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Policing: An International Journal

ISSN : 1363-951X

Article publication date: 23 June 2021

Issue publication date: 31 August 2021

Detective work is a mainstay of modern law enforcement, but its effectiveness has been much less evaluated than patrol work. To explore what is known about effective investigative practices and to identify evidence gaps, the authors assess the current state of empirical research on investigations.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors assess the empirical research about the effectiveness of criminal investigations and detective work in resolving cases and improving clearance rates.

The authors’ analysis of the literature produced 80 studies that focus on seven categories of investigations research, which include the impact that case and situational factors, demographic and neighborhood dynamics, organizational policies and practices, investigative effort, technology, patrol officers and community members have on case resolution. The authors’ assessment shows that evaluation research examining the effectiveness of various investigative activities is rare. However, the broader empirical literature indicates that a combination of organizational policies, investigative effort and certain technologies can be promising in improving investigative outcomes even in cases deemed less solvable.

Research limitations/implications

From an evidence-based perspective, this review emphasizes the need for greater transparency, evaluation and accountability of investigative activities given the resources and importance afforded to criminal investigations.

Originality/value

This review is currently the most up-to-date review of the state of the research on what is known about effective investigative practices.

• Investigations
• Evidence-based policing
• Effectiveness

Acknowledgements

This evidence-assessment was funded by a grant from Arnold Ventures.

Prince, H. , Lum, C. and Koper, C.S. (2021), "Effective police investigative practices: an evidence-assessment of the research", Policing: An International Journal , Vol. 44 No. 4, pp. 683-707. https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-04-2021-0054

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Recent advances in forensic science research

For immediate release, acs news service weekly presspac: april 20, 2022.

Forensic scientists collect and analyze evidence during a criminal investigation to identify victims, determine the cause of death and figure out “who done it.” Below are some recent papers published in ACS journals reporting on new advances that could help forensic scientists solve crimes. Reporters can request free access to these papers by emailing  newsroom@acs.org .

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“Carbon Dot Powders with Cross-Linking-Based Long-Wavelength Emission for Multicolor Imaging of Latent Fingerprints” ACS Applied Nanomaterials Jan. 21, 2022 For decades, criminal investigators have recognized the importance of analyzing latent fingerprints left at crime scenes to help identify a perpetrator, but current methods to make these prints visible have limitations, including low contrast, low sensitivity and high toxicity. These researchers devised a simple way to make fluorescent carbon dot powders that can be applied to latent fingerprints, making them fluoresce under UV light with red, orange and yellow colors.

“Proteomics Offers New Clues for Forensic Investigations” ACS Central Science Oct. 18, 2021 This review article describes how forensic scientists are now turning their attention to proteins in bone, blood or other biological samples, which can sometimes answer questions that DNA can’t. For example, unlike DNA, a person’s complement of proteins (or proteome) changes over time, providing important clues about when a person died and their age at death.

“Integrating the MasSpec Pen with Sub-Atmospheric Pressure Chemical Ionization for Rapid Chemical Analysis and Forensic Applications” Analytical Chemistry May 19, 2021 These researchers previously developed a “MasSpec Pen,” a handheld device integrated with a mass spectrometer for direct analysis and molecular profiling of biological samples. In this article, they develop a new version that can quickly and easily detect and measure compounds, including cocaine, oxycodone and explosives, which can be important in forensics investigations.

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Criminal Justice Resources

Articles and papers/reports, selected books and law-related material, statistics/data, organizations, other sources, 50-state surveys, historical archives/research, what is happening in criminal justice, getting help, introduction.

This guide is meant to serve as a starting place for people researching criminal justice and related criminal law issues.  It focuses primarly on issues related to the United States.  For more criminal law sources (particularly for 1L's), be sure to check out our guides for Criminal Law and Law and Public Policy  and the Kennedy School Library's Criminal Justice guide.

Subject Guide

Indexing/abstracting resources focused on criminal justice

• Crime and Delinquency Abstracts Covers 1963-1972. National Council on Crime and Delinquency and National Clearinghouse for Mental Health Information. Previously,
• Criminal Justice Abstracts (Harvard Key Login) Criminal Justice Abstracts provides comprehensive coverage of U.S. and international criminal justice literature including scholarly journals, books, dissertations, governmental and non-governmental studies and reports, unpublished papers, magazines, newsletters and other materials. In addition to criminal justice and criminology, topics covered include criminal law and procedure, corrections and prisons, police and policing, criminal investigation, forensic sciences and investigation, history of crime, substance abuse and addiction, and probation and parole. 1968-current. more... less... Criminal Justice Abstracts provides comprehensive coverage of U.S. and international criminal justice literature including scholarly journals, books, dissertations, governmental and non-governmental studies and reports, unpublished papers, magazines, newsletters and other materials. In addition to criminal justice and criminology, topics covered include criminal law and procedure, corrections and prisons, police and policing, criminal investigation, forensic sciences and investigation, history of crime, substance abuse and addiction, and probation and parole.
• NCJRS The National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) is a federally funded resource offering justice and substance abuse information to support research, policy, and program development worldwide. The NCJRS Abstracts Database contains summaries of the more than 185,000 criminal justice publications housed in the NCJRS Library collection. Most documents published by NCJRS sponsoring agencies since 1995 are available in full-text online. A link is included with the abstract when the full-text is available. Use the Thesaurus Term Search to search for materials in the NCJRS Abstracts Database using an NCJRS controlled vocabulary. This controlled vocabulary is used to assign relevant indexing terms to the documents in the NCJRS collection.

Finding legal articles and papers

• Index to Legal Periodicals and Books
• Index to Legal Periodicals Retrospective: 1908-1981 (Law Login Required) covers back to 1908 more... less... This retrospective database indexes over 750 legal periodicals published in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. Annual surveys of the laws of a jurisdiction, annual surveys of the federal courts, yearbooks, annual institutes, and annual reviews of the work in a given field or on a given topic will also be covered.
• More resources for finding legal articles

Multidisciplinary databases

• Academic Search Premier (Harvard Login) more... less... Academic Search Premier (ASP) is a multi-disciplinary database that includes citations and abstracts from over 4,700 scholarly publications (journals, magazines and newspapers). Full text is available for more than 3,600 of the publications and is searchable.
• JSTOR more... less... Includes all titles in the JSTOR collection, excluding recent issues. JSTOR (www.jstor.org) is a not-for-profit organization with a dual mission to create and maintain a trusted archive of important scholarly journals, and to provide access to these journals as widely as possible. Content in JSTOR spans many disciplines, primarily in the humanities and social sciences. For complete lists of titles and collections, please refer to http://www.jstor.org/about/collection.list.html.

Other social science databases related to criminal justice

• PAIS International (Harvard Login) provides access to materials about public policy, including academic journal articles, yearbooks, books, reports and pamphlets. Items indexed include works by academics, agencies, international organizations and federal, state and local governments from 1972 to the present. PAIS covers over 1,600 journals and roughly 8,000 books each year. PAIS is international in scope and contains items in many romance languages. more... less... PAIS International indexes the public and social policy literature of public administration, political science, economics, finance, international relations, law, and health care, International in scope, PAIS indexes publications in English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish. The database is comprised of abstracts of thousands of journal articles, books, directories, conference proceedings, government documents and statistical yearbooks.
• More academic resources by field
• Law and Public Policy Guide
• Urban Studies Abstracts (Harvard Login) more... less... Electronic index and abstracts to the literature in the area of urban studies, including urban affairs, community development, and urban history. The backfile of this index has been digitized, providing coverage back to 1973.

Selected Journals and newsletters

• Annual Review of Criminal Procedure (Georgetown) Latest issue available in print at Law School KF9619 .G46

• Federal Sentencing Reporter also on Lexis

Congressional publications/government reports

• CRS reports
• House and Senate Hearings, Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection, and Digital US Bills and Resolutions
• Federal Legislative History
• US Department of Justice
• PolicyFile (Harvard Login) Abstracts of and links to domestic and international public policy issue published by think tanks, university research programs, & research organizations. more... less... PolicyFile provides abstracts (more than half of the abstracts link to the full text documents) of domestic and international public policy issues. The public policy reports and studies are published by think tanks, university research programs, research organizations which include the OECD, IMF, World Bank, the Rand Corporation, and a number of federal agencies. The database search engine allows users to search by title, author, subject, organization and keyword.
• Rutgers University Don M. Gottsfredson School of Criminal Justice Gray Literature Database

Rules of Criminal Procedure

• Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Federal Rules of Practice & Procedure) Includes postings of proposed rule changes. From the uscourts.gov website.
• Rulemaking (Pending Rules)(US Courts)

Model Penal Code

• Criminal Law: Model Penal Code
• Model Penal Code and Commentaries (official draft and revised comments) : with text of Model penal code as adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962.
• Model penal code : official draft and explanatory notes : complete text of Model penal code as adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962.
• Model Penal Code (ALI Library) Includes drafts

Selected Criminal Law Treatises, Basic Texts and Practice Manuals

Below are sources related to criminal law generally or focused on federal criminal law.  For a particular jurisdiction, look for secondary sources related to that particular state.  For constitutional issues, see also secondary sources related to constitutional law more generally.

• United States Attorneys Manual
• Legal Division Reference Book
• United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual

Search and Seizure

• Search and Seizure also on Lexis

Sources for criminal justice statistics generally

• Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Currently in transition (no longer funded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics), but still a good starting place. Data included as of 2013.
• Bureau of Justice Statistics
• FBI Uniform Crime Reports Annual report is Crime in the United States .
• National Crime Victimization Survey See also NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool and National Crime Victimization Survey Resource Guide .
• Justice Research and Statistics Association
• National Archive of Criminal Justice Data
• United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) Interactive Sourcebook
• Sunlight Criminal Justice Project Its Hall of Justice provides a searchable inventory of publically available criminal justice data sets and research.
• Arrest Data Analysis Tool underlying data from FBI's UCR (Uniform Crime Reports)
• Measures for Justice
• State Criminal Caseloads
• United States Historical Corrections Statistics - 1850-1984 from BJS abstract: "The introductory chapter contains a brief history of Federal corrections data collection efforts. Summary information on capital punishment includes data on illegal lynchings by race and offense, regional comparisons of the number of persons executed, the number under the death sentence, the number of women executed, and the number of persons removed from the death sentence other than by execution. Prison statistics cover the number in Federal, State, and juvenile facilities; the average sentence by sex, region, race, and offense; length of sentence; and type of release. Statistics also cover facility staff, inmate-staff ratio, and jail inmates. Probation and parole statistics address the numbers under supervision (both adults and juveniles), average caseload, terminations by method of termination, the average length of parole and percent with favorable outcome, and probationer and parolee profiles. Implications are drawn for current data collection efforts, and the appendix contains limited information on military prisons."
• Crime Solutions.gov

Crime Mapping

• NIJ Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety

Specialized sources of statistics/data

• Death Penalty Information Center
• Federal Sentencing Statistics
• The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US (The Guardian)
• Washington Post (People Shot Dead by Police)
• Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Protection's (OJJDP's) Statistical Briefing Book
• Stanford Open Policing Project Data on vehicle and pedestrian stops from law enforcement departments across the country.
• Corporate Prosecution Registry
• Police Crime Data
• Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences Series
• Citizen Police Data Project focused on Chicago
• Chicago Data Collaborative "Collaborative members collect data from institutions at all points of contact in the Cook County criminal justice system, including the Chicago Police Department, the Illinois State Police, the Office of the State's Attorney, and the Cook County Jail."
• Washington Post (Unsolved Homicide Database)
• American Violence Run by the NYU Marron Institute of Urban Management, the initial iteration of this databases includes city-level figures on murder rates in more than 80 of the largest 100 U.S. cities. According to the website, the second iteration will feature neighborhood-level figures on violent crime in 30-50 cities with available data.
• Police Data Initiative "This site provides a consolidated and interactive listing of open and soon-to-be-opened data sets that more than 130 local law enforcement agencies have identified as important to their communities, and provides critical and timely resources, including technical guidance and best practices, success stories, how-to articles and links to related efforts." See map of participating agencies" .

Other sources for statistics

• American Fact Finder
• See Judicial Workload, Jury Verdicts and Crime Statistics generally
• Harvard Dataverse more... less... The Harvard-MIT Data Center is the principal repository of quantitative social science data at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The majority of its holdings are available to Harvard and MIT affiliates directly via its web site through its search engine. Graduate students and faculty with a Harvard or MIT Library card can check out paper code books from libraries at either institution, under Harvard's and MIT's reciprocal borrowing agreement. In addition, the Data Center has negotiated a special agreement for undergraduates and summer graduate students, who are not covered by the standard agreement.
• Proquest Statistical Insight (Harvard Login) more... less... Proquest Statistical Insight is a bibliographic database that indexes and abstracts the statistical content of selected United States government publications, state government publications, business and association publications, and intergovernmental publications. The abstracts may also contain a link to the full text of the table and/or a link to the agency's web site where the full text of the publication may be viewed and downloaded.
• Data.gov Includes data from the Department of Justice and other agencies.
• Data Citation Index (Web of Science)
• Historical Statistics of the United States (Harvard Login) more... less... Presents the U.S. in statistics from Colonial times to the present. Included are statistics on U.S. population, including characteristics, vital statistics, internal and international migration. Statistics on work and welfare, economic structure and performance, economic sectors, and governance and international relations. Tables may be downloaded for use in spreadsheets and other applications. This electronic database is also in a five volume hard copy set.

Books, reports and articles about criminal justice statistics and records

• Data and Civil Rights: Criminal Justice Primer Part of larger conference on Data and Civil Rights http://www.datacivilrights.org/ ; includes write-up from conference http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2014-1030/CriminalJustice-Writeup.pdf
• Ensuring the Quality, Credibility, and Relevance of U.S. Justice Statistics (2009)
• Estimating the Incidence of Rape and Sexual Assault
• Modernizing Crime Statistics: Report 1: Defining and Classifying Crime

Case Processing and Court Statistics

• Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics
• State Court Caseload Statistics See also Data Collection: Court Statistics Project and CSP Data Viewer .
• Statistics and Reports (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts)

Criminal Records

• Search Systems A mega search site with links to public records by state, county, city and also by record type. A great place to start your research. more... less... From the website: We've located, analyzed, described, and organized links to over 55,000 databases by type and location to help you find property, criminal, court, birth, death, marriage, divorce records, licenses, deeds, mortgages, corporate records, business registration, and many other public record resources quickly, easily, and for free.
• BRB Publications BRB Publications maintains a page with links to more than 300 local, state and federal websites offering free access to public records.
• National Sex Offender Public Registry From the US Department of Justice. This site also has links to all 50 states, District of Columbia, US territories, and tribal registry websites.
• FBI's Sex Offender Database websites An alternate source for state level sex offender databases.
• FBI's Bureau of Prisons Inmate Finder
• VINELink VINELink is the online version of VINE (Victim Information and Notification Everyday), the National Victim Notification Network. This service allows crime victims to obtain timely and reliable information about criminal cases and the custody status of offenders 24 hours a day.

Research Organizations and Advocacy Groups

• Vera Institute of Justice
• Agencies, Think Tanks and Advocacy Groups
• Urban Institute-Crime and Justice
• National Center for State Courts
• National Conference of State Legislatures
• Innocence Project
• Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice (UPenn Law)
• Capital Jury Project

Professional Organizations

• American Bar Association (Criminal Justice section)
• National District Attorneys Association
• American Correctional Association
• National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

Research guides from other libraries

• MSU Libraries, Criminal Justice Resources
• Georgetown Law Criminal Law and Justice Guide
• Harvard Kennedy School Library, Criminal Justice
• Criminal Law Prof Blog
• White Collar Crime Prof Blog

50-State-Surveys

• ABA Collateral Consequences Database
• National Conference of State Legislatures-Civil and Criminal Justice

HIstorical Archives/Projects

• National Death Penalty Archives
• ProQuest History Vault (Harvard Login)

Updates from popular criminal justice resources

New books in the library, new books in general.

• New Books Received at Rutgers

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Criminal Investigation Research Paper

View sample criminal justice research paper on criminal investigation. Browse criminal justice research paper topics for more inspiration. If you need a thorough research paper written according to all the academic standards, you can always turn to our experienced writers for help. This is how your paper can get an A! Feel free to contact our writing service for professional assistance. We offer high-quality assignments for reasonable rates.

This research paper provides an overview of the criminal investigation process and investigative methods. The focus of the discussion is on definitional issues along with the identification and evaluation of the types and sources of information often used in criminal investigations.

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Get 10% off with 24start discount code, criminal investigation defined.

An investigation refers to the process of collecting information in order to reach some goal; for example, collecting information about the reliability and performance of a vehicle prior to purchase in order to enhance the likelihood of buying a good car. Applied to the criminal realm, a criminal investigation refers to the process of collecting information (or evidence) about a crime in order to: (1) determine if a crime has been committed; (2) identify the perpetrator; (3) apprehend the perpetrator; and (4) provide evidence to support a conviction in court. If the first three objectives are successfully attained, then the crime can be said to be solved. Several other outcomes such as recovering stolen property, deterring individuals from engaging in criminal behaviors, and satisfying crime victims have also been associated with the process.

A useful perspective on the criminal investigation process is provided by information theory (Willmer). According to information theory, the criminal investigation process resembles a battle between the police and the perpetrator over crime-related information. In committing the crime, the offender emits ‘‘signals,’’ or leaves behind information of various sorts (fingerprints, eyewitness descriptions, murder weapon, etc.), which the police attempt to collect through investigative activities. If the perpetrator is able to minimize the amount of information available for the police to collect, or if the police are unable to recognize the information left behind, then the perpetrator will not be apprehended and therefore, the perpetrator will win the battle. If the police are able to collect a significant number of signals from the perpetrator, then the perpetrator will be identified and apprehended, and the police win. This perspective clearly underscores the importance of information in a criminal investigation.

The major problem for the police in conducting a criminal investigation is that not only is there potentially massive amounts of information available, but the relevance of the information is often unknown, the information is often incomplete, and the information is often inaccurate. Further, to be useful in proving guilt in court (where beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard), the evidence must have certain other qualities, and certain rules and procedures must be followed in collecting the evidence.

The Structure of Criminal Investigations

Criminal investigations can be either reactive, where the police respond to a crime that has already occurred, or proactive, where the investigation may go on before and during the commission of the offense.

The reactive criminal investigation process can be organized into several stages. The first stage is initial discovery and response. Of course, before the criminal investigation process can begin, the police must discover that a crime occurred or the victim (or witness) must realize that a crime occurred and notify the police. In the vast majority of cases it is the victim that first realizes a crime occurred and notifies the police. Then, most often, a patrol officer is dispatched to the crime scene or the location of the victim.

The second stage, the initial investigation, consists of the immediate post-crime activities of the patrol officer who arrives at the crime scene. The tasks of the patrol officer during the initial investigation are to arrest the culprit (if known and present), locate and interview witnesses, and collect and preserve other evidence.

If the perpetrator is not arrested during the initial investigation, then the case may be selected for a follow-up investigation, the third stage of the reactive investigation process. The followup investigation consists of additional investigative activities performed on a case, and these activities are usually performed by a detective. The process of deciding which cases should receive additional investigative effort is referred to as case screening. This decision is most often made by a detective supervisor and is most often guided by consideration of the seriousness of the crime (e.g., the amount of property loss or injury to the victim) and solvability factors (key pieces of crime-related information that, if present, enhance the probability of an arrest being made) (Brandl; Brandl and Frank).

Finally, at any time in the process the case may be closed and investigative activities terminated (e.g., victim cancels the investigation, the crime is unfounded, there are no more leads available, or an arrest is made). If an arrest is made, or an arrest warrant is issued, primary responsibility for the case typically shifts to the prosecutor’s office. The detective then assists the prosecutor in preparing the case for further processing.

With regard to proactive criminal investigations, undercover investigations are of most significance (Marx). Perhaps the most well-known type of undercover strategy is the sting or buy-bust strategy that usually involves a police officer posing as someone who wishes to buy some illicit goods (e.g., sex, drugs). Once a seller is identified and the particulars of the illicit transaction are determined, police officers waiting nearby can execute an arrest. Another common strategy involves undercover police officers acting as decoys where the attempt is to attract street crime by presenting an opportunity to an offender to commit such crime (e.g., a police officer poses as a stranded motorist in a high crime area; when a robbery attempt is made, nearby officers can make an arrest). Undercover strategies are controversial primarily because of the possibility of entrapment. Although a multitude of court cases have dealt with this issue, the basic rule is that the police can provide the opportunity or can encourage the offender to act but cannot compel the behavior—a fine line indeed.

Sources of Information and Evidence in Criminal Investigations

As noted earlier, the major problem for the police in conducting criminal investigations is determining the utility of the information (evidence) collected. While much information may be discovered or otherwise available to the police, only a small portion of it may be accurate, complete, and relevant, and hence useful, in establishing the identity (and/or whereabouts) of the culprit. As discussed below, not all types of information are equal in this regard—some types of evidence are usually more useful than others.

Information from Physical Evidence

Physical evidence is evidence of a tangible nature relating directly to the crime. Physical evidence includes such items as fingerprints, blood, fibers, and crime tools (knife, gun, crowbar, etc.). Physical evidence is sometimes referred to as forensic or scientific evidence, implying that the evidence must be scientifically analyzed and the results interpreted in order to be useful.

Physical evidence can serve at least two important functions in the investigative or judicial process (Peterson et al.). First, physical evidence can help establish the elements of a crime. For example, pry marks left on a window (physical evidence) may help establish the occurrence of a burglary. Second, physical evidence can associate or link victims to crime scenes, offenders to crime scenes, victims to victims, instruments to crime scenes, offenders to instruments, and so on. For example, in a homicide case, a body of a young female was found along a rural road. Knotted around her neck was a black electrical cord (physical evidence). The cause of death was determined to be ligature strangulation via the electrical cord. Upon searching the area for evidence, an abandoned farmhouse was located and searched, and a piece of a similar electrical cord was found. This evidence led the investigators to believe that the farmhouse may have been where the murder actually occurred. Further examination of the scene revealed tire impressions from an automobile (more physical evidence). These tire impressions were subsequently linked to the suspect’s vehicle.

Most forensic or physical evidence submitted for analysis is intended to establish associations. It is important to note that physical evidence is generally not very effective at identifying a culprit when one is not already known. Typically the identity of the culprit is developed in some other way and then physical evidence is used to help establish proof of guilt. Possible exceptions to this pattern are fingerprints (when analyzed through AFIS or Automated Fingerprint Identification System technology) and DNA banks. With AFIS technology, fingerprints recovered from a crime scene can be compared with thousands of other prints on file in the computer system at the law enforcement agency. Through a computerized matching process, the computer can select fingerprints that are close in characteristics. In this way a match may be made and a suspect’s name produced.

DNA printing allows for the comparison of DNA obtained from human cells (most commonly blood and semen) in order to obtain a match between at least two samples. In order for traditional DNA analysis to be useful, a suspect must first be identified through some other means, so that a comparison of samples can be made. However, emerging technology involves the creation of DNA banks, similar to the computerized fingerprint systems, in order to compare and match DNA structures. There is little question, as technological capabilities advance, so too will the value of physical evidence.

Information from People

Beside physical evidence, another major source of information in a criminal investigation is people, namely witnesses and suspects. Witnesses can be classified as either primary or secondary. Primary witnesses are individuals who have direct knowledge of the crime because they overheard or observed its occurrence. This classification would include crime victims who observed or who were otherwise involved in the offense. Eyewitnesses would also be included here. Secondary witnesses possess information about related events before or after the crime. Informants (or street sources ) and victims who did not observe the crime would be best classified as secondary witnesses.

A suspect can be defined as any individual within the scope of the investigation who may be responsible for the crime. Note that a witness may be initially considered a suspect by the police because information is not available to rule him or her out as the one responsible for the crime.

Besides the basic information about the particulars of the criminal event and possibly the actions of the perpetrator (to establish a modus operandi), another important type of information often provided by witnesses is eyewitness descriptions and identifications. Such information is quite powerful in establishing proof—for the police, prosecutor, judge, and jury—but the problem is that eyewitness identifications are often quite inaccurate and unreliable (Loftus et al.). Research has shown that many factors—such as environmental conditions, physical and emotional conditions of the observer, expectancies of the observer, perceived significance of the event, and knowledge of the item or person being described—can significantly influence the accuracy of eyewitness statements.

Hypnosis and cognitive interviews are two investigative tools available in the interview setting for the purpose of enhancing memory recall, and thus enhancing the accuracy of eyewitness information. Hypnosis is typically viewed as an altered state of consciousness that is characterized by heightened suggestibility (Niehaus). For the police, hypnosis is used as a method of stimulating memory in an attempt to increase memory recall greater than that achieved otherwise. While the use of hypnosis has increased sharply in the 1990s many courts have refused to admit such testimony because of accuracy concerns, or have established strict procedures under which hypnotically elicited testimony must be obtained (e.g., interview must be videotaped, the hypnotist should know little or nothing about the particulars of the case, no other persons are to be present during the interview, etc.). Most problematic is that under hypnosis, one is more responsive to suggestions (by definition) and thus, the hypnotist (intentionally or not) may lead the subject and inaccurate information may result. Once again then, information is produced but it is unknown whether the information is accurate.

Another method used to enhance memory recall among witnesses involves the use of the cognitive interview (Niehaus). A cognitive interview is designed to fully immerse the subject in the situation once again, but through freedom of description not hypnosis. The subject is instructed to report everything he or she can think of no matter how trivial it may seem. The witness may be instructed to recount the incident in more than one order. The intent is to allow for a much deeper level of recollection than the traditional interview. Research has shown that the cognitive interview approach elicits significantly more accurate information than a standard police interview, which typically involves frequent interruptions of explanations and descriptions, includes many closed-ended and short answer questions, and involves the inappropriate or overly strict ordering of questions (Niehaus).

In contrast to interviews of witnesses, interrogations of suspects are often more accusatory in nature. Usually interrogations are more of a process of testing already developed information than of actually developing information. The ultimate objective in an interrogation is to obtain a confession (Zulawski and Wicklander).

For obvious reasons, offenders have great incentive to deceive investigators. Understanding this, there are several tools available to investigators who wish to separate truthful from deceptive information. First is the understanding of kinesic behavior, the use of body movement and posture to convey meaning (Walters). Although not admissible in court, information derived from an understanding and interpretation of body language can be quite useful in an investigation. The theory behind the study of nonverbal behavior is that lying is stressful and individuals try to cope with this stress through body positioning and movement.

Although no single behavior is always indicative of deception, there are patterns (Zulawski and Wicklander). For example, a deceptive subject will tend not to sit facing the interrogator with shoulders squared but will protect the abdominal region of the body (angled posture, crossed arms). Major body shifts are typical especially when asked incriminating questions; and use of manipulators (or created jobs) are also common among deceptive subjects (e.g., grooming gestures), as are particular eye movements (Zulawski and Wicklander).

Much like nonverbal behavior, verbal behavior can also provide information about the truthfulness of a suspect. For example, deceptive subjects tend to provide vague and confusing statements, talk very soft or mumble, provide premature explanations, focus on irrelevant (but truthful) points in an explanation, or may claim memory problems or have a selectively good memory. Of course, interpretations of nonverbal and verbal behaviors in terms of deception must consider individual, gender, and cultural differences in personal interaction.

The polygraph is a mechanical means of detecting deception. The polygraph is a machine that measures physiological responses to psychological phenomenon. The polygraph records blood pressure, pulse, breathing rate, and electro-dermal reactivity and changes in these factors when questioned. Interpretation of the resulting chart serves as the basis for a judgment about truthfulness. Once again, the theory is that a person experiences increased stress when providing deceptive information and the corresponding physiological responses can be detected, measured, and interpreted. While this general theory is well founded, the accuracy of the polygraph depends largely on the skill of the operator and the individual who interprets the results of the polygraph examination (Raskin). No one can be forced to take a polygraph and polygraph results are seldom admissible in court. Often investigators threaten suspects with a polygraph examination in order to judge the nature of their reaction to it, or to induce a confession (Raskin).

Other Sources of Information

Along with physical evidence, witnesses, and suspects, there are a number of other sources that can provide useful information in a criminal investigation. These include psychological profiling, crime analysis, and the general public.

In the last two decades, psychological profiling has received much media attention. It is often portrayed as a complicated yet foolproof method of crime solving. In reality, psychological profiling is not all that mysterious. Psychological profiling is a technique for identifying the major personality, behavioral, and background characteristics of an individual based upon an analysis of the crime(s) he or she has committed. The basic theory behind psychological profiling is that the crime reflects the personality and characteristics of the offender much like how clothes, home decorations, and the car you drive reflects, to some degree, your personality. And these preferences do not change, or do not change very much over time.

In constructing a psychological profile, the characteristics of the offender are inferred from the nature of the crime and the behaviors displayed. The elements of a psychological profile are essentially statements of probability as determined from previous crimes and crime patterns (Holmes). Profiles are best suited and most easily constructed in cases where the perpetrator shows indications of psychopathology such as lust and mutilation murder, sadistic rape, and motiveless fire setting.

The value of a psychological profile is that it can help focus an investigation or reduce the number of suspects being considered. In this respect, a psychological profile is much like most physical evidence; a psychological profile cannot identify a suspect when one is not already known. There has been very little systematic research that has documented the actual impact of psychological profiles on criminal investigations. In an internal examination by the F.B.I. (as reported in Pinizzotto, 1984), analysts examined 192 cases where profiling was conducted. Of these, 88 were solved. Of these 88 solved cases, in only 17 percent did a profile offer significant help. Given the limitations of psychological profiles, it is clear that they are not as useful as media depictions might suggest.

Crime analysis is another potentially powerful source of information in a criminal investigation. Simply defined, crime analysis is the process of identifying patterns or trends in criminal incidents. Various means can be used to reach such ends, from computer mapping technology to computer data banks. The Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VI-CAP) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an example of an elaborate and sophisticated crime analysis system. When police departments are confronted with unsolved homicides, missing persons, or unidentified dead bodies, personnel in the department may complete a VI-CAP questionnaire, which asks for detailed information regarding the nature of the incident. These data are then sent to the F.B.I. and entered into the VI-CAP computer system, which is able to collate the data and possibly link crimes that occurred in different jurisdictions based on similarities in the crimes. This system, and similar intrastate systems, are designed to facilitate communication and sharing of information across agencies.

Finally, the general public is a potentially useful source of information in criminal investigations. As defined here, the public consists of people who have information relating to a particular crime or criminal but often cannot be identified through traditional methods (like a neighborhood canvass). Crime Solvers (or Crime Stoppers) tip lines and television shows such as America’s Most Wanted provide a method of disseminating information and encouraging individuals to come forward with information relating to particular crimes. Although once again, little systematic research has examined the actual effects of such strategies, information that has come from the general public through these sources has led to the solving of many crimes across the county (Rosenbaum; Nelson).

This discussion has provided an overview of the criminal investigation process and the role, function, and utility of various types and sources of evidence within the process. With these understandings, one may be able to better appreciate the complexities of criminal evidence and the criminal investigation process.

Bibliography:

• BRANDL, STEVEN ‘‘The Impact of Case Characteristics on Detectives’ Decision Making.’’ Justice Quarterly 10 (1993): 395–415.
• BRANDL, STEVEN, and FRANK, JAMES. ‘‘The Relationship Between Evidence, Detective Effort, and the Disposition of Burglary and Robbery Investigations.’’ American Journal of Police 13 (1994): 149–168.
• HOLMES, RONALD. Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989.
• LOFTUS, ELIZABETH; GREENE, EDITH L.; and DOYLE, JAMES M. ‘‘The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony.’’ In Psychological Methods in Criminal Investigation and Evidence. Edited by David C. Raskin. New York: Springer, 1989. Pages 3–45.
• MARX, GARY. Undercover: Police Surveillance in America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
• NELSON, SCOTT ‘‘Crime-Time Television.’’ F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin, August 1989, pp. 1–9.
• NIEHAUS, JOE. Investigative Forensic Hypnosis. New York: CRC Press, 1998.
• PETERSON, JOSEPH; MIHAJLOVIC, STEVEN; and GILLILAND, MICHAEL. Forensic Evidence and the Police: The Effects of Scientific Evidence on Criminal Investigations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1984.
• PINIZZOTTO, ANTHONY. ‘‘Forensic Psychology: Criminal Personality Profiling.’’ Journal of Police Science and Administration 12 (1984): 32–40.
• RASKIN, D. C. Psychological Methods in Criminal Investigation and Evidence. New York: Springer, 1989.
• ROSENBAUM, DENNIS. ‘‘Enhancing Citizen Participation and Solving Serious Crime: A National Evaluation of Crime Stoppers Program.’’ Crime and Delinquency 35 (1990): 401–420.
• WALTERS, STAN Principles of Kinesic Interview and Interrogation. New York: CRC Press, 1996.
• WILLMER, M. Crime and Information Theory. Edinburgh, Scotland: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970.
• ZULAWSKI, DAVID E., and WICKLANDER, DOUGLAS E. Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation. New York: Elsevier, 1992.

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One crime wave, three hypotheses: using interrupted time series to examine the unintended consequences of criminal justice reform, computer tablet recording of crime and a long-term hot spots policing programme

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• Published: 02 May 2024

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• Spencer P. Chainey 1 &
• Patricio R. Estévez-Soto 1  

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After sustained reductions in robberies and thefts in 2016, the city of Montevideo, Uruguay, experienced a sudden increase in these crimes in late 2017. Using interrupted time series regressions, and controlling for seasonality using ARIMA models, we investigated three potential explanations for this increase: (1) the failure of a hot spots policing program to maintain crime decreases; (2) improved crime recording by police patrols using tablet computers; and (3) the change from an inquisitorial to an adversarial criminal justice procedure. We found that the hot spots policing program that began in April 2016 continued to be associated with crime reductions during 2017, that the increases observed after November 2017 were strongly associated with the new criminal justice procedure, and that tablets had a positive, albeit negligible, effect. The findings illustrate that criminal justice reforms, desirable as such reforms may be, can have unintended consequences on crime levels.

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Introduction

In late 2017 and in to 2018, the capital city of Uruguay, Montevideo, experienced a sudden and substantial increase in robberies and thefts against pedestrians of over 45percent on the previous year (increasing from 15,093 of these crimes in 2017 to 21,984 in 2018). Although increases were observed in other types of crime, the increases in robberies and thefts were greater than those against property (e.g., domestic burglary) or crime in non-public settings (e.g., domestic violence). This increase in robberies and thefts was surprising because it came after a sustained period of decreases in these crimes that were associated with a large-scale hot spots policing program in Montevideo (Chainey et al. 2021 ). Faced with this increase in robberies and thefts in 2018, Uruguayan authorities began to question the long-term crime prevention effect of the hot spots policing programme (named Programa de Alta Dedicación Operativa, PADO) and whether the resourcing commitment to the programme should continue. In 2018, Montevideo also implemented two changes in police practice and criminal justice policy. These changes involved a transition to police officers using handheld computer tablets to record crimes and a nationwide change to an adversarial criminal justice procedure. Little consideration had been given to the possible influence of these two changes on the increase in robberies and thefts.

In this paper we examine three potential explanations for the increase in robberies and thefts in Montevideo in 2018: the increase in crime was associated with the reduced effectiveness of the PADO hot spots policing program; the increase in crime was associated with an increase in crime reporting and recording associated with the use of tablet computers, and the increase in crime was associated with the change in the criminal procedure code.

The research aims to make three contributions to the existing research literature. First, the findings from the study contribute new insights into the impact on crime levels from the adoption of an adversarial criminal procedure code in countries that previously operated inquisitorial criminal justice systems. A feature of the inquisitorial criminal justice system involves a suspect of a crime being sent to prison until their case is heard at a court of law and a conviction decision is reached. The adversarial system minimizes the use of pre-trial detention and instead involves conditional release mechanisms whereby suspects can return home and wait for their trial. Most countries have used adversarial criminal procedures for decades; however, in Latin America, many countries have historically followed an inquisitorial criminal procedure. In recent years, these Latin American countries, including Uruguay, have transitioned to adversarial procedures. Adversarial procedures have been implemented to improve the slow and abuse-prone criminal justice processes that the inquisitorial system is susceptible to. To date, very few studies have examined how these criminal justice reforms may have influenced changes in criminal behavior, and consequently, crime levels (see Zorro Medina et al. 2020 ; Huebert 2019 ). We examine the impact of the adoption of the adversarial criminal procedure code (implemented on the 1st November 2017) on changes in crime levels in Montevideo.

Second, we assess if the adoption of new technology for front-line policing can affect crime reporting and recording levels. While the scholarship on the adoption and use of mobile technologies in policing is an established field (e.g., Lindsay et al. 2009 ; Lum et al. 2017 ; Koper et al. 2014 ; Allen et al. 2008 ), the potential impact that these technologies could have on crime levels remains unexplored.

Third, we add to the evidence on the long-term impact of hot spots policing by considering these effects for a large city. To date, we know of only one study that has examined the long-term effects of hot spots policing, with this being for a small city in the USA (Koper et al. 2021 ). The current study examines if the hot spots policing programme in Montevideo was no longer effective in reducing crime after operating for over a year.

The rest of the article is structured as follows: First, we introduce the context of the study and briefly review the relevant literature. Then we describe the data and methods used. This is followed by the results. Lastly, we discuss the findings and limitations, and end with conclusions including those that relate to crime prevention.

Hot spots policing in Montevideo: PADO

PADO, introduced in April 2016 in Montevideo, was the first hot spots policing programme in Latin America that involved the use of a large number of police officers solely dedicated to patrolling hot spots (Inter-American Development Bank and the Uruguay Ministry of Interior 2017 ). PADO involved the precise targeted deployment of police patrols to the specific streets where robberies and thefts were known to concentrate. Prior to the implementation of PADO, robberies and thefts had been increasing in Montevideo by at least ten percent per year for almost a decade. In 2015, drawing from the international evidence on the effects of hot spots policing (Braga et al. 2014 ) and an analysis of the geographic and temporal patterns of robberies and thefts in Montevideo, the Uruguay Police implemented PADO in the top 120 hot spot locations in Montevideo (Chainey et al. 2021 ). This involved groups of two or three police officers patrolling each hot spot location on foot, supported by a small number of motorbike police patrols (about two motorbike patrols for every 15 foot patrols). The PADO patrols operated between 17.00 and 01.00 h (informed by a temporal analysis of the crime hot spots) and required the foot patrols to remain within their assigned patrol area for the evening. The exception to this was when a person was arrested by a PADO patrol, requiring one of the PADO patrol officers to accompany the police response team (that had been called to the scene) and the suspect to a local police station. For every 15 patrols, a supervisor was assigned to ensure the patrols were where they needed to be and to coordinate any support to specific hot spots during a patrol shift. Every day, over 400 police officers were dedicated to PADO.

The primary purpose of the PADO patrols was to act as a visible deterrent to offending behavior. Their purpose was not necessarily to be more active in making arrests, but instead to increase the perceived risk of offending in the locations where the foot patrols were deployed. It was rare for PADO foot patrol officers to make an arrest while on patrol, meaning their presence in the hot spot locations were maintained for the duration of their assignment. A quasi-experimental evaluation of PADO in 2016 showed the programme was responsible for a 23 percent decrease in robberies and thefts in PADO patrol areas compared to control areas, with no evidence of displacement to other areas or other crime types (Chainey et al. 2021 ). PADO continued throughout 2017 and 2018, with the same resourcing levels being maintained.

The implementation and use of tablet computers by police officers inMontevideo

To help improve the completion of administrative tasks while police officers were on patrol, in 2017 the Uruguay Police began the incremental roll out of tablet computers to police officers in Montevideo, including to PADO patrol officers. These tablets now meant that police officers could perform immediate identification checks of individuals and vehicles, and record offence details reported to them while they were in the field. The use of the tablets therefore made it potentially easier for victims to report crimes. Prior to the introduction of the tablets, crimes could only be reported at police stations. Tablets used by PADO patrol officers meant that victims could now report the offence to these patrol officers. This meant that robberies and thefts that may not have previously been reported because the victim decided not to visit a police station could more likely be reported. Also, the introduction of the tablets meant that when a PADO patrol officer did make an arrest, they did not need to accompany the person they had arrested to a local police station. Although arrests made by PADO officers were rare, the patrol officer could now complete the arrest details on the tablet and remain in their patrol location with their patrol colleagues.

After a period of pilot testing in 2017, a large roll out programme commenced in 2018 to equip all PADO patrol groups with at least one tablet. Hence, it was plausible that the increases in robberies and thefts experienced in 2018 were because of an increase in crime reporting to PADO officers while they were on patrol, rather than an actual increase in the incidence of robberies and thefts.

Uruguay’s new criminal procedure code

Since the 1990s, more than 20 countries in Latin America have transformed their justice systems by replacing inquisitorial procedures (inherited from colonial rule) with an adversarial model presided over by an impartial judiciary. This “criminal procedural revolution” (Zorro Medina et al. 2020 ) was implemented to modernize the region’s criminal justice systems. Its goals were to improve the efficiency of criminal justice processes by increasing clearance rates and shortening lengthy criminal procedures, and reducing abuses of the criminal justice system such as weak human rights protections that incentivized the use of torture to forcibly obtain confessions (Magaloni and Rodriguez 2020 ).

One of the aims of the transition from the inquisitorial to adversarial system was to reduce the use of pre-trial detention. Inquisitorial criminal justice systems rely on extensive secret pre-trial investigations and written records (rather than oral proceedings), lack alternatives to a formal trial (e.g., pre-trial diversions or plea bargains), and are overseen by judges who are responsible for prosecuting, defending and adjudicating cases (Hafetz 2003 ). As a consequence, pre-trial detention, referred to in Spanish as prisión preventiva (preventive detention), is a feature of the inquisitorial criminal justice system in Latin America. This involves a suspect (based on a judge’s decision) being sent immediately to prison until their case is heard at a court of law and conviction decision is reached. The aim of this was to reduce the risk of suspects interfering with criminal investigations or fleeing justice (Fondevila and Quintana-Navarrete 2021 ). As Hafetz ( 2003 ) notes “many unconvicted inmates spend several years behind bars awaiting a verdict… some remain in prison for a longer period than if they had been convicted of the crime itself” (p 1758). Around 30 to 85 percent of the incarcerated population in Latin American prisons constitute these suspects that have not been convicted (Fondevila and Quintana-Navarrete 2021 ). This incarceration violates human rights and additionally subjects suspects to dismal conditions in Latin American prisons such as overcrowding, violence, physical and sexual abuse, and malnutrition (Hafetz 2003 ; Fondevila and Quintana-Navarrete 2021 ).

In Uruguay, reform to an adversarial system aimed to improve the general efficiency of the country’s criminal justice system. This new system shifted the burden of proof to criminal prosecutors who are required to build and present cases before judges, who then rule on whether there are sufficient grounds to indict a suspect. The new system also aimed to minimize the use of pre-trial detention. In practice, the transition from prisión preventiva involved implementing conditional release mechanisms whereby suspects could return home and wait for their trial. On November 1, 2017, Uruguay replaced its inquisitorial system with the adversarial criminal procedure system. Before the implementation of this new criminal procedure code the percentage of all prison inmates in Uruguay that were in pre-trial detention (between 2000 and 2017) ranged between 94 and 63 percent of the prison population (Organisation of American States 2022 ). From November 1, 2017, suspects had a right to be given bail. Following this change, the percentage of the prison population that were suspects held in pre-trial detention decreased to 43 percent in 2018 and 22 percent in 2019 (Organisation of American States 2022 ).

Uruguay, like many other countries in Latin America, have implemented these criminal justice reforms to improve their previous inefficient and abuse-prone criminal justice systems. However, whether these reforms have unintended consequences on levels of crime is a topic that has received little attention. Certain empirical evidence does suggest that changes in criminal procedure codes do affect criminal behavior (for a review see Zorro Medina et al. 2020 ). The most notable of these is that the incarceration of offenders denies them of the ability to commit crime, which in turn reduces crime via their incapacitation (Cohen 1983 ). In an opposite manner, reductions in pre-trial detention could lead to increases in crime, because the incapacitation effect of pre-trial detention has been removed. Evidence from Colombia supports this hypothesis, where following the implementation of an adversarial criminal justice procedure, a 22 percent increase in crime was observed (Zorro Medina et al. 2020 ). We therefore hypothesize that one possible explanation for the increases in crime observed in Uruguay in 2018 was associated with the implementation the new adversarial criminal procedure code.

The current study tests three hypotheses for explaining the increase in robberies and thefts. First, we test if the increase in crime was associated with the reduced effectiveness of the PADO hot spots policing program. Second, we test if the introduction of tablet computers for recording offenses contributed to these increases in the recorded levels of robberies and thefts. Third, we test whether the transition to the adversarial criminal procedure system was associated with the increases in robberies and thefts. We examine each hypothesis using interrupted time series regression to detect whether changes in the levels of crime coincided with the timing of the changes in policing and criminal justice procedures we describe above.

Data and methods

We began the analysis using disaggregated data on every robbery and theft recorded in Montevideo between January 1, 2015, and November 25, 2018 ( n  = 70,016). Incidents were aggregated by date into a daily time series covering the study period, consisting of 1425 daily observations. We then added two dummy variables to indicate the periods of interest: A “PADO” variable indicated whether the date was on or after April 11, 2016 (the date PADO began), and a “Justice” variable indicated whether the date was on or after November 1, 2017 (the day the new penal code came into force).

Tablets for recording crime were introduced in Montevideo over three stages. Between January and July 2017, the use of a small number of tablets was tested in Montevideo. From August to December 2017, the use of tablets incrementally increased, until January 2018 when the full roll out of tablets across Montevideo had been completed. The systematic recording of whether a crime had been recorded using a tablet only began in January 2018; however, two attributes captured in crime records prior to 2018 can be used as proxy variables to determine how many incidents were recorded using tablets. The first of these attributes was the median time (in minutes) that elapsed between when the robbery or theft occurred and when it was reported to the police. In 2018, the median time for a tablet-recorded robbery or theft to be reported was 6 min. In contrast, the median time-to-report for conventionally recorded robberies and thefts (that required the victim to visit a police station) was 66 min Chainey(Kruskal–Wallis \(\chi^{2} = 3769.2\) , \(df = 1\) , \(p < 0.001\) , \(n = 11,854\) ). On examining the median time-to-report per day, a clear trend emerged that coincided with the rollout of the tablets in Montevideo in 2017. This showed, see Fig.  1 , that before January 2017, the median time between when the crime occurred and when it was reported to the police was stable. During 2017, this median time began to decrease as tablets were being rolled out, until January 2018 when the median time between when the crime occurred and when it was reported stabilized, which coincides with the completion of the tablet rollout program.

Time series of the daily median time-to-report and the proportion of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min or less during the study period. Thick lines represent generalized additive model smooth trends

The second attribute we examined to determine the estimated number of robberies and thefts that were recorded using tablets was the proportion of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min or less per day. To identify the 10-min cutoff point, we fitted a logistic model to 2018 data using time-to-report to predict the odds of a crime being recorded using a tablet. This model found a significant and negative relationship between the time-to-report (log-transformed due to the highly skewed distribution of time-to-report) and the odds of a crime being recorded with a tablet (Wald χ _( df  = 1)^2 = 2417.14, p  < 0.001, see Fig.  2 for coefficient parameters). To identify the suitable cutoff point in minutes, we calculated predicted probabilities for 0 to 120 min in time-to-report and found that the probability of a crime being recorded in a tablet was greater than 50% when the time-to-report was 10 min or less (see Fig.  2 ). We then examined the trend in the daily proportion of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min and found that it matched the pattern of the median time-to-report, with proportions of robberies and thefts reported within 10 min increasing while tablets were being introduced in Montevideo (see Fig.  1 ).

Predicted probabilities of robberies and thefts being recorded on a tablet during 2018 conditional on the time-to-report. Coefficient estimates from the logistic model are shown in the table insert

To examine if the change in the criminal procedure code and the introduction of tablets for recording crime were associated with the increase in robberies and thefts experienced in Montevideo, we used interrupted time series (ITS) regression. ITS is used to evaluate the effects of macro-level interventions that have a clear implementation period. Lopez Bernal et al. ( 2017 ) provide a good theoretical and practical introduction to the technique. Essentially, an ITS is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which the dependent variable ( \(y\) ) is primarily modeled as a function of time ( \(T\) ) with at least one dummy variable representing the implementation of an intervention ( \(x\) ) at \(T_{x}\) . Additionally, the model can include the effect of an interaction between \(x \times T\) to indicate a change in slope after the implementation of \(x\) . The general form of the ITS model is:

where \(\beta_{0}\) corresponds to the value of \(y\) when \(T = 0\) , \(\beta_{1}\) represents the baseline trend before the intervention of \(x\) , \(\beta_{2}\) represents the baseline change in \(y\) after the intervention \(x\) , \(\beta_{3}\) is the change in trend after the intervention, and \(e\) is an error term. We used two intervention dummies to control for the effects of PADO and the implementation of the new CJS ( \(x_{1} = {\text{PADO}}\) . and \(x_{2} = {\text{Justice}}\) ). Additionally, we used two models to separately control for the use of tablets ( \(x_{3t}\) ) using the daily median time-to-report (Model 1) and the proportion of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min or less (Model 2).

A crucial element of fitting an ITS model is to appropriately capture the underlying functional form of the trend as well as controlling for seasonal patterns. Crime trends are not always linear, thus more complex growth functions can be approximated using polynomial terms. We used second-order orthogonal polynomials to capture the underlying trend, as they were significantly better than a first-order polynomial ( F _( df  = 2) = 20.4, p  < 0.001). A model using third-order polynomials was not significantly better than a model using second-order polynomials ( F _( df  = 2) = 0.2, p  = 0.8). To control for seasonal effects, we first used OLS models with day of the week and week of the year dummy variables. However, when time series models experience residual autocorrelation (a common issue in time series analysis of crime events), the assumption of independence underpinning OLS is violated, leading to biased standard errors and potentially spurious inferences. Thus, to deal with residual autocorrelation we estimated linear models with ARIMA errors (Hyndman 2010 ; Hyndman and Athanasopoulos 2019 ). ARIMA errors are a powerful method to control for serial autocorrelation and can also be used to control for seasonal autocorrelation—providing a more flexible approach for controlling seasonality than the dummy variable approach we used in the OLS models. Therefore, in our ARIMA models we controlled seasonality using seasonal ARIMA components instead of day of the week and week of the year dummy variables.

A fundamental difference between OLS and the linear model with ARIMA errors is that the error term expressed in Eq.  1 ( \(e_{t}\) ) is not assumed to be independent and identically distributed, but is rather assumed to exhibit complex short-, medium-, and long-term dependencies (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014 ). The ARIMA model captures such dependencies by specifying the order of non-seasonal and seasonal autoregressive ( p ), integration ( d ), and moving average parameters ( q )—denoted as \({\text{ARIMA}}\left( {p,d,q} \right) \times \left( {P,D,Q} \right)_{m}\) —that are required to reduce the error term to a white noise process (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014 ; Estévez-Soto 2021 ). Formally, the errors are assumed to take the following form:

where \(\theta\) and \(\phi\) are the non-seasonal autoregressive and moving average parameters, \({\Theta }\) and \({\Phi }\) are the autoregressive and moving average parameters for a seasonal period of length \(m\) , \(B\) is the backshift operator, and \(z_{t}\) are white noise residuals (Estévez-Soto 2021 ). If (non-seasonal) integration is present, \(\phi \left( B \right)\) is replaced by \(\nabla^{d} \phi \left( B \right)\) , where \(\nabla\) is the differencing operator \(\left( {1 - B} \right){ }\) (Hyndman 2010 ; Hyndman and Athanasopoulos 2019 ). While a detailed discussion of ARIMA modeling is beyond the scope of this study, readers interested in technical details are directed to Box-Steffensmeier et al. ( 2014 ) and Hyndman and Athanasopoulos ( 2019 ).

Implementation of the linear models with ARIMA errors followed Estévez-Soto ( 2021 ), using Hyndman and Khandakar’s ( 2008 ) algorithm for automatically selecting ARIMA parameters that minimize the Akaike information criterion (AIC) as implemented by the ‘fable’ package (O’Hara-Wild et al. 2020 ) in R (R Core Team 2020 ).

Model fits were assessed by inspecting model residuals visually and statistically. Visually, we inspected residual time series plots, residual autocorrelation plots, and residual density plots (see Fig.  3 ). Statistically, we used the Ljung–Box test (Ljung and Box 1978 ) to identify if there was statistically significant autocorrelation in the residuals, Engle’s ( 1982 ) ARCH test to rule out autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, and KPSS tests (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992 ) to ensure residuals were stationary. These tests help diagnose if the models have captured the underlying temporal dependencies that could otherwise bias our results. Lastly, counterfactual trends were estimated for each intervention by calculating the values predicted by the estimated coefficients while holding the coefficient for the intervention dummy to zero (see Fig.  4 ).

Residual diagnostic plots for OLS and ARIMA error models

Plot with observed and counterfactual trends estimated by ARIMA model 2

In Table  1 , we report the results of the two specifications used: Model 1 used daily median time-to-report to control for the introduction of tablets, and Model 2 used the proportion of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min or less (expressed as a percentage). For each specification, we estimated coefficients using OLS and ARIMA methods. Reviewing first the model diagnostic results, OLS estimates consistently experienced a high degree of residual autocorrelation as evidenced by the significant Ljung–Box statistic (Ljung and Box 1978 ). Engle’s ( 1982 ) ARCH tests did not suggest the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in either OLS or ARIMA estimates. KPSS tests (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992 ) suggested the residuals of all models were stationary. Further model diagnostics can be found in Fig.  3 , showing that the residual time series (Panel A) did not suggest neglected temporal patterns nor evidence of heteroscedasticity in all models. The autocorrelation plots (Fig.  3 : Panel B) confirm the results of the Ljung–Box tests, indicating residual autocorrelation in OLS residuals. The density plots (Fig.  3 : Panel C) suggest the residuals for all models were reasonably normal and centered around zero.

The results indicated that OLS residual autocorrelation was adequately captured by an ARIMA(2,0,1) x (2,0,1)[7] error model, thus we do not discuss OLS estimates in further detail. Overall, ARIMA estimates for Models 1 and 2 were similar. Both models indicated that the trend ( \(T\) and \(T^{2}\) ) in robberies and thefts before the implementation of PADO was not significant, meaning that robberies and thefts were stable at around 52 incidents per day in Montevideo after controlling for non-seasonal and seasonal autocorrelation. ARIMA estimates for the PADO variable were also similar for Models 1 and 2: In both cases the PADO variable was negative, of similar magnitude, and significant ( \(p < 0.01\) ). The models suggest that PADO was associated with 11.3 fewer robberies and thefts per day in Montevideo after its implementation in April 2016 to the end of October 2017. That is, in addition to the results reported by Chainey et al. ( 2021 ) on the significant reductions in robberies and thefts associated with PADO between April 2016 and December 2016, PADO continued to be associated with a consistent significant city-wide reduction in the daily average rate of robbery and thefts in Montevideo to the end of October 2017.

The Justice dummy variable, and the interactions between Justice and time were significant ( \(p < 0.001\) and \(p < 0.01\) , respectively) and of similar magnitude in ARIMA Models 1 and 2, suggesting that robberies and thefts changed both in baseline level as well as trend. However, because the orthogonal polynomials transform the scale of the time variable, it is not possible to interpret the direction and magnitude of the effect from the coefficient estimates. We return to the interpretation of these results below.

Both ARIMA models suggested that the introduction of tablets had a significant ( \(p < 0.05\) ), albeit only modest association with the levels of robberies and thefts. The time-to-report coefficient (Model 1) suggested that a one-minute decrease in the median time-to-report was associated with 0.03 more robberies and thefts per day. Similarly, the coefficient for the percentage of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min or less suggested that a one-percentage point increase was associated with 0.08 more robberies and thefts per day. To better appreciate these estimates, we can predict the increases in robberies and theft for the absolute changes in reporting times observed after the introduction of tablets. Considering that between 2015 and 2018 the median time-to-report decreased by approximately 29 min and the proportion of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min or less increased by 16 percentage points, our estimates suggest that the use of tablets was associated with increases of 0.87 (based on median time-to-report) or 1.28 (based on the proportion of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min) in the daily number of robberies and thefts. Both results indicate that the introduction of tablet computers for recording offenses were associated with only a miniscule share of the observed increases in the number of robberies and thefts.

As noted earlier, interpreting the effect of the Justice dummy variable is difficult because of the orthogonal polynomials. Thus, to facilitate interpretation, Fig.  4 presents a graphical summary of the main effects of ARIMA Model 2. We used ARIMA Model 2 because it had a slightly better fit, as indicated by the AIC statistic. The light gray dots represent the observed counts of robberies and thefts in Montevideo for every day of the study period. The gray solid line represents the fitted values of the model. The black solid line represents the observed trend, holding constant the proportion of robberies and thefts reported in 10 min or less at the mean and controlling for serial and seasonal dependencies. The vertical gray dotted lines indicate the beginning of PADO (April 11, 2016) and the day the change to the adversarial system was implemented (November 1, 2017). Lastly, the two dashed black lines represent counterfactual trends of the number of robberies and thefts expected if PADO or the adversarial system had not been implemented.

We can estimate the overall effect associated with the interventions by comparing the amount of crime predicted by the counterfactual trends with the observed trend. In the case of PADO, there were 6389.8 fewer robberies and thefts between April 11, 2016, and October 31, 2017 (569 days). This corresponds to 11.2 fewer robberies and thefts per day, a 21.3 percent decrease in robberies and thefts in Montevideo in comparison to the counterfactual expectation. Although the observed trend between April 2016 and November 2017 was slightly upward (see Fig.  4 ), the difference in the observed trend and the PADO counterfactual was consistent during this period. In contrast, there were 6,865.9 more robberies and thefts than those expected after the implementation of the adversarial system. This corresponds to an increase of 17.6 robberies and thefts per day from November 1, 2017, until the end of the study period (390 days) and represents a 40.7 percent increase in robberies and thefts in Montevideo from the counterfactual expectation.

Discussion and limitations

The results from the current study suggest that PADO, a large-scale hot spots policing program in Montevideo, was responsible for long-term reductions in robberies and thefts. Not only did PADO appear to halt the continual increases in robberies and thefts that had been experienced in Montevideo before its implementation in April 2016, PADO also appeared to have a sustained effect in decreasing these crimes before November 2017: In 2015, an average of 47.4 robberies and thefts per day were experienced in the city; between April 2016 (when PADO was implemented) and October 2017 the number of robberies and thefts decreased to an average of 41.9 per day. The decrease in the number of robberies and thefts for the period April 2016 and October 2017 was equivalent to a city-wide decrease of over 21 percent in these types of crime, assuming pre-PADO trends had continued. This 21 percent difference between the observed levels of crime and the counterfactual measure was consistent between April 2016 and October 2017.

From November 2017 to November 2018, robberies and thefts increased in Montevideo by over 40 percent over the expected incidence level—reaching an average of 61.9 robberies and thefts per day during this period. Our analysis revealed that the introduction of tablets was associated with a negligible proportion of this increase. Although tablets used by patrol officers were likely to provide an easier means for members of the public to report crimes (rather than victims needing to visit a police station to report an offense), their implementation was responsible for an increase of about one robbery or theft in the daily incidence rate.

Our findings indicate that the change from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system of criminal justice in Uruguay was likely the main reason for the increase in robberies and thefts: the additional 17.6 robberies and thefts per day (on average) from November 1, 2017, until the end of the study period were most likely, we hypothesize, associated with suspected offenders being ‘free’ to commit crime (and perhaps commit several crimes) compared to the situation prior to November 2017 when it was likely these same suspects would have been retained in prisión preventiva . We recognize the important human rights advantages that the adversarial system of criminal justice provides over the inquisitorial system that was previously in operation in Uruguay. However, our findings indicate that the change in justice system may have had adverse effects by significantly increasing robbery and thefts in Montevideo (which we anticipate were also experienced nationwide).

At the time when the increases in robberies and thefts were being experienced in Montevideo, decision-makers (including the President of Uruguay and the Minister of Security) and the media questioned the Uruguay Police about their overall ineffectiveness in catching offenders and the effectiveness of PADO. No one could easily explain the increases in robberies and thefts. The findings provided in this study helped the government of Uruguay and the Uruguay Police identify the likely reasons for the increase in these crimes. These results directly contributed to PADO continuing into 2019 and helped to identify ways to reduce any possible additional offending by suspects who had been released on bail. The latter included requirements for suspects with a criminal record to routinely report-in to the police about their movements, and a more coordinated approach between the police, prosecutors, and the courts (El Pais 2018 ). Future research, therefore, could examine the impact these monitoring procedures of suspects had on robberies and thefts in Montevideo. Future research could also more specifically examine the change in robberies and thefts in the locations where PADO patrols were deployed from November 2017 to determine if the increase in these crimes was less significant in PADO areas than in other areas of Montevideo. This research would help to further examine the long-term impacts that hot spots policing interventions can have on crime.

The change in the criminal procedure code in Uruguay from an inquisitorial to adversarial criminal justice system is a change that other countries in the world, in particular countries in Latin America, have adopted in recent years, yet research of its effect on crime levels is limited. Although Mexico made a similar change from an inquisitorial model to an adversarial system of criminal justice in 2018, no known study has examined if the criminal justice reform in Mexico was associated with crime increases that were also observed over this period (UNODC 2017 ). Evidence from Colombia supports the findings from the current study that suggest that a 22 percent increase in crime coincided with when the adversarial criminal justice procedure was implemented (Zorro Medina et al. 2020 ). We also note that although conditions associated with changes in demography, social conditions and the economy (such as increases in the size of the youth population, increases in inequality and increases in unemployment) may have an influence on increases in crime levels, these types of factors slowly change over time and hence are unlikely to have a sudden dramatic effect on the level of crime (Croci and Chainey 2023 ). Also, we know of no significant demographic, social or economic factor that changed at the end of 2017 in Montevideo that could have had an instant effect on the observed increases in robberies and thefts. We encourage further research that examines whether other countries have experienced similar crime increases following criminal justice reform.

Although the analyses presented herein are statistically robust, there are three main limitations in terms of threats to internal validity. First, the ITS approach is a ‘pre-post’ test that compares the change in the outcome before and after an intervention. However, in the absence of an appropriate control group, it is not possible to fully rule out competing explanations for the changes observed. This is particularly relevant for the effect of the change in the CJS. The findings from a previous evaluation of PADO using a quasi-experimental approach consisting of a comparison between treatment and control groups (see Chainey et al. 2021 ) are in line with the findings on the impact of PADO that we observe in the current study. However, the change to an adversarial system was implemented simultaneously across Uruguay, meaning there are no suitable cities in the country that could serve as controls in this study. Thus, despite its limitations, the ITS approach represents the best method to evaluate the impact of the new penal code on robbery and thefts in Montevideo. The impact of the change to the criminal justice system on crime across the whole of Uruguay was beyond the scope of the current study. Montevideo, however, accounts for over 40 percent of Uruguay’s population and for over 70 percent of crime experienced in the country, so we anticipate our results are representative of the national experience but recommend a national study as an area for future research.

Second, the concurrent implementation of three interventions during the study period (PADO, the introduction of tablets, and the change in the CJS) makes it challenging to isolate the specific effect of each intervention. While it would have been methodologically ideal to implement and evaluate each intervention independently, the study was concerned with analyzing real-world policy changes that were beyond our control. Thus, while we acknowledge that the analysis cannot completely disentangle the effects of each intervention, we believe that the fact that each intervention was implemented at a different time during the study period mitigates the risk of confounding to a reasonable extent.

Third, although the results point to a causal effect (albeit with the limitations noted above), the study does not address the potential mechanisms linking the increase of robberies and thefts to the change from an inquisitorial to adversarial criminal justice system. We hypothesize that increases may be related to the reduction in the use of preventive detention, meaning more suspected offenders were free to continue offending while awaiting trial, compared to the previous system in which they would have been incapacitated. Furthermore, the reduction in the use of preventive detention may have also altered the perceived risk of offending, enlarging the pool of potential offenders and increasing their propensity to commit crime. We were unable to probe which mechanism (or mechanisms) may be responsible for the increases observed as this was beyond the scope of our study. However, this would seem to be an important avenue for future research, should suitable data become available.

In terms of external validity, the findings are valid for the period, city and crimes under study. It is not known how the patterns observed in robbery and theft may have continued after the study period. Though the trend line suggested a downward slope, it would be incorrect to extrapolate beyond the data at hand. Future research could focus on the medium- and long-term effects of the adversarial system to explore whether crime levels increased, plateaued, or drifted down toward pre-November 2017 levels. Lastly, the current study focused on robberies and thefts, though it is possible that other crimes may have experienced similar changes, and future research could explore this topic. Data on these other crime types were not available at the level required to permit a similar analysis of other types of crime.

Conclusions and recommendations for crime prevention

Most hot spots policing programs operate for no longer than 6 months. While there is extensive evidence that shows that hot spots policing reduces crime (Braga et al. 2014 ), there is little evidence about its longer-term impact. PADO was a large-scale long-term hot spots policing programme that operated in Montevideo from April 2016. From the date it was implemented to November 2017, PADO was responsible for a consistent city-wide decrease of over 21 percent in robberies and thefts. This result shows evidence of the long-term crime prevention effect of hot spots policing and from this we recommend that hot spots policing programs should operate for longer than has been the norm. In 2017, Uruguay implemented a change from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system of criminal justice and issued tablet computers to police patrol officers to improve crime recording processes. Using interrupted time series regressions for a 4-year period we identified that the 40 percent increase in robberies and thefts were mainly associated with the change in criminal justice processes. Although these findings should not be construed as a criticism of the change to an adversarial criminal justice system, as there are many societal benefits to reducing preventive detention, the findings suggest that practitioners should be aware of the potential unintended consequences of such reforms (at least in the short term) and may wish to adjust their plans to mitigate the risk of increases in crime.

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Chainey, S.P., Estévez-Soto, P.R. One crime wave, three hypotheses: using interrupted time series to examine the unintended consequences of criminal justice reform, computer tablet recording of crime and a long-term hot spots policing programme. Crime Prev Community Saf (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41300-024-00205-8

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Breaking news, house covid panel grills ecohealth alliance chief, demands criminal probe over virus research in wuhan.

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A House subcommittee investigating the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic urged a criminal investigation of EcoHealth Alliance president Dr. Peter Daszak ahead of a Wednesday hearing, releasing a trove of documents about the Manhattan-based nonprofit’s controversial virus experiments in Wuhan, China.

Rep. Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio), chairman of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, released a 59-page report and interview transcripts with half a dozen National Institutes of Health (NIH) officials and scientists linked to EcoHealth’s research — including Daszak himself .

EcoHealth has received millions in federal grants to conduct research around the globe — including more than $4 million for an NIH project titled “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence.”

Beginning in 2014, the project conducted experiments on mice at the now-infamous Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) that modified novel bat coronaviruses and made them 10,000 times more infectious — but “failed to report” that fact to the NIH.

NIH principal deputy director Lawrence Tabak — who was interviewed by the House COVID subcommittee — disclosed to Congress in 2021 that EcoHealth had violated the terms of its grant in the Wuhan lab, leading to the grant’s suspension.

The same day that Tabak made the disclosure, the NIH scrubbed its website of the agency’s longstanding definition of gain-of-function research, which enhances the transmissibility of viruses.

“We have found that EcoHealth was nearly two years late in submitting a routine progress report to NIH, that EcoHealth failed to report, as required, a potentially dangerous experiment conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, that EcoHealth used taxpayer dollars to facilitate risky gain-of-function research, and that Dr. Daszak omitted a material fact regarding his access to unanalyzed virus samples and sequences at the WIV in his successful effort to have his grant reinstated by NIH,” Wenstrup said in his opening statement.

“Dr. Daszak has been less-than-cooperative with the select subcommittee, he has been slow to produce requested documents, and has regularly played semantics with the definition of gain-of-function research, even in his previous testimony,” he added.

Wenstrup then blasted Daszak for the material omissions and failures to be forthcoming with the subcommittee, declaring his nonprofit “a threat to national security.”

“We see no reason the American people should be paying for EcoHealth’s research, or any other work Dr. Daszak conducts,” he concluded. “And let me be clear, I support global health research. I support work that will make the world safer. That’s why we are investigating. Our concern is that this research and research similar does the opposite — puts the world at risk of a pandemic.”

The report also calls out former National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases director Dr. Anthony Fauci — who was also interviewed by the subcommittee in January — for having “played semantics” with the definition of gain-of-function research.

During Wednesday’s hearing, Republicans and Democrats were united in their denunciations of Daszak for his conflicting testimony about US taxpayer funds his organization received for the risky experiments.

“Did any of the research that you funded through your organization at the Wuhan lab modify a virus to make it more infectious among humans? Yes or no?” Staten Island GOP Rep. Nicole Malliotakis pressed.

“No, that was not the goal of our work, and that’s why it was not considered gain-of-function,” Daszak said.

In  a 2016 email  to NIH, Malliotakis noted, Daszak said he was “very happy to hear that our Gain of Function research funding pause has been lifted.”

“EcoHealth never has and did not do gain-of-function research, by definition,” he repeated moments later — a remark strikingly similar to one made by Fauci during a tense May 2021 exchange with Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.).

“Sen. Paul, with all due respect, you are entirely, entirely and completely incorrect … the NIH has not ever and does not now fund gain-of-function research in the Wuhan Institute,” Fauci said.

But Daszak’s testimony also contradicted sworn statements by Tabak and Dr. Ralph Baric, who collaborated with EcoHealth and the Wuhan lab on the project.

Baric, one of the world’s leading coronavirologists who kicked off the experiments in his lab at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, told panel members in a  Jan. 22, 2024, interview  that the work “absolutely” constituted gain-of-function research.

In a 2015 research paper, Baric and Shi Zhengli, the top coronavirus researcher at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, also flagged that the artificial virus, or chimera, could infect human cells and “scientific review panels may deem similar studies … too risky to pursue.”

Baric’s testimony, which was first reported by Vanity Fair , also revealed that the coronavirologist urged Zhengli to conduct experiments in a biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) lab, rather than the lower levels at which it was being conducted.

But Zhengli declined to upgrade the Wuhan lab from BSL-2 conditions, prompting Baric to tell congressional investigators of a potential lab accident: “You can’t rule that out … You just can’t.”

In an email obtained by the COVID subcommittee, Baric had also privately told Daszak it was “a load of BS” to maintain the SARS-like experiments were undertaken with sufficient safety measures.

“EcoHealth maintains the appropriate biosafety levels for our research,” Daszak reaffirmed during his testimony, adding that COVID-19 starting from a lab accident was “possible but extremely unlikely.”

“Lab biosafety … has nothing to do with the COVID origins,” he claimed.

The FBI  and  US Energy Department  have determined that a lab leak was the most likely explanation for the pandemic, while the CIA was unable to conclude how the virus originated.

In his interview with Wenstrup’s panel, Baric broke his silence on the lab-leak theory, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic was more likely the result of a natural spillover from animals to humans but denying that it emerged from a Wuhan wet market.

“Clearly, the market was a conduit for expansion,” Baric said, noting that the virus was already circulating among humans two months before the first public cases in December 2019 at the market. “Is that where it started? I don’t think so.”

While Daszak repeatedly claimed the Wuhan bat coronavirus research “was shown not to infect people,” Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-Va.) accused the EcoHealth president of  lying to the committee  in past testimony about the likelihood of a natural spillover occurring.

“You changed perhaps one of the most important findings, the likelihood of bat coronavirus spillover into humans, from ‘very rare’ in early 2020 … to possibly over a million spillovers annually in southeast Asia and southeast China alone by late 2021,” Griffith noted. “You don’t think this is a significant change?”

“No,” Daszak said.

“Wow. You know what? I practiced in the criminal courts for many, many years, and I will just tell you, if you were my client, I would tell you that that dog won’t hunt, and the judge ain’t gonna believe that,” Griffith replied.

Asked later by the lead counsel for the Republican majority, Daszak tried to recover: “Both things are true — that this is a rare event and it infects a lot of people every year.”

Tabak and others have denied that the NIH grant resulted in COVID-19, since the chimeric virus from the WIV experiments were “genetically very distant.”

But a 2018 proposal that EcoHealth submitted to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has since been referred to as “ smoking gun ” evidence that COVID-19 was engineered in a lab.

Dr. Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University, told The Intercept in 2021 that the pandemic coronavirus“is the only virus in its entire genus of SARS-related coronaviruses” to have “a fully functional cleavage site at the S1, S2 junction.”

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In the DARPA proposal, known as Project DEFUSE, researchers outlined plans “explicitly to engineer that sequence at that position in chimeric lab-generated coronaviruses,” Ebright said.

While the grant was never approved, drafts and notes for the proposal obtained by US Right to Know show that Daszak sought to “ downplay ” the involvement of Wuhan researchers for it.

“I simply wanted to stress the US-side of the proposal,” Daszak said of the DEFUSE project, acknowledging that the Chinese biosafety rules were at a lower level than those required by the US.

“The final proposal is what matters,” he added. “And I want to remind the committee that this proposal was not funded. The work was never done. It is utterly irrelevant to the origins of COVID.”

“Well, it’s not irrelevant. Dr. Daszak, it’s very relevant,” Wenstrup shot back. “You’re okay with China’s standards as opposed to the US standards. And it does matter whether it’s at a BSL-2 or BSL-3, as Dr. Baric pointed out. And it also is important to understand that you intentionally downplayed the role of China.”

“Between your actions to DARPA and those with NIH, you failed to be a good steward of taxpayer dollars,” he said. “And it’s our recommendation that you do not receive any more.”

While denying he knew of China’s military being associated with the Wuhan lab, Daszak acknowledged that “there’s a long history of pathogens being used as bio weapons, but that is not the research that we do.”

Rep. Raul Ruiz of California, the top Democrat on the COVID subcommittee, also took Daszak to task for having organized  an open letter  in The Lancet medical journal to “strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin.”

Daszak signed onto the letter without disclosing his relationship with researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology — some of whom, he admitted during his testimony, he still maintains contact with despite the lab being barred from US funding.

“Why did you decide not to declare a competing interest?” Ruiz asked, adding that even when requested to do so by the Lancet his “updated disclosures do not explicitly acknowledge that you had partnered with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

“That is a glaring omission,” Ruiz said.

Daszak dodged questions on the subject from the ranking member, pointing to the “political maelstrom” that the pandemic became and arguing the statement was responding to conspiracies that “there are HIV inserts into the virus” and “the virus contains snake DNA, that it’s a bioengineered virus.” 

In 2022, professor Jeffrey Sachs, who chaired the COVID-19 commission for the Lancet, said he was “ pretty convinced ” that the virus “came out of US lab biotechnology, not out of nature.”

Daszak repeatedly denied the possibility — even under sharp questioning from the lead majority counsel for the subcommittee — and argued that federal funding for EcoHealth’s research was “critical to preventing the next pandemic.”

“Daszak’s testimony was a parade of perjury,” Ebright told The Post. “A litany of lies. One knowing, willful, brazen — and provable — lie after another.”

“It is imperative that EcoHealth Alliance be referred for debarment and that Daszak be referred for prosecution,” he said.

In addition to a request for formal debarment and a criminal investigation by the Justice Department, Wenstrup’s subcommittee has recommended eight improvements to the federal grants process to “increase biosafety and biosecurity of high-risk research.”

After publication, an EcoHealth Alliance spokesperson reached out to refute “that its work violated any terms of NIH’s grant” and said “oversight of experiments adhered to NIH grant award conditions.”

“At the time of this work, NIH never once commented that oversight needed to be changed, and it was only more than two years later, in hindsight, that NIH raised any questions about this experiment which are based on the mistaken assumption that [EcoHealth’s] report showed a real instance of significantly enhanced viral growth,” the spokesperson said.

“Regarding allegations of wilfully late reporting, EcoHealth Alliance provided the Government Accountability Office with documentation to show that the experiment reported in the year 5 report was first reported to NIH on time during Year 4 of the award, and that the important issue of viral growth is in that Year 4 report, submitted on time,” the spokesperson added.

“EcoHealth Alliance did not support ‘gain-of-function’ research at WIV,” the spokesperson restated, pointing to a July 2016 letter from the NIH that said the proposed experiments were “not subject to the GoF research funding pause,” which had been put in place by the Obama administration.

The statement is again in direct contradiction with the sworn testimony from Baric earlier this year to the subcommittee.

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• Kevin R. Bender, M.D./DBC Research Corporation - 680072 - 05/02/2024

WARNING LETTER

Kevin R. Bender, M.D./DBC Research Corporation MARCS-CMS 680072 — May 02, 2024

7707 North University Drive, Suite 106 Tamarac , FL 33321 United States

United States

Dear Dr. Bender:

This Warning Letter informs you of objectionable conditions observed during the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspection conducted at your clinical site between December 5 and December 16, 2022. Investigator Angelica Chica, representing FDA, reviewed your conduct of the following clinical investigations:

• Protocol (b)(4) , “ (b)(4) ,” of the investigational drug product (b)(4) , performed for (b)(4) (formerly performed for (b)(4) )
• Protocol (b)(4) , “ (b)(4) ,” of the investigational drug product (b)(4) , performed for (b)(4) .
• Protocol (b)(4) , “ (b)(4) ,” of the investigational drug product  (b)(4) , performed for (b)(4) .

This inspection was conducted as a part of FDA’s Bioresearch Monitoring Program, which includes inspections designed to evaluate the conduct of research and to help ensure that the rights, safety, and welfare of human subjects have been protected.

At the conclusion of the inspection, Investigator Chica presented and discussed with you the Form FDA 483, Inspectional Observations. We acknowledge receipt of your January 4, 2023, written response to the Form FDA 483.

From our review of the FDA Establishment Inspection Report, the documents submitted with that report, and your January 4, 2023, written response, it appears that you did not adhere to the applicable statutory requirements in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) and applicable regulations contained in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part 312 [21 CFR 312] governing the conduct of clinical investigations and the protection of human subjects. We wish to emphasize the following:

You failed to take adequate precautions to prevent theft or diversion of an investigational drug that is subject to the Controlled Substances Act [21 CFR 312.69], and you failed to ensure that the investigation was conducted according to the investigational plan [21 CFR 312.60].

As a clinical investigator, when handling an investigational drug that is subject to the Controlled Substances Act, you are required to take adequate precautions to prevent theft or diversion of the controlled substance into illegal channels of distribution. These precautions include the storage of the investigational drug in a securely locked, substantially constructed cabinet, or other securely locked, substantially constructed enclosure, access to which is limited. In addition, as a clinical investigator, you are required to ensure that your clinical studies are conducted in accordance with the investigational plan. The investigational plan for Protocol (b)(4) required you to ensure that all clinical drug supplies were stored in a secured, monitored, and limited-access area, in accordance with labeled storage conditions. Additionally, the protocol required the clinical investigator to limit access to the study drug to the named subinvestigators, or to other appropriately designated study personnel or monitoring personnel.

You failed to adhere to these requirements. Study drug was provided in metered dose pumps containing (b)(4) or matching placebo. (b)(4) , an investigational drug for Protocol (b)(4) , is classified by the DEA as a Schedule III controlled substance because it contains (b)(4) . You failed to store the investigational drug in a secured and limited-access area in accordance with the requirements of 21 CFR 312.69 and the investigational plan. Specifically, the shipment containing the investigational drug, (b)(4) , or matching placebo was received on December 2, 2021; was stored outside the designated locked cabinet in a locked room following receipt; and the room was accessible to individuals other than staff designated to oversee investigational drug for Protocol (b)(4) . Reports to the study monitor on March 10, 2022, and to the DEA on April 1, 2022, stated that 110 kits of investigational drug received on December 2, 2021, were missing because of customer/nonemployee theft.

In your January 4, 2023, written response, you acknowledged that a break in your process for securely storing investigational product (IP) (that is, standard operating procedure (SOP) and DEA’s storage requirements for a Class III Controlled Substance) resulted in the loss of IP. You stated that following the discovery of the missing IP, your site performed a comprehensive investigation, including but not limited to a complete accountability and reconciliation of all available kits onsite and in the Interactive Web Response System (IWRS); however, the exact cause remains unknown.

As part of your written response, you stated that the following corrective and preventive actions have been taken or will be taken:

• An electronic keypad has been installed on the door of the IP room. It is configured to lock (b)(4) after it is unlocked, whether the door is open or closed, and  (b)(4) .
• A video camera has been installed inside the IP room. It monitors the room (b)(4) , with immediate motion notification being sent to the clinical investigator and the Site Director.
• Manual IP inventory will be carried out once a week. This process will be added to the SOP.
• Constructed a larger IP room with a closet to store new and used IP, which will remain secure and inaccessible to all non-study staff.

While we acknowledge the actions that your site has taken and plans to take, your response is inadequate because you did not include sufficient details about your corrective action plan. For example, you did not provide sufficient details about how you will limit access to secure areas that store investigational product subject to the Controlled Substances Act. While you noted several measures to secure access to the IP room, you did not provide details concerning how you will ensure access is limited to the appropriate personnel. Also, you did not provide details concerning any planned or completed training on the responsible conduct of clinical trials or compliance with FDA regulations. Without this information, we are unable to determine whether your corrective action plan is adequate to prevent similar violations in the future.

We emphasize that as the clinical investigator, it was your responsibility to ensure that this study was conducted properly and in compliance with FDA regulations, both to protect the rights, safety, and welfare of study subjects and to ensure the integrity of study data. Your failure to ensure that investigational product subject to the Controlled Substances Act was stored in a secured and limited-access area, as required by FDA regulations and the protocol, raises significant concerns about the protection of study subjects enrolled at your site, and raises concerns about the reliability of the data generated at your site.

This letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of deficiencies with your clinical study of an investigational drug. It is your responsibility to ensure adherence to each requirement of the law and relevant FDA regulations. You should address any deficiencies and establish procedures to ensure that any ongoing or future studies comply with FDA regulations.

This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you with an opportunity to address the deficiencies described above. Within 15 business days of your receipt of this letter, you should notify this office in writing of the actions you have taken to prevent similar violations in the future. Failure to adequately address this matter may lead to regulatory action. If you believe that you have complied with the FD&C Act and relevant regulations, please include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration.

If you have any questions, please call Miah Jung, Pharm.D., M.S., at 240-402-3728. Alternatively, you may e-mail FDA at [email protected].

Your written response and any pertinent documentation should be addressed to:

Miah Jung, Pharm.D., M.S. Branch Chief Compliance Enforcement Branch Division of Enforcement and Postmarketing Safety Office of Scientific Investigations Office of Compliance Center for Drug Evaluation and Research U.S. Food and Drug Administration Building 51, Room 5352 10903 New Hampshire Avenue Silver Spring, MD 20993

Sincerely yours, {See appended electronic signature page} David C. Burrow, Pharm.D., J.D. Director Office of Scientific Investigations Office of Compliance Center for Drug Evaluation and Research U.S. Food and Drug Administration -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a representation of an electronic record that was signed electronically. Following this are manifestations of any and all electronic signatures for this electronic record. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- /s/ ------------------------------------------------------------ DAVID C BURROW 05/02/2024 10:10:20 AM

Pakistan Spy Honey Traps Indian Defense Contractor Employee

I n a startling revelation, a resident of Ankleshwar in Gujarat’s Bharuch district, Pravin Mishra, has been arrested on charges of espionage for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Mishra is accused of collecting classified information about the Indian Armed Forces and defense research firms, potentially compromising national security.

According to the Gujarat Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Mishra fell victim to a sophisticated “honey trap” orchestrated by a Pakistan Spy posing as a woman named Sonal Garg, who purportedly worked for IBM Chandigarh. This revelation sheds light on the increasingly sophisticated methods employed by foreign intelligence agencies to gather sensitive information from Indian Government Employees.

The Honey Trap Scheme

The modus operandi of the espionage operation centered around a honey trap, a tactic that exploits romantic or sexual relationships to manipulate individuals into divulging confidential information. In this case, the Pakistan Spy or ISI operative, using the alias Sonal Garg, initiated contact with Mishra through social media platforms, presenting herself as an employee of IBM Chandigarh.

Employing an Indian WhatsApp number and a fake Facebook profile, the operative strategically targeted Mishra, who previously worked in Hyderabad for an organization collaborating with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

The Pakistan Spy Operation

The ISI operative meticulously crafted a false identity to establish a rapport with Mishra. Through seemingly innocuous conversations, Mishra was gradually lured into sharing sensitive information regarding India’s defense capabilities.

CID ADGP Rajkumar Pandian explained, “She honey-trapped one Pravin Mishra, who worked in Hyderabad in an organisation which in turn worked with DRDO.”

As Mishra’s trust in “Sonal Garg” grew, he began to share vital information, including details about drones manufactured by DRDO. Additionally, the ISI operative attempted to install malware on Mishra’s office server, further compromising security protocols.

The Shared Information

The information shared by Mishra, including details about DRDO-manufactured drones, posed a significant threat to national security. The leakage of such classified data could potentially compromise India’s defense capabilities and strategic interests.

CID ADGP Rajkumar Pandian revealed, “Pravin Mishra shared some vital information.” This information was being relayed to an intelligence agency located in Pakistan, raising serious concerns about the extent of the breach and its ramifications.

The Investigation

The investigation into Mishra’s activities began following a tip-off from Military Intelligence in Udhampur. Authorities were alerted to attempts to target current or retired personnel of the Armed Forces, DRDO, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and individuals involved in missile system development.

The collaborative efforts of Gujarat CID and Military Intelligence in Udhampur were instrumental in uncovering the espionage plot. The swift action taken by authorities underscores the importance of constant vigilance in safeguarding national security interests.

Espionage: Unveiling the Covert World of Spies, Secrets, and Betrayal

Former NSA Employee Sentenced for Daring Attempted Espionage

US Sanctions may cost Pakistan $18 Billion

Legal Ramifications

In light of the evidence gathered, a case has been registered against Mishra, the ISI operative using the fake identity “Sonal Garg,” and any Indian officials who may have been involved in the conspiracy. Legal proceedings are underway to ensure that those responsible for compromising national security are brought to justice.

Protecting National Interests

This incident serves as a stark reminder of the evolving tactics employed by foreign intelligence agencies to gather sensitive information. It underscores the importance of stringent security measures and heightened vigilance in safeguarding national interests.

Efforts must be intensified to educate individuals about the dangers of espionage and to implement robust security protocols to prevent similar incidents in the future. The protection of classified information is paramount in ensuring the security and sovereignty of the nation.

18 arrested in ongoing fraud investigation in Morgan Co.

MORGAN CO., Ala. ( WAFF ) - On Wednesday, eighteen people were arrested following an ongoing fraud investigation totaling over $2 million in losses in Morgan County.

According to the Morgan County Sheriff’s Office, a total of 23 suspects are facing charges following a fraud investigation. The investigation began in September 2023 after a Morgan County financial institution started experiencing an influx of transfer fraud.

Authorities said through ATM withdrawals, in-store or online purchases and Cash App, the total loss amount totaled $2 million.

The sheriff’s office investigators were assisted by the FBI, Army Criminal Investigations Division and Green Research Technology.

Sixteen suspects were arrested and charged with Theft of Property 1st Degree:

• Bobby Wilkins, 61 of Decatur
• Nia Janaa Brown, 20 of Decatur
• Devron Lerand Carroll, 23 of Decatur
• Cody Allen Powell, 32 of Lacey’s Spring
• Jayden Mekhi Burton, 19 of Decatur
• Markus De’angelo Tapscott, 18 of Hartselle
• Rosie Lee Wallace, 51 of Decatur
• Steven Lee Steiner, 71 of Decatur
• Stella Jean Couch, 53 of Hartselle
• John Karlik Jr, 58 of Decatur
• Krista Lynn Spurgeon, 44 of Lacey’s Spring
• Eterniti Lee-Ann Powell, 23 of Huntsville
• Paula Carol Ivey Hatfield, 55 of Hartselle
• Lily-Grace Little, 19 of Priceville
• Tamari Michelle Boulden, 21 of Decatur
• Tyeisha Amia Lewis, 22 of Decatur

The bonds for each suspect are set at $5,000.

Two suspects were arrested and charged with Theft of Property 2nd Degree:

• Arieanna Michelle Swopes, 20 of Decatur
• Dana Carter Mosely, 56 of Decatur

The bonds for each suspect are set at $2,500.

Warrants have been issued for five suspects:

• Kobe Elijah Sharpley, 21 of Decatur
• Calup Duvun Cunningham, 21 of Decatur
• Traevion Malik Hill-Lawson, 18 of Decatur
• Joseph Anthony Berry, 68 of Decatur
• Jakey Deshun Conner, 22 of Decatur (in custody in another county)

The sheriff’s office encourages the suspects with warrants issued to turn themselves in at the Morgan County Sheriff’s Office.

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Tornado Watch in effect until 11 p.m., severe threat continues overnight

Power outages, damage reported across Tennessee Valley

Huntsville police looking for leads after Sunday shooting injures five

Lauderdale Co. Deputy, woman killed in wreck on Florence Blvd.

Child injured after shooting in Madison

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Storm cleanup begins across Five Points area

Nws confirms at least five tornadoes touched down across the tennessee valley.

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A Plan to Remake the Middle East

While talks for a cease-fire between israel and hamas continue, another set of negotiations is happening behind the scenes..

This transcript was created using speech recognition software. While it has been reviewed by human transcribers, it may contain errors. Please review the episode audio before quoting from this transcript and email [email protected] with any questions.

From New York Times, I’m Michael Barbaro. This is The Daily.

[MUSIC CONTINUES]

Today, if and when Israel and Hamas reach a deal for a ceasefire fire, the United States will immediately turn to a different set of negotiations over a grand diplomatic bargain that it believes could rebuild Gaza and remake the Middle East. My colleague Michael Crowley has been reporting on that plan and explains why those involved in it believe they have so little time left to get it done.

It’s Wednesday, May 8.

Michael, I want to start with what feels like a pretty dizzying set of developments in this conflict over the past few days. Just walk us through them?

Well, over the weekend, there was an intense round of negotiations in an effort, backed by the United States, to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza war.

The latest ceasefire proposal would reportedly see as many as 33 Israeli hostages released in exchange for potentially hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.

US officials were very eager to get this deal.

Pressure for a ceasefire has been building ahead of a threatened Israeli assault on Rafah.

Because Israel has been threatening a military offensive in the Southern Palestinian city of Rafah, where a huge number of people are crowded.

Fleeing the violence to the North. And now they’re packed into Rafah. Exposed and vulnerable, they need to be protected.

And the US says it would be a humanitarian catastrophe on top of the emergency that’s already underway.

Breaking news this hour — very important breaking news. An official Hamas source has told The BBC that it does accept a proposal for a ceasefire deal in Gaza.

And for a few hours on Monday, it looked like there might have been a major breakthrough when Hamas put out a statement saying that it had accepted a negotiating proposal.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says the ceasefire proposal does not meet his country’s requirements. But Netanyahu says he will send a delegation of mediators to continue those talks. Now, the terms —

But those hopes were dashed pretty quickly when the Israelis took a look at what Hamas was saying and said that it was not a proposal that they had agreed to. It had been modified.

And overnight —

Israeli troops stormed into Rafah. Video showing tanks crashing over a sign at the entrance of the city.

— the Israelis launched a partial invasion of Rafah.

It says Hamas used the area to launch a deadly attack on Israeli troops over the weekend.

And they have now secured a border crossing at the Southern end of Gaza and are conducting targeted strikes. This is not yet the full scale invasion that President Biden has adamantly warned Israel against undertaking, but it is an escalation by Israel.

So while all that drama might suggest that these talks are in big trouble, these talks are very much still alive and ongoing and there is still a possibility of a ceasefire deal.

And the reason that’s so important is not just to stop the fighting in Gaza and relieve the suffering there, but a ceasefire also opens the door to a grand diplomatic bargain, one that involves Israel and its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians, and would have very far-reaching implications.

And what is that grand bargain. Describe what you’re talking about?

Well, it’s incredibly ambitious. It would reshape Israel’s relationship with its Arab neighbors, principally Saudi Arabia. But it’s important to understand that this is a vision that has actually been around since well before October 7. This was a diplomatic project that President Biden had been investing in and negotiating actually in a very real and tangible way long before the Hamas attacks and the Gaza war.

And President Biden was looking to build on something that President Trump had done, which was a series of agreements that the Trump administration struck in which Israel and some of its Arab neighbors agreed to have normal diplomatic relations for the first time.

Right, they’re called the Abraham Accords.

That’s right. And, you know, Biden doesn’t like a lot of things, most things that Trump did. But he actually likes this, because the idea is that they contribute to stability and economic integration in the Middle East, the US likes Israel having friends and likes having a tight-knit alliance against Iran.

President Biden agrees with the Saudis and with the Israelis, that Iran is really the top threat to everybody here. So, how can you build on this? How can you expand it? Well, the next and biggest step would be normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

And the Saudis have made clear that they want to do this and that they’re ready to do this. They weren’t ready to do it in the Trump years. But Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, has made clear he wants to do it now.

So this kind of triangular deal began to take shape before October 7, in which the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia would enter this three way agreement in which everyone would get something that they wanted.

And just walk through what each side gets in this pre-October 7th version of these negotiations?

So for Israel, you get normalized ties with its most important Arab neighbor and really the country that sets the tone for the whole Muslim world, which is Saudi Arabia of course. It makes Israel feel safer and more secure. Again, it helps to build this alliance against Iran, which Israel considers its greatest threat, and it comes with benefits like economic ties and travel and tourism. And Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been very open, at least before October 7th, that this was his highest diplomatic and foreign policy priority.

For the Saudis, the rationale is similar when it comes to Israel. They think that it will bring stability. They like having a more explicitly close ally against Iran. There are economic and cultural benefits. Saudi Arabia is opening itself up in general, encouraging more tourism.

But I think that what’s most important to the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, is what he can get from the United States. And what he has been asking for are a couple of essential things. One is a security agreement whose details have always been a little bit vague, but I think essentially come down to reliable arms supplies from the United States that are not going to be cut off or paused on a whim, as he felt happened when President Biden stopped arms deliveries in 2021 because of how Saudi was conducting its war in Yemen. The Saudis were furious about that.

Saudi Arabia also wants to start a domestic nuclear power program. They are planning for a very long-term future, possibly a post-oil future. And they need help getting a nuclear program off the ground.

And they want that from the US?

And they want that from the US.

Now, those are big asks from the us. But from the perspective of President Biden, there are some really enticing things about this possible agreement. One is that it will hopefully produce more stability in the region. Again, the US likes having a tight-knit alliance against Iran.

The US also wants to have a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia. You know, despite the anger at Mohammed bin Salman over the murder of the Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi, the Biden administration recognizes that given the Saudis control over global oil production and their strategic importance in the Middle East, they need to have a good relationship with them. And the administration has been worried about the influence of China in the region and with the Saudis in particular.

So this is an opportunity for the US to draw the Saudis closer. Whatever our moral qualms might be about bin Salman and the Saudi government, this is an opportunity to bring the Saudis closer, which is something the Biden administration sees as a strategic benefit.

All three of these countries — big, disparate countries that normally don’t see eye-to-eye, this was a win-win-win on a military, economic, and strategic front.

That’s right. But there was one important actor in the region that did not see itself as winning, and that was the Palestinians.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

First, it’s important to understand that the Palestinians have always expected that the Arab countries in the Middle East would insist that Israel recognize a Palestinian state before those countries were willing to essentially make total peace and have normal relations with Israel.

So when the Abraham Accords happened in the Trump administration, the Palestinians felt like they’d been thrown under the bus because the Abraham Accords gave them virtually nothing. But the Palestinians did still hold out hope that Saudi Arabia would be their savior. And for years, Saudi Arabia has said that Israel must give the Palestinians a state if there’s going to be a normal relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Now the Palestinians see the Saudis in discussions with the US and Israel about a normalization agreement, and there appears to be very little on offer for the Palestinians. And they are feeling like they’re going to be left out in the cold here.

Right. And in the minds of the Palestinians, having already been essentially sold out by all their other Arab neighbors, the prospect that Saudi Arabia, of all countries, the most important Muslim Arab country in the region, would sell them out, had to be extremely painful.

It was a nightmare scenario for them. And in the minds of many analysts and US officials, this was a factor, one of many, in Hamas’s decision to stage the October 7th attacks.

Hamas, like other Palestinian leaders, was seeing the prospect that the Middle East was moving on and essentially, in their view, giving up on the Palestinian cause, and that Israel would be able to have friendly, normal relations with Arab countries around the region, and that it could continue with hardline policies toward the Palestinians and a refusal, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said publicly, to accept a Palestinian state.

Right. So Michael, once Hamas carries out the October 7th attacks in an effort to destroy a status quo that it thinks is leaving them less and less relevant, more and more hopeless, including potentially this prospect that Saudi Arabia is going to normalize relations with Israel, what happens to these pre-October 7th negotiations between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel?

Well, I think there was a snap assumption that these talks were dead and buried. That they couldn’t possibly survive a cataclysm like this.

But then something surprising happened. It became clear that all the parties were still determined to pull-off the normalization.

And most surprisingly of all, perhaps, was the continued eagerness of Saudi Arabia, which publicly was professing outrage over the Israeli response to the Hamas attacks, but privately was still very much engaged in these conversations and trying to move them forward.

And in fact, what has happened is that the scope of this effort has grown substantially. October 7th didn’t kill these talks. It actually made them bigger, more complicated, and some people would argue, more important than ever.

We’ll be right back.

Michael, walk us through what exactly happens to these three-way negotiations after October 7th that ends up making them, as you just said, more complicated and more important than ever?

Well, it’s more important than ever because of the incredible need in Gaza. And it’s going to take a deal like this and the approval of Saudi Arabia to unlock the kind of massive reconstruction project required to essentially rebuild Gaza from the rubble. Saudi Arabia and its Arab friends are also going to be instrumental in figuring out how Gaza is governed, and they might even provide troops to help secure it. None of those things are going to happen without a deal like this.

Fascinating.

But this is all much more complicated now because the price for a deal like this has gone up.

And by price, you mean?

What Israel would have to give up. [MUSIC PLAYING]

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, you have an Arab population that is furious at Israel. It now feels like a really hard time to do a normalization deal with the Israelis. It was never going to be easy, but this is about as bad a time to do it as there has been in a generation at least. And I think that President Biden and the people around him understand that the status quo between Israel and the Palestinians is intolerable and it is going to lead to chaos and violence indefinitely.

So now you have two of the three parties to this agreement, the Saudis and the Americans, basically asking a new price after October 7th, and saying to the Israelis, if we’re going to do this deal, it has to not only do something for the Palestinians, it has to do something really big. You have to commit to the creation of a Palestinian state. Now, I’ll be specific and say that what you hear the Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, say is that the agreement has to include an irreversible time-bound path to a Palestinian state.

We don’t know exactly what that looks like, but it’s some kind of a firm commitment, the likes of which the world and certainly the Israelis have not made before.

Something that was very much not present in the pre-October 7th vision of this negotiation. So much so that, as we just talked about, the Palestinians were left feeling completely out in the cold and furious at it.

That’s right. There was no sign that people were thinking that ambitiously about the Palestinians in this deal before October 7th. And the Palestinians certainly felt like they weren’t going to get much out of it. And that has completely changed now.

So, Michael, once this big new dimension after October 7th, which is the insistence by Saudi Arabia and the US that there be a Palestinian state or a path to a Palestinian state, what is the reaction specifically from Israel, which is, of course, the third major party to this entire conversation?

Well, Israel, or at least its political leadership, hates it. You know, this is just an extremely tough sell in Israel. It would have been a tough sell before October 7th. It’s even harder now.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is completely unrepentantly open in saying that there’s not going to be a Palestinian state on his watch. He won’t accept it. He says that it’s a strategic risk to his country. He says that it would, in effect, reward Hamas.

His argument is that terrorism has forced a conversation about statehood onto the table that wasn’t there before October 7th. Sure, it’s always in the background. It’s a perennial issue in global affairs, but it was not something certainly that the US and Israel’s Arab neighbors were actively pushing. Netanyahu also has — you know, he governs with the support of very right-wing members of a political coalition that he has cobbled together. And that coalition is quite likely to fall apart if he does embrace a Palestinian state or a path to a Palestinian state.

Now, he might be able to cobble together some sort of alternative, but it creates a political crisis for him.

And finally, you know, I think in any conversation about Israel, it’s worth bearing in mind something you hear from senior US officials these days, which is that although there is often finger pointing at Netanyahu and a desire to blame Netanyahu as this obstructionist who won’t agree to deals, what they say is Netanyahu is largely reflecting his population and the political establishment of his country, not just the right-wingers in his coalition who are clearly extremist.

But actually the prevailing views of the Israeli public. And the Israeli public and their political leaders across the spectrum right now with few exceptions, are not interested in talking about a Palestinian state when there are still dozens and dozens of Israeli hostages in tunnels beneath Gaza.

So it very much looks like this giant agreement that once seemed doable before October 7th might be more important to everyone involved than ever, given that it’s a plan for rebuilding Gaza and potentially preventing future October 7th’s from happening, but because of this higher price that Israel would have to pay, which is the acceptance of a Palestinian state, it seems from everything you’re saying, that this is more and more out of reach than ever before and hard to imagine happening in the immediate future. So if the people negotiating it are being honest, Michael, are they ready to acknowledge that it doesn’t look like this is going to happen?

Well, not quite yet. As time goes by, they certainly say it’s getting harder and harder, but they’re still trying, and they still think there’s a chance. But both the Saudis and the Biden administration understand that there’s very little time left to do this.

Well, what do you mean there’s very little time left? It would seem like time might benefit this negotiation in that it might give Israel distance from October 7th to think potentially differently about a Palestinian state?

Potentially. But Saudi Arabia wants to get this deal done in the Biden administration because Mohammed bin Salman has concluded this has to be done under a Democratic president.

Because Democrats in Congress are going to be very reluctant to approve a security agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

It’s important to understand that if there is a security agreement, that’s something Congress is going to have to approve. And you’re just not going to get enough Democrats in Congress to support a deal with Saudi Arabia, who a lot of Democrats don’t like to begin with, because they see them as human rights abusers.

But if a Democratic president is asking them to do it, they’re much more likely to go along.

Right. So Saudi Arabia fears that if Biden loses and Trump is president, that those same Democrats would balk at this deal in a way that they wouldn’t if it were being negotiated under President Biden?

Exactly. Now, from President Biden’s perspective, politically, think about a president who’s running for re-election, who is presiding right now over chaos in the Middle East, who doesn’t seem to have good answers for the Israeli-Palestinian question, this is an opportunity for President Biden to deliver what could be at least what he would present as a diplomatic masterstroke that does multiple things at once, including creating a new pathway for Israel and the Palestinians to coexist, to break through the logjam, even as he is also improving Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia.

So Biden and the Crown Prince hope that they can somehow persuade Bibi Netanyahu that in spite of all the reasons that he thinks this is a terrible idea, that this is a bet worth taking on Israel’s and the region’s long-term security and future?

That’s right. Now, no one has explained very clearly exactly how this is going to work, and it’s probably going to require artful diplomacy, possibly even a scenario where the Israelis would agree to something that maybe means one thing to them and means something else to other people. But Biden officials refuse to say that it’s hopeless and they refuse to essentially take Netanyahu’s preliminary no’s for an answer. And they still see some way that they can thread this incredibly narrow needle.

Michael, I’m curious about a constituency that we haven’t been talking about because they’re not at the table in these discussions that we are talking about here. And that would be Hamas. How does Hamas feel about the prospect of such a deal like this ever taking shape. Do they see it as any kind of a victory and vindication for what they did on October 7th?

So it’s hard to know exactly what Hamas’s leadership is thinking. I think they can feel two things. I think they can feel on the one hand, that they have established themselves as the champions of the Palestinian people who struck a blow against Israel and against a diplomatic process that was potentially going to leave the Palestinians out in the cold.

At the same time, Hamas has no interest in the kind of two-state solution that the US is trying to promote. They think Israel should be destroyed. They think the Palestinian state should cover the entire geography of what is now Israel, and they want to lead a state like that. And that’s not something that the US, Saudi Arabia, or anyone else is going to tolerate.

So what Hamas wants is to fight, to be the leader of the Palestinian people, and to destroy Israel. And they’re not interested in any sort of a peace process or statehood process.

It seems very clear from everything you’ve said here that neither Israel nor Hamas is ready to have the conversation about a grand bargain diplomatic program. And I wonder if that inevitably has any bearing on the ceasefire negotiations that are going on right now between the two of them that are supposed to bring this conflict to some sort of an end, even if it’s just temporary?

Because if, as you said, Michael, a ceasefire opens the door to this larger diplomatic solution, and these two players don’t necessarily want that larger diplomatic solution, doesn’t that inevitably impact their enthusiasm for even reaching a ceasefire?

Well, it certainly doesn’t help. You know, this is such a hellish problem. And of course, you first have the question of whether Israel and Hamas can make a deal on these immediate issues, including the hostages, Palestinian prisoners, and what the Israeli military is going to do, how long a ceasefire might last.

But on top of that, you have these much bigger diplomatic questions that are looming over them. And it’s not clear that either side is ready to turn and face those bigger questions.

So while for the Biden administration and for Saudi Arabia, this is a way out of this crisis, these larger diplomatic solutions, it’s not clear that it’s a conversation that the two parties that are actually at war here are prepared to start having.

Well, Michael, thank you very much. We appreciate it.

On Tuesday afternoon, under intense pressure from the US, delegations from Israel and Hamas arrived in Cairo to resume negotiations over a potential ceasefire. But in a statement, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear that even with the talks underway, his government would, quote, “continue to wage war against Hamas.”

Here’s what else you need to know today. In a dramatic day of testimony, Stormy Daniels offered explicit details about an alleged sexual encounter with Donald Trump that ultimately led to the hush money payment at the center of his trial. Daniels testified that Trump answered the door in pajamas, that he told her not to worry that he was married, and that he did not use a condom when they had sex.

That prompted lawyers for Trump to seek a mistrial based on what they called prejudicial testimony. But the judge in the case rejected that request. And,

We’ve seen a ferocious surge of anti-Semitism in America and around the world.

In a speech on Tuesday honoring victims of the Holocaust, President Biden condemned what he said was the alarming rise of anti-Semitism in the United States after the October 7th attacks on Israel. And he expressed worry that too many Americans were already forgetting the horrors of that attack.

The Jewish community, I want you to know I see your fear, your hurt, and your pain. Let me reassure you, as your president, you’re not alone. You belong. You always have and you always will.

Today’s episode was produced by Nina Feldman, Clare Toeniskoetter, and Rikki Novetsky. It was edited by Liz O. Baylen, contains original music by Marion Lozano, Elisheba Ittoop, and Dan Powell, and was engineered by Alyssa Moxley. Our theme music is by Jim Brunberg and Ben Landsverk of Wonderly.

That’s it for The Daily. I’m Michael Barbaro. See you tomorrow.

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Hosted by Michael Barbaro

Featuring Michael Crowley

Produced by Nina Feldman ,  Clare Toeniskoetter and Rikki Novetsky

Edited by Liz O. Baylen

Original music by Marion Lozano ,  Elisheba Ittoop and Dan Powell

Engineered by Alyssa Moxley

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If and when Israel and Hamas reach a deal for a cease-fire, the United States will immediately turn to a different set of negotiations over a grand diplomatic bargain that it believes could rebuild Gaza and remake the Middle East.

Michael Crowley, who covers the State Department and U.S. foreign policy for The Times, explains why those involved in this plan believe they have so little time left to get it done.

On today’s episode

Michael Crowley , a reporter covering the State Department and U.S. foreign policy for The New York Times.

Background reading :

Talks on a cease-fire in the Gaza war are once again at an uncertain stage .

Here’s how the push for a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia looked before Oct. 7 .

From early in the war, President Biden has said that a lasting resolution requires a “real” Palestinian state .

Here’s what Israeli officials are discussing about postwar Gaza.

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The Daily is made by Rachel Quester, Lynsea Garrison, Clare Toeniskoetter, Paige Cowett, Michael Simon Johnson, Brad Fisher, Chris Wood, Jessica Cheung, Stella Tan, Alexandra Leigh Young, Lisa Chow, Eric Krupke, Marc Georges, Luke Vander Ploeg, M.J. Davis Lin, Dan Powell, Sydney Harper, Mike Benoist, Liz O. Baylen, Asthaa Chaturvedi, Rachelle Bonja, Diana Nguyen, Marion Lozano, Corey Schreppel, Rob Szypko, Elisheba Ittoop, Mooj Zadie, Patricia Willens, Rowan Niemisto, Jody Becker, Rikki Novetsky, John Ketchum, Nina Feldman, Will Reid, Carlos Prieto, Ben Calhoun, Susan Lee, Lexie Diao, Mary Wilson, Alex Stern, Dan Farrell, Sophia Lanman, Shannon Lin, Diane Wong, Devon Taylor, Alyssa Moxley, Summer Thomad, Olivia Natt, Daniel Ramirez and Brendan Klinkenberg.

Our theme music is by Jim Brunberg and Ben Landsverk of Wonderly. Special thanks to Sam Dolnick, Paula Szuchman, Lisa Tobin, Larissa Anderson, Julia Simon, Sofia Milan, Mahima Chablani, Elizabeth Davis-Moorer, Jeffrey Miranda, Renan Borelli, Maddy Masiello, Isabella Anderson and Nina Lassam.

Michael Crowley covers the State Department and U.S. foreign policy for The Times. He has reported from nearly three dozen countries and often travels with the secretary of state. More about Michael Crowley

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