán’s hostility to immigration, liberalism and the EU has turned him into a political hero within NatCon circles. What of Orbán’s authoritarian polices that have undermined both press and academic freedom? Such policies, Farage insisted, had nothing to do with censorship. Rather, Orbán’s aim was to “ shut down a global millionaire, George Soros, indoctrinating kids. That’s different”.

If my ideological soulmate imposes censorship, it is to protect people. If my ideological foe does the same, it is an assault on free speech.

Kir had used two justifications in his attempt to ban the NatCon conference: that the public needed to be “safe” and that the conference was a “far-right” gathering. Both the use of “safety” as validation for censorship, and the stretching of labels as a way of targeting political opponents, have become central to contemporary “cancel culture”. While these are often pushed by the left, the right is as deft (in many cases, defter) in exploiting them.

The wave of “anti-woke” legislation sweeping Republican states in America, including bans on “unacceptable” views in universities and corporations, is often justified in protectionist terms. In many such states, teachers are prohibited from introducing material that might make “any individual feel discomfort, guilt, anguish, or any other form of psychological distress on account of his or her race or sex”. Earlier this month, an appeals court ruled it unconstitutional for Florida , through its “individual freedom law”, the state’s so-called “anti-woke” legislation, to outlaw “ideas designated as offensive”. A Florida judge observed of the law , that it “bans professors from expressing disfavored viewpoints… while permitting unfettered expression of the opposite viewpoints”. In their survey of US campus cancel culture The Cancelling of the American Mind , Greg Lukianoff and Rikki Schlott observe that “Ironically, the right and the left have traded places when it comes to imposing… campus speech codes”.

The right, though, has always been censorious. What has changed is that the left has provided conservatives with new weapons with which to pursue their censoriousness. The right has gleefully adopted the language of safety and offence to pursue its ideological ends while simultaneously denouncing the left’s use of these as “woke”.

Take current attempts to suppress pro-Palestinian speech . From university campuses to social media , academics, artists and writers have been sacked or silenced for supporting Palestinian rights or criticising Israel.

Describing a case in which Columbia University students were asked to remove Palestinian flag emojis from their names during Zoom meetings because these “caused trauma reactions”, the academic and writer Natasha Lennard observed that this might sound like “the stuff of far-right parody: an absurd example of ‘woke’ culture”. Yet, “safety” has become “the latest weapon… to silence criticism of Israel”. “People are taking their feelings of being uncomfortable with information as the same as physically being unsafe”, one student observed. This conflation has been enabled by many on the left themselves eroding, in Lennard’s words, the distinction “between feeling safe and being safe”.

And just as many on the left have stretched the meaning of “far right” to target opponents, many on the right (and liberals, too) have expanded the meaning of antisemitism to target critics of Israel . And nowhere more so than in Germany . One reason that the actual closure of a conference in Berlin drew less outrage than the failed attempt to ban one in Brussels is that censorship of Palestinian voices has become unexceptional.

It is not just pro-Palestinian voices, though, whose rights can be eroded in the name of protecting the public. A Metropolitan police officer recently told Gideon Falter, of the Campaign Against Antisemitism, that as an “openly Jewish” person he could not approach a pro-Palestinian march – even though most such marches include a visible Jewish bloc. The Met apologised but, in its initial statement, added that people like Falter must know that “their presence is provocative” and a threat to “public safety”. The Met was then forced to apologise for its apology . It is difficult to think of a more textbook definition of antisemitism than for a Jew to be told that he cannot be visibly Jewish for fear of causing upset.

We need to push back against attempts to censor political speech and criticism under the guise of “protecting the public”. We also need to recognise the way that the left has provided the right with weapons with which to target progressive causes. It is always those fighting for social change who are most harmed by the imposition of censorship.

Kenan Malik is an Observer columnist

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German police forbid ‘speaking irish’ at berlin protest — free speech dispatch april 2024.

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Last month, FIRE launched the  Free Speech Dispatch , a regular series covering new and continuing censorship trends and challenges around the world. Our goal is to help readers better understand the global context of free expression. The previous entry addressed global takedowns out of India, repression in Hong Kong, and worrying legislation in Canada. And this week, we’ll look at a series of troubling censorship allegations across Europe, extensive online restrictions in China, and Iran’s campaign against its critics.

Protesters in Germany better watch their tongues (literally) 

To put it mildly, Germany has not handled protests about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict well in recent months, and regular accusations of censorship have emerged from across the country. More allegations surfaced this month when Berlin police  shut down — and cut off power to — a Palestine Congress conference over “the potential for hate speech.” 

Authorities specifically cited the risks of a speech broadcast by video from Palestinian author Salman Abu Sitta, who police  said has “in the past made antisemitic and violence-glorifying remarks” and is “forbidden from being politically active in Germany.” One of the event’s co-organizers, Jewish Voice for a Just Peace in the Middle East, alleges police detained two of its members, one for holding a “Jews against genocide” sign outside.

And last Friday, Berlin police again shut down a pro-Palestinian protest, this time for a less expected reason: Demonstrators were speaking an unpermitted language. According to the  Irish Independent , police dispersed the event of “about 40 Irish people living in the German capital, under rules that only allow English and German, and in some cases Arabic, to be used during protests.” One protester, who accused police of also cracking down on protests in Arabic, said police were “worried that we, in Irish, would say something that glorified terrorism or incited violence” and, because they did not provide an interpreter, “were banned from speaking in Irish.”

Belgian mayor tries to shut down National Conservatism Conference 

Emir Kir, mayor of Brussels’ Saint-Josse-ten-Noode neighborhood, attempted — ultimately unsuccessfully — to close down the National Conservatism Conference last week,  citing the need to “guarantee public safety.” Speakers at the event included Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a close ally of Vladimir Putin, and U.K. politician Nigel Farage, a prominent supporter of the Brexit movement. 

Police  arrived during Farage’s April 16 speech and announced that “authorities have decided to shut down the event.” Organizers of the conference encountered trouble even before it began when at least one hotel refused to host it after being  pressured by another mayor in Brussels. 

But these efforts failed, with Belgium’s supreme administrative court  issuing an order the following day affirming the right to free expression and suggesting efforts to censor it for perceived safety concerns “derived purely from the reactions that its organisation might provoke among opponents.” 

This reliance on nebulous “safety” claims and potential threats of violence is a common pretext for censorship, even in the United States. Last week, University of Southern California leadership  offered similar justification for its cancellation of class valedictorian Asna Tabassum’s commencement speech following online criticism of comments she had made about Israel. Such a result permits the  heckler’s veto to determine who can and cannot speak — or it allows authorities to use potential heckling or violence as a pretext for disallowing speakers. 

Correctional labor sentence for Belarusian dissidents

Earlier this month, Belarusian authorities  convicted Alyaksandr Ilyin, Siarhei Kulsha and Dzmitry Khalyaukin, members of rock band Nizkiz, of “organizing and plotting actions grossly violating public order” and sentenced them to two years of correctional labor. These charges are the latest in President Alexander Lukashenko’s years-long  crackdown on anti-government protests in the country.

Nizkiz, whose music is also now banned due to its inclusion on the country’s list of registered extremists, became a figure in Belarus’ demonstrations with its 2020  protest song “Rules” and later filmed a music video for the song at a protest.

Messaging apps disappear from Apple’s app store in China

China is known for its extensive internet restrictions and, as of this month, more apps joined the censored list. Amid the backdrop of American legislators’  efforts to force TikTok to divest from Chinese company ByteDance or face a ban in the U.S., Chinese government officials ordered Apple to remove Meta’s WhatsApp and Threads from its app store in China. Apple complied, stating the company was “obligated to follow the laws in the countries where we operate, even when we disagree.” Apple tends to  comply with orders from the Chinese government without challenge, and the company’s alleged unwillingness to allow Jon Stewart to critically discuss the country in his Apple TV+ show reportedly  contributed to the show’s early end. 

The government’s orders to Apple  followed officials’ discovery of unspecified content about Xi Jinping on the apps “that was inflammatory and violated the country’s cybersecurity laws.” Signal and Telegram were also  removed from the app store due to national security concerns. These moves will further limit Chinese citizens’ already heavily restrained access to information and communication tools.

Iranian censorship at home — and in the UK?

On April 13, Iranian cartoonist, activist, and frequent censorship target Atena Farghadani was  arrested on charges of “blasphemy,” “disturbing public order,” and creating “propaganda against the Islamic Republic.” She had reportedly  displayed her artwork publicly in Tehran, leading to her arrest, and has since rejected bail in protest. 

But it isn’t only dissenters within the country that are at risk. Late last month, London-based Iran International journalist and government critic Pouria Zeraati was stabbed outside his home by a group of men who fled the country immediately after the attack. Zeraati survived and is now living in a safe house, but  investigators do not believe the act of violence was random. Instead, the case is being handled by the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command. 

Zeraati  joins a group of over a dozen U.K.-based individuals who have faced recent violence or threats likely linked to the Iranian government. Iran International spokesperson Adam Baillie said the organization is on “high alert” and views the stabbing as “a very clear warning.” This is one of today’s worst free speech challenges — authoritarian governments that operate with impunity not just within their own borders, but on a global scale.

Stay tuned for more updates from the Free Speech Dispatch.

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Brazilian Government Forced Censorship on X: New Report Reveals

• Two copies each of 28 orders, in Portuguese and in English translation, issued by Justice Alexandre de Moraes to X Corp.;
• An additional 23 orders issued by Justice Alexandre de Moraes for which X Corp. does not have an English translation; and
• 37 orders issued by the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil.
• Jair Messias Bolsonaro, 38th President of Brazil
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Today’s Campus Protest Crackdowns Are All Too Familiar to Me

I lived through a similar college crisis after 9/11. the lessons of that era are urgent..

As the student-run, pro-Palestinian protest encampments at Columbia University spread across the country, they have drawn increasing scrutiny from politicians and media figures who want to see them crushed. Most recently, GOP Sens. Tom Cotton and Josh Hawley made a ludicrous call to send in the National Guard to disperse the protestors. Though absurd, the idea was very much in keeping with the far right’s lust for using violence against dissent . But if we take a step back from this immediate controversy, we should see that what is unfolding on campuses is nothing new. It’s merely the latest iteration of a battle over who can say what about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And you do not have to endorse every strategic or rhetorical move of the protestors to recognize that the right has dramatically escalated its effort—which stretches back more than two decades to the immediate post-9/11 period—to use public pressure to shame, silence, and destroy critics of Israeli and American policy.

I started a Ph.D. program focusing on Middle East politics a week or so before 9/11. It didn’t take long before the patriotic fervor that enveloped the United States in the aftermath of those horrific attacks turned into calls to fire professors who violated the new codes of nationalist correctness that were informally imposed in the years following the disaster. What conservatives now decry as “ cancel culture ” was standard operating procedure in the early 2000s for right-wing organizations. In 2005, for example, University of Colorado professor of ethnic studies Ward Churchill became the target of a nationwide campaign calling for his dismissal after an essay he had written after 9/11—which used needlessly incendiary language to make a bog-standard argument about the attacks being blowback for U.S. foreign policy—went viral. Churchill was later fired for plagiarism , allegations of which would never have surfaced without the preceding national media firestorm.

The right put real weight into this effort, including creating the organization Campus Watch, started in 2002 by Daniel Pipes (who has been arguing for more than 20 years that the path to peace runs through ruthlessly crushing the Palestinians and then forcing them to “ lose hope ”), then the director of the Middle East Forum. While apologists said that they were merely documenting what gets said and written about the Middle East on American campuses, anyone who directly experienced being targeted by the group can attest that the ultimate goal was to build pressure on universities to fire or refuse tenure to high-profile critics of Israel and American foreign policy.

If you can make tenuring someone a big enough headache, then colleges might ultimately prefer to pay one-time settlements to aggrieved faculty members rather than deal with complaints about them, particularly from deep-pocketed donors, for 30 more years. Campus Watch compiled lists of professors, by institution, with short articles documenting things that they had said or written about Israel or the “War on Terror.” Once a few well-known professors met professional doom as a result of these efforts, it had a chilling effect on the willingness of scholars at other institutions to speak out or even to publish certain kinds of research. That was the point. The relentless unpleasantness of dealing with such people was a major motivation behind my decision not to study the Israeli-Palestinian conflict professionally.

This was not an abstract fear. One of the first classes I ever taught was a discussion section for a large International Relations of the Middle East course at the University of Pennsylvania that was taught by my eventual dissertation adviser. On the first day of class, he asked everyone why they were taking the course, and one student said, “I want to see how the Middle East is taught.” That person ended up in my discussion section and made everyone’s lives a living hell for four months, not because his beliefs were particularly unusual but because he refused to let any kind of discussion unfold without aggressively advancing the Israeli far right’s position, to the point where he repeatedly left other students in tears. He eventually told me that he had been asked to do this by Campus Watch in an effort to document whatever the professor—a prominent liberal, Jewish supporter of the two-state solution—was saying in class. As a second-year graduate student with no professional power, I very much did not want to end up in the crosshairs of Campus Watch, so I bent over backward, in retrospect perhaps too far, to ensure that this student felt like he could say whatever he wanted in my section.

This effort was far from limited to Penn. And Columbia in particular is not a newcomer to being at the center of national controversy about free speech as it relates to Israel and the Middle East. Twenty years ago, the David Project produced a documentary called Columbia Unbecoming , which attacked several Columbia professors, including Joseph Massad (also at the center of controversy today ), accusing them of racism and bias against Jews and other students who disagreed with them in class. Cancel-culture warrior du jour Bari Weiss was heavily involved as an undergraduate, and while she denied calling specific professors racist or seeking to have them dismissed, it would take a willful suspension of disbelief to think that the purpose was neither to silence them nor to harm their career prospects.

Massad’s tenure application became a national controversy, and while he received his promotion, efforts to get him fired have begun anew after he published an article last year for Electronic Intifada that critics argued painted the Hamas attackers in a positive light. (The name of that publication has perhaps contributed to the controversy.) Massad naturally disagrees with that assessment of his piece. Others, like DePaul University political scientist Norman Finkelstein , were denied tenure or saw job offers rescinded. Steven Salaita’s position in the American Indian Studies program at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign was withdrawn after some offensive tweets of his surfaced. In both cases the universities were forced to offer substantial financial settlements. These were extreme examples, but for every national news story like them there were likely countless instances of universities quietly passing on someone whose positions on Palestine might have ruffled feathers.

Today, efforts to intimidate aren’t limited to faculty. The explosion of social media has made it possible to target individual students participating in protests or other actions. To choose one example, the New York law firm Davis Polk rescinded offers of employment to several Harvard and Columbia law students for signing a letter that placed blame on Israel for Oct. 7. Harvard donor and repeat Twitter main character Bill Ackman led the call to blacklist students who committed anti-Israel thought-crimes, an effort that was applauded by a number of other titans of industry and commerce. Today, this crowd is calling for Columbia protestors to be ineligible for loan forgiveness, expelled , arrested , or to meet the wrath of the National Guard. One gets the sense that they would not be terribly unhappy if another Kent State unfolded in New York City, because assaulting, maiming, and running over protestors has become a shared dream on the American far right. And if this is not cancel culture, then the term genuinely has no meaning.

The goalposts have also moved significantly. Today, students and faculty are the subject of a national pressure campaign to redefine antisemitism to include things like “ anti-Zionism ” and slogans with complicated and contested meanings like “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.” And while I am troubled by the way that Zionism has become a pejorative on the left, the effort to effectively outlaw or even criminalize opposition to Zionism is outrageous and extremely dangerous. That also includes the asymmetric bans of campus groups like Students for Justice in Palestine and Jewish Voice for Peace at Columbia and elsewhere. And it is very hard to watch people who not long ago turned J.K. Rowling into an international martyr for free speech celebrating the destruction of lives and careers of people who signed a problematic statement or who don’t believe in or support Israel’s destruction of Gaza, the occupation, the settler movement, and similar projects that subjugate and immiserate Palestinians.

The real issues involved in the campus speech battles are actually much more complex than anyone in this debate would like to admit. Colleges and universities are not just giant free speech zones where anything goes. They are also workplaces for faculty and staff and literal homes for hundreds of thousands of students. I would not want to be the administrator tasked with navigating the often incompatible demands of employment law, academic freedom, free speech rights, and community standards, especially not in the midst of a heated controversy that places all of the unresolved tensions over campus speech front and center.

But let’s be clear: Most people who have turned Columbia into a national lightning rod couldn’t care less about the human beings who live and work there or the very real challenges of making everyone on campus feel safe, heard, and free. They are heaping scorn on the encampment not because they oppose civil disobedience but because the protestors represent the leading edge of a generational change in attitudes about Israel. And I can guarantee that most critics calling for the heads of Columbia students for the terrible crime of camping out on their own university’s lawn were enthusiastically in favor of , for example, trucker convoys laying siege to major cities in 2021 to protest vaccine mandates. The bottom line is that to forestall the coming reckoning with 40 years of failed, unjust policy, Israel’s defenders want to criminalize it, to cast Palestinians out of the public sphere and hound them until—despairing of the impact of their activism on their life and career prospects—they give up.

And the message from the protestors is and should be very clear: That’s not happening.

Elon Musk and Anthony Albanese's church attack spat isn't about free speech. It's about power

Analysis Elon Musk and Anthony Albanese's church attack spat isn't about free speech. It's about power

It takes a special kind of person to attract universal criticism across Australia's federal political landscape.

For Elon Musk, the controversial owner of the social media platform formerly known as Twitter, the backlash he's facing is likely something he'll wear as a badge of honour.

He's been called an "egotistical billionaire" by cabinet minister Tanya Plibersek, a "narcissistic cowboy" by Greens senator Sarah Hanson-Young, an "absolute friggin' disgrace" by the Tasmanian independent Jacqui Lambie and an "arrogant billionaire who thinks he's above the law" by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. 

The Coalition too wants in, putting aside its usual defence of free speech rights to suggest Musk is pursuing an "insulting and offensive argument" in his refusal to remove graphic footage of a stabbing in a Sydney church last week. 

That incident, which authorities quickly called an act of terrorism, saw Bishop Mar Mari Emmanuel hospitalised with lacerations to his head after being lunged at with a knife during a mass that was being broadcast online.

Footage of the incident spread across social media platforms, prompting Australia's eSafety commissioner Julie Inman Grant to order websites take down content referencing the Wakeley stabbing. 

Meta, the owner of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, agreed, while Musk's company X threatened its legal action in a bid to fight the government. 

If it was a legal fight that Musk was wanting, he got it. Inman Grant beat him to the court and won a two-day injunction against X for only blocking the content in Australia . 

At the time of writing, the video remains online and is actively being  promoted by a crossbench senator elected under Clive Palmer's party.

Case sparks questions about the reach of Australian law

The whole saga offers a timely reminder of how far the world has come in such a short time.

It was only in 2008 that Supreme Court Justice Betty King banned the crime drama Underbelly from being broadcast in Victoria . It was a simpler time. TV episodes were broadcast weekly, streaming was barely a thing and getting the episodes to Victoria almost required the shelving of a USB (maybe don't Google that at work) to get it across state lines. 

Now we live in a globally connected world, where technology and media companies have wide-reaching platforms that share content across international jurisdictions. 

The Musk-Inman Grant matter sits in the hands of the courts to determine how far-reaching Australian laws are.

Should a country be able to ban content being shown globally? Where does the line exist? Could a country, say Russia, have the ability to demand X remove content beyond its borders of Ukraine's military resistance?

These are questions for the nation's sharpest legal minds to determine. But there is more at play here than simply matters of the law.

Both Musk and Australian politicians are using the case to fight political battles in their interests.

For Musk, it's a chance to further bolster his free speech credentials. It's in his interests to pick a fight with a government he thinks is overreaching. It's a chance for him to be seen sticking it to "the man".

But there is more at stake than just speech. His commercial interests lie at the heart of this dispute.

Musk knows that other nations are closely watching the laws Australia makes for the social media giants. Just look at how Australia's plain packaging of tobacco has been adopted internationally. Further social media crackdowns here could come with greater crackdowns in bigger markets like the United States and the United Kingdom. 

The X owner says the footage should stay up because it doesn't breach the company's standards. 

Musk also seems to forget that free speech doesn't mean it's free of consequences. Global tech companies might have long been able to influence governments of the day, but it is the law of the land, not his commercial interest, that determines what is legal and what isn't. 

For Albanese and the broader Australian political class, this too is about standing up to "the man".

The government sees a political virtue in pushing back against Musk and his platform, which has repeatedly been found to foster a toxic discourse. They've determined that the spreading of a terrorist act is a bridge too far in the public's eyes. 

Labor likely sees another use for this scandal. It's been threatening greater action against the social media platforms to curb the spread of misinformation. This unrelated scandal offers cover for advancing new laws against the tech giants. 

It's little wonder Meta, knowing the threat it is facing, was  so keen to be seen to have followed Inman Grant's orders . (Also, did someone say schadenfreude?).

The former US president Theodore Roosevelt is often quoted as saying you can go a long way if you "speak softly and carry a big stick".

It's a sentiment that embodies the American-born Inman Grant's approach to her tenure as eSafety commissioner.

Inman Grant is a former senior official at Twitter. She knows X's soft underbelly and has repeatedly shown an ability to find the spot to inflict pain on the company when it fails to meet community standards. 

Her job comes with enforceable powers which means if the companies don't answer her questions, they face daily fines in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's these powers that have allowed her to accuse X of failing to police hate and failing to meet anti-child-abuse standards .

That big stick that Inman Grant carries has brought with it not just shame but financial pain for Musk's X.

He's now taken to calling her the "Australian censorship commissar", a move straight out of Donald Trump's playbook to dismiss her as a Communist or Soviet party official.

Having touched a nerve, Musk might not be the only one wearing a badge of honour. 

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