how globalization affects our daily life essay

Effects of Economic Globalization

Globalization has led to increases in standards of living around the world, but not all of its effects are positive for everyone.

Social Studies, Economics, World History

Bangladesh Garment Workers

The garment industry in Bangladesh makes clothes that are then shipped out across the world. It employs as many as four million people, but the average worker earns less in a month than a U.S. worker earns in a day.

Photograph by Mushfiqul Alam

Put simply, globalization is the connection of different parts of the world. In economics, globalization can be defined as the process in which businesses, organizations, and countries begin operating on an international scale. Globalization is most often used in an economic context, but it also affects and is affected by politics and culture. In general, globalization has been shown to increase the standard of living in developing countries, but some analysts warn that globalization can have a negative effect on local or emerging economies and individual workers. A Historical View Globalization is not new. Since the start of civilization, people have traded goods with their neighbors. As cultures advanced, they were able to travel farther afield to trade their own goods for desirable products found elsewhere. The Silk Road, an ancient network of trade routes used between Europe, North Africa, East Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Far East, is an example of early globalization. For more than 1,500 years, Europeans traded glass and manufactured goods for Chinese silk and spices, contributing to a global economy in which both Europe and Asia became accustomed to goods from far away. Following the European exploration of the New World, globalization occurred on a grand scale; the widespread transfer of plants, animals, foods, cultures, and ideas became known as the Columbian Exchange. The Triangular Trade network in which ships carried manufactured goods from Europe to Africa, enslaved Africans to the Americas, and raw materials back to Europe is another example of globalization. The resulting spread of slavery demonstrates that globalization can hurt people just as easily as it can connect people. The rate of globalization has increased in recent years, a result of rapid advancements in communication and transportation. Advances in communication enable businesses to identify opportunities for investment. At the same time, innovations in information technology enable immediate communication and the rapid transfer of financial assets across national borders. Improved fiscal policies within countries and international trade agreements between them also facilitate globalization. Political and economic stability facilitate globalization as well. The relative instability of many African nations is cited by experts as one of the reasons why Africa has not benefited from globalization as much as countries in Asia and Latin America. Benefits of Globalization Globalization provides businesses with a competitive advantage by allowing them to source raw materials where they are inexpensive. Globalization also gives organizations the opportunity to take advantage of lower labor costs in developing countries, while leveraging the technical expertise and experience of more developed economies. With globalization, different parts of a product may be made in different regions of the world. Globalization has long been used by the automotive industry , for instance, where different parts of a car may be manufactured in different countries. Businesses in several different countries may be involved in producing even seemingly simple products such as cotton T-shirts. Globalization affects services, too. Many businesses located in the United States have outsourced their call centers or information technology services to companies in India. As part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. automobile companies relocated their operations to Mexico, where labor costs are lower. The result is more jobs in countries where jobs are needed, which can have a positive effect on the national economy and result in a higher standard of living. China is a prime example of a country that has benefited immensely from globalization. Another example is Vietnam, where globalization has contributed to an increase in the prices for rice, lifting many poor rice farmers out of poverty. As the standard of living increased, more children of poor families left work and attended school. Consumers benefit also. In general, globalization decreases the cost of manufacturing . This means that companies can offer goods at a lower price to consumers. The average cost of goods is a key aspect that contributes to increases in the standard of living. Consumers also have access to a wider variety of goods. In some cases, this may contribute to improved health by enabling a more varied and healthier diet; in others, it is blamed for increases in unhealthy food consumption and diabetes. Downsides Not everything about globalization is beneficial. Any change has winners and losers, and the people living in communities that had been dependent on jobs outsourced elsewhere often suffer. Effectively, this means that workers in the developed world must compete with lower-cost markets for jobs; unions and workers may be unable to defend against the threat of corporations that offer the alternative between lower pay or losing jobs to a supplier in a less expensive labor market. The situation is more complex in the developing world, where economies are undergoing rapid change. Indeed, the working conditions of people at some points in the supply chain are deplorable. The garment industry in Bangladesh, for instance, employs an estimated four million people, but the average worker earns less in a month than a U.S. worker earns in a day. In 2013, a textile factory building collapsed, killing more than 1,100 workers. Critics also suggest that employment opportunities for children in poor countries may increase negative impacts of child labor and lure children of poor families away from school. In general, critics blame the pressures of globalization for encouraging an environment that exploits workers in countries that do not offer sufficient protections. Studies also suggest that globalization may contribute to income disparity and inequality between the more educated and less educated members of a society. This means that unskilled workers may be affected by declining wages, which are under constant pressure from globalization. Into the Future Regardless of the downsides, globalization is here to stay. The result is a smaller, more connected world. Socially, globalization has facilitated the exchange of ideas and cultures, contributing to a world view in which people are more open and tolerant of one another.

Articles & Profiles

Media credits.

The audio, illustrations, photos, and videos are credited beneath the media asset, except for promotional images, which generally link to another page that contains the media credit. The Rights Holder for media is the person or group credited.

Production Managers

Program specialists, last updated.

February 20, 2024

User Permissions

For information on user permissions, please read our Terms of Service. If you have questions about how to cite anything on our website in your project or classroom presentation, please contact your teacher. They will best know the preferred format. When you reach out to them, you will need the page title, URL, and the date you accessed the resource.

If a media asset is downloadable, a download button appears in the corner of the media viewer. If no button appears, you cannot download or save the media.

Text on this page is printable and can be used according to our Terms of Service .

Interactives

Any interactives on this page can only be played while you are visiting our website. You cannot download interactives.

Related Resources

How Globalization Forces Affect Quality of Life Essay

Globalization can be described as how nations from different parts of the world are becoming more interconnected. Essentially, it also captures in its scope the economic and social changes that have come about as a result. It may be pictured as the threads of an immense spider web formed over millennia, with the number and reach of these threads increasing over time. Therefore, the interconnection has been influenced by forces like advanced technology, transportation, global finance, and the media; through globalization, the economy of states has been boosted, and new hostile cultures have also been formed.

For example, globalization can boost the economy and raise living standards while posing risks to the economy’s health and the welfare of workers. Gathering support from speeches and films of world-renowned figures that address the effects of globalization on our daily life. Globalization has helped emerging, and industrialized nations’ economies expand by creating a market for products and services (Bailey, 2015). The Gross Domestic Product, commonly known as GDP and typically expressed as a percentage, is the most common way to quantify economic growth. Macron, in his speech, talks of equalitative efforts from states and civil societies to help enhance globalization. He talks of building a France recognized by all and one capable of standing behind those forgotten by globalization (BQ Prime, 2018). By aiding and abetting emerging nations by providing loans to strengthen their economies, globalization has encouraged peace among nations.

Instead, the interaction of many groups in our culture has impacted the formation of new cultural practices that are hostile to specific communities. On the other side, given that most of our jobs have been replaced by robots, the media has impacted the third generation, rendering them indolent. Other issues, such as escalating violence, moral decay, and a lack of employment due to population growth, have a negative impact on people’s lives. The increase in commercial fraud brought on by globalization has impacted the world market. Warren Buffet talks about trade wars and how they have affected the global marketing system (Fox Business, 2018). He speaks of how producers do not want the trade wars to be passed to customers since it will be a great crisis. Essentially, it is also noted that human beings have the right to life, to vote, and anything that pertains to them and is legal, as portrayed by the constitution (Frank, 2001).

The US government’s dissatisfaction with the results of globalization is shown in the current implementation of and hikes in tariff levels on specific groups of imports. The US government implemented nationalist and protectionist policies to compel the relocation of industrial jobs, particularly labor-intensive jobs, to the US. Immigration has increased in this region purposefully to market products and improve the state’s economy (Kamarck et al., 2022). According to the research, the labor stagnation between and within nations has caused globalization-related dislocations in several developed economies. Artificial immigration barriers between countries impede the movement of workers, and labor market rigidities and the lack of perfect substitutes within nations hindering the movement of labor from lagging to flourishing economic sectors, resulting in significant income disparities (PRB, 2010).

In conclusion, it is evident that globalization is an aspect that is helpful in today’s world. However, the interaction can be a problem whenever wars are present. Forces, including cutting-edge technology, transportation, global finance, and the media, have impacted interconnection. Generally, it ultimately affects communities and societies negatively and positively. Essentially, no nation can thrive in solitude; instead, allowing all production factors to circulate without limits would enable all individuals of the advantages of globalization to be realized.

Bailey, R. (2015). Globalization is good for you! Reason. Web.

BQ prime. (2018). Emmanuel Macron At WEF 2018: Globalization A Major Crisis [Video]. YouTube. Web.

Fox Business. (2018). Warren Buffett: We do not want trade wars [Video]. YouTube. Web.

Frank, T. M. (2001). Are Human Rights Universal? Center for Learning Innovation – Bellevue University.

Kamarck, E., Hudak, J., & Stenglein, C. (2017). Immigration by the numbers . Brookings. Web.

Population Bulletin Update: Immigration in America 2010 . PRB. Web.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2024, January 25). How Globalization Forces Affect Quality of Life. https://ivypanda.com/essays/how-globalization-forces-affect-quality-of-life/

"How Globalization Forces Affect Quality of Life." IvyPanda , 25 Jan. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/how-globalization-forces-affect-quality-of-life/.

IvyPanda . (2024) 'How Globalization Forces Affect Quality of Life'. 25 January.

IvyPanda . 2024. "How Globalization Forces Affect Quality of Life." January 25, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/how-globalization-forces-affect-quality-of-life/.

1. IvyPanda . "How Globalization Forces Affect Quality of Life." January 25, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/how-globalization-forces-affect-quality-of-life/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "How Globalization Forces Affect Quality of Life." January 25, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/how-globalization-forces-affect-quality-of-life/.

• Threads in Operating Systems and Central Processing Unit
• Photography Exhibition “Threads” in Melbourne
• The Open Systems Interconnection Referencing Model
• Multithreading Models: Definition and Types
• Interconnection Between the Lives of Human Beings and the Internet
• Religion and Morality Interconnection
• Open Systems Interconnection model
• Malware: Code Red Computer Worm
• "Watching TV Makes You Smarter" by Steven Johnson
• Coarse- and Fine-Grained Parallelism
• Effects of Global Stratification
• Globalization: London as a Global City
• Globalization or the Age of Transition
• Globalization Influence on Australia’s Policies
• Globalization and the Dominance of Market-Centered Economic Strategies

Type to search

• Privacy Policy
• Terms And Conditions

How Does Globalization Affect Your Life? The Positive And Negative Effects

Globalization has become part of the modern world, but many are yet to understand how it affects their lives.

People from the U.S. can buy products from China from the comfort of their homes. Communicating with other people thousands of miles away is a breeze. You can even find out about events happening around the world from the comfort of your home. All you need is an internet connection.

Globalization affects every facet of our lives. These include educational system, healthcare, economy, jobs, technology, and others. And shockingly, these impacts could be positive or negative.

So, how does globalization affect your life? Keep reading to find out.

What Globalization Means

When experts say, the world is a global village, what they mean is that people worldwide are connected via various technologies and programs. Before now, it was challenging to communicate with someone thousands of miles away in real-time.

Now, globalization has changed everything. You can interact with whoever you like from the comfort of your home. It’s now easy, quick, and much more convenient.

Over 67.04 percent of the world’s population, which is approximately 5.25 billion people, uses mobile devices.

So,  what is globalization ? It’s a term that describes the rising interdependence of the world’s population, economies, and culture caused by cross-border trades, investment flow, information, people, and technology.

Globalization affects all countries, both developed and developing. It also affects everyone positively and negatively. That’s why it’s always a crucial subject for discussion. It has caused many changes and will do more in the future.

How Globalization Affects You Positively

Here are ways globalization has affected your life for the better.

Communication: 

Globalization has transformed how the world interacts. Board meetings are via videoconferences, instead of the traditional way of meeting face-to-face. Each board member can live thousands of miles away and still participate in the discussion. Distance is not a barrier.

The only bottleneck would have been having a device that supports videoconference calls and stable internet service. But developed, including many developing countries, have taken care of these problems. Even the developing countries are stepping up.

Imagine if there weren’t devices or software to make such calls and you have to be physically present at the meeting. Embarking on such trips would be expensive, draining, and time-consuming.

Again, imagine what would happen if globalization hadn’t changed the way people communicate or shop online in this trying time. The fight against the spread of COVID-19 would have been more difficult than it already seems.

You can order for anything anywhere in the world and have them delivered to their doorsteps. This also made the sit-at-home order a bit more successful. The internet has also made banking and interacting with customer service agents a breeze.

Finding New Markets:

The focal point in starting a business is making sales. When you make sales, the business grows. Today, anybody can create a new business and find buyers for their products. You can even sell your products to people in different parts of the globe, provided they meet international standards.

So, finding new markets isn’t as difficult as it used to be, thanks to globalization. A manufacturer from China can buy goods from the United States of America and vice versa.

Engaging new talents:

Hiring overseas workers has also gotten a lot easier, thanks to globalization. Job seekers can learn about job opportunities abroad and even apply online. If qualified, employers can arrange call interviews and do the paperwork to bring the right candidate thousands of miles away.

For the records, an employee from a developing country may not earn as much as someone from a developed region. But then, the job opportunities overseas for people in these less developed regions are a welcome development. Employers in these developed regions are also benefiting from the cheap labor.

So, it’s a win-win for employers and job seekers.

Lower product prices:

Globalization has made it possible for manufacturers to find low-cost ways of producing goods. On the other hand, consumers now have a massive variety of choices to make. This helps to ensure satisfaction.

With lower prices, consumers in developing and developed regions can live better, purchasing goods with lesser money.

Makes people aware of global issues:

News about natural disasters and global warming are so easy to obtain. Almost everyone on the planet knows what these dangers are, including the natural disasters taking place in various parts of the world.

None of these would have been possible without globalization. Globalization made the world aware of the 2004 Tsunami that claimed 227,898 lives. Different countries, including the U.K., sent help to the troubled region after learning about the gravity of the damage caused by the natural disaster.

Deforestation, air pollution, and other human activities give rise to global warming. Experts have also warned about the dangers of global warming.

Today, a lot of people are aware of the benefits of tree planting. Governments are almost aiming for zero air pollution in the foreseeable future. Many top companies have started producing electric cars, which doesn’t cause air pollution.

Remote work:

Remote work has made many people consider quitting their 9 to 5 jobs. It has become so attractive, thanks to globalization. Remote jobs are flexible and offer diverse opportunities for people to earn a living.

As a remote worker, you can choose the job you like to do and take breaks without being scolded. This won’t be possible in a 9 to 5 job. Being a remote worker also allows you to manage other side hustles. It gives you a unique opportunity to generate more streams of income.

On the other hand, employers hiring remote workers gain access to a multi-culturally diverse workforce. By hiring remote workers, companies can lower the cost of running an office and improve profit.

Managing remote workers have also gotten a lot easier, thanks to tech advancement. There are programs employers can use to monitor the activities of remote employees. You can check the software at the end of each working day to see how your employees spent their time.

The COVID-19 pandemic halted business activities. Many shops were closed down, and some employees were asked to work from home. And all these were possible because of globalization.

Educational system:

Globalization has also had a massive impact on the educational system. It interconnects teaching systems across the globe. People from other parts of the world can go to school wherever they want.

Many educational tech gadgets are available and make student’s academic life easier. Through the help of these gadgets, students can understand complex subjects and get their assignments done.

You also don’t need to visit the library to have access to academic materials. The internet has virtually almost everything you need. This has also improved the spread of information and awareness about sensitive global issues.

How Globalization Affects You Negatively

Here are the diverse ways globalization is affecting people adversely .

A threat to cultural diverse:

Cultural diversity is what makes us unique as a people. But with globalization transforming every facet of our lives, the world’s cultural diversity is obviously under serious threat.

It is believed that globalization might one day drown out cultures, local economies, and languages. It might mold the world into the image of the capitalist West and North.

Many might be asking how this would happen. But let’s not forget that Hollywood films are replacing local ones in both developing and developed countries. Movies produced in Hollywood are also more likely to gain global success than films made in Bollywood or elsewhere.

Job insecurity:

Globalization has put many workers in fear of job insecurity. Manufacturing companies are now seeking ways to lower production costs. Many companies are also investing in robots, as they aim to use them in place of human labor.

Many companies have also relocated their production departments to countries where they can find cheaper labor.

Robots have taken over most jobs. What’s happening in the automobile industry is a good example.

Dangers of uncontrolled information:

Though globalization has made access to information much easier, the fact that it’s uncontrolled makes it a ticking time bomb. People trust anything they see on social media these days. Only a handful of people do care if such information is from credible sources or not.

We have seen the destructions that misinformation can create. In the U.S., we all witnessed how electoral malpractice talks in the November 2019 presidential election without evidence led to riots and invasion of the Capitol.

Thousands of people have died due to false information. A lot of people have had to evacuate their homes due to false alarms.

Globalization is affecting every facet of our lives, positively and negatively. It affects our economies, education, culture, businesses, and personal lives.

However, we must make proper use of every available tool globalization has given us to improve our lives and society. Students should take advantage of educational gadgets to enhance their academic performance. Those in business should also do the same.

Leave a Comment Cancel Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Recent Posts

Popular Posts

Trending & Hot

• Business Essentials
• Leadership & Management
• Credential of Leadership, Impact, and Management in Business (CLIMB)
• Entrepreneurship & Innovation
• Digital Transformation
• Finance & Accounting
• Business in Society
• For Organizations
• Support Portal
• Media Coverage
• Founding Donors
• Leadership Team

• Harvard Business School →
• HBS Online →
• Business Insights →

Business Insights

Harvard Business School Online's Business Insights Blog provides the career insights you need to achieve your goals and gain confidence in your business skills.

• Career Development
• Communication
• Decision-Making
• Earning Your MBA
• Negotiation
• News & Events
• Productivity
• Staff Spotlight
• Student Profiles
• Work-Life Balance
• AI Essentials for Business
• Alternative Investments
• Business Analytics
• Business Strategy
• Business and Climate Change
• Design Thinking and Innovation
• Digital Marketing Strategy
• Disruptive Strategy
• Economics for Managers
• Entrepreneurship Essentials
• Financial Accounting
• Global Business
• Launching Tech Ventures
• Leadership Principles
• Leadership, Ethics, and Corporate Accountability
• Leading with Finance
• Management Essentials
• Negotiation Mastery
• Organizational Leadership
• Power and Influence for Positive Impact
• Strategy Execution
• Sustainable Business Strategy
• Sustainable Investing
• Winning with Digital Platforms

4 Effects of Globalization on the Environment

• 15 Apr 2021

Globalization —defined in the online course Global Business as the increased flow of goods, services, capital, people, and ideas across international boundaries—has brought many changes in its wake.

While globalization can positively and negatively impact society, its effect on the environment is primarily negative. Here’s a breakdown of how globalization impacts society and the environment and what business leaders can do to reduce these negative consequences.

How Does Globalization Affect Society?

The world has become more connected than ever before through the increase in technological advancements and economic integrations. Advanced economies are formed as domestic businesses transform into international ones and further contribute to the spread of technology around the world.

There are several benefits of globalization , such as increased international trade and cooperation and less international aggression. Social globalization —the sharing of ideas and information between countries—has led to innovation in the medical, technological, and environmental preservation industries.

Additionally, globalization has improved the quality of life in several developing nations. This includes implementing efficient transportation systems and ensuring accessibility to services such as education and healthcare.

However, globalization can also have negative effects on society, such as increased income inequality and substandard working conditions in developing countries that produce goods for wealthier nations. Income inequality is directly related to globalization as it further increases the gap between more advanced and developing areas of a nation. As a result, it can also increase the risk of societal violence.

Along with its societal effects, globalization has a lasting impact on the environment—and typically not a positive one.

Access your free e-book today.

What Are the Effects of Globalization on the Environment?

1. Increased Transport of Goods

One of the primary results of globalization is that it opens businesses up to new markets in which they can sell goods and source labor, raw materials, and components.

Both of these realities mean finished products travel farther now than ever before—potentially halfway around the globe. In the past, products were more likely to be produced, sold, and consumed locally. This increased transport of goods can impact the environment in several ways, including:

• Increased emissions: The farther a product travels, the more fuel is consumed, and a greater level of greenhouse gas emissions is produced. According to a report by the International Transport Forum , CO2 emissions from transport will increase 16 percent by 2050. These emissions contribute to pollution, climate change , and ocean acidification around the world and have been shown to significantly impact biodiversity.
• Habitat destruction: Transportation—especially when land-based—requires infrastructure like roads and bridges. The development of such infrastructure can lead to issues including habitat loss and pollution. The more ships that travel by sea, the greater the chances for major oil spills or leaks that damage the delicate marine environment.
• Invasive species: Every shipping container and vessel presents an opportunity for a living organism—from plants to animals to fungus—to hitch a ride to a new location where it can become invasive and grow without checks and balances that might be present in its natural environment.

2. Economic Specialization

One often-overlooked side effect of globalization is that it allows nations and geographical regions to focus on their economic strengths while relying on trading partners for goods they don’t produce themselves. This economic specialization often boosts productivity and efficiency.

Unfortunately, overspecialization can threaten forest health and lead to serious environmental issues, often in the form of habitat loss, deforestation, or natural resource overuse. A few examples include:

• Illegal deforestation in Brazil due to an increase in the country’s cattle ranching operations, which requires significant land for grazing
• Overfishing in coastal areas that include Southeast Asia, which has significantly contributed to reduced fish populations and oceanic pollution
• Overdependence on cash crops, such as coffee, cacao, and various fruits, which has contributed to habitat loss, especially in tropical climates

It’s worth considering that globalization has allowed some nations to specialize in producing various energy commodities, such as oil, natural gas, and timber. Nations that depend on energy sales to fund a large portion of their national budgets, along with those that note “energy security” as a priority, are more likely to take intervening actions in the market in the form of subsidies or laws that make transitioning to renewable energy more difficult.

The main byproduct of these energy sources comes in the form of greenhouse gas emissions, which significantly contribute to global warming and climate change.

3. Decreased Biodiversity

Increased greenhouse gas emissions, ocean acidification, deforestation (and other forms of habitat loss or destruction), climate change, and the introduction of invasive species all work to reduce biodiversity around the globe.

According to the World Wildlife Fund’s recent Living Planet Report , the population sizes of all organisms—including mammals, birds, fish, amphibians, and reptiles—have decreased 68 percent since 1970. Latin America and Africa—two rapidly developing regions important to global trade—have seen disproportionate levels of biodiversity loss, especially among environmentally sensitive fish, reptiles, and amphibians.

While this decrease in biodiversity has many causes, it’s widely believed that the issues listed above have contributed in part.

4. Increased Awareness

While many of globalization’s environmental effects have been negative, its increase has heightened environmental awareness worldwide.

Greater connectivity and higher rates of international travel have made it easier than ever for individuals to see the effects of deforestation, habitat loss, and climate change on the environment. This, in turn, has contributed to new laws, regulations, and processes that limit negative effects.

Globalization as a Threat and an Opportunity

Globalization has allowed society to enjoy many benefits, including increased global cooperation, reduced risk of global conflict, and lower prices for goods and commodities. Unfortunately, it’s also led to serious negative effects on the environment.

Since it isn’t feasible for globalization to end or reverse, it’s likely the situation will worsen until nations, governing bodies, and other organizations are compelled to implement laws and regulations that limit negative effects.

Businesses and industries that operate globally have an incentive to take whatever voluntary actions they can to reduce the potential for negative consequences. Doing so can not only provide an organization greater control over its initiatives, but also a powerful marketing and communication tool .

Some ways businesses address climate change include:

• Transitioning to renewable energy sources
• Choosing greener infrastructures or equipment
• Reducing energy consumption
• Creating credible climate transition plans
• Raising awareness among employees

In addition, investing in renewable energy and packaging, embracing responsible land-use management, and shifting goods production to move closer to the end customer are all viable options that businesses can and should consider. The challenge lies in balancing a desire to embrace corporate social responsibility with the need to turn a profit and run a successful business.

Are you interested in breaking into a global market? Sharpen your knowledge of the international business world with our four-week Global Business course. In addition, explore our Business and Climate Change course to help your organization adapt to and embrace business risks and opportunities created by climate change, as well as our other online courses related to business in society .

This post was updated on February 28, 2024. It was originally published on April 15, 2021.

About the Author

Globalization, Supranational Dynamics and Local Experiences pp 1–40 Cite as

Introduction: Globalization between Theories and Daily Life Experiences

• Marco Caselli 4 &
• Guia Gilardoni 5  
• First Online: 04 November 2017

563 Accesses

Part of the book series: Europe in a Global Context ((EGC))

Though a wide range of scientific studies have been published on the topic of globalization, seemingly analyzed to the smallest detail, discussion of this issue is neither commonplace nor easy. Analysis of globalization is never done, as the process is undergoing continuous transformation along development trends that are neither linear nor predictable in advance. In addition, analysis of it is not easy, given that the term globalization has been used with different meanings in several frameworks, both scientific and otherwise (Fiss and Hirsch 2005). But, even considering a single discipline such as sociology, we find that it has not assigned a univocal meaning to the topic, and analyses of the underlying processes of globalization are conducted according to radically different perspectives and interpretations. Hence, there is no general consensus on the concept’s definition, its confines, and even, at least in part, its basic characteristics. Finally, as underscored by Scholte (2005: 46) with a good dose of irony, “the only consensus about globalization is that it is contested”.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution .

http://gmdac.iom.int/global-migration-trends-factsheet

https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean

http://heindehaas.blogspot.it/2016/08/the-case-for-border-controls.html

Art. 2(l) of Directive 2011/95/EU (Recast Qualification Directive).

Eurostat, Migration and Migrant Population Statistics, data extracted in May 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/10-migration-trends-to-look-out-for-in-2016/

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/20/angela-merkel-shocked-saddened-berlin-christmas-market-attack/

Acosta Arcarazo, D. (2014, 1/July–October). EU integration policy: Between soft law and hard law. KING Desk Research Paper & In-Depth Study .

Google Scholar  

Adam, B. (1998). Timescape of modernity . London: Routledge.

Albrow, M. (1996). The global age . Cambridge: Polity.

Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism . London and New York: Verso.

Anderson, N. (1923). The hobo: The sociology of the homeless man . Chicago: University Press.

Appadurai, A. (1990). Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. In M. Featherstone (Ed.), Global culture . London: Sage.

Arrighi, G. (1994). The long twentieth century . London: Verso.

Augé, M. (1992). Non-lieux . Paris: Seuil.

Axford, B. (2013). Theories of globalization . Cambridge: Polity.

Back, L. (1996). New ethnicities and urban culture. Racism and multiculture in young lives . London: UCL Press.

Bauman, Z. (1998). Globalization: The human consequences . Cambridge: Polity.

Baumann, G. (1996). Contesting culture. Discourses of identity in multi-ethnic London . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beck, U. (1992). Risk society. Towards a new modernity . London: Sage.

Beck, U. (2000a). The cosmopolitan perspective: Sociology of the second age of modernity. British Journal of Sociology, 51 (1), 79–105.

Beck, U. (2000b). What is globalization? Cambridge: Polity.

Beck, U. (2004). Der kosmopolitische Blick order: Krieg ist Frieden . Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Beck, U. (2005). Power in the global age . Cambridge: Polity.

Beck, U. (2006). Cosmopolitan vision . Cambridge: Routledge.

Billing, M. (1997). Banal nationalism . London: Sage.

Breindenbach, J., & Zukrigl, I. (2000). Cultural battle or McWorld? Deutschland, 3 , 40–43.

Caselli, M. (2012). Trying to measure globalization. Experiences, critical issues and perspectives . Dordrecht: Springer.

Castles, S., de Haas, H., & Miller, M. J. (Eds.). (2014). The age of migration. International population movements in the modern world (5th ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (Eds.). (2009). The age of migration. International population movements in the modern world (4th ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cohen, R. (2007). Creolization and cultural globalization: The soft sounds of fugitive power. Globalizations, 4 (2), 369–385.

Cowen, T. (2002). Creative destruction . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fiss, P. C., & Hirsch, P. M. (2005). The discourse of globalization: Framing and sensemaking of an emerging concept. American Sociological Review, 70 , 29–52.

Gallino, L. (2004). Dizionario di sociologia . Torino: Utet.

García Canclini, N. (1995). Hybrid cultures: Strategies for entering and leaving modernity . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Giaccardi, C., & Magatti, M. (2001). La globalizzazione non è un destino . Roma-Bari: Laterza.

Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity . Cambridge: Polity.

Giddens, A. (1996). Beyond left and right . Cambridge: Polity.

Giddens, A. (2000). Runaway world. How globalization is reshaping our lives . New York: Routledge.

Gilardoni, G., D’Odorico, M., & Carrillo, D. (2015). King-knowledge for integration governance. Evidence on migrants’ integration in Europe . Milan: Fondazione Ismu. Retrieved from http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/KING_Report.pdf .

Gill, S. (1992). Economic globalization and the internationalization of authority. Geoforum, 23 , 269–283.

Gilroy, P. (1993). The Black Atlantic: Modernity and double consciousness . Harvard: University Press.

Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., & Blanc-Szanton, C. (1992). Transnationalism: A new analytic framework for understanding migration . New York: Annals of the Academy of Science.

Gobo, G. (2011). Glocalizing methodology? The encounter between local methodologies. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 14 (6), 417–437.

Hall, S. (1991). The local and the global: Globalization and ethnicity. In A. King (Ed.), Culture, globalization and the world-system (pp. 19–39). London: Macmillan.

Hannerz, U. (1992). Global complexity . New York: Columbia University Press.

Harvey, D. (1990). The condition of postmodernity . Oxford: Blackwell.

Hay, C., & Marsh, D. (Eds.). (2000). Demystifying globalisation . London: Macmillan.

Held, D., & McGrew, A. (2007). Introduction: Globalization at risk? In D. Held & A. McGrew (Eds.), Globalization theory. Approaches and controversies . Cambridge: Polity.

Helliwell, J. F. (2000). Globalization: Myths, facts and consequences . Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.

Hirst, P., & Thompson, G. (1996). Globalization in question: The international economy and the possibilities of governance . Cambridge: Polity.

Holton, R. J. (2005). Making globalization . Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Hoogvelt, A. (1997). Globalisation and the postcolonial world. The new political economy of development . London: Macmillan.

Hopkins, A. G. (2002). The history of globalization—And the globalization of history? In A. G. Hopkins (Ed.), Globalization in world history . New York: Norton.

Huges, E., & Huges, H. (1952). Where peoples meet: Racial and ethnic frontiers . Chicago: Free Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilisations? Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), 22–49.

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2009). Cosmopolitan communications: Cultural diversity in a globalized world . New York: Cambridge University Press.

IOM—Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC). (2015). How the world views migration. Retrieved from http://publications.iom.int/books/how-world-views-migration

Kaldor, M. (1999). New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era . Cambridge: Polity.

Kennedy, P. (2010). Local lives and global transformation. Towards world society . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

King, A. (1991). Culture, globalization and the world-system. Contemporary conditions for the representation of identity . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lash, S., & Urry, J. (1994). Economics of sign and space . London: Sage.

Levitt, P. (2001). The transnational villagers . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Levitt, T. (1983, May–June). The globalization of markets. Harvard Business Review, 61 , 92–102.

Ley, D. (2004). Transnational spaces and everyday lives. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29 (2), 151–164.

Martell, L. (2007). The third wave in globalization theory. International Studies Review, 9 , 173–196.

Martin, D., Metzger, J. L., & Pierre, P. (2006). The sociology of globalization. Theoretical and methodological reflections. International Sociology, 21 (4), 499–521.

Mc Grew, A. (2007). Organized violence in the making (and remaking) of globalization. In D. Held & A. McGrew (Eds.), Globalization theory. Approaches and controversies . Cambridge: Polity.

Meyer, J. W. (2007). Globalization: Theory and trends. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 48 (4), 261–273.

Miller, D., & Walzer, M. (1995). Pluralism, justice and equality . Oxford: University Press.

Ngongi, N. A. (2001) Lotta alla povertà e all’esclusione nel contesto dell’economia globale. In R. Papini (a cura di) Globalizzazione: solidarietà o esclusione? Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche Italiane.

O’Brien, R. (1992). Global financial integration: The end of geography . New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

Ohmae, K. (1990). The borderless world: Power and strategy in the interlinked economy . London: Collins.

Ohmae, K. (1995). The end of the nation-state: The rise of regional economies . New York: Simon and Schuster.

O’Rourke, K., & Williamson, J. (1999). Globalization and history . Cambridge: MIT Press.

Park, R. E. (1921). Introduction to a science of sociology . Chicago: University Press.

Penninx, R., Kraal, A., Martiniello, M., & Vertovec, S. (Eds.). (2004). Citizenship in European cities . Aldershot: Ashgate.

Petrella, R. (1995) Presentation to the conference “Gestion locale et régionale des transformations économiques, technologiques et environnementales”. Organised by the French Commission for UNESCO, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, and the French Ministry for Higher Education and Research.

Pieterse, J. N. (2003). Globalization and culture: Global mélange . Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Pieterse, J. N. (2009). Globalization and culture: Global mélange (2nd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Racine, J. L. (2001). On globalisation: Beyond the paradigm. States and civil societies in the global and local context. In R. S. Melkote (Ed.), Meanings of globalisation: Indian and French perspectives . New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.

Ray, L. (2007). Globalization and everyday life . Abingdon: Routledge.

Reich, B. (1991). The work of nations: Preparing ourselves for 21st century capitalism . New York: Vintage Books.

Risse, T. (2007). Social constructivism meets globalization. In D. Held & A. McGrew (Eds.), Globalization theory. Approaches and controversies . Cambridge: Polity.

Ritzer, G. (2006). The globalization of nothing 2 . Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization: Social theory and global culture . London: Sage.

Robertson, R. (1994). Globalization or glocalization? The Journal of International Communication, 1 (1), 33–52.

Robertson, R. (1995). Glocalization: Time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity. In M. Featherstone, S. Lash, & R. Robertson (Eds.), Global modernities . London: Sage.

Robertson, R., & Inglis, D. (2004). Beyond the gates of the polis : Reworking the classical roots of classical sociology. Journal of Classical Sociology, 4 (2), 165–189.

Rosenberg, J. (2005). Globalization theory: A post mortem. International Politics, 42 , 2–74.

Roudometof, V. (2016). Glocalization. A critical introduction . Abingdon: Routledge.

Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism . New York: Pantheon.

Sassen, S. (1991). The global city: New York, London, Tokio . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sassen, S. (2000). New frontiers facing urban sociology at the Millennium. British Journal of Sociology, 51 (1), 143–159.

Sassen, S. (2007). The places and spaces of the global: An expanded analytic terrain. In D. Held & A. McGrew (Eds.), Globalization theory. Approaches and controversies . Cambridge: Polity.

Scholte, J. A. (2000). Globalization. A critical introduction . Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Scholte, J. A. (2005). Globalization. A critical introduction (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Schunk, R. (2014). Transnational activities and immigrant integration in Germany. Concurrent or competitive process? Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Sen, A. (2002). Globalizzazione e libertà . Milano: Mondadori.

Simmel, G. (1968). Sociologia . Torino: Edizioni Comunità.

Sklair, L. (1991). Sociology of the global system . Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Sklair, L. (1999). Competing conceptions of globalization. Journal of World-Systems Research, 5 (2), 143–163.

Smith, A. D. (1995). Nations and nationalism in a global era . Cambridge: Polity.

Taylor, C. (1992). Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition . Princeton: Amy Gutmann.

Thomas, W. I., & Znaniecki, F. (1918). The Polish peasant in Europe and America . Boston: Gorham.

Tomlinson, J. (1999). Globalization and culture . Cambridge: Polity.

Tomlinson, J. (2007). Globalization and cultural analysis. In D. Held & A. McGrew (Eds.), Globalization theory. Approaches and controversies . Cambridge: Polity.

Turner, B., & Khonder, H. (2010). Globalization: East and West . London: Sage.

UNHCR. (2016, December). Bureau of Europe, refugees & migrants sea arrivals in Europe . Retrieved from http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php

Wade, R. (1996). Globalization and its limits: Reports of the death of the national economy are greatly exaggerated. In S. Berger & R. Dore (Eds.), National diversity and global capitalism . Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Wiewiorka, M. (1998). Is multiculturalism the solution? Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21 (5), 881–910.

Wiewiorka, M. (2001). La diffèrence . Paris: Balland.

Zorbaugh, H. (1929). The gold coast and the slum . Chicago: University Press.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Dipartimento di Sociologia, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy

Marco Caselli

Fondazione ISMU, Milano, Italy

Guia Gilardoni

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

ISMU Foundation, Milano, Italy

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter.

Caselli, M., Gilardoni, G. (2018). Introduction: Globalization between Theories and Daily Life Experiences. In: Caselli, M., Gilardoni, G. (eds) Globalization, Supranational Dynamics and Local Experiences . Europe in a Global Context. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64075-4_1

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64075-4_1

Published : 04 November 2017

Publisher Name : Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-319-64074-7

Online ISBN : 978-3-319-64075-4

eBook Packages : Social Sciences Social Sciences (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

• Open access
• Published: 20 May 2021

How does globalization affect COVID-19 responses?

• Steve J. Bickley 1 , 2 ,
• Ho Fai Chan   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-7281-5212 1 , 2 ,
• Ahmed Skali 3 ,
• David Stadelmann 2 , 4 , 5 &
• Benno Torgler 1 , 2 , 5  

Globalization and Health volume  17 , Article number:  57 ( 2021 ) Cite this article

264k Accesses

29 Citations

69 Altmetric

Metrics details

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vast differences in approaches to the control and containment of coronavirus across the world and has demonstrated the varied success of such approaches in minimizing the transmission of coronavirus. While previous studies have demonstrated high predictive power of incorporating air travel data and governmental policy responses in global disease transmission modelling, factors influencing the decision to implement travel and border restriction policies have attracted relatively less attention. This paper examines the role of globalization on the pace of adoption of international travel-related non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during the coronavirus pandemic. This study aims to offer advice on how to improve the global planning, preparation, and coordination of actions and policy responses during future infectious disease outbreaks with empirical evidence.

Methods and data

We analyzed data on international travel restrictions in response to COVID-19 of 185 countries from January to October 2020. We applied time-to-event analysis to examine the relationship between globalization and the timing of travel restrictions implementation.

The results of our survival analysis suggest that, in general, more globalized countries, accounting for the country-specific timing of the virus outbreak and other factors, are more likely to adopt international travel restrictions policies. However, countries with high government effectiveness and globalization were more cautious in implementing travel restrictions, particularly if through formal political and trade policy integration. This finding is supported by a placebo analysis of domestic NPIs, where such a relationship is absent. Additionally, we find that globalized countries with high state capacity are more likely to have higher numbers of confirmed cases by the time a first restriction policy measure was taken.

Conclusions

The findings highlight the dynamic relationship between globalization and protectionism when governments respond to significant global events such as a public health crisis. We suggest that the observed caution of policy implementation by countries with high government efficiency and globalization is a by-product of commitment to existing trade agreements, a greater desire to ‘learn from others’ and also perhaps of ‘confidence’ in a government’s ability to deal with a pandemic through its health system and state capacity. Our results suggest further research is warranted to explore whether global infectious disease forecasting could be improved by including the globalization index and in particular, the de jure economic and political, and de facto social dimensions of globalization, while accounting for the mediating role of government effectiveness. By acting as proxies for a countries’ likelihood and speed of implementation for international travel restriction policies, such measures may predict the likely time delays in disease emergence and transmission across national borders.

The level of complexity around containing emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases has increased with the ease and increased incidence of global travel [ 1 ], along with greater global social, economic, and political integration [ 2 ]. In reference to influenza pandemics, but nonetheless applicable to many communicable and vector-borne diseases, the only certainty is in the growing unpredictability of pandemic-potential infectious disease emergence, origins, characteristics, and the biological pathways through which they propagate [ 3 ]. Globalization in trade, increased population mobility, and international travel are seen as some of the main human influences on the emergence, re-emergence, and transmission of infectious diseases in the twenty-first Century [ 4 , 5 ].

Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases have presented major challenges for human health in ancient and modern societies alike [ 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 ]. The relative rise in infectious disease mortality and shifting patterns of disease emergence, re-emergence, and transmission in the current era has been attributed to increased global connectedness, among other factors [ 11 ]. More globalized countries – and, in particular, global cities – are at the heart of human influence on infectious diseases; these modern, densely populated urban centers are highly interconnected with the world economy in terms of social mobility, trade, and international travel [ 12 , 13 ]. One might assume that given their high susceptibility to infectious diseases, globalized countries would be more willing than less globalized countries to adopt screening, quarantine, travel restriction, and border control measures during times of mass disease outbreaks. However, given their globalized nature, globalized countries are also likely to favor less protectionist policies in general, thus, contradicting the assumption above, perhaps suggesting that counteracting forces are at play: greater social globalization may require faster policy adoption to limit potential virus import and spread through more socially connected populations [ 14 , 15 ]; greater economic globalization may indicate slower policy adoption due to legally binding travel and trade agreements/regulations, economic losses, and social issues due to family relations that cross borders [ 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 ]. Greater political globalization may indicate greater willingness to learn from others and/or maintain democratic processes of decision making in global coordination efforts, either way potentially delaying the implementation of travel restrictions. Travel restrictions may also have minimal impact in urban centers with dense populations and travel networks [ 22 ]. Moreover, the costs of closing are comparatively higher for open countries than for already protective nations. For example, more globalized countries are more likely to incur financial or economic penalties (e.g., see [ 23 , 24 ]) when implementing health policies which aim to improve the health of local populations such as import restrictions or bans on certain food groups/products and product labelling. Globalization, after all, is known to promote growth and does so via a combination of three main globalization dimensions: economic integration (i.e., flow of goods, capital and services, economic information, and market perceptions), social integration (i.e., proliferation of ideas, information, culture, and people), and political integration (i.e., diffusion of governance and participation in international coordination efforts) [ 25 , 26 ]. See Table  1 for examples of data used in the estimation of each (sub)dimension of the KOF globalization index we use in this study.

Globalization appears to improve population health outcomes such as infant mortality rate (IMR) and life expectancy (LE) regardless of a country’s level of development (i.e., developed, developing, or underdeveloped) [ 27 , 28 ]. Links between the dimensions of globalization (i.e., social, political, and economic) and general population health are less clear cut [ 29 ]. For less developed countries, the economic dimension of globalization appears to provide the strongest determinant in IMR and LE, whereas for more developed countries, the social aspect of globalization is the strongest factor [ 27 ]. This suggests that as a country becomes more economically stable, it then moves towards greater social and political integration into global society; and for less developed countries, increased wealth creation through economic integration potentially delivers the greatest increases in population health. In contrast, for low- to middle-income countries, the social and political dimensions of globalization appear most strongly related to the propensity of women to be overweight [ 30 , 31 ]. This suggests that for the least developed countries, the adoption of western culture, food habits and lifestyle may be detrimental to adult health if not backed up by social and political progress. Hence, it appears there is no definite relationship between the different aspects of globalization (i.e., social, political, and economic), a country’s level of development, and health outcomes that hold across all health contexts. Regardless, trade policies and more generally, globalization, influence both a nation’s determinants of health and the options and resources available to its health policymakers [ 32 ].

The influence of open trade agreements, policies favoring globalization and greater social connectedness on the (delayed) timing of travel restrictions during a pandemic would make logical sense. Globalized countries are more likely to incur financial, economic, and social penalties by implementing restrictive measures that aim to improve population health outcomes (e.g., see [ 23 , 24 ]) and hence, will be less inclined to do so. Further, countries that rely on international students and tourism and have a high number of expatriates living and working abroad might be even less likely to close their borders or implement travel restrictions to avoid (1) increases in support payments or decreases in tax income during times of unforeseen economic upset, (2) negative backlash from media and in political polls, and (3) tit-for-tat behaviors from major trading partners. However, countries which are more socially connected may also act more quickly because they are inherently at higher risk of local outbreak and hence, to delay local emergence they may implement international travel restrictions earlier. Membership and commitments to international organizations [ 33 ], treaties, and binding trade agreements might also prevent or inhibit them from legally doing so [ 23 , 34 , 35 ], suggesting there are social, trade, and political motivators to maintain ‘open’ borders.

Domestic policies implemented in response to the coronavirus pandemic have ranged from school closures and public event cancellations to full-scale national lockdowns. Previous research has hinted that democratic countries, particularly those with competitive elections, were quicker to close schools. Interestingly, those with high government effectiveness (i.e., those with high-quality public and civil services, policy formulation, and policy implementation) were slower to implement such policies [ 36 ] as were the more right-leaning governments [ 37 ]. Further, more democratic countries have tended to be more sensitive to the domestic policy decisions of other countries [ 38 ]. In particular, government effectiveness – as a proxy of state capacity – can act as a mediator with evidence available that countries with higher effectiveness took longer to implement COVID-19 related responses [ 36 , 39 ]. Countries with higher levels of health care confidence also exhibit slower mobility responses among its citizens [ 40 ]. Those results may indicate that there is a stronger perception that a well-functioning state is able to cope with such a crisis as a global pandemic like SARS-CoV-2. More globalized countries may therefore take advantage of a better functioning state; weighing advantages and disadvantages of policies and, consequently, slowing down the implementation of restrictive travel policies to benefit longer from international activities. Regardless, the need to understand the reasons (and potential confounding or mediating factors) behind the selection of some policy instruments and not others [ 36 ] and the associated timing of such decisions is warranted to enable the development and implementation of more appropriate policy interventions [ 41 ].

The literature seems to agree that greater globalization (and the trade agreements and openness which often come with it) make a country more susceptible to the emergence and spread of infectious and noncommunicable diseases [ 2 , 42 ]. Greater connectedness and integration within a global society naturally increases the interactions between diverse populations and the pathways through which potential pathogens can travel and hence, emerge in a local population. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (e.g., social distancing, city lockdowns, travel restrictions) may serve as control measures when pharmaceutical options (e.g., vaccines) are not yet available [ 43 ]. However, such non-pharmaceutical measures are often viewed as restrictive in a social, political, and economic context. Our review of the literature did not detect clear indications of the likelihood that globalized cities will implement such measures, nor were we able to identify how quickly such cities will act to minimize community transmission of infectious diseases and the possible mediating effects of government effectiveness in the decision-making process. Furthermore, our review could not locate research on the relative influence of the social, political, and economic dimensions of globalization on the speed of implementing travel restriction policies. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vast differences in approaches to the control and containment of coronavirus across the world and has demonstrated the varied success of such approaches in minimizing the transmission of coronavirus. Restrictive government policies formerly deemed impossible have been implemented within a matter of months across democratic and autocratic governments alike. This presents a unique opportunity to observe and investigate a plethora of human behavior and decision-making processes. We explore the relative weighting of risks and benefits in globalized countries who balance the economic, social, and political benefits of globalization with a higher risk of coronavirus emergence, spread, and extended exposure. Understanding which factors of globalization (i.e., social, economic, or political) have influenced government public health responses (in the form of travel/border restriction policies) during COVID-19 can help identify useful global coordination mechanisms for future pandemics, and also improve the accuracy of disease modelling and forecasting by incorporation into existing models.

Key variables

The record for each country’s international travel policy response to COVID-19 is obtained from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) database [ 44 ] (185 countries in total). The database records the level of strictness on international travel from 01 January 2020 to the present (continually updated), categorized into five levels: 0 - no restrictions; 1 - screening arrivals; 2 - quarantine arrivals from some or all regions; 3 - ban arrivals from some regions; and 4 - ban on all regions or total border closure. At various points in time from the beginning of 2020 to the time of writing (06 October 2020), 102 countries have introduced a policy of screening on arrival, 112 have introduced arrival quarantine, 152 have introduced travel bans, and 148 have introduced total border closures. Footnote 1 A visual representation of these statistics in Fig.  1 shows the cumulative daily count of countries that have adopted a travel restriction, according to the level of stringency, between 01 January and 01 October 2020. Countries with a more restrictive policy (e.g., total border closure) and countries with less restrictive policies (e.g., ban on high-risk regions) are also counted. Figure  2 then shows the type of travel restriction and the date each country first implemented that policy. Together, we see that countries adopted the first three levels of travel restrictions in two clusters; first between late January to early February, and second during mid-March, around the time that COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the WHO. Total border closures, on the other hand, were mainly imposed after the pandemic declaration, except for two countries that went into lockdown at the beginning of March (i.e., State of Palestine, and San Marino). Country-specific timelines are shown in Fig. S 1 in the Appendix.

Timeline of international travel restriction policy adoption for 184 countries. Daily count shows the cumulative number of countries that have introduced an international travel policy that is ‘at-least-as-strict’. Relaxation of international travel restriction is not shown in the figure

Restrictiveness of the first travel policy implemented over time. Each marker ( N  = 183) represents the type and date of the first travel restriction adopted, with the size of the marker representing the number of confirmed COVID cases at the time of policy implementation. Violin plot shows the kernel (Gaussian) density of timing of implementation

We obtained COVID-19 statistics from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the COVID-19 Data Repository by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University [ 45 ]. The dataset consists of records on the number of confirmed cases and deaths daily for 215 countries since January 2020.

Our measure of globalization is generated from the KOF Globalization Index (of more than 200 countries for the year 2017), published by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute Footnote 2 [ 26 ]. The KOF Globalization Index is made up of 44 individual variables (24 de facto and 20 de jure components) relating to globalization across economic, social, and political factors Footnote 3 , Footnote 4 (see also [ 25 ]). The complete index is calculated as the average of the de facto and the de jure globalization indices. We focus this analysis on the overall index, as well as the subdimensions of globalization (i.e., Economic (Trade and Financial), Social (Interpersonal, Informational, and Cultural), and Political globalization). Additionally, we also investigate the relative contributions of the de facto and de jure indices separately. Each index ranges from 1 to 100 (highest globalization). In the regression models, we standardize the variable to mean of zero with unit variance for effect size comparison.

Countries with no records of travel restriction adoption (not included in the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker) and globalization data from the KOF Globalization Index are listed in Tables S 1 and S 2 , respectively. Footnote 5

Control variables

When analyzing the timing of international travel restrictions, we take into account how such decisions can be affected by the policies of neighbors [ 37 , 38 ]. Thus, to control for policy diffusion, we constructed a variable to reflect international travel policy adoption of neighboring countries by averaging the strictness of each country’s neighbors weighted by the share of international tourism. Inbound tourism data of 197 countries were obtained from the Yearbook of Tourism Statistics of the World Tourism Organization [ 46 ]. The data consist of total arrivals of non-resident tourists or visitors at national borders, in hotels, or other types of accommodations; and the overnight stays of tourists, broken down by nationality or country of residence, from 1995 to 2018. Due to differences in statistical availability for each country, we take records from 2018 (or 2017 if 2018 is not available) of arrivals of non-resident tourists/visitors at national borders as the country weights for the computation of foreign international travel policy. If arrival records at national borders are not available for these years, we check for the 2018 or 2017 records on arrivals or overnight stays in hotels or other types of accommodation before relying on records from earlier years. To determine the weighted foreign international restriction policy for each country, we calculated the weighted sum using the share of arrivals of other countries multiplied by the corresponding policy value ranging from 0 to 4. Footnote 6

Similarly, case severity amongst countries comprising the majority of inbound tourists should also increase the likelihood of a country adopting travel restrictions. We thus constructed a variable which takes the sum of the number of confirmed cases from neighboring countries weighted by their share of total arrivals in the focal country (log).

While [ 47 ] suggests that the diffusion of social policies is highly linked to economic interdependencies between countries, and is less based on cultural or geographical proximity, we test the sensitivity of our results using a variety of measures of country closeness (Fig. S 4 and S 5 ). Doing so also allows us to examine which factors are more likely to predict COVID-19 policy diffusion. In general, while our results are not sensitive to other dimensions of country proximity, decisions to adopt travel restrictions are best explained by models where neighbors are defined by tourism statistics (see SI Appendix ).

Previous studies have found that countries with higher government effectiveness took longer to implement domestic COVID-19 related policy responses such as school closure (e.g., [ 36 , 39 ], perhaps due to (mis)perception that a well-functioning state should be able to cope with such a crisis as the current coronavirus pandemic and therefore, has more time or propensity to learn from others and develop well-considered COVID-19 response plans. Therefore, we also control for governance capacity; the data for which is based on measures of state capacity in the Government Effectiveness dimension of the 2019 Worldwide Governance Indicators (the World Bank).

We check the robustness of our results using alternative measures such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Quality of Government and tax capacity (tax revenue as % of GDP obtained from the World Development Indicators) [ 38 , 47 ]. The ICRG measure on the quality of government is computed as the average value of the “Corruption”, “Law and Order”, and “Bureaucracy Quality” indicators. We include additional control variables to account for each country’s macroeconomic conditions, social, political, and geographical characteristics. For macroeconomic conditions, we obtained the latest record of GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and Gini coefficient from the WDI. We include population density, percentage urban population, and share of the population over 65, to control for the social structure of the country, which might affect the odds of implementing the policy due to a higher risk of rapid viral transmission and high mortality rates [ 38 ]. We also control for the number of hospital beds in the population [ 36 , 38 , 39 , 40 ], which we used to proxy for a country’s health system capacity, as countries with higher health capacity may be less likely to implement restrictive travel measures. Footnote 7 We use the electoral democracy index from V-Dem Institute to control for the type of political regime [ 36 , 38 , 40 ]. Following previous studies, we include a dummy variable for countries with prior experience of managing SARS or MERS [ 38 , 48 , 49 ]; defined as those with more than 50 cases. Lastly, we include continent dummies which would absorb any unobserved regional heterogeneity [ 36 ] Footnote 8 and country-specific weekend days, as policy changes might have occurred less often on days when politicians are not generally active or at their workplace.

Empirical strategy

We explore the following questions: how will more globalized countries respond to COVID-19? Do they have more confirmed cases before they first implement travel restrictions? Do they take longer to implement travel restriction policies in general? Which dimension of globalization (i.e., social, political, or economic) contributes most to these responses? To provide answers to these questions, we first report the correlations between the level of globalization and the time gap between the first confirmed domestic case and the implementation date of the first international travel restriction policy, calculated using records from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT [ 44 ];) on the timing of restrictions on international travel for each country and COVID-19 case statistics from the ECDC and CSSE [ 45 ]. We then examine the relationship using survival analysis through a multiple failure-event framework. This approach allows us to examine the underlying factors which affect the implementation of international travel restriction policies across country borders in an attempt to isolate the effect of globalization. It also allows us to use ‘incomplete’ datasets as certain countries may not have implemented any type of policy or may have implemented a strict policy without first implementing a less strict one (i.e., not sequentially implement policies of ‘least strict’ to ‘most strict’). Furthermore, we conjecture that as a consequence from the above, countries with higher levels of globalization may have more confirmed cases by the time the first policy was introduced. Therefore, we also examine the relationship between globalization and the number of confirmed cases (in logs) at the time of policy implementation.

We employ the time-to-event analysis (survival analysis or event history analysis) to examine the role of globalization in the timing of international travel restriction policies. Similar to previous studies [ 37 , 38 , 50 ], we use the marginal risk set model [ 51 ] to estimate the expected duration of time (days) until each policy, with increasing strictness, was imposed by each country. Specifically, we model the hazard for implementing screening , quarantine, ban on high-risk regions , and total border closure separately; thus, allowing the possibility that a country may adopt a more restrictive policy early on, as countries are assumed to be simultaneously at risk for all failures (i.e., implementation of any level of policy strictness). Intuitively, as more stringent policies are less likely to be implemented or adopted early (especially if state capacity is high), we stratified the baseline hazards for the four restrictions to allow for differences in policy adoption rate. Yet, when a country adopts a more restrictive travel restriction policy (e.g., total border closure ) before (or never) implementing the less restrictive ones (e.g., ban on high-risk regions ), the latter is effectively imposed (at least from an outcome perspective). Thus, we code them as failure on the day the more restrictive policy was implemented. Footnote 9 We also stratify countries by the month of the first confirmed COVID-19 case, Footnote 10 as countries with early transmission of coronavirus have fewer other countries from which they can learn how best to respond to the pandemic [ 52 ]. This is important because disproportionally more countries with a higher globalization index contracted the virus early (Fig. S 2 in the SI Appendix ). Additionally, we stratify time observations into before and after pandemic declaration (11 March 2020) [ 53 ] as it is likely to significantly increase the likelihood of countries adopting a travel restriction policy (particularly for border closures as seen in Fig.  2 ) as consensus on the potential severity of the pandemic solidified. Out of all 184 countries in our sample, 3 and 39 did not implement ban on high-risk regions and total border closure , respectively, before the end of the sample period, and are thus (right) censored (Fig. 1 ); i.e., nothing is observed or known about that subject and event after this particular time of observation.

We define the time-at-risk for all countries as the start of the sample period (i.e., 01 January 2020) Footnote 11 and estimate the following stratified (semi-parametric) Cox proportional hazards model [ 37 , 38 , 50 ]:

where h g (t) is the hazard function of strata g , representing the four levels of international travel policy strictness: screening, quarantine and ban on high-risk regions , and total border closure , with h 0 g as the respective baseline hazard. Because of the stratification approach, we cluster the standard errors at the country level. Tied failures are handled using the Efron method. The extended Cox model in (1) allows us to include static predictor variables – such as the KOF globalization index – and time-varying covariates on neighboring countries’ international travel policy adoption or daily COVID-19 case statistics to examine their effects, relative to the baseline hazard, on the timing of policy implementation in the multiple-events data framework.

To study the relationship between COVID-19 case prevalence and the level of globalization at the time of travel restriction [ 39 ], we apply ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to estimate the following model:

where Y ij is the number of cases (log) at the time of the restriction j (or a stricter restriction) was implemented. Globalisation i is the KOF globalization index of country i and X is a vector of country-specific controls.

First, we examine whether the level of globalization of the country is correlated with the timing of international travel restrictions relative to the date of a country’s first local confirmed case of coronavirus. With a simple correlation analysis, we find that the Pearson’s correlation between the first policy implementation-first case gap and globalization index is significantly positive ρ  = 0.35 ( p  < 0.001; 95%CI = [0.210, 0.475]; n  = 170), Footnote 12 demonstrating that more globalized countries exhibited a delay in imposing travel restrictions compared with less globalized countries (Fig.  3 a), relative to their first local confirmed case of COVID-19. Figure  3 a also indicates that countries that reacted before the first local COVID-19 case tended to adopt screening on arrivals or quarantine rules as the first precautionary measures. We find that more globalized countries tend to have a higher number of confirmed local cases of COVID-19 at the time of implementing travel restrictions (Pearson’s correlation between the log of confirmed cases and KOF index: ρ  = 0.408; p  < 0.001; 95%CI = [0.276, 0.525]; n  = 173), Fig. 3 b). Footnote 13 One noteworthy case is the United Kingdom, which only enforced quarantine on travelers from high-risk regions on the 08 June 2020, 129 days after COVID-19 was first confirmed in the country.

Correlation between the globalization level of a country and a) the number of days between the first international travel restriction policy implemented and the first confirmed case; and b ) the number of confirmed cases (log scale, with countries reporting 0 COVID-19 cases mapped below 1) at the time of the first policy being implemented. The colors represent the four international travel restrictions implemented first in each country. Size of the marker shows the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases on the date of the implementation of the first travel policy

These correlations persist and remain significant when each level of travel restriction is evaluated (see Fig. S 3 in SI Appendix ). This shows that more globalized countries are more likely to impose international travel restrictions later, relative to the first confirmed case in the country, regardless of policy strictness. Interestingly, the two least strict policies (i.e., screening and quarantine ) have slightly higher correlation coefficients meaning that it took more globalized countries longer to impose these policies relative to the first local COVID-19 case. One would think that the least strict policies would represent a lower barrier to continued globalization and hence, be the more likely route for a COVID-19 response measure for more globalized countries.

An intuitive narrative for these findings is that globalized countries are typically among the first to be hit by emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases and are naturally more susceptible to local community transmission [ 12 , 13 ] (Fig. S 2 ). Hence, globalized countries may have less time to react, strategize, and learn from others in terms of suitable NPIs and how resources need to be mobilized for effective implementation. They may also underestimate the speed of transmission and contagiousness of the virus due to lack of clear evidence and knowledge of the virus at the early stage of the outbreak. Below, we present findings after accounting for the timing of the first COVID-19 wave appearing in the country.

Do more globalized countries take longer to implement travel restriction policies in general?

We present the results from the survival analysis in Table  2 , which shows the hazard ratios (HRs) for each factor. For binary explanatory variables, HRs can be interpreted as the ratio of the likelihood of adopting travel restrictions between the two levels, while for continuous variables, it represents the same ratio for unit difference.

Despite the strong positive correlation observed in the bivariate analysis between globalization and the time difference between first local confirmed case and implementation of travel restriction, we did not find substantial evidence suggesting that more globalized countries are more reluctant to adopt travel restriction policies relative to their first local confirmed case. In fact, after adjusting for the date that COVID-19 was first locally contracted (through observation stratification), we find that, in general, more globalized countries are more likely to adopt travel restriction policies. Specifically, as the KOF globalization index increases by one standard deviation (e.g., from Paraguay to New Zealand), the likelihood of adopting travel restrictions increases by 80% ( p  = 0.007; 95%CI = [1.163, 2.617], Table 2 model 3).

We also find strong evidence of travel restriction policy diffusion between countries that are heavily interdependent in the tourism sector; that is, a country is more likely to adopt a travel restriction if neighboring countries (in terms of share of non-resident visitor arrivals) have done so. As expected, an increase in COVID-19 prevalence in regions comprising the majority of inbound international tourist arrivals increases the likelihood of enforcing travel restrictions. Specifically, for every 1% increase in COVID-19 cases in neighboring countries, the chance of adopting a travel policy increases by about 15% ( p  < 0.001, 95%CI = [1.075, 1.237]). On the other hand, increases in domestic COVID-19 cases do not appear to influence travel policy adoptions Footnote 14 suggesting that travel restriction policy decisions may be driven more by ‘keeping the disease out’ than containing the disease locally for the greater global good. The likelihood of adopting a restrictive travel policy (e.g., arrivals ban) is about three times higher if the country has already implemented a less strict policy, suggesting there may be decreased difficulty in implementing more restrictive policies over time or an increased preference to do so. Moreover, policy change is 60% less likely to occur during weekends ( p  = 0.005, 95%CI = [0.199, 0.757]), perhaps because government officials are less likely to be working on weekends and hence, less active in the political decision-making process.

The effect of the electoral democracy index is not statistically significant, and our results are contrary to the findings of [ 38 ], where OECD countries with higher electoral democracy have lower rates of domestic policy adoption. Footnote 15 Perhaps decisions to implement international travel restrictions are less controversial to voters than domestic policies as the former primarily aims at limiting mobility from outside country borders rather than restricting the freedom and mobility within country borders as the latter do. In addition, we find that countries with a higher unemployment rate are more likely to implement travel restrictions. Surprisingly, countries with a larger share of older population are less likely to implement travel restrictions, while no statistically significant effect was observed for the share of urban population and population density. Contrary to our expectation, countries with greater healthcare capacity tend to be more likely to adopt a travel restriction policy. Footnote 16

Government capacity as a relevant mediator

When including the interaction term between the globalization index and measures of state capacity in the model, we find strong evidence suggesting that more globalized countries with higher government effectiveness are slower to adopt travel restrictions. On the other hand, the likelihood to adopt travel restrictions increases with the level of globalization for countries with lower state capacity. Perhaps these countries are more self-aware of their lack of preparedness and/or ability to execute effective COVID-19 response plans or accommodate large fluxes of hospital admissions owing to the coronavirus pandemic. Each regression includes the same set of control variables as those used in Table 2 model 4. As shown in Fig.  4 , the hazard ratios of the interaction terms between KOF globalization index and WGI government effectiveness are statistically less than one ( p  = 0.001), as well as the interaction term with an alternative measure of state capacity, namely ICRG quality of government ( p  = 0.006) and tax capacity ( p  = 0.018). For instance, computing the hazard ratios of globalization at different levels of government effectiveness reveals that the change in the likelihood to impose travel restrictions, with respect to a one standard deviation increase in KOF, is about 1.5 times higher (hazard ratio of 2.5) for a country with a WGI of 1.5 standard deviations below the world’s average (e.g., Chad) while the risk a country with a WGI 1.5 standard deviations above the world’s average (e.g., Austria) would fell by 12% (hazard ratio of 0.88). Moreover, we also find a similar effect with the interaction terms between globalization and health capacity (as measured by number of hospital beds ( p =  0.075), physicians ( p  < 0.001), or nurses and midwives per 1000 ( p  < 0.001), and current expenditure on heath (log) ( p  < 0.001)). This evidence supports the notion that countries with higher state or healthcare capacity and globalization were less likely to limit international travel, even when the stakes might be comparatively higher, i.e. when the country is more globalized and hence, more susceptible to infectious disease outbreaks.

Hazard ratios of interaction terms between globalization and state capacity or health care capacity. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals. Shaded area highlights the range of HRs

Which aspect of globalization can primarily account for these responses?

Next, we assess which aspects of globalization are more important when predicting travel restriction policy adoption by examining the influence of each (sub)dimension of the globalization index. We find the positive effect of globalization on the likelihood to adopt international travel restrictions is likely to be driven by the social dimension of globalization (Fig. S 6 , HR is larger than 1 for both de jure and de facto dimensions), as the estimates of HR are statistically significant when we re-estimate model 4 in Table 2 with the three subdimensions of KOF. Only the subdimension of social globalization is statistically significant which shows that countries with higher social globalization are quicker to adopt travel restrictions, controlling for other factors. Moreover, we estimate and compare the hazard ratios of the interaction term of each globalization dimension with government effectiveness to assess mediator effects (Fig.  5 ). Footnote 17 Overall, we find the likelihood of implementing travel restriction policies among countries with high state capacity is robustly estimated for all subcomponents (Fig. 5 a), with HRs ranging from 0.70 (political globalization) to 0.76 (social globalization). A closer inspection distinguishing between de facto (actual flows and activities, Fig. 5 b) and de jure (policies, resources, conditions and institutions, Fig. 5 c) measures [ 26 ] leads to interesting insights.

HRs of the interaction terms between government effectiveness and different dimensions of the globalization index on adoption of travel restrictions. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals

First, we find that de jure political (number of treaties and memberships in international organizations) globalization, have the largest effect out of all other sub-dimensions of globalization. Footnote 18 This is a highly surprising result given the call for international cooperation and coordination by many international organizations (e.g., WHO, Footnote 19 World Economic Forum, Footnote 20 United Nations Footnote 21 ). We find that those countries with high government effectiveness and engagement in international political coordination efforts are less likely to implement travel restriction policies and hence, slower to do so. On the other hand, de facto economic globalization, which measures actual economic activities (such as exchange of and goods and services) over long distances, is not as strongly related to the timing of travel policy adoption for countries with high government effectiveness. De facto social globalization has the largest effect among other de facto globalization dimensions. These results suggest that a nation with high government effectiveness and more global social, interpersonal, and cultural flows is less likely to implement travel restriction policies in pandemic crises and hence, may delay doing so. Countries with higher government effectiveness and policies and conditions that tend to facilitate or favor globalization (e.g., trade policy, political connectedness and engagement in international political cooperation) are also less likely to implement travel restrictions.

Placebo analysis with domestic COVID-19 responses

To assess whether the observed delay in travel restriction adoption is better explained by globalization and its interplay with state capacity, we conduct a placebo analysis using COVID-19 policy responses that, at least in theory, cannot be explained by the same mechanism. Specifically, we employ the same event history analysis on domestic non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) imposed to mitigate COVID-19 transmission. While previous studies have argued for [ 48 ] and found a substantial negative effect of government effectiveness on the timeliness of enacting school closure policies [ 36 ] and other NPIs across Europe [ 39 ], there is no obvious reason why the delayed responses to implement domestic NPIs would be related to globalization. Thus, we would expect that the interaction term between globalization and government effectiveness to be zero. If our expectation is correct, then we are more comfortable interpreting our previous results as truly reflective of the effect of globalization on travel restrictions, rather than as the effect of globalization on the propensity to implement all types of NPIs.

Data on domestic NPIs adoption are derived from the same source we obtained records on international travel restriction (i.e., the OxCGRT database). Domestic containment and closure policies include closing of schools, workplace, and public transport, restriction on gatherings and internal movement, cancellation of public events, and shelter-in-place order. We follow the approach of [ 38 ], who focus only on mandatory nationwide policies adopted. Footnote 22 We again utilize the marginal risk set model in analyzing the timing of adoption of the seven domestic policies, that is, we stratified the seven different policies and their variation in strictness. Similarly, adoption of a stricter version of the policy (e.g., restrictions on gatherings between 11 and 100 people or 10 people or less) implies the adoption of the less strict version.

The results of the placebo analysis are presented in Table S 3 , showing the hazard ratios of each factor predicting the adoption of any COVID-19-related NPIs. Comparison of the estimates of several key variables to previous studies, while subject to a larger set of countries and more complete time frame, suggests that our modelling approach is reasonable. Footnote 23 Similar to the adoption of international travel restrictions, more globalized countries are quicker to implement domestic NPIs than their less globalized counterparts.

Notably, the estimates of HRs are larger in magnitude and with higher statistical significance compared to the set in Table 2 for the case of international travel restrictions. This shows that the relative speed of more globalized countries in adopting travel restrictions is slower than domestic NPIs, compared to less globalized countries, suggesting the former takes relatively more time to impose international travel restrictions, where one would expect international travel policies to be adopted relatively earlier. Thus, this may show that globalized countries are more reluctant, at least relative to the implementation of domestic interventions, to impose international restrictions. This is perhaps due to that domestic NPIs are relatively easier to actualize in more globalized countries, as legally binding international travel and trade agreements and regulations and the potential for massive economic losses [ 23 , 33 , 34 , 35 ] would also impede the introduction of international travel restriction policies, relative to domestic NPIs. Secondly, and more importantly, we did not find any statistical evidence suggesting the effect of state capacity varies across countries with different levels of globalization as the interaction effect between KOF and government effectiveness is not significant. This result holds for the alternative measures of state capacity as well as using measures of health system capacity. Finally, we also show that the results of the placebo analysis are not sensitive to the type of domestic policy adopted (see Table S 4 ) nor when different dimensions of globalization were considered, as none of the HRs of their interaction terms is statistically significantly smaller than one. Footnote 24

Nevertheless, while the results from the placebo analysis suggest that the results we see in Table 2 are less likely to arise from, e.g., confounding effects due to other unobserved variables, given the difference in nature of domestic and international NPIs, Footnote 25 we cannot conclusively claim that this is in fact the case. For example, an alternative explanation for why more globalized countries respond relatively faster with domestic policies than do less globalized countries might be found in the fact that most of the domestic policies were implemented at a later stage of the pandemic (compared to travel restrictions which were typically adopted early on). Hence, globalized countries may be better at learning how to coordinate resources and implement social distancing policies.

COVID-19 case severity at the introduction to international travel restriction policies

We conduct an analysis using the Ordinary Least Squares model predicting the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases when each travel restrictions were implemented. Footnote 26 In each regression, we control for the date when the country has the first confirmed COVID-19 case. For countries with no confirmed cases when the travel restriction was implemented (i.e., date of the first confirmed is later than the date of the policy adoption), we recode this variable to the date when the policy was adopted.

In Fig.  6 , we present the estimates of KOF globalization index on COVID-19 prevalence (total number of cases in log (6A) and case per capita in log (6B)) at the time the travel restriction was implemented. We report the estimates obtained from the models without controlling for other factors except for the date of the first confirmed case and models in which we include a full set of control variables (full regression results are presented in Table S 5 and Table S 6 ). This includes government effectiveness, electoral democracy, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, GINI coefficient, number of hospital bed per 1000 people, urban population, population density, whether the country experienced SARS or MERS, and region dummies. Additionally, we also control for containment policies implemented before the introduction of the travel restrictions of interest. We proxy this variable by the average value of the stringency index from the beginning of the time period to the day before the travel policy was adopted. Footnote 27

Coefficients of globalization index predicting the number of COVID-19 cases at the time of travel restriction. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals. Full regression results are presented in Table S 5 and Table S 6

We find strong positive associations between the globalization index and the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases (and per capita cases) at the time the travel restriction policy was first introduced when we only account for when the country was first exposed to COVID-19. In particular, with a one standard deviation increase in globalization index, the predicted number of COVID-19 cases increases by about 1.9 times when screening (or more strict policies) was first adopted, while cases per capita are 7.7 times higher. The globalization multiplier in COVID-19 cases (or cases per capita) is higher when considering firmer travel restrictions (i.e., adoption of quarantine and banning entry from high-risk regions) except for total lockdown. However, the coefficient estimates for globalization predicting COVID-19 cases at the time of total border closure is likely to be underestimated, as a number of highly globalized countries, such as the USA, Japan, South Korea, and a large group of European countries (with the exception of Germany) did not totally close their borders at any point.

Except for the adoption of screening and quarantine, the effect of globalization became statistically insignificant when other control variables are added to the model. The reduction in the effect size is not unexpected as globalization index is highly correlated with several control variables, such as GDP per capita (ρ = 0.631), government effectiveness (ρ = 0.751), and share of the population over 65 (ρ = 0.775).

Additionally, we find further evidence supporting the mediating role of state capacity to the effect of globalization as suggested by the statistically significant interaction effect between globalization and government effectiveness (Table  3 ). That is, among globalized countries, those with higher state capacity are more likely to have more COVID-19 cases when the government first imposes travel restrictions. This echoes the findings from the time-to-event analysis.

Non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel restrictions may be seen an immediate means by which governments can delay infectious disease emergence and transmission [ 43 ], particularly during the early stages of a pandemic when pharmaceutical interventions such as vaccines are not available [ 43 ]. To our knowledge, this study is the first to explore the influence of globalization on the timing of international travel restrictions implemented during the recent coronavirus pandemic and the mediating effect of government effectiveness. From a sample of more than 100 countries, we observe that in general, more globalized countries are more likely to implement international travel restrictions policies than their less globalized counterparts. However, we also find that more globalized countries tend to have a higher number of domestic COVID-19 cases before implementing their first travel restriction and also react slower to their first confirmed domestic case of COVID-19. Additionally, we find that countries with a higher level of globalization may be relatively more reluctant to impose international travel restrictions compared to domestic social isolation policies as the effect of globalization on the likelihood to implement the former is smaller than the latter.

Among globalized nations, those with high measures of government effectiveness are less likely to impose international travel restriction policies, suggesting some mediating effect. Perhaps their lower likelihood to implement travel restriction policies is due to (over)confidence in their capability and resources to deal with disease outbreaks, particularly true for some North American and European countries with substantial health system capacity but limited recent experiences with such pandemics [ 48 ]. It may also be that high government effectiveness is associated with mechanisms to better evaluate potential costs and benefits of implementing different measures or require approvals, coordination, and action across various levels of (sometimes conflicting) governance. In particular, the interaction variables between government effectiveness and de jure political and economic globalization metrics (i.e., representing policies, trade agreements, and pre-conditions which support greater global mobility and trade) have the largest influence on the likelihood to adopt travel restrictions out of all (sub)dimensions of globalization. Perhaps because the penalties from restrictive travel policies are not insignificant, countries with high government effectiveness and more formalized economic and political integration are more inclined to spend time considering the advantages (e.g., delayed domestic COVID-19 emergence) and disadvantages (e.g., reduced trade and potential conflicts with incumbent trade partners) of travel restrictions because the disadvantages affect them so disproportionately. Out of the interactions between government effectiveness and de facto measures, social measures of globalization have the greatest influence on likelihood to implement travel restrictions. Perhaps a nation with high government effectiveness and more global social, interpersonal, and cultural flows needs more time to consider the practicality of implementing travel restrictions or have their hands tied by commitments to international treaties and travel agreements (i.e., they must maintain ‘open’ borders to honor their incumbent commitments) [ 23 , 33 , 34 , 35 ]. Given this evidence, we propose that interaction variables between government effectiveness and (sub)dimensions of globalization may be suitable proxies in infectious disease models for the likelihood of a country implementing travel and border restriction policies during a global health crisis such as COVID-19.

Countries often implement policies similar to those employed by their major economic partners, rather than those of close cultural or geographical proximity [ 55 ]. They also tend to emulate policy interventions of ‘successful’ foreign incumbents [ 56 ], suggesting some degree of knowledge or information transfer. However, during the early days of a pandemic, there may be limited ‘successful’ nations to learn from. Our study provides further support to the former proposition: countries are more likely to implement a travel restriction policy if their nearest neighbor (in terms of share of non-resident visitor arrivals) does. The implementation of travel restrictions is related more strongly to confirmed cases in neighbor countries than it is to domestic cases; perhaps this is due to the aim of the policy to keep the disease out rather than minimize spread between nations. Finally, we also find that the likelihood of adopting a more restrictive travel policy (e.g., arrivals ban) is about three times higher if the country has already implemented a less strict policy, suggesting reduced inertia in enacting more restrictive policies once the first measure has been taken.

The benefits of incorporating individual behavioral reactions and governmental policies when modelling the recent coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China has been demonstrated [ 57 ] and the usefulness of including air travel in the modelling of global infectious disease transmission has been shown [ 58 , 59 ]. Some empirical evidence points to a small yet significant positive relationship between the implementation of international travel restrictions and the time delay in infectious disease emergence and transmission in the focal country [ 22 , 60 , 61 ]. Broader policy evaluations are still missing. Our results indicate it might be reasonable to assume that global infectious disease forecasting could be improved by including the globalization index while accounting for the mediating role of government effectiveness. In particular, the de jure economic and political dimensions and de facto social dimensions could serve as proxies for an effective government’s likelihood and speed to implement travel restriction policies and hence, to predict the likely time delays in disease emergence and transmission across national borders [ 62 ]. include domestic, nationwide pandemic policies in their model with results to suggest that such policies are effective and promptly enforced to demonstrate the greatest benefits. While the results from this study might suggest that including international travel restriction policies could bolster additional support for the adoption of such policies in times of mass disease outbreak, it is important to remember that travel restrictions do not (typically) completely mitigate the emergence of infectious diseases, instead delaying the importation of infectious diseases and potentially minimizing the overall severity of outbreak [ 43 , 60 ] and hence, reducing the associated demand for health system resources at the same time. Geographical regions known hotspots for the emergence and re-emergence of infectious agents [ 63 , 64 ] could be considered as early candidates for inbound country-specific travel restrictions in the event of mass disease outbreaks.

Due to the ongoing state of COVID-19 transmission and continued enforcement of travel restriction policies, we are not yet able to fully explore the relationship between globalization and the easing of travel restrictions over time. As this data becomes available in the coming months, we will be able to explore various phenomena related to globalization and the easing of international travel restrictions; for example, where nations open up too early (i.e., are these nations overconfident in their health system capability?) or the sequence of easing travel restriction (i.e., do more globalized countries lift restrictions entirely in one go or do they go from strict to less strict?). To this end, further research is required to assess the drivers behind a nation’s decision to (not) close its border in a timely fashion, despite their level of globalization.

In any analysis seeking insights based on government-based data sources, there is concern regarding the availability and quality of reporting as well as the difficulties in drawing robust policy recommendations using these data and the research design of the study. We control for this by incorporating into our analyses a wide and varied set of data sources and analytical tools. In doing so, we aim to strengthen our findings by demonstrating multiple routes/methods to reach similar conclusions. Nevertheless, care should be taken in interpreting the results of our analyses as correlation does not mean causation. However, our findings seem to provide strong support for the notion that, in general, more globalized countries are more likely to implement travel restriction policies. However, if they are also high in government effectiveness, they tend to be more hesitant to implement travel restriction policies (both domestic and international), particularly when high in de jure economic and political globalization and de facto social globalization. Thus, suggesting some non-insignificant mediating effect. Additionally, measurement errors stemming from states underreporting of outbreaks due to fear of financial losses or lack of testing capacities [ 18 ] could also contribute to the explanations of our results.

The recent COVID-19 pandemic highlights the vast differences in approaches to the control and containment of infectious diseases across the world, and demonstrates their varying degrees of success in minimizing the transmission of coronavirus. This paper examines the influence of globalization, its (sub)dimensions, and government efficiency on the likelihood and timeliness of government interventions in the form of international travel restrictions. We find that countries with higher government effectiveness and globalization are more cautious regarding the implementation of international travel restriction policies. We also find that the de jure economic and political dimensions and de facto social dimension of globalization have the strongest influence on the timeliness of policy implementation. We also find that countries are more likely to implement travel restrictions if their neighbor countries (in terms of share of non-resident visitor arrivals) do and that a country is over three times more likely to implement a more restrictive international travel policy measure if they have already adopted a less restrictive one first. These findings highlight the relationship between globalization and protectionist policies as governments respond to significant global events such as a public health crisis as in the case of the current COVID-19 pandemic. The findings suggest that the inclusion of such interaction variables in infectious disease models may improve the accuracy of predictions around likely time delays of disease emergence and transmission across national borders and as such, open the possibility for improved planning and coordination of transnational responses in the management of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases into the future.

Availability of data and materials

Data and materials used in the study are available online on Open Science Framework (Center for Open Science; see https://osf.io/qg6kc ).

While we follow the definition in [ 44 ], we acknowledge that there could be potential measurement errors with how the variable is measured. For example, countries may have different criteria for screening and arrival ban policies, which may vary due to the relationship with the target countries, or border closure due to non-COVID 19 reasons (e.g., war). Within country difference in levels of enforcement and coverage (e.g., state varying or selected airport screening) of the travel restrictions may also contribute to the measurement error. In addition, the measure records policy for foreign travelers and not citizens (e.g., travelling to the target country). For detailed interpretation of the variable, see https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker/blob/master/documentation/interpretation_guide.md .

https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html

See https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2019/KOFGI_2019_method.pdf for detailed methods on the calculation of the weights of each component and the overall index.

See also https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2019/KOFGI_2019_variables.pdf for a detailed description of each variable used in the index.

The average globalization index among countries (for those with KOF data, mean = 55) without OxCGRT records is slightly less than the global average (mean = 62, 95%CI = [60.1, 64]).

Specifically, the strength of travel restrictions, for a given country i , that is influenced by the country’s neighbors indexed by j, can be written as: \( Restrictio{n}_{it}=\sum \limits_{j=1}^N{\gamma}_j Restrictio{n}_{jt} \) , where 0 <  γ j  < 1 is the share of country i ’s visitors that come from country j .

Additionally, we check the robustness of our results using the number of physicians per 1000 people and nurses and midwives per 1000 people; we present those results in the supplementary information.

Regions are defined as Africa, Asia, Central America, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South America.

While the marginal risk set model treats each failure event as an independent process, the hazards of implementing more restrictive travel policies may not be unconditional to the occurrence of less restrictive policy being implemented. We capture this uncertainty by incorporating a time-varying variable indicating whether the country has implemented a less restrictive policy in our model.

Cronert [ 36 ] stratified countries by the date of the first confirmed case, however, we believe this might cause over stratification. We also group together countries that did not record their first confirmed case before April ( n  = 10).

This approach is also used by [ 36 , 50 ] when examining the adoption rate of domestic NPI policies [ 38 ]. defines the beginning time-at-risk as the date of the first confirmed COVID-19 case of the country, thus treating countries which implemented a policy before having the first confirmed case as left censored observations. While this approach is more sensible when examining the adoption rate of domestic NPI policies (i.e., country is not yet at risk for the failure – policy implementation), it risks removing countries that engaged in precautionary strategy, i.e., implementing travel restrictions before domestic outbreaks of COVID-19.

Since the effect of travel restrictions might delay an outbreak of the virus, which itself might be more salient for more globalized countries, we check the correlation by censoring negative gaps (travel policy implementation before first confirmed COVID-19 case) to zero. The correlation is highly statistically significant, while the effect size is smaller ( ρ  = 0.248; p  = 0.0011; n  = 170). Four countries were excluded from the calculation as they have zero COVID-19 cases during the entire sample period. The correlation increases to ρ  = 0.366 ( p  < 0.001) when the end of the sample period date is used to calculate the first policy implementation-first case gap for these countries.

We obtain very similar results when confirmed cases are adjusted for population size, i.e., log confirmed COVID-19 cases per million people ( ρ  = 0.397; p  < 0.001; n  = 173).

In a separate model, we control for death rate instead of number of new confirmed cases in the last seven days; the effect of either variable is statistically insignificant when added separately in the model or together.

The results are highly robust when we substitute other measures of democracy for electoral democracy, such as the Boix-Miller-Rosato (BMR) dichotomous coding of democracy [ 54 ], (revised) polity score and institutionalized democracy score from Polity V.

In addition, the effect is more pronounced if health capacity is measured with number of physicians per 1000 people. However, using the number of nurses and midwives per 1000 has no effect.

The HR estimates of each globalization dimension are also presented in Figure S6 (diamonds) for reference.

In a more sophisticated model where we include all interaction terms between each KOF subdimension (three de facto and three de jure dimensions) and government effectiveness, we find that the estimate of the interaction effect with de jure political dimension is most economically and statistically significant.

See https://www.who.int/nmh/resource_centre/strategic_objective6/en/

See https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/09/global-cooperation-international-united-nations-covid-19-climate-change/

See https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1069702

In unreported analysis, we included policy recommendation of closure and containment. This does not alter the findings.

For example, we find some evidence of policy diffusion beyond the OECD context [ 38 ], while timing of domestic NPIs adoption is not sensitive to foreign COVID-19 case. We also find robust evidence that countries with a large state capacity delay implementation of domestic COVID-19 policies [ 36 , 39 ]. Interestingly, we also find that countries with relevant past experience (SARS and MERS) intervened relatively early [ 48 ].

Notably, the HRs for gathering and internal movement restrictions are statistically (at 10% level) larger than one.

Where the former are purposed to prevent and control mass transmission of the virus within the country and the latter aims to avoid the virus from coming in to the country. In particular, countries adopt travel restrictions at an earlier stage compared to domestic policies (between mid-March to April).

If the country did not adopt the travel restriction, we take the COVID-19 case statistics at the end of the sample period ( n =  4 for entry ban and n  = 37 for total border closure). Since we use cumulative case statistics, the resulting coefficients are likely to be underestimated. This is because the sample of countries that did not implement travel bans has a higher level of globalisation than the mean, including the UK and the USA.

This measure captures the adoption of seven domestic containment policies and public information campaign, as well as the implementation of less restrictive travel restrictions. See https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker/blob/master/documentation/index_methodology.md for the construction of the stringency index.

Lim PL. Travel and the globalization of emerging infections. Trans R Soc Trop Med Hyg. 2014;108:1309–10. https://doi.org/10.1093/trstmh/tru051 .

Article   Google Scholar  

Lindahl JF, Grace D. The consequences of human actions on risks for infectious diseases: a review. Infect Ecol Epidemiology. 2015;5(1):30048.

Kilbourne ED. Influenza pandemics of the 20th century. Emerging Infect Dis. 2006;12:9.

Jones BA, Betson M, Pfeiffer DU. Eco-social processes influencing infectious disease emergence and spread. Parasite. 2017;144:26–36. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031182016001414 .

Tatem AJ, Rogers DJ, Hay SI. Global transport networks and infectious disease spread. Adv Parasitol. 2006;62:293–343.

Article   CAS   Google Scholar  

Armelagos GJ, McArdle A. Population, disease, and evolution. Memoirs of the Society for American Archaeology. 1975;30:1–10.

Barrett R, Kuzawa CW, McDade T, Armelagos GJ. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases: the third epidemiologic transition. Annu Rev Anthropol. 1998;27:247–71.

Cockburn TA. Infectious diseases in ancient populations. Curr Anthropol. 1971;12:45–62. https://doi.org/10.1086/201168 .

Article   CAS   PubMed   Google Scholar  

Karlsson EK, Kwiatkowski DP, Sabeti PC. Natural selection and infectious disease in human populations. Nat Rev Genet. 2014;15:379–93. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg3734 .

Article   CAS   PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Larsen CS. The bioarchaeology of health crisis: infectious disease in the past. Annu Rev Anthropol. 2018;47:295–313. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-102116-041441 .

Kock RA. Will the damage be done before we feel the heat? Infectious disease emergence and human response. Anim Health Res Rev. 2013;14:127–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1466252313000108 .

Ali SH, Keil R. Global cities and the spread of infectious disease: the case of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Toronto, Canada. Urban Stud. 2006;43:491–509. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500452458 .

Keil R, Ali H. Governing the sick city: urban governance in the age of emerging infectious disease. Antipode. 2007;39:846–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00555.x .

Article   PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Smith RD. Trade and public health: facing the challenges of globalization. J Epidemiol Community Health. 2006;60:650–1.

Huynen MM, Martens P, Hilderink HB. The health impacts of globalisation: a conceptual framework. Global Health. 2005;1:14.

Gostin LO. International infectious disease law: revision of the World Health Organization's international health regulations. JAMA. 2004;291:2623–7.

Zacher M, Keefe TJ. The Politics of Global Health Governance: United by Contagion. Springer; 2008.

Book   Google Scholar  

Cash RA, Narasimhan V. Impediments to global surveillance of infectious diseases: consequences of open reporting in a global economy. Bull World Health Organ. 2000;78:1358–67.

CAS   PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Weir L, Mykhalovskiy E. Global public health vigilance: creating a world on alert. New York: Routledge; 2010.

Ramon MK, Beaglehole R, Correa CM, Mirza Z, Buse K, Drager N. The public health implications of multilateral trade agreements. In: Lee K, Buse K, Fustukian S, editors. Health policy in a globalising world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. p. 18–40.

Shaffer ER, Waitzkin H, Brenner J, Jasso-Aguilar R. Global trade and public health. Am J Public Health. 2005;95:23–34.

Mateus AL, Otete HE, Beck CR, Dolan GP, Nguyen-Van-Tam JS. Effectiveness of travel restrictions in the rapid containment of human influenza: a systematic review. Bull World Health Organ. 2014;92:868–80. https://doi.org/10.2471/BLT.14.135590 .

Barlow P, Labonte R, McKee M, Stuckler D. Trade challenges at the World Trade Organization to national noncommunicable disease prevention policies: a thematic document analysis of trade and health policy space. PLoS Med. 2018;15:e1002590. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002590 .

Gleeson D, O'Brien P. Alcohol labelling rules in free trade agreements: advancing the industry's interests at the expense of the public's health. Drug Alcohol Rev. 2020 (in press). https://doi.org/10.1111/dar.13054 .

Dreher A. Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization. Appl Econ. 2006;38:1091–110. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840500392078 .

Gygli S, Haelg F, Potrafke N, Sturm JE. The KOF globalisation index–revisited. Rev Int Organ. 2019;14:543–74.

Jani VJ, Joshi NA, Mehta DJ. Globalization and health: an empirical investigation. Glob Soc Policy. 2019;19:207–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468018119827475 .

Martens P, Akin SM, Maud H, Mohsin R. Is globalization healthy: a statistical indicator analysis of the impacts of globalization on health. Glob Health. 2010;6:16–29. https://doi.org/10.1186/1744-8603-6-16 .

Barnish M, Tørnes M, Nelson-Horne B. How much evidence is there that political factors are related to population health outcomes? An internationally comparative systematic review. BMJ Open. 2018;8:e020886. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2017-020886 .

Vogli RD, Kouvonen A, Elovainio M, Marmot M. Economic globalization, inequality and body mass index: a cross-national analysis of 127 countries. Crit Public Health. 2014;24:7–21.

Goryakin Y, Lobstein T, James WP, Suhrcke M. The impact of economic, political and social globalization on overweight and obesity in the 56 low and middle income countries. Soc Sci Med. 2015;133:67–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.03.030 .

Jarman H. Trade policy governance: what health policymakers and advocates need to know. Health Policy. 2017;121:1105–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.09.002 .

Article   PubMed   Google Scholar  

Bozorgmehr K, San SM. Trade liberalization and tuberculosis incidence: a longitudinal multi-level analysis in 22 high burden countries between 1990 and 2010. Health Policy Plan. 2014;29:328–51.

Barlow P, McKee M, Basu S, Stuckler D. The health impact of trade and investment agreements: a quantitative systematic review and network co-citation analysis. Glob Health. 2017;13:1–9.

McNeill D, Barlow P, Birkbeck CD, Fukuda-Parr S, Grover A, Schrecker T, Stuckler D. Trade and investment agreements: implications for health protection. J World Trade. 2017;51:159–82.

Google Scholar  

Cronert A. Democracy, state capacity, and covid-19 related school closures. 2020. Preprint at https://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/apsa/article-details/5ea8501b68bfcc00122e96ac .

Adolph C, Amano K, Bang-Jensen B, Fullman N, Wilkerson J. Pandemic politics: timing state-level social distancing responses to COVID-19. J Health Polit Policy Law. 2020;8802162. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-8802162 .

Sebhatu A, Wennberg K, Arora-Jonsson S, Lindberg SI. Explaining the homogeneous diffusion of COVID-19 nonpharmaceutical interventions across heterogeneous countries. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2020;117:21201–8.

Toshkov D, Yesilkagit K, Carroll B. Government capacity, societal trust or party preferences? What accounts for the variety of national policy responses to the covid-19 pandemic in Europe?. 2020. Preprint at https://osf.io/preprints/7chpu/

Chan HF, Brumpton M, Macintyre A, Arapoc J, Savage DA, Skali A, Stadelmann D, Torgler B. How confidence in health care systems affects mobility and compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic. PLoS One. 2020;15(10):e0240644.

Greer SL, King EJ, da Fonseca EM, Peralta-Santos A. The comparative politics of COVID-19: the need to understand government responses. Glob Public Health. 2020;15:1413–6.

Barlow P, McKee M, Stuckler D. The impact of US free trade agreements on calorie availability and obesity: a natural experiment in Canada. Am J Prev Med. 2018;54:637–43.

Ryu S, Gao H, Wong JY, Shiu EY, Xiao J, Fong MW, Cowling BJ. Nonpharmaceutical measures for pandemic influenza in nonhealthcare settings—international travel-related measures. Emerging Infect Dis. 2020;26:961.

Hale T, Petherick A, Phillips T, Webster S. Variation in government responses to COVID-19. Blavatnik school of government working paper. 2020;31 https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-05/BSG-WP-2020-032-v6.0.pdf .

Dong E, Du H, Gardner L. An interactive web-based dashboard to track COVID-19 in real time. Lancet Infect Dis. 2020;20:533–4. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30120-1 .

World Tourism Organization. Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, Data 2014–2018, 2020 edition, UNWTO, Madrid. 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.18111/9789284421442 .

Hendrix CS. Measuring state capacity: theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict. J Peace Res. 2010;47:273–85.

Capano G, Howlett M, Jarvis DS, Ramesh M, Goyal N. Mobilizing policy (in) capacity to fight COVID-19: understanding variations in state responses. Polic Soc. 2020;39:285–308.

Dowd JB, Andriano L, Brazel DM, Rotondi V, Block P, Ding X, Liu Y, Mills MC. Demographic science aids in understanding the spread and fatality rates of COVID-19. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2020;117(18):9696–8.

González-Bustamante B. Evolution and early government responses to COVID-19 in South America. World Dev. 2020;137:105180.

Wei LJ, Lin DY, Weissfeld L. Regression analysis of multivariate incomplete failure time data by modeling marginal distributions. J Am Stat Assoc. 1989;84:1065–73.

Chan HF, Skali A, Savage DA, Stadelmann D, Torgler B. Risk attitudes and human mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sci Rep. 2020; In press.

Weible CM, Nohrstedt D, Cairney P, Carter DP, Crow DA, Durnová AP, Heikkila T, Ingold K, McConnell A, Stone D. COVID-19 and the policy sciences: initial reactions and perspectives. Policy Sci. 2020:225–41.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-020-09381-4 ,  https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11077-020-09381-4 .

Boix C, Miller M, Rosato S. A complete data set of political regimes, 1800–2007. Comp Polit Stud. 2013;46:1523–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012463905 .

Schmitt C. Culture, closeness, or commerce? Policy diffusion and social spending dynamics. Swiss Political Sci Rev. 2013;19(2):123–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12035 .

Bohmelt T, Ezrow L, Lehrer R, Ward H. Party policy diffusion. Rev Polit Review of Politics. 2016;110:397–410. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000162 .

Chong KC, Zee BC. Modeling the impact of air, sea, and land travel restrictions supplemented by other interventions on the emergence of a new influenza pandemic virus. BMC Infect Dis. 2012;12(1):309.

Qianying L. A conceptual model for the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak in Wuhan. China with individual reaction and governmental action. Int J Infect Dis. 2020;93:211–6.

Hosseini P, Sokolow SH, Vandegrift KJ, Kilpatrick AM, Daszak P. Predictive power of air travel and socio-economic data for early pandemic spread. PLoS One. 2010;5:e12763.

Hufnagel L, Brockmann D, Geisel T. Forecast and control of epidemics in a globalized world. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2004;101:15124–9.

Caley P, Becker NG, Philp DJ. The waiting time for inter-country spread of pandemic influenza. PLoS One. 2007;2:e143.

Giordano G, Blanchini F, Bruno R, Colaneri P, Di Filippo A, Di Matteo A, Colaneri M. Modelling the COVID-19 epidemic and implementation of population-wide interventions in Italy. Nat Med. 2020 Apr;22:1–6. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0883-7 .

Epstein JM, Goedecke DM, Yu F, Morris RJ, Wagener DK, Bobashev GV. Controlling pandemic flu: the value of international air travel restrictions. PLoS One. 2007;2:e401.

Murray KA, Preston N, Allen T, Zambrana-Torrelio C, Hosseini PR, Daszak P. Global biogeography of human infectious diseases. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2015;112:12746–51.

Download references

Acknowledgements

Not applicable.

There is no funding support for the study.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, 2 George St, Brisbane, QLD, 4000, Australia

Steve J. Bickley, Ho Fai Chan & Benno Torgler

Centre for Behavioural Economics, Society and Technology (BEST), 2 George St, Brisbane, QLD, 4000, Australia

Steve J. Bickley, Ho Fai Chan, David Stadelmann & Benno Torgler

Department of Global Economics & Management, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

Ahmed Skali

University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany

David Stadelmann

CREMA – Centre for Research in Economics, Management, and the Arts, Südstrasse 11, CH-8008, Zürich, Switzerland

David Stadelmann & Benno Torgler

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Contributions

SJB, HFC and BT designed the research; HFC extracted the data; SJB, HFC and BT analyzed the data and drafted the paper. AS and DS revised the manuscript and provided substantial inputs. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ho Fai Chan .

Ethics declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate, consent for publication, competing interests.

There is no competing interest to declare.

Additional information

Publisher’s note.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Steve J. Bickley, Ho Fai Chan and Benno Torgler contributed equally to this work

Supplementary Information

Additional file 1 fig. s1..

Country-specific timeline for adoption of travel policy restrictions. Diamond markers with black outlines represent the first travel restriction implemented. Countries are ranked according to the Globalization measure. ^Countries with no travel restriction records ( n  = 32). *Countries without KOF index ( n  = 24). Five countries do not have any confirmed COVID case at time of study. Fig. S2. Correlation between timing of first confirmed COVID case and globalization. Pearson’s correlation (ρ) is − 0.543 ( p  < 0.001). Marker size represents the total number of COVID cases at time of data collection. Horizontal and vertical lines indicate the respective mean. Fig. S3. Correlations between KOF globalization index and the number of days between first COVID-19 case and travel restriction implementation (A-D) and number of COVID-19 cases at the time of first travel restriction (E-H). For each country, we calculate the measure of interest by taking the earliest of either the implementation date of the focal policy (e.g., quarantine) or the date of a more restrictive travel policy being adopted. Thus, the measures can be interpreted as the number of days lapsed since the first confirmed COVID-19 case or the number of COVID-19 cases when a ‘at-least-as-strict’ travel policy x was in place, respectively. Marker size represents the total number of COVID-19 cases at time of the respective policy implementation. Color indicates geographical regions (see Fig. S 2 legend). Pearson’s correlations: A ( ρ  = 0.35, p  < 0.001, n  = 170); B ( ρ  = 0.323, p  < 0.001, n  = 170); C ( ρ  = 0.240, p  = 0.0017, n  = 170); D ( ρ  = 0.287, p  = 0.001, n  = 170); E ( ρ  = 0.408, p  < 0.001, n  = 173); F ( ρ  = 0.494, p  < 0.001, n  = 173); G ( ρ  = 0.502, p  < 0.001, n  = 173); H ( ρ  = 0.506, p  < 0.001, n  = 173). Fig. S4. Robustness checks with alternative measure of country closeness. HRs of diffusion of travel restrictions (left) and prevalence of COVID-19 in neighboring countries (right) on adoption of travel restrictions. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals. Fig. S5. HRs of interaction terms between globalization index and government effectiveness on adoption of travel restrictions. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals. Fig. S6. Estimates of the HRs of different dimensions of the globalization index on adoption of travel restrictions. Circle markers represent estimates from the main effects model (i.e., without interaction terms), with KOF indices included in the model one at the time. Triangle markers show the estimated HRs of the three KOF dimensions added together in the same model (competing effects). Diamonds show the HR estimates of the globalization dimensions in the interaction model. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals. Table S1 . List of countries with no OxCGRT data (as of 23 September 2020). Table S2 . List of countries with no KOF measures. Table S3 . Placebo analysis with domestic COVID-19 responses. Table S4 . Placebo analysis with specific domestic COVID-19 NPIs. Table S5. Prediction of number of COVID-19 cases at the adoption of travel restriction. Table S6. Prediction of COVID-19 case per capita at the adoption of travel restriction

Rights and permissions

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ . The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver ( http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ ) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article.

Bickley, S.J., Chan, H.F., Skali, A. et al. How does globalization affect COVID-19 responses?. Global Health 17 , 57 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-021-00677-5

Download citation

Received : 08 July 2020

Accepted : 25 February 2021

Published : 20 May 2021

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-021-00677-5

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Coronavirus
• Globalization
• Travel restriction
• Border closure
• Health screening
• Survival analysis

Globalization and Health

ISSN: 1744-8603

• Submission enquiries: [email protected]
• General enquiries: [email protected]

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

The Influence of Globalization on Our Daily Life: A Comparative Overview of Baidoa in Somalia and Abu Dhabi in the UAE

2021, Journal of Research in Business and Management

Globalization is a reality that affects our lives on every day basis and in multiple ways. Scholars of globalization believe that the world is better off globalized than exist in units of nations or geographical entities whose interactions can be limited by national borders. However, critical observers argue that globalization is not evenly participated in and that its biases affect poor nations more than the benefits gained by the rich nations that advocate for globalization. Therefore, using Baidoa city in the SouthWest of Somalia and Abu Dhabi city in the United Arab Emirates as an example, this essay attempts to present a comparative overview of how globalization influences our lives.

Related Papers

International Journal of African and Asian Studies

Mohamed A Eno , Anthony Osambo

Scholars of oil-based rentierism otherwise dubbed as 'the oil curse', claim that the political systems of such countries and their leaderships cannot be taken as serious development focused agents. In a similar contention, proponents of western-style democracy support the idea that 'sheikhdom' leadership based on patriarchic inheritance is destructive to development, while yet another section of scholars claims that Islam, as a faith, is in general anti-development. In order to broaden the debate on this subject, this study uses the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a case of a country that has achieved a tremendous success in various development areas and contrary to the old view of the three types of critics mentioned here. Introduction The United Arab Emirates (UAE) became the youngest state in the Middle East after gaining independence from the UK in 1971 and creating in 1972 a federation of seven small emirates. It has an average population of about 5 million, including a large number of expatriates who also constitute the majority of the workforce in the country. However, the International Monetary Fund had projected the population of the UAE to reach up to six million by 2015, increasing from 5.4 million in 2010, and that an increase in the number of expatriate population, considered over 80 per cent of the country's workforce, comprises the main growth drivers within the various areas of the country's economic development (IMF, 2011). The island city of Abu Dhabi is the capital of the UAE. Although it is the seat of the federal government, Abu Dhabi, as an emirate, is also composed of several regions which make it the largest among its federated sister emirates. With most of the oil and gas produced in the country extracted within the geographical boundary of the island, Abu Dhabi is indeed the richest individual emirate, making the UAE the second largest oil exporting country in the Middle East with a high concentration in the petrochemical industry. Despite Abu Dhabi's natural wealth, many people around the world think of Dubai as the capital of the country. This perception reigns due to Dubai's drastic measures in commercializing its potential in the areas of tourism, real estate, and the maritime business, particularly offering free port facilities for goods destined to other countries in the region and far beyond the Gulf region. As such, Dubai enjoys being the commercial hub of the country and possibly of the entire Gulf region. An attractive policy of short-stay tourist visa system has contributed massively towards Dubai's popularity at the global scene with numerous academic, industrial, commercial as well as professional seminars, workshops, conferences and other high profile celebrity events held in the emirate. The UAE is sometimes lumped together with its Gulf neighbors when the discussion is about political environment and structure of the states in the region. For instance, it is common to hear terms like Gulf Arab States or Arab Gulf States or the Persian Gulf Arab States, referring to the six Arab nations that formed in 1981 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, The Sultanate of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The grouping up, though providing descriptive similarities, seems to undermine the internal differences the countries have in their social and political structures, leadership selection and even compositions and constitutions of the states (Aartun, 2001). The similarity may be drawn from the patrimonial inheritance of the rulership and other traditional hierarchical factors relating to the patrilineal ascension to the crown. But the distinctness of the UAE from its sister neighbours becomes clear when some consideration is given to the function of the first adjective in the country's name 'United', which symbolizes the federal type of government which the UAE embraces, unlike the other Gulf states. Secondly, the UAE, though a Muslim state, does not have tendencies of adherence to Islamic conservatism as a national political guideline or constitution (Bill & Springborg, 2000). It practices a modest quality of Islam which complies with the principles of the sharia while at the same time harmonizing it with the modern doctrines of contemporary socioeconomic systems. This is to argue that it has opted to adhere to both the principles of the Federation and of the Islamic doctrine, fulfilling simultaneously the requirements of a

Journal of Somali Studies

Mohamed A Eno

Somalia has a long history and well known figures who developed unique systems of governance, which allowed economic development, social harmony and political participation long before the colonial occupation. The history of the Jama'a of Baardheere offers one such example. This work part of a larger project exploring the Jama'a system of administration, structure of governance,

Marvin R. Soriano

QUEST JOURNALS

Introduction: In Somalia, cholera is feared as one among the deadliest diseases that spread in the country. In the district of Baidoa in Bay Region, SouthWest State of Somalia, a large number of IDPs from the rural area, other districts, and neighboring regions are hosted. The IDP camps are described to be in undesirable condition. Baido itself, as a city and district, has not had enough preparation to accommodate the large influx of migrants it has experienced over the past years. Under this situation, what many believed to be the worst cholera epidemic has struck the district in 2017, causing a major outbreak and claiming more lives than previous outbreaks. Objective: The objective of the study is to highlight some of the causes of cholera in Baidoa from the perceptions of some of the medical personnel who had participated in the treatment of the cholera epidemic during the operation to control the outbreak. Method: The study benefits from a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods of research for data collection and analysis of responses from selected 20 male and female medical professionals who participated in the emergency of the cholera epidemic of 2017 in Baidoa district, SWSS. Results are illustrated in tables by furnishing details in frequency and percentage as well as presenting direct quotes of the respondents. Results: Poor sanitation is blamed unanimously by 100% for the outbreak. Similarly, shortage or lack of water is believed by 85% of respondents to be among the factors behind the outbreak while lack of awareness returned 95% and a highly possible cause. Overflow or increase of IDPs in Baidoa district and its environs represents the perception of 80% of the respondent medical professionals as a contributory factor to the outbreak of cholera. Conclusion: Several factors have been identified as causes behind the recurrence of the cholera epidemic in the district of Baidoa. While some of these are natural, others are man-made factors which could be addressed easily. There is need to increase preventive measures and preparedness for an outbreak by initially targeting improvement of sanitation through the creation of awareness and availability of adequate clean drinking water.

Investigating Maternal Mortality of the Year 2019 at Bay Regional Hospital in Baidoa, South-West State of Somalia

Mohamud Abukar

Background: Maternal mortality (MM) has been described as a critical problem of global dimension. In 2017 alone, according to a report by the World Health Organization in collaboration with its partners (WHO et al. 2019), MM is estimated to have claimed the lives of 295,000 women worldwide. Considering this concern, the University of Southern Somalia's faculty and students from the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences and a faculty member from the Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities of the USS, in association with Hakaba Institute for Research & Training, Baidoa, SWSS, carried out this study to highlight the causes of MM in Baidoa City. The purpose of the study is to shed light on the extent at which cases of MM occur and the causes inherent to it by focusing on incidents at Bay Regional Hospital (BRH) in Baidoa city, SWSS, in the year 2019. Methods: The study benefits from quantitative case study method by utilizing observation of data available in the archives of Bay Regional Hospital. Analyzing frequencies of occurrences of MM and their causes, the study uses 4 tables to demonstrate the comparisons of the incidents and causes of death from January to December 2019. Results: A total number of 1950 pregnant women visited the hospital; 883 were consulted, treated and returned home; 1049 underwent safe delivery; while 18 women died in the process of childbirth. Conclusion: MM poses a great threat to expecting mothers in Baidoa as they are exposed to the risk of dying from obstetric complications linked to numerous direct and indirect causes. Eclampsia, PPH/APH and numerous types of infections have been identified to be among the direct and indirect causes, although many of them are classified as preventable, treatable, or manageable in nature.

Journal of Political Ecology

stephen fragaszy

This article presents the Liwa Oasis as a hydrosocial territory. It is defined by its natural resource, social, economic, and political context and we show how these manifest in policy and practice. The article identifies these components through analysis of the political economy of water management and agricultural production systems. Two distinct hydrosocial periods are defined: from independence in 1971 to the formation of agencies with water sustainability remits in 2006, and then from 2010 to the present, when subsidy regimes incentivized changes to cropping in existing agricultural production systems. The changes between these periods reflect alterations in the hydrosocial cycle stemming from natural resource degradation and from how agricultural policy responded to it, while still meeting social stability and food security objectives. In Liwa, water management and agricultural production regimes reflect the distributive nature of the state, in that agricultural subsidies and ...

Serkan Yolaçan

Noura Mansouri

Arabian Humanities

Dale Hudson

More than 60 feature‑length narrative films have been produced in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) since the first in 1988. Few, however, have generated an excitement to suggest Emirati filmmaking may become popular culture. The first supported by the state‑owned media company, Image Nation Abu Dhabi, was Djinn (2013), staged local folklore of a female djinn under the direction of a Hollywood filmmaker. It was lampooned by critics and largely ignored by audiences. This article considers how and when Emirati filmmaking might become part of a UAE film culture by revaluating frameworks that define UAE film audiences and by comparing two films that feature Emirati citizens, alongside Arab, European, and South Asian expatriates to move discussions beyond Arabization, cosmopolitanism, and exceptionalism.

RELATED PAPERS

Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies

Brendon J Cannon

Gökçe Günel

yasser elsheshtawy

Jackie Armijo

International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies

haerinck ernie

Roger Ballard

IJARW Research Publication , TRAN THUY PHUONG

Rift Valley Institute

Jason Mosley , Federico Donelli

AFED reports , Najib Saab

Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy

Cornelia Zeineddine

Fatima Badry

Robina Mohammad

ISPI Analysis

Eleonora Ardemagni

Media in the Middle East: Activism, Politics, and Culture

Daniel Moshashai

Seth J . Vogelman

Art & International Affairs

Melissa Nisbett

Li-Chen Sim

Journal of the British Academy

Peter Chonka , Jutta Bakonyi

Joseph Maseland

Alice Yaoyao DANG

United Arab Emirates & Alexandria University

Fayez Elessawy

Low carbon energy in MENA

Danielle Wolff

Experiences of Oil

Melissa Gronlund

The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment in UAE Economic growth

Mohamed N A B I L Shamsan

Ege Yildirim

Middle East Insights

Nisha Mathew

The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition

Robin Mills

The GCC in the Eastern Mediterranean: Growing Significance, Competing Agendas (Institute for International Political Studies, ISPI - Italy)

Naser al-tamimi

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Ronald Hawker

Ismail Mohamed Ali

Sarina Wakefield

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024